East Asian Security Environment and the Korean Peninsula
IV. China-South Korea Relationship
dramatically from mere $6.4 billion in 1992 to $270 billion in 2013, the figure grew more than 40 times. Two leaders decided to strengthen macroeconomic policy coordination and jointly respond to external economic risks. The bilateral trade target is to reach trade volume of $300 billion by 2015, and gradually achieve trade balance.
As for the most important economic cooperation progress between two countries in 2013, it must be the ongoing negotiation of China- South Korea bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). We all know that the economic links between the two countries have already become very tight after twenty years of cooperation. Considering that economies in both countries are complementary in respect of market, natural resource, and technology, there is every necessity to further intensify economic cooperation in order to make full use of potentials. Chinese enterprises are very interested in going out for investment, so Korea needs to take more attractive measures to attract Chinese investment, while upgrading Korean investment in China in emerging and high- tech industries. China’s urbanization development strategy will also create new opportunities for Korean entrepreneurs.
Among the results of the first phase talks of the FTA in early September 2013, the most important one is that the rate of tariff reduction has been set to 90 percent in terms of the whole items, and 85 percent of imports in terms of their monetary value. This lays the stable base for further negotiations. Now the second phase of negotiations has started, it will consist of 8 rounds of talks. Both governments expect the negotiation to be concluded in the year 2014 since the Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP) talks are well in progress and the 12 members can probably strike a deal in the first quarter of 2014. Then the non-TPP countries will lose competitiveness in the world market.
In addition, many observers hope the two governments will make much bolder determination to raise the currently low standard of tariff exemption in the FTA package deal.
Second, security and political relationship are further developed. Since President Park learned Chinese at the age of 30 for some time and since then she has been fond of Chinese ancient culture very much.
She received honorary doctoral degrees from the Chinese Culture University in Taiwan in 1987. Because of this experience and cultural affections, President Park, as she became the President, tries to move closer to Beijing politically in comparison with other major power instead of relying too much on the U.S. as in the Lee Myung-bak government. In her mind, the key to the solution of North Korea nuclear program and containment of the DPRK’s provocation lies with China.8 In the past few years, Beijing’s role on the issue of security and nuclear development on the Korean Peninsula was relative passive;
one of the causes was that the two top leaders lacked close personal relations.
Therefore President Park Geun-hye’s visit to China in June 2013 represented a fresh start to bilateral relations. The two leaders agreed to establish a direct communication channel between China’s state councilor for foreign affairs and the South Korean presidential national security chief, to make sure their foreign ministers visit each other regularly. This is really a breakthrough for the bilateral strategic relations. Furthermore, military leaders from both sides decided to
8President Park said the success of peacekeeping initiatives with North Korea
“largely depends on how much co-operation she can get from China,” see Kim Wall, “South Korean President Puts China Ahead of Japan in Visiting Beijing,”
South China Morning Post, June 26, 2013.
establish a mechanism for routine communications between high-level military officials. And the joint statement issued by two presidents almost touched upon all the major or potential issues that are of importance for two sides, which include some thorny and long-perplexed issues.
For example, the undecided maritime delimitation on the Yellow Sea (West Sea) has led to dispute on some isles or reefs concerning ownership and respective administration (known as Suyan Reef in China and Socotra Rock or Ieodo in South Korea); though it is difficult to reach an agreement considering the conflicting public opinion, both sides have decided to start negotiations. The maritime conflicts between South Korean coast guards and Chinese fishers within the Korean management zone have also been growing over the recent years, which has the effect of intensifying a bad impression of China in South Korean media and public opinion. Now both leaders realize that we need to jointly take pragmatic measures to contain this dangerous escalation of confrontation. Joint patrol and administration by two fisheries departments within these overlapping waters are one of several feasible options. China-ROK Joint Committee on Fisheries and other relevant existing fisheries are encouraged to establish well- functioning practices through consultative mechanism.
