3. Non-state-wide parties
3.2. Ethno-regionalist parties Definition and ideological variation
Ethno-regionalist partiesare parties that put the quest for regional autonomy at the forefrontof their political agenda. Ethno-regionalist parties reflect the aspirations of ‘geographically [regionally] concentrated minorities which challenge the working order and sometimes even the democratic order of a nation state by demanding recognition of their cultural identity’ (Müller- Rommel 1994: 183; 1998: 19). Usually, they emerge in so-called ‘stateless nations’, such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, Scotland and Wales.
Scholars have distinguished between various types of ethno-regionalist parties. Ferdinand Müller-Rommel has suggested a fourfold classification. He distinguishes between separatists, left-libertarian federalists, autonomists and protectionists (Müller-Rommel 1994: 184–5).
Theseparatistsare the most radical group. They seek full sovereignty for the nation which they claim to represent and do not wish to give up their sovereignty for membership of the EU. They do not necessarily shun away from linking up with paramilitary or terrorist organizations. Herri Batasuna (later renamed Euskal Herritarrok), the presently outlawed Basque separatist party which maintains organizational links with the Basque terrorist organi- zation ETA, is the best example of a separatist party.
Left-libertarian federalists aim for a strong degree of decentralization and popular representation and seek regional independence within a stronger European Union. Thus, they propagate a Europe ofrather than a Europe with the Regions. Ideologically, they are left leaning. Their defence of regionalism is often combined with a demand for recognition of a minority language and an emphasis on ‘new politics issues’ such as environmental rights or minor- ity rights. The Scottish National Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales), the Basque Solidarity Party (EA – Eusko Alkartasuna) and the Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya) belong to this left libertarian strand of ethno-regionalism.
The third group, the autonomists, propagates regional autonomy within the framework of a mature federal state. At their most extreme, these parties pay lip-service to full-blown regional independence. They aim for the protection of historical territorial rights, for example, fuerosin the case of the Basque country; or of a minority language. Ideologically they are positioned in the centre or right of centre. Their frequent links with Catholicism also put them in a more conservative position on ethical issues. The best-known examples are the Catalan Convergence and Union (Convergència i Unió) and the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco). The Flemish People’s Union (Volksunie; recently renamed New Flemish Alliance) and the Democratic Front of Francophones (Front Démocratique des Francophones), a party which protects the rights of the French-speaking Belgians who live in Brussels and its adjacent areas, also belong to this group.
Finally, the protectionists seek to safeguard the link between an ethnic group in the periphery, of which they are the defendants, and the centre.
They do not propagate a form of separatism. Generally, they aspire to a hege- monic position within their region and have transformed into catch-all parties. Protectionist parties position themselves around the ideological centre to achieve that aim. We do not find a clear example of a ‘protection- ist’ party within our group of case studies. However, in Western Europe the South Tyrolean People’s Party (SVP or Südtiroler Volkspartei) is its best exam- ple. The SVP defends the rights of the German-speakers who live in the Italian province of Bolzano-South Tyrol (itself a part of Trentino-Alto Aldige, one of five Italian regions with a special status).
Table 5.2 summarizes the results for the most important ethno-regionalist parties (i.e. those parties which have assembled close to or more than 5 per cent of the regional vote) in the regions in which they campaign. In order to make the table comparable with Table 5.1 I list the electoral strength for these parties in the most recent generalelections. We should note that, particularly in Spain, ethno-regionalist parties perform much better in
Table 5.2 Ethno-regionalist parties and their electoral performance in the most recent general (and regional) elections
United Kingdom
Spain (2004) Belgium (2003)* (2005)
Canary Islands Flanders Scotland
Coalición Canaria 23.5(30.8) NVA 4.9(-**) SNP 17.7(20.9) Catalonia Vlaams Blok*** 18.1(24.1) Wales
CiU 20.8(37.6) Plaid 12.6(20.5)
ERC 16.0(16.4) Cymru
Galicia
BNG 23.5(22.4)
Navarra
Nafarroa Bai 20.8(41.3****) Basque Country
PNV 33.7(42.7*****)
Eusko Alkartsuna 6.5
Note: Performance in most recent regional elections prior to June 2005 listed in between brackets.
*In Belgium, the FDF formed an electoral alliance with the French-speaking Liberals.
**NVA in electoral alliance with Flemish Christian Democrats in Flemish 2004 regional elections.
***Strictly speaking, the classification of the Vlaams Blok as an ethno-regionalist party is debatable.
****NB On a joint list with PP in regional elections of 2003; campaigned as UPN.
*****PNV-EA on a joint list in regional elections in 2001. Regional election data 2001: Basque Country and Galicia; 2003: Canary Islands, Catalonia, Navarra, Scotland and Wales; 2004: Flanders.
