Deborah Chaffin
The contours and strategic importance of Derrida’s critique of ideal- ism, and more specifically of the extent to which he ‘takes Hegel seriously,’ can be nowhere better viewed than in his treatment of Hegel’s theory of representation and the sign. As he has many times stated: The problematic of the sign derives from a fundamental logo- centrism, from a philosophy of consciousness or of the originary subject.’1 In his protracted history of the notion of the sign in Of Grammatology as well as the shorter version presented in his inter- view with Julia Kristeva,2 Derrida is concerned to show that the very concept of the sign has always depended upon, or been deter- mined by, that fundamental metaphysical opposition: the sensible and the intelligible. His various treatments of the sign work to show that the metaphysical tradition has always treated the sign as a tran- sition or bridge between these two moments of presence. Because the sign could only function as a provisional reference between pres- ence in the form of the object (the sensible) and presence in the form of self-presence (the intelligible), Derrida views it as the time of referral which signifies self-presence: in the case of Hegel, it is the self-presence of the absolute as subject, or ‘absolute subjectivity.’
But if we accept Derrida’s argument that the history of the notion of the sign must be read as the history of the determination of Being as presence (as metaphysics), why would it have to follow that ‘we cannot do without the concept of the sign’ or abandon this
‘metaphysical complicity’?3 Derrida’s argument is that we cannot give up this metaphysical complicity,
without also giving up the critique we are directing against
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this complicity, or without the risk of erasing difference in the self-identity of a signified reducing its signifier into itself or, amounting to the same thing, simply expelling its signifier out- side itself.4
In other words, Derrida holds that we need this problematic in order to put the system of metaphysics as a whole into question. And in the case of Hegel in particular, if Derrida can show that the signifier has been reduced to or derived from the signified, then he can argue that Hegel has submitted the sign to thought, and that the opposition of the sensible and the intelligible is systematic with the reduction of the sign to thought. In short, Derrida’s focus on the problematic of the sign—on writing and language generally—allows him to develop an alternative to the traditional systematic relegation of the sign to the status of transition, as something merely provisional. On the basis of his critique of the history of the concept of the sign, Derrida can lift this site of the transition between two moments of full presence (the sensible and the intelligible) and effect a posi- tively displacing and transgressive ‘appropriation’ of Hegelian logic.
Such an appropriation of Hegel cannot be achieved on the basis of the problematic of the sign, or writing and language, alone. In the section following I will show that this problematic is bound inti- mately to Derrida’s understanding of Hegelian Aufhebung. Such a context will elicit the sense in which Derrida’s own reading of Hegel may be viewed as transformational. I will then consider the import of this ‘transformation’ by focusing on Derrida’s understand- ing of the role of contradiction in Hegelian Aufhebung. Finally, however, I will suggest that important aspects of the Hegelian argu- ments concerning the role and function of contradiction are still valid and should be rethought outside their Derridian affiliation.
I
In his ‘Exergue,’ or ‘outwork,’ to Of Grammatology, Derrida focuses attention on a triple movement of our ‘logocentric’ and ‘eth- nocentric’ epoch. According to this analysis, the metaphysics of phonetic writing (=logocentrism) has controlled and ordered in one system:
1. the concept of writing….
2. the history of (the only) metaphysics, which has…always assigned the origin of truth in general to the logos: the history of truth, of the truth of truth, [which] has always been…the debasement of writing, and its repression outside ‘full’ speech.
3. the concept of science or the scientificity of science—what has always been determined as logic.5
Because of the pervasive and continuing influence of this controlling order, even the science of writing—grammatology—may never be established as such. Indeed, both the idea of science and the idea of writing are themselves meaningful only ‘in terms of an origin and within a world to which a certain concept of the sign…and a certain concept of the relationship between speech and writing, have already been assigned.’6 Thus, modern semiology is itself consti- tuted on concepts and presuppositions discernible in, among others, Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Hegel, and Husserl.7
Derrida’s critique of Hegel’s semiology can thus be understood as a moment in a general strategy of transformation, displacement, and reinscription at work in the Derridean project of grammatology.
