SERVICES
CHART 18. CHART 18. MERCHANT SHIP TONNAGE AVAILABLE FOR UNITED NATIONS SHIPPING
CHART 18. MERCHANT SHIP TONNAGE AVAILABLE FOR
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the combined shipping resources totaled 90.8 million deadweight tons, of which 54.1 million belonged to the United States. In practice the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board functioned only when the British or the American forces required the assistance of the other.
The United States provided the British with considerable cargo ship- ping, and they in turn aided the United States in transporting troops.
In the calendar year 1944, for example, the United States made 6,350,- 000 deadweight tons of cargo shipping available to the British, or about 20 percent of the total. The British in turn transported about one-fourth of the American troops sent overseas in that· year. Mili- tary shipping needs were controlled within the United States by the Joint Army-Navy Military Transportation Committee, on which the Chief of Transportation represented the Army Service Forces.
At the beginning of the war it was necessary to estimate the Army's shipping requirements by various types of vessels: cargo ship3, tankers, transports, and combat loaders, and of assuring that the needs for various types of ships were included in the construction program of the Maritime Commission. In 1943 an imbalance devel- oped in the program, cargo carrying capacity exceeding troop trans- port capacity. In order to meet this situation the British made avail- able passenger vessels, particularly the Queen Mary and the Queen Elizabeth, for the transport of American troops. In addition, the Maritime Commission instituted a program to convert troop trans- ports into cargo vessels. Other conversions were similarly made later in the war. Examples of these were the additional bospital ships required in 1944, and the troop transports needed in 1945 for redeploy- ment and the return of troops to the United States for discharge.
Securing the fullest possible utilization of the ships made available to the Army was extremely important. Cal'eful plannjng of cargo loading assured proper use of hold space, and the deck loading of cargo ships and tankers also increased the capacity of vessels. By August 1944, Army ships carried loads averaging 90 percent of the bale cubic capacity. The shipment of fully assembled aircraft was largely accomplished by constructing special superstructures on tankers. By the end of the war, 535 tankers had been equipped for deck loading, and 19,000 airplanes had been delivered overseas by this means alone. Aircraft were also transported on converted aircraft carriers and on Liberty ships.
At various times delays in the unloading of cargo vessels at oversea.
ports severely handicapped the dispatch of supplies. In February 1943 there were 88 vessels waiting to be unloaded at N oumea, New Caledonia, and Espiritu Santo in the South Pacific. Similar con- gestion occurred in both the Atlantic and Pacific in the latter half of 1944. During the time operations in the European Theater depended
upon the Port of Cherbourg and the beaches of Normandy, and awaited the opening of the Port of Antwerp, the unloading of supplies could not keep pace with shipments. Cargo vessels were held as floating warehouses for considerable periods. In October 1944,290 ships were waiting to be unloaded in the European Theater. In the Pacific the absence of unloading facilities on Leyte and the destruction of port t'acilities at Manila caused a shipping jam that was broken only by a reduction in shipping schedules.
At the peak of its operations the Transportation Corps used eignt major ports of embarkation, five subparts, and three cargo ports.
The commanders of all these were held responsible for meeting over- sea supply requisitions, including the assembling of supplies and the loading of them on outgoing vessels. In providing an orderly flow of supplies into ports, the Army Service Forces established It system of cargo planning that fixed definite periods within which supply action was to be taken by depots and Technical Services. Procedures were developed whereby the movement of carloads from depots to ports was closely supervised, and each shipment was carefully controlled until the actual loading was completed. In order to assure constant con- lact and up-to-date information on shipments, the New York Port conducted daily two-way teletype conferences with the European and Mediterranean Theaters, and the San Francisco Port· communicated similarly with the Southwest Pacific and the Pacific Ocean Areas.
Extraordinary safegnards were necessary during the loading and oversea shipment of ammunition. Special ammunition piers were con- structed in isolated places, and special controls were exercised so as to avoid the accumulation of large concentrations of ammunition or explosives near the loading piers. These precautions were so effective that the largest tonnage of explosives in Army history was moved with- out serious mishap.
A first major transportation objective within the United Stutes was to prevent the congestion at ports that had so seriously impeded oversea transport in World War I. With the cooperation of the Asso- ciation of American Railroads, the Transportation Corps early in the
war institllted a careful system of traftic control that limited cargo shipments to ports. This proved to be so effective that the number of freight cars on hand at any port rarely exceeded mare than 10 days' loading capacity. This was very different from World 'Val' I, when freight cal's waiting to be unloaded in New York were backed up all the way to Pittsburgh.
Eflic:ient util ization of existing railroad freight equipment was of the utmost importance. A continuous program was conducted for the purpose of achieving maximum landing and the quick release of cars.
A reduction of back hauling and cross hauling was accomplished. One