To obtain increased trust from China, President Park offered to return the remains of 360 Chinese troops killed in the 1950-1953 Korean War and buried in South Korea.
In 2013, there were three summits between Park Geun-hye and Xi Jinping. In every instance, the two leaders exchanged opinions on common issues of interest and expressed a desire to upgrade bilateral relations.
However, the bilateral strategic relations are still very fragile and are seen skeptically by some people in South Korea. When China declared the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on November 23, 2013, which overlaps a bit with South Korean claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), South Korea had a strong reaction to China’s unexpected action. Since the two countries haven’t reached a consensus on the delimitation line between the two countries’ EEZ, China thinks it has the right to temporarily cover this area for management. And more importantly, China’s act was aimed at restraining Japan’s intrusive ADIZ over China’s airspace.
Beijing expressed explicitly that it wanted to have consultations with Seoul about how to avoid collision over the overlapping space between China’s and Korea’s ADIZs.
Third, in addition to the economic and security cooperation, people- to-people exchanges are also very important, which could serve a solid base for inter-governmental organizations cooperation. The two presidents’ joint statement announced that the China-South Korea Cultural and Educational Exchange Joint Committee, as an inter- governmental coordinating body, will regularly convene working meetings to plan exchange programs and guide the implementation.
That means that people-to-people exchanges between the two countries are institutionalized and it will help better understandings and trust between the two societies and inevitably produce a positive impact upon bilateral relations in the long run. The programs will include students’ exchange visits; the language understanding improvement exchange; citizens’ understanding and knowledge of the other country;
promotion of sustainable development of cultural relations; promotion of films; cooperation in cultural industry such as television, games, music drama, etc.
Fourth, the biggest obstacle in relations between China and South Korea is not in the bilateral relations, but in the two external factors, North Korea and the US. Wherever North Korea adopts some risky or provocative action, or there is some frustration in the process of denuclearization, South Korean media or government will pressure China, accusing Beijing of not exerting enough influence on Pyongyang, or not taking sufficient measures to cut off its economic relations with North Korea.
While China often feels a bit anxious when South Korea imports too many American weapons or plans to build an American model of MD system to deter North Korea threat, in turn, North Korea will take more steps to develop nuclear weapons and missiles so as to offset South Korea’s military superiority. Beijing doesn’t want to see a large number of American warships, fighters and aircraft carriers to be involved in military maneuvers in the Yellow Sea, which is a body of water adjacent to China’s capital — Beijing, and important military naval bases — Bohai Gulf.9
With the advancement of America’s “pivot to Asia” strategy, US hedging on military deployment shifts more on China, in their strategy, the US-ROK and US-Japan military alliance are regarded as an indispensable part. The US actually is dubious about the intimate cooperation between China and South Korea. Washington questions whether Seoul will do its utmost to support the US military operation, in case of a conflict between China and Japan, as presumably the US would get involved in the East China Sea. Under this complicated
9Luo Yuan. “Why China Opposes US-South Korean Military Exercises in the Yellow Sea,” People Daily, July 16, 2010, see http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/
90001/90780/91342/7069743.html.
structure, South Korea has to keep subtle balance in diplomacy between China and the US, since China and South Korea have respective interests from these two bilateral relations.
Of course, in regard to the North Korea problem, China and South Korea can work together. China and South Korea should keep close consultation and take a similar position, or at least a position com- plementary to each other for stabilizing the tense situation, if North Korea takes some irresponsible moves, i.e., ranging from coordinating a stance, exchanging information to taking suitable action. We can let North Korea know the grave consequence for their risky actions and emphasize that there are no rewards for their aggressive behavior.
