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use”.205 Florquin states that South Africa is a “key transit point[s]” which only allows semi- automatic weapons to enter its territory.206 The researcher is of the view that Florquin’s statement, based on interviews with PMSCs in 2011, was in the midst of the “critical period” and the refusal to issue permits resulting in the seizure of weapons by the SAPS led to the three separate court cases discussed in Chapter Four. In simple terms, if other states are able to accommodate the movement of PCASP in their territory and set out clear requirements and policies, provided security interests are considered, South Africa should have no difficulty in amending its outdated legislation and developing procedures that can facilitate PMSC in South African territory.
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The PMA published its policy on armed guards in a Merchant Marine Circular.210 It makes direct reference to the IMO recommendations211 for the attention of all “ship owners, company security officers, legal representatives of Panamanian Flagged Vessels, Panamanian Merchant Marine Consulates and Recognized Organizations”.212
The notice does not set out specific requirements for the authorisation of PCASP but rather directs interested parties to the IMO Circulars213 in deciding on the use of a PMSC to protect vessels transiting the HRA. The PMA states that “ships, which intend hiring the services of private security firms, should provide the crew with the necessary training and information about the risks of having an armed team on board”.214 This is not commonly found in the polices published by other jurisdictions or IMO Guidelines and should, in the researcher’s view, be incorporated into BMP 4; as greater understanding of the roles of all on board will enhance the application of standard operating procedures in the event of imminent attack.
Authorisation for the use of PMSC and a PCASP team was initially required from the General Directorate of Merchant Marine (GD) with the following documents in support of such permission, a “motivational letter from the owner requesting approval, a signed bi-lateral agreement between the owner and PMSC215, details of PCASP team and proof of training and experience of PCASP team members”.216
210 Panama Maritime Authority ‘Requirements regarding the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board Panamanian Flagged Vessels’ - Merchant Marine Circular MMC-228 (6 July 2011) available at
http://www.skuld.com/upload/INSIGHT/Piracy/Panama-MMC-228.pdf - accessed on 16 November 2013.
211 IMO Interim Guidance to ship owners, ship operators, and shipmasters on the use of privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships in the high risk area. MSC.1/Circ. 1405. Rev. 1. And: IMO Interim
Recommendations for Flag States regarding the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board ships in the high risk area. MSC.1/Circ. 1406. Rev.1.
212 Panama Maritime Authority ‘Requirements regarding the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board Panamanian Flagged Vessels’ - Merchant Marine Circular MMC-228 (6 July 2011) available at
http://www.skuld.com/upload/INSIGHT/Piracy/Panama-MMC-228.pdf - accessed on 16 November 2013.
213 IMO Interim Guidance to ship owners, ship operators, and shipmasters on the use of privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships in the high risk area. MSC.1/Circ. 1405. Rev. 1, and IMO Interim
Recommendations for Flag States regarding the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board ships in the high risk area. MSC.1/Circ. 1406. Rev.1.
214Panama Maritime Authority ‘Requirements regarding the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board Panamanian Flagged Vessels’ - Merchant Marine Circular MMC-228, para. 1.2. (6 July 2011) available at http://www.skuld.com/upload/INSIGHT/Piracy/Panama-MMC-228.pdf - accessed on 16 November 2013.
215 Panama Maritime Authority ‘Requirements regarding the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board Panamanian Flagged Vessels’ - Merchant Marine Circular MMC-228, para. 3. (6 July 2011) available at http://www.skuld.com/upload/INSIGHT/Piracy/Panama-MMC-228.pdf - accessed on 16 November 2013. A written contract is required setting out the following; “contact details of parties, extent of insurance cover, consent to law
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However, this requirement changed with a list of 79 PMSCs approved by the PMA that was published in a subsequent notice on 21 January 2013.217 It is expressly stated that authorisation from the GD is not required, provided one of the listed PMSCs is utilised on Panamanian flagged vessels, unless a port authority requests written authorisation from the PMA.218 The blanket approval for specific PMSCs will reduce the bureaucracy and red tape involved in obtaining authorisation for each Panamanian flagged vessel. The researcher is of the view that a list of approved PMSCs should be considered by coastal states. This would reduce the time required to vet each and every PMSC intending to enter a state’s port with weapons. It will also prevent double vetting by flag and coastal states of the same PMSC. If a listed PMSC is applying for a permit in a coastal state, the procedure to issue same should be more efficient without the need to verify the authenticity and standing of the company. The researcher is not suggesting a complete waiver of permit or licensing requirements in port states, but rather that the burden on the authorities to process applications and issue the necessary documentation can be significantly reduced through cooperation with flag states and prior ‘blanket’ recognition of certain PMSCs.
The PCASP must be enrolled as supernumeries219 on board all Panamanian flagged vessels and paragraph 5 states “all ship-owners when entering into a contract with a PMSC should ensure compliance with the IMO Guidelines to ship owners”.220 The Panama position allows for varied interpretation of the IMO Guidelines to shipowners including the manner in which risk assessment is conducted. However, the list of approved PMSCs does create ambiguity in the requirements for shipowners. Does due diligence of the selected PMSC still have to be undertaken if a listed PMSC is engaged to provide armed protection services? The researcher is of the view that good practice dictates that shipowners should still undertake due diligence of
‘listed’ PMSCs; however the process is streamlined by means of the choice of already
“accepted” companies for provision of armed security services.
and jurisdiction, rules of engagement, each parties obligations, duration and termination, weapons to be utilized and the specific transit route”.
216 Ibid para. 3(d) (6 July 2011).
217 Panama Maritime Authority ‘Authorized Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) transiting High Risk Areas’ - Merchant Marine Circular MMC-245 (21 January 2013) available at http://www.segumar.com/wp- content/uploads/2014/05/MMC-245mayo2014.pdf accessed on 16 May 2014.
218 Ibid para. 3.
219 Panama Maritime Authority ‘Requirements regarding the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board Panamanian Flagged Vessels’ - Merchant Marine Circular MMC-228, para. 4. (6 July 2011) available at http://www.skuld.com/upload/INSIGHT/Piracy/Panama-MMC-228.pdf accessed on 16 November 2013.
220 Ibid para. 5.
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In summary, the list of approved PMSCs should be utilised by other flag states, and in particular, the South African authorities in adopting or amending its procedure and policies on armed guards as a port state.