quest for more regional autonomy at the forefront of their political programme. What drives their success and how homogeneous are they as a group?
In the third section I turn to the internal structure of the state-wideparties and seek to highlight the relationship between the territorial structure of the federal arrangement and the internal structure of the party on the basis of six hypotheses. To that purpose, state-wide parties are not only cut into vertical slices (separating the central from the regional and sub-regional party wings) but also into horizontal slices (separating the party’s elected officials who serve in public office from the party officials who work in the party bureau- cracy). Some examples are given to illustrate the channels of influence which have developed between each of these segments, for instance in can- didate selection, party finance or drafting electoral manifestos.
In the final section I focus on the role of parties in the electoral arena. What is the importance of regional relative to general elections? What is the strat- egy of state-wide and non-state-wide parties in central and regional elections, and in the government formation process that follows upon it? In multina- tional federations, what is the campaign strategy of state-wide parties which face the competition of ethno-regionalist parties? Do such parties take on a more regionalist profile in regional elections in which they face strong com- petition from ethno-regionalist parties than in general elections where they must take the views of a more heterogeneous electorate into account?
Table 5.1 General election results for state-wide parties and their regional breakdown
Austria 2002
Federal Maximum Minimum
result ARD RDI (and region) (and region)
Christian 42.3 5.83 0.14 51.9 30.5
Democrats (Tyrol) (Kärnten)
Social 36.5 5.98 0.16 45.8 20.1
Democrats (Burgenland) (Voralberg)
Freedom Party 10.0 2.98 0.30 23.6 6.4
(Kärnten) (Burgenland)
Greens 9.5 3.03 0.32 15.1 4.7
(Vienna) (Burgenland)
Others 1.7
Germany 2002 (on the basis of list votes (Zweitstimme))
Federal Maximum Minimum
result ARD RDI (and region) (and region) Social Democrats 41.9 4.43 0.11 48.6 (BRE) 26.1 (BAV) Christian Democrats 32.1 6.41 0.20 42.8 (BAWU) 22.3 (BRA)
Greens 5.6 3.9 0.70 16.2 (HA) 3.4 (SA-A)
Liberal 5.8 1.46 0.25 9.3 (NRW) 4.5 (BAV)
PDS 4.0 5.96 1.49 17.2 (BRA) 0.7 (BAV)
Others 10.6
Spain 2004
National Maximum Minimum
result ARD RDI (and region) (and region)
PP 37.6 9.51 0.25 57.5 (MURC) 15.5 (CAT)
PSOE 42.6 4.78 0.11 52.8 (AND) 27.2 (BAS)
IU 5.0 2.69 0.54 8.53 (AST) 1.77 (GAL)*
Others 14.8
Switzerland 2003
National Maximum Minimum
result ARD RDI (and region) (and region) People’s Party 26.6 9.97 0.37 43.6 (Schwyz) 7.6 (Tessin)*
Social Democrats 23.3 9.95 0.43 67.1 (Glarus) 11.1 (Luzern)*
Radicals/Liberals 17.3 9.78 0.57 88.1 (Nidwald) 7.3 (Geneva)*
Continued
the third column should be interpreted in the light of the overall state-wide election result. For instance, in relative terms the support for the Austrian Freedom Party is more uneven (ARD of 3 per cent relative to that party’s state- wide result of 10 per cent) than that for the Austrian Christian Democrats (ARD of close to 6 per cent relative to that party’s state-wide result of more than 42 per cent). Therefore, in column four the ARD for a party is divided by its state-wide result. The outcome reflects the regional deviation index (RDI).
In the example just given, the RDI for the Freedom Party is 0.30 compared with 0.14 for the Austrian Christian Democrats. The final two columns list the maximum and minimum results for each of the parties in the regions in which candidates were filedand specify the region in which these were obtained.
Table 5.1 shows that the regional variations in electoral support for state- wide parties are highest in Switzerland and lowest in Austria.
In Switzerland, the ARD came close to 10 per cent for each of the three largest parties in the most recent Swiss federal elections. Furthermore, since Table 5.1 Continued
Switzerland 2003
National Maximum Minimum
result ARD RDI (and region) (and region)
Christian Democrats 14.4 12.2 0.85 69.2 2.3
(Appenzell- (Bern)*
Innerhoden)
Greens 7.4 7.05 0.95 13.8 2.6
(Neuchatel) (Valais)*
Others 25.4
United Kingdom 2005
National Maximum Minimum
result ARD RDI (and region) (and region)
Labour 35.3 3.9 0.11 42.7 35.4
(Wales) (England)
Conservatives 32.3 10.3 0.31 35.7 15.8
(England) (Scotland)
Lib. Dem. 22.1 1.67 0.07 22.9 18.4
(England) (Wales)
Others 10.3
*Minimum result for region in which party had filed candidates.