China is actively propelling the construction of “new type of major powers” for Sino-American relations. The US starts to cooperate with China along with this line, notwithstanding the skepticism at the beginning.10The formulation of the relations will definitely create an opportunity for China and South Korea to cooperate, since it is not termed as G-2 that must base on the same ideology, strategy and national outlook. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it clearly at the Brookings Institution, on September 20, 2013 that China wants to start the building of this new model of relationship from the Asia-Pacific region. Specifically speaking, he stated that cooperation over hotspot issues in the Asia-Pacific, in which Korean nuclear issue is a case in point, could prove the relationship to be successful.11 From his
10The US officially is using this concept a slight differently, i.e. “a new model of major power relations”; or “a different kind of relationship for the 21st century.”
At a Georgetown University speech on November 20, 2013, US National Security Advisor Susan Rice said the US seeks to operationalize a new model of major power relations. China Daily USA, December 2, 2013.
11Speech is made by China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Brookings Institution, September 20, 2013.
remarks, China, South Korea, and the US must be the main players for cooperation. If this model could be accomplished, South Korea could avoid choosing either side amidst two competing major powers. This implies new strong triangular relations should play a dominant role in maintaining peace on the Peninsula while diluting military functions in the already existing triangular relations among United States, South Korea, and Japan.
There are also other problems that could bring about negative impacts on bilateral relations such as historical problems and maritime disputes. Historical nationalism cannot be solved in the foreseeable future, but both China and South Korea should take an attitude of
“looking forward,” emphasizing common interests rather than staying entangled in the past. In another words, both countries should carefully cope with the above obstacles, and at least not let them become harmful to bilateral relations. As time goes by and common interests accumulate, two countries will have more wisdom and vision to address this issue in the future.
Finally, in Northeast Asia, another issue could probably put China and South Korea together with common interests, i.e. Japan’s re- militarization and denial of post-world war regional order. As Japan is moving further to the direction of right wing rule, and the days of their re-possession of collective defense right are numbered, China and South Korea should form a unified front to restrain Japan’s future military and political ambition. Both China and South Korea have territorial sovereignty disputes with Japan, and we are all highly concerned about Japanese politicians’ attempt to distort the war history, covering its war crimes, which occurs repeatedly in the issues
of history textbook, comfort women, and visit to Yasukuni Shrine, in which 12 A-class war criminals are honored.
Both South Korea and Japan are allies of the US. Now the US has indulged itself in a conviction that a remilitarized Japan will do good for American strategic interests, which could play a balancing role to a rising China. However, the US underestimates one point that a re- militarized and nationalistic Japan could stimulate Beijing to take a more offensive posture towards Tokyo; and an assertive Japan will easily stir up a conflict with China on the disputed islands because of miscalculations, which certainly will damage the stability of the region and even drag the US and South Korea into an escalated war against China.
Such a concern and judgment is not contrived, it is already proved by a statement made by Shinichi Kitaoka, a key security adviser to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. He stated that the right to exercise collective self-defense should be applied “to any country which is very close to Japan, … in other words, if that country is heavily damaged and that might bring a serious threat to Japan, then this is a situation in which Japan may consider exercising the right of collective self-defense.”12
Thus, the future security situation in East Asia is very dangerous.
South Korea, as an ally, could give the US some advice that encouraging Japan to re-gain the collective self-defense right will have counterproductive effects. It is not out of the question that a
12Linda Sieg, “Japan Collective Self-Defense Right Should Include Others, Not just the US,” Reuters, November 6, 2013.
re-militarized Japan will be involved in a contingent situation on the Korean Peninsula without getting prior permission from South Korea if they think the American troops are engaged in a war and it is in their interest to play a leading role at the earlier stage. The strategic dialogue between Japan and South Korea or various multilateral security partnerships could not disable their determination and capability to become a military power in the region.13
Though Japan is a democratic country and an ally of the US, it will not confine its role as a peace lover and no one can guarantee it will not resort to force to consolidate its territorial claims and re-shape the regional order. So China and South Korea need to foster their strategic cooperation and keep vigilant against Japan’s ambitious goal.
13Park Young-june, “Japan’s Assertion of the Right of Collective Self-Defence and Policy Recommendations for South Korea,” November 19, 2013, Interview- 2013-09, The East Asia Institute, Korea.