Viewed positively, the critique of Hegelian semiology allows Der- rida to avoid a simple rejection of Hegel which would inevitably fix his own place within the Hegelian matrix. Such a strategy also allows Derrida to locate Hegel quite firmly within the history of the
‘logocentric’ tradition.
In ‘The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel’s Semiology,’8 Derrida presents a detailed analysis of the Hegelian theory of speech and writing, and does so by focusing on two long Remarks from The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Both Remarks are found in the subchapter ‘Imagination’ in the chapter ‘Psychology’
within ‘Subjective Spirit.’9 As we shall see, Derrida’s general cri- tique is double-edged, for it aims to throw into question the primacy Hegel accords to psychology in his theory of speech and writing, and also to question the privilege Hegel accords the sonorous or pho- netic expression.
But first, let us consider exactly why Hegel’s theory of speech and writing—his semiology—falls within the sphere of subjective spirit, and more precisely within the area of psychology (and not, for instance, within anthropology or phenomenology—the two previ- ous moments of subjective spirit). First of all, we should recall that
Hegel’s Encyclopedia, his most general presentation of the philo- sophic system, is divided into three parts:
I. Logic: the science of the Idea in and for itself.
II. The Philosophy of Nature: the science of the Idea in its otherness.
III. The Philosophy of Spirit: the science of the Idea come back to itself out of that otherness. (Section 18)
The theory of signs, falling as it does within the third moment of the Idea or system of reason, is, then, a part of the philosophy of spirit. Since it follows the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of spirit is concerned to show that and how spirit ‘frees itself from nature, from its otherness. All three moments of this ‘movement’—
anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology—are concerned with this ‘motion of freeing itself,’10 but only the moment of psychology shows the reality of reason: the anthropological moment of subjec- tive spirit shows reason to be the goal of nature, and the phenomeno- logical shows reason to be the goal of consciousness. But the goal of the psychological investigation of spirit is to show that reason is the element of subjective spirit, that reason is the active power of spirit, and not just its ‘goal.’
More precisely: the theory of signs is located within the first movement of spirit, in subjective spirit. Spirit in general is articu- lated in three parts:
1. Subjective spirit: the spirit’s relation to itself, an only ideal total- ity of the Idea. This is Being-near-to-itself in the form of only internal freedom.
2. Objective spirit, as a world to produce and produced in the form of reality, not only ideality. Freedom here becomes an existing, present necessity.
3. Absolute spirit: the unity, that is in itself and for itself, of the objectivity of the spirit and of its ideality or its concept, the unity producing itself eternally, spirit in its absolute truth—abso- lute spirit. (Section 385)
And since Hegel’s theory of the sign falls within subjective spirit and this determination of spirit is finite and transitory, Derrida argues that ‘the sign indeed appears as a mode or determination of subjective and finite spirit as a mediation or transgression [Ubersich-
hinausgehen] of itself, a transition within the transition, a transition of the transition.’11 In other words, far from actually providing a way out of itself, the theory of signs presents a return to itself of spirit, another version of the ‘idealizing mastery’ of the system as a whole.
Indeed, it would appear, as Derrida suggests, that the theory of signs is a form of ‘idealizing mastery’ in its very architecture: as a moment of intelligence (Intelligenz), representation makes the transi- tion between intuition and thought explicit (Section 458, Addition).
Representation (Vorstellung) distinguishes the activity of immediate intuition from the content intuited, transforming the sensible appear- ances which intuition has always already mediated. Throughout all the moments of representation—recollection, imagination, memory—
such transformative activity is present. Indeed, in the production of signs, or language generally, intelligence explicitly posits its imagina- tive activities. Since signs are external, they escape the provisional character of the consciousness which produces them: as Hegel remarks,
intelligence…appears in taking up sensuous content and form- ing representations for itself out of this material…it then gives its independent representations a definite determinate being (ein bestimmtes Dasein). (Section 458 Addition)
It is precisely at this point that Derrida locates the idealizing mas- tery at work in Hegelian semiology. I will now quote in full what Derrida claims in this regard, for it is the basis of his critique of Hegelian semiology.