Abbreviations: AND⫽Andalucia, AST⫽Asturias, BAS⫽Basque Country, BAV⫽Bavaria, BAWU⫽Baden-Württemberg, BRA⫽Brandenburg, BRE⫽Bremen, CAT⫽Catalonia, HA⫽Hamburg, GAL⫽Galicia, MURC⫽Murcia, NRW⫽North-Rhine Westphalia, SA-A⫽Saxony-Anhalt
Sources: General Elections Results (as found on websites of Ministry of the Interior, central parliaments or National Office for Statistics in each of these countries).
the smallest cantons elect only one delegate to the Swiss National Council (federal lower house) some of the major state-wide parties may decide not to put up regional candidates. This turns the electoral system in these cantons into a de facto plurality (‘winner takes all’) system. It stimulates some of the state-wide parties to join forces with a group of other (potentially state-wide) parties or not to put up candidates at all. Of the four parties that have been represented in the federal executive since 1959, the Swiss Christian Democrats have the most unevenly spread support. Traditionally, they score better in Catholic, and thus predominantly French-speaking, cantons. The Swiss Liberal Party and the Christian Democrats also attract a predominantly French-speaking electorate (Sciarini and Hug 1999: 136–7). Prior to its trans- formation into a right-wing Populist Party, the support of the Swiss People’s Party was primarily confined to rural, German-speaking Switzerland as well.
By now it has spread to the rest of Switzerland.
In contrast, in the most recent Austrian federal elections (2002), the two largest state-wide parties, the Christian Democrats (ÖVP) and the Social Democrats (SPÖ) displayed low regional deviation indices. The index for the German Social Democrats falls within the same range, but that of the German Christian Democrats is significantly higher. In relative terms, the German party system is not as symmetric as the Austrian one. For one thing, the support for the PDS, the successor party to the East German Communists, is regionally concentrated. Formally a state-wide party the PDS handsomely passes the 5 per cent electoral threshold in all five Eastern regions. In the 2002 general elections it assembled 16.9 per cent of the East German vote, but attracted only 2.2 per cent of the vote in Bremen, the Western region in which it performed best.
The data for the UK and Spain are similar to the German data insofar as one of the major catch-all parties has a much more regionally diversified support base than the other party. In Spain the Conservatives (Partido Popular) assemble more than half of the votes in some of the regions, but scarcely collect 15 per cent of the vote in the region of Catalonia. The PP’s RDI is more than double the RDI for the PSOE, the Social Democratic party. Similarly, in Britain, the Conservative Party is substantially overrep- resented in England. However, in the 2005 general elections, the party captured only 15.8 per cent of the vote in Scotland. By comparison, the support for the British Labour Party was less unevenly spread than that of the Conservatives.
Regional variations in state-wide party support can have many causes. For instance, a state-wide party may be able to build up a reliable regional sup- port base because the party’s general ideology corresponds with the socio- economic or religious profile of most of the voters who live in that particular region. For instance, in the last 25 years (1970–2004), the German Social Democrats performed particularly well in North-Rhine Westphalia and rather badly in Baden-Württemberg. Skilful party leadership, for instance, of Johannes Rau or Wolfgang Clement may explain some part of the success in
North-Rhine Westphalia. However, more important is that region’s strong industrial background, comprising the densely populated Ruhr area which underwent a painful restructuring of its coal and mine industries. This certainly has created a more reliable pool of Social Democratic voters. In contrast, the more agrarian, religiously conservative profile of Baden- Württemberg, a region which after World War II quickly developed into one of the most powerful economic German regions, generates a broader pool of centre-right (Christian Democratic) voters.
Regional variations in the support for state-wide parties are not necessarily owing to the strength or weakness of the competing state-wide parties.
Table 5.1 reveals striking variations in electoral support for the residual (‘other’) parties, that is for parties which do not qualify as ‘state wide’. With the exception of the UK, these non-state-wide parties have collected more than 10 per cent of the popular vote. In Switzerland, they even represent about a quarter of the aggregate vote. Belgium was left out of Table 5.1 because the share of its non-state-wide parties approximates 100 per cent.
Indeed, since 1978, all of the major party groups (Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Liberals) have been split along linguistic lines. I now turn to an analysis of these non-state-wide parties.