Testimonies Testifier ID A North Korean defector was caught while attempting to
defect in 2018 and was detained in a holding center (jipkyulso) and a detention center (guryujang) for about four and a half months in early 2019. He/she was beaten during the investigation process for not making a confession and was forced to remain in a fixed posture.
NKHR2020000020 2020-07-04
A testifier who had worked at a detention facility for approximately four and a half months from April 2019, said that a person confined in a detention facility before trial is considered “a person whose sentence is pending” and thus treated as a prisoner, to whom cruel treatment, such as forcing of fixed posture, is given.
NKHR2020000035 2020-09-05
In this case, “public execution of the death penalty” refers to cases where the death penalty is conducted in public, provided that it is imposed only for crimes stipulated in the Criminal Law and carried out in accordance with certain procedures. If an extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution is carried out in public, it would violate both Article 6 and Article 7 of the ICCPR.
Meanwhile, regardless of whether an execution is carried out as a result of imposing a death sentence or as an extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution, it is bound to be seen by the general population if it is carried out in public. From the perspective of those who witness the execution, the act may constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, which violates Article 7.45
Although provisions on the procedures and methods of carrying out the death penalty are included in the Criminal Procedure Law and the Judgments and Decisions Enforcement Law of North Korea of 2005,46 there is no provision in North Korean laws that
pointed out the issue of public execution of the death penalty. Note by Secretary-General, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UN Doc. A/67/279 (2012).
The COI also stated the following in its report of the detailed findings, “Especially for young children and relatives of the victim, the experience of [watching such killings] is often so horrifying, that the witnesses must themselves also be considered victims of inhuman and cruel treatment in contravention of Article 7 of the ICCPR.” OHCHR, “Report of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” UN Doc.
A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (2014), para. 830.
Article 421 of the North Korean Criminal Procedure Law stipulates that the death penalty shall be carried out by the punishment enforcement institution that has received the order to execute the death penalty and a certified copy of the written
explicitly provides for the carrying out of the death penalty in public. However, testimonies claiming that public executions were carried out for political and ideological reasons or acts of superstition have been collected. A North Korean defector testified that in 2015, the manager and the Party secretary of the Daedonggang Terrapin Farm were publicly shot to death for political and ideological crimes, such as committing acts against the Party, disobeying the teachings and instructions of the Supreme Leader (Suryeong) and corruption, and the execution was attended by around 1,000 people.47 In addition, a North Korean defector who defected in 2019 testified that policy-based control over acts of superstition was widely carried out between 2018 and 2019, and he/she had heard that public executions were held in the process.48 Cases of public executions for narcotics training and murder were also recounted by the interviewees. A North Korean defector who defected in 2019 testified about a public execution carried out at the Suseong Stream (Suseongcheon) in Chongjin in January 2018. According to the testifier, the wife of the County Party chief secretary’s driver, who was engaged in narcotics trading with a woman in her mid-30s, was murdered by that woman due to a conflict between the two, and an order was
judgment issued by the Central Court. Article 32 of the Judgments and Decisions Enforcement Law provides the same as the Criminal Procedure Law and further stipulates that the death penalty “shall be carried out in ways such as shooting.”
NKHR2020000018 2020-07-04.
NKHR2020000011 2020-06-15.
issued by Kim Jong Un to shoot the female perpetrator in front of a crowd.49
According to the testimonies of North Korean defectors, it appears that public executions are still carried out by the North Korean authorities. Testimonies have been collected indicating that the People’s Unit (inminban) announces the time and place of public execution in advance but does not make attendance mandatory,50 people are mobilized in schools or at work to attend public executions,51 and university students who are considered rebellious (so-called “aerosaeng”) are separately mobilized and forced to attend public executions.52 However, the number of residents going to see public executions seems to be decreasing compared to the past.
TableⅡ-9 Cases of Public Executions by Shooting
Testimonies Testifier ID
In 2015, three women were publicly executed by shooting at Gilseongpo Port, North Hwanghae Province.
NKHR2019000054 2019-07-29 In February 2015, five men were publicly executed by shooting
at a stadium in Pyeongseong, South Pyeongan Province.
NKHR2017000083 2017-09-25 In October 2016, three men and four women were publicly
executed by shooting at an airfield in Yeonbong-dong, Hyesan, Yanggang Province.
NKHR2017000073 2017-08-28 In 2017, two men were publicly executed by shooting at an
airfield in Yeonbong–dong, Hyesan, Yanggang Province.
NKHR2018000114 2018-10-13
NKHR2022000014 2022-06-10.
NKHR2018000060 2018-07-02.
NKHR2018000098 2018-10-01.
NKHR2018000114 2018-10-13.
Testimonies Testifier ID In February 2017, approximately 20 people were publicly
executed by shooting in Byeoksong County, South Hwanghae Province.
NKHR2017000073 2017-08-28 In December 2017, one woman was publicly shot dead in
Onsong County, North Hamgyeong Province.
NKHR2018000107 2018-10-01 In 2018, two people were publicly executed by shooting in
Pyeongseong, South Pyeongan Province.
NKHR2019000024 2019-05-18 In 2018, a woman was publicly executed by shooting in
Chongjin, North Hamgyeong Province.
NKHR2019000071 2019-08-26 In January 2018, a woman was publicly executed by shooting
in Sinuiju, North Pyeongan Province.
NKHR2019000111 2019-11-18 In January 2018, a woman in her 30s was publicly executed
by shooting at the Suseong Stream (Suseongcheon) in Chongjin for murdering the wife of the County Party chief secretary’s driver due to a conflict over narcotics trading in which the two were involved.
NKHR2022000014 2022-06-10
Sometime in February–March 2018, a man was publicly executed by shooting in Onsong County, North Hamgyeong Province.
NKHR2019000118 2019-11-30
Due to limited information, it is not easy to clearly divide the recounted cases into those in which the death penalty was publicly carried out and those in which extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions were conducted in public. However, carrying out an execution by shooting in public itself is inhuman under Article 7 of the ICCPR, and thus, the above cases, at the very least, represent a violation of Article 7 of the ICCPR. However, testimonies claiming that public executions have not been carried out since around 2010 have been collected. These testimonies are examined in II. The Reality of Civil and Political Rights, 1. Right to Life. Regarding the decrease in the number of public executions, more detailed observation is required to determine if it means that there are more non-public executions or more secret
summary executions.
According to KINU’s survey results thus far, when categorized by region, public executions are most often witnessed in Hyesan, Yanggang Province. This finding can largely be attributed to the fact that more than half of the interviewees had lived in Yanggang Province. However, in general, public execution of the death penalty seems to be carried out more frequently in border areas than in inland areas, and in cities than in rural areas. It is analyzed that this tendency may be because there are relatively more illegal activities in border regions and cities, and the North Korean authorities are trying to warn and incite fear among residents in those regions.