The sign unites an ‘independent representation’ and an ‘intu- ition,’ in other words, a concept (signified) and a sensory perception (signifier). But Hegel must immediately recognize a kind of separation, a disjointing which, by dislocating the ‘intu- ition,’ opens the space and play of signification. There is no longer in the signifying unity, in the welding of representation and intuition, an intuition like any other. Doubtless, as in every intuition, a being is given, a thing is presented and is to be received in its simple presence…. It is there, immediately visible, indubitable. But insofar as it is united to Vorstellung (to a representation), this presence becomes representation, a representation (in the sense of representing) of a representation
(in the general sense of conceptual ideality). Put in the place of something other, it becomes etwas anderes vorstellend: here Vorstellen and represent release and reassemble all their mean- ings at once.12
Derrida’s point is that the strange ‘intuition’ present in the sign rep- resents an ideality, the ideality of a Bedeutung or meaning. And as the unity of the signifying body and the signified ideality, the sign itself ‘becomes a kind of incarnation.’13 Thus, in general and most importantly for Derrida’s project, ‘the opposition of the intelligible and the sensory, condition the difference between the signified and the signifier, between the signifying intention (bedeuten), which is an animating activity, and the inert body of the signifier.’14
For Hegel, then, as Derrida notes, the proper and animated body of the signifier (the sign) is a tomb:
The body of the sign thus becomes the monument in which the soul will be enclosed, preserved, maintained, kept in main- tenance, present, signified. At the heart of this monument the soul keeps itself alive, but it needs the monument only to the extent that it is exposed—to death—in its living relation to its own body…. The sign—the monument-of-life-in-death, the sepulcher of a soul…is the pyramid.15
Thus, in the final analysis for Derrida, at its heart Hegelian semiol- ogy remains within the seriousness of the negative, within the work of meaning and truth. The production of signs, the use of language, is an interiorization of spirit relating itself to itself with its sight set on truth. ‘With its sight set: conceived in its destination on the basis of the truth toward which it is oriented.’16 Derrida’s criticism is that Hegel’s semiology remains within the chain of a dialectic tied to the Aufhebung. As his subsequent analysis in ‘The Pit and the Pyramid’
shows, all of Hegel’s essential insights into language and representa- tion are founded on dialectics, ‘the resolution of the sign in the horizon of the nonsign, of the presence beyond the sign.’17 And as he stated elsewhere, the submission to the hegemony of meaning present in his theory of language is ‘the essence and element of phi- losophy, of Hegelian ontologies.’18
II
Since the sign works on the basis of contradiction, Derrida’s under- standing of Hegel’s semiology as structured according to the move- ment of the Aufhebung is simply one instance of a much larger issue.
Throughout all his major texts on Hegel, Derrida lays great stress on Hegel’s reliance on negativity and contradiction, the essential charac- teristics of Aufhebung. In addition to the chief role this movement plays in Derrida’s reconstruction of Hegelian semiology, it is also crucial for his sustained concern to distinguish différance from Hegelian difference; for difference, alleges Derrida, is determined in the Science of Logic ‘as contradiction (Widerspruch) only in order to resolve it, to interiorize it, to lift it up…into the self-presence of an onto-theological or ontoteleological synthesis.’19 Indeed, Derrida has argued that Hegelian idealism is a relève of all the binary oppo- sitions of classical idealism, ‘a resolution of contradiction into a third term that comes in order to aufheben, to deny while raising up, while idealizing, while sublimating into an anamnesic interiority (Errinnerung), while interning difference in a self-presence.’20 In order to preserve meaning, then, only the Aufhebung will do; the very movement and structure of Aufhebung rests on the understand- ing of difference, or contradiction, as negativity.21
Now certainly it is true that Hegel’s explicit treatment of contra- diction in the Science of Logic begins with its identification as a Wesenheit, or essentiality. As a determination of reflection, contradic- tion (along with the categories of identity and difference) is treated thematically as a category of essence. But Derrida’s focus on contra- diction as the structure of Aufhebung also suggests that the Hegelian method itself embodies contradiction, that there is no important dif- ference between the thematic and the methodological senses of contradiction. In the following, I will suggest that there are impor- tant reasons to acknowledge the difference between the thematic and the methodological uses of contradiction, and that this distinction underlies Hegel’s position that in comprehensive thinking otherness is relevant only to the extent that it can be translated into the terms of thought (or the categories).22 Moreover, any interpretation of Hegel’s concept of contradiction according to which it would be dependent on extralogical subject matters will be shown to be much more ambitious than Hegel’s theory itself.