Source: as for Table 5.1 for general election results; most recent Spanish regional election data provided by Liselotte Libbrecht; for Belgium: Ministry of the Interior; for the UK: BBC-Website (consulted on 8 May 2005).
regional than in general parliamentary elections. Therefore, the figures between brackets reflect the outcome for the same parties in the most recent regional elections.
Explaining the rise (and demise) of ethno-regionalist parties
The success of ethno-regionalist parties has been attributed to a number of factors. Ferdinand Müller-Rommel put forward two causal theories that are linked to widespread but contrasting views on the consequences of eco- nomic nationalism (Müller-Rommel 1994).
The first theory builds upon insights from Gellner, Lipset and Rokkan. It links the rise of ethno-regionalist movements to processes of moderniza- tion and nation-state building. These processes may have separated the main economic from the leading political centres. The growing strength of regionalist forces in the economically advanced, but politically more peripheral, Catalan or Basque regions confirm this tendency. Since Flanders and Bavaria have outperformed the other Belgian or German regions in the last three decades, the same argument has fuelled demands for stronger autonomy in these two regions. Arguably, the process of European integration has sharpened the conflict between economic and domestic political centres. The breakdown of national trade barriers facili- tated cross-boundary economic cooperation between adjacent regions and enabled the latter to forge direct economic and political links with Brussels (Hooghe and Marks 2001).
The second theory, first developed by Michael Hechter, emphasizes the congruencebetween economic and political ‘peripheries’ as the main driving force of stateless nationalism. The more economic peripheries rely on fiscal and social support from industrialized centres, the more they may perceive that very dependence as the cause of their economic and cultural depriva- tion. The predictive value of this theory would have stronger resonance in Scotland, Wales and Galicia than in the other minority nations with ethno- regionalist parties (Hechter 1975).
Empirical research puts the relevance of this ‘colonization’ theory some- what into perspective. For instance, Scotland achieved the status of a
‘peripheral’ nation in the Hechtereansense shortly after its heavy manufac- turing industries went into decay. Although Scotland benefited from central welfare payments, the Scots were willing to profess their loyalty to the British state because of, and not inspite of, their central welfare dependence.
The drastic retrenchment of the British welfare state under Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government reduced the fiscal largesse of England towards the rest of the UK. The exposureof this welfare dependence, rather than the dependence itself, and the impossibility of correcting it owing to a lack of Scottish policy autonomy at the time, triggered a sharp rise in Scottish nationalism (McEwen 2002). Similarly, the relatively weak socio- economic status of the Walloon region is an important factor for explaining
why at present the attachment to the Belgian state is stronger in Wallonia than in Flanders (De Winter 2002).
The discussion above made clear that theories of ‘economic nationalism’
cannot adequately explain why ethno-regionalist parties flourish better in some regions than in others. Therefore, it is said that ethno-regionalist parties owe their success more to the presence of a particular regional culture than to whether or not they are located in a region which is socio-economically and/or politically marginalized. A particular regional culture requires a feel- ing of ‘regional belonging’ that is often linked with specific ‘socio-cultural’
identity markers, such as a minority language or a distinct legal or church system (De Winter 1998: 214–35; Moreno 2001). In an era in which parties can no longer be assured of fixed support, voters may flock to ethno- regionalist parties or to new political movements, such as the Greens or extreme-right-wing parties. As argued above, new political movements can combine their ideological agenda with a demand for separatism. The Vlaams Belang in Belgium or the Catalan Greens, which is filed as a separate party from the Spanish Greens, exemplify this.
In his comparative study of ethno-regionalist parties Lieven De Winter raised a number of additional factors which may have contributed to the rapid rise or demise of parties. Some of these factors may be endogenous to the party’s organization, profile and strategy; others are exogenous to it (De Winter 1998: 214–35).
For instance, among the endogenous factors, De Winter pointed at the rele- vance of skilful party leadership, centralized party organizational structures and strong linkages with civil society. Party leaders are important because, particularly during the formative years of the party, they represent the exter- nal face of the party. Skilful leadership can also help to bridge often widely diverging views on other issues, such as socio-economic policy making or ethical disputes. The best-known example of strong leadership is Jordi Pujol.
Pujol served as party leader of the CDC (Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya), the predecessor of the CiU of which he also became the leader.
Pujol headed all the Catalan governments between 1980 and 2003. His deci- sion to retire from politics caused a leadership vacuum and contributed to the party’s bad showing in the 2003 regional elections. Charismatic leadership has also contributed to the early successes of the Flemish People’s Union, Plaid Cymru and the SNP. Relatively strong levels of organizational centralization may help to push through policy decisions where leadership alone cannot do the trick. Finally, the Catalan ethno-regionalist parties have a relatively broad social movement (spanning cultural and civic associations) to lean on. This provided them with a firm basis of support which the ethno-regionalist parties elsewhere are missing (De Winter 1998: 232; Keating 2001a on Catalonia and Scotland; Keating, Loughlin and Deschouwer 2003 on Belgium).
