3. Constitutional asymmetry
3.1. Diminishing constitutional asymmetry in Spain
Next to the two main routes, the constitution also listed a few alternative routes to autonomy. One of these is constitutionally assigned as ‘excep- tional’. Constitutionally speaking popular majorities are needed in all of a region’s provinces before it can qualify for this procedure. Andalucia fell short by only one of its eight provinces of that requirement. Nonetheless, the Spanish government conceded autonomy in 1980. As a result, Andalucia was the only one of the non-historic regions which managed to catch up with the fast-track regions. The constitution also contained the option of expanding regional powers by simple organic law, instead of by amendment of a region’s Statute of Autonomy. Valencia and the Canary Islands success- fully used this provision, which meant that they gained somewhat more autonomy than the other non-historic regions except for Andalucía. Finally, Navarra declined to join the Basque Country as its fourth province.
However, a parliamentary law recognized its historic fueros. In consequence, Navarra is entitled to the same level of fiscal autonomy as the Basque Country. This level exceeds that of all the other regions, including Catalonia and Galicia. Table 3.1 lists the constitutional origins for each of the Spanish regions, and the date on which their Statutes of Autonomy came into force.
Next to differences in the timing and route to regional autonomy, the regions have also controlled different sets of policies. These sources of con- stitutional asymmetry can be summarized as follows.
Table 3.1 The Spanish regions and differences in constitutional status
Name of Constitutional Date Statute Name of Constitutional Date Statute
region route to of region route to of
autonomy Autonomy autonomy Autonomy
entered into entered into
force force
Basque Fast track 18–12–1979 Aragon Slow track 10–08–1982
Country (historic)
Catalonia Fast track 18–12–1979 Castilla-La Slow track 10–08–1982
(historic) Mancha
Galicia Fast track 06–04–1981 Canary Intermediary 10–08–1982
(historic) Islands track
Andalucia Fast track 30–12–1981 Extremadura Slow track 25–02–1983 (exceptional)
Asturias Slow track 30–12–1981 Balearic Slow track 25–02–1983 Islands
Cantabria Slow track 30–12–1981 Madrid Slow track 25–02–1983 La Rioja Slow track 09–06–1982 Castilla y Slow track 25–02–1983
León
Murcia Slow track 09–06–1982 Navarra Special 10–08–1983
Valencia Intermediary 01–07–1982 provision
track (fueros)
Source: Heywood 1995: 146.
First, for long the four fast-track regions plus Valencia, the Canary Islands, and Navarra have had more autonomy in health policies than the other regions. These regions could claim central block grants to finance their extra responsibilities.
Second, the Statute of Autonomy for the Basque Country enabled the creation of an autonomous Basque police force, which operates alongside the national police force. Similarly, the Spanish constitution recognizes dif- ferent legal standards which underpin civil and private law in Catalonia and acknowledges Galicia’s deviant legal system with respect to land tenure and payments (Agranoff 1999a: 102).
Third, the outstanding feature of formal asymmetry today pertains to the distribution of tax powers. Invoking their foral states, the Basque Country and Navarra collect all taxes except customs duties and the taxes on petro- leum products and tobacco. The centre controls the most important taxes for all the other regions, including Catalonia and Galicia (Agranoff 1999: 99).
The fourth source of asymmetry ensues from the presence of regional languages in only five of the regions. In addition to Castilian (Spanish), the official state-wide language, the constitution recognizes Euskara, Galician, Catalan, Valencian and Majorcan – two derivatives of Catalan – as co-official languages. Citizens who live in regions in which these languages are spoken are free to opt for Spanish or to use the regional language as a working language. The Statutes of Autonomy preclude discrimination on the basis of language and prescribe the co-official status of Castilian as the basis of regional linguistic policy (Agranoff 1999: 100).
The fifth and final source of asymmetry results from differences between the fast track and the other regions in their levels of constitutive autonomy.
Unlike the fast-track regions, the other regions organize their legislative elec- tions on the same day. They cannot freely change the legislative terms of their assemblies and they are not allowed to install more than ten members in their executives. The historic communities have more freedom to orga- nize their institutions as they see fit, including the timing of legislative elec- tions. The elections of the Galician, Catalan and Basque legislative assemblies do not normally coincide with that of the other regional assem- blies (Colomer 1998: 45).
Despite these differences, the asymmetric features of Spanish devolution have considerably diminished since devolution was first implemented. By now, all 17 regions share certain characteristics. Each region has its own minister-president, executive, legislative assembly, civil service and High Court of Justice. By 2001 all regions were involved in town planning, tourism, social welfare, museum policy and, where applicable, regional language policy.
The most significant step in reducing levels of formal asymmetry came in 1992, when a central agreement (Pact of Autonomy) made 32 areas of responsibility accessible to all of the ACs. Technically speaking, such an
agreement had been possible in 1987, five years after the moratorium on competence-expansion for the slow-track regions elapsed. Yet, it took a further five years before the necessary bipartisan support between both of the largest state-wide parties, the Social-Democrats (PSOE) and Conservatives (PP) was found. The agreement also specified an overall maximum level of responsibility for the regions. However, its main purpose was to even differ- ences in competencies between the fast- and slow-track regions (Gibbons 1999: 21; Agranoff 1999: 99). In the wake of the 1992 agreement, the centre started to devolve important aspects of education policy to all of the regions in 1996. An agreement in December 2001 also devolved health care to all of the regions, so that there is little ‘formal’ discrepancy left between the fast- and slow-track regions in this regard as well.
Between 1993 and 2000, two central minority governments were depen- dent on the support of ethno-regionalist parties from Catalonia, the Basque Country or even the Canary Islands. Although this helped the regions to further their levels of regional autonomy, it did not substantially increase asymmetry. For instance, the share of central income tax revenues that accrues to the regions has doubled between 1993 and 2000 (from 15 to 30 per cent). Yet, the fast-track regions (other than the Basque Country) have not received any preferential treatment as far as the distribution of this extra money is concerned.