In order to view the precise thematic determination of contradic-
tion within Hegel’s Science of Logic, I will first sketch its place in the Logic as a whole. The form of the categories in the Logic is a systemic one; it is only when viewed as a totality of logical cate- gories related according to their own internal logic, that the structure of rationality Hegel presents can be explained to be true. It is only when the structure is so understood, that is, as an essentially self- related whole, that the being of rationality can be justified as the rationality of being. This characterization permits us to view an aspect of the perhaps unsuspected modesty of Hegel’s project: ontol- ogy, for Hegel, does not claim to be exhaustive in the sense of including all entities (or extralogical subject matters) within its dialectical purview. Hegelian ontology rather claims to be able to explain being only in so far as being is rational.
The level of being in its immediacy, or that region investigated in the first book of the Logic, is only relatively rational. Yet the relativ- ity of the rationality of immediate being is not judged on the basis of a criterion, as if imposed from ‘outside being’. According to its own principles, those of being itself and negation, the sphere of immedi- ate being is shown to be only relatively rational. The full signifi- cance of the other, in distinction from which alone being is determi- nate being, does not yet appear at the level of immediacy, for immediacy is ‘indifferent’ to its determining other.
The very indifference of immediacy pushes being to mediation:
the determinateness of immediate being depends upon its being dif- ferentiated from its other. In order that such differentiation belong to being itself, immediate being’s indifference to its other which deter- mines it must be overcome. Because it is the mediating other of immediate being, reflection determines immediate being. However, this negativity of essence is also immediate and is, then, simply self- identical. But as self-identical, essence is self-related and so posits its own determinateness. Yet the determination of appearance—or reflec- tive being—even though determined intrinsically, still has the ground of its appearance outside itself. The sense of appearance is thereby derivative, and cannot adequately be explained by reflection.
As immediate negativity, essence cannot fully explain the sense it has as determinate being.
In the third, and final, sphere, the level of conceptuality, both sense and determinateness are fully integrated. Conceptual being is a negative unity which posits itself in its negative. Thus, in the being of the concept, otherness, or real negativity, is sublated. The sense
of subjectivity is determined by the sense of objectivity; and objec- tivity possesses sense only through its negative. In the category of the absolute idea this mutual implication is posited. If being makes sense—if it is at all rational—it has the sense dialectical thought is able to explicate. Thus Hegel’s philosophy attempts to resituate what is commonly understood to be given in experience into the form of thought. His account does not begin on the presupposition of the givenness of experience, but rather it justifies the theoretical accept- ability of the given on the basis of theoretical principles alone. And Hegel’s Logic provides an account of those principles which shows, finally, that thought itself is the principle of the account: ‘not only the account of scientific method, but even the concept itself of the science as such belongs to its content, and in fact constitutes its final result.’23
Now, the concept (Begriff) of the account given in the final chap- ter of the Logic allows us to focus on the methodological meaning of the dialectic. For the concept of the account must show (i) that the categories elicited in the course of the Logic are normative with respect to that which they categorize, and (ii) that the individual cat- egories have their normative status solely on the basis of their development as categories. In other words, there must be both a pro- gressive and a regressive interpretation of the movement of the categories.24 In the progressive reading, the account must build up an understanding of categorization without appeal to extracategorial items. While the regressive reading must provide a justification for the status of each of the categories as moments in the progressive understanding of thought’s normativity.
As my account of the overall structure of the Logic has indicated, the first phase of the account of the categories does begin with cate- gories which are immediate or indifferent to each other and to the account thought gives of them. However, this progressive understand- ing of the movement of the categories must result, finally, in a categorial expression of what it means to be a category. Thus, in the final sphere of the Logic, the level of the concept, we view cate- gories which are neither indifferent to each other nor to what thought makes of them. In order that the categories of the first phase will be justified, there must therefore be access to them from the third phase. The logic of essence, the second phase of the Logic, provides this intermediate sphere by showing that the determinations present in the categories are relational (not indifferent to one