The success of ethno-regionalist parties is also determined by a number of factors exogenous to the party. A first factor relates to the presence of certain
institutional rules, such as the electoral system. Emerging ethno-regionalist parties may stand a better chance of success in states or regions which orga- nize elections by a form of proportional representation (PR). PR is more likely to speed up their prospect of representation in parliament. After all, it took the SNP about 35 years after its formation before it first gained seats in a British general election (De Winter 1998: 219). British general elections use a plurality vote. The British example contrasts sharply with Spain, where elections use a PR formula. In Spain, ethno-regionalist parties quickly gained legislative representation although, at a state-wide level, they polled less than 15 per cent of the popular vote. This said, ethno-regionalist parties have a regionally concentrated support base. Some of them may even have specific subregional strongholds. Therefore, state-wide parties with a diffused electoral support may suffer more from a first-past-the-post system than ethno-regionalist parties. For instance, in Britain the parliamentary repre- sentation for Plaid Cymru has been more reflective of its overall electoral strength in the UK party system than that of the Liberal Democrats. This is so because the electoral support for Plaid Cymru is concentrated in the pre- dominantly Welsh-speaking areas of Wales, whereas that of the Liberal Democrats is regionally dispersed.
The rise of ethno-regionalist parties in one region may generate a ‘demon- stration or snowball effect’ on similar parties in the same or other regions.
We can see this as a second exogenous factor for explaining the success of an ethno-regionalist party. The party politics of Spain and Belgium illustrate this snowball effect very well. For instance, in the first regional elections of 1981, non-state-wide Spanish parties (not all of which may be classified as ethno-regionalist) collected 16.6 per cent of the vote. They comprised absolute majorities in Catalonia and the Basque Country. By 1991, the vote share of these parties had increased further to 20.1 per cent. This was almost entirely due to their rising support in Aragon, the Canary Islands, Cantabria and Valencia (Pallarés and Keating 2003: 251–3). The combined support for the ethno-regionalist parties has stabilized or somewhat declined since (in the regional elections of 1999 they assembled 18.9 per cent of the vote).
A large group of Spanish voters only vote for non-state-wide parties in regional elections, where they believe these parties matter most. Therefore, the corre- sponding vote share of the non-state-wide parties in general elections has increased from just 11.4 per cent in 1986 to 12.6 per cent in 1999 (Pallarés and Keating 2003: 251–3).3 In Belgium, the presence of the Volksunie (People’s Union) – a Flemish ethno-regionalist party – contributed to the emergence of ethno-regionally inspired ‘counter-movements’ in Brussels and Wallonia. The Volksunie emerged in the late 1950s when Belgium was seeking to demarcate its internal language boundaries. The party propagated a federal Belgium, with a monolingual Flanders as one of its regions. The borders of Flanders would correspond with the borders of the present Flemish Region. In addition, the party defended the status of Brussels as a
bilingual city agglomeration (but not a Region), comprising the 19 munici- palities which presently make up the Brussels Capital Region. Many French- speakers strongly objected to these proposals. Brussels is a predominantly French-speaking city region and some of its surrounding municipalities comprise sizeable French-speaking majorities as well. The Front of Democratic Francophones (Front Démocratique des Francophones) tapped into these feelings of discontent. It actively campaigned against the bilingual status of Brussels, but requested such a status for the surrounding suburban municipalities. In the same period, the Rassemblement Wallon emerged.
Unlike the leading Flemish political elites of the day, it defended a more gov- ernment-planned approach to restructuring Wallonia’s decaying coal and steel industries. To that purpose it sought to regionalize some instruments of economic policy-making. Although in Spain and Belgium the presence of ethno-regionalist parties in one region has triggered the emergence of like- minded parties in other regions, similar dynamics have not yet developed in the UK. Citizens who live in (the border regions of) England identify with England in the first place and recognize its dominant position in the UK as a whole. They are happy to rely on state-wide party MPs for representing local or regional interests in Westminster.
The support for ethno-regionalist parties may be boosted also by some policy decisions of the state-wide parties or some scandals which undermine the legitimacy of the centre (De Winter 1998). For instance, Thatcher’s Conservative government first introduced the highly unpopular and regres- sive poll tax in Scotland, a year ahead of the rest of Britain. The introduction of the poll tax drove many Scottish voters to the SNP and the Labour parties.
Although beyond the scope of this book, in Italy widespread corruption and nepotism that was revealed after the fall of communism opened up a window of opportunity for some of the Northern regionalist leagues. In 1992, the Northern League (Lega Nord) constituted the strongest political force in the North, absorbing many votes which until then had flown to the centre parties (Christian Democrats and Social Democrats; Gold 2003).
Finally, the electoral strategies of the ethno-regionalist or state-wide par- ties against which they compete also play an important role for explaining why some ethno-regionalist parties succeed and others fail. Since I will take a specific look at the electoral dynamics in a multileveled arena in the final section of this chapter, I shall not touch upon it here.