One criticism of utilitarianism is that it ignores equality. Unless there is a good moral reason, the ethical principle of equality argues that people should be treated equally (Singer, 1979). This is one way of looking at equality. The other principle regarding equality is that people should access equal welfare opportunities unless they choose lesser welfare, caused lesser welfare or they benefit from the condition of inferior welfare (Rosen, 2003; Little, 2002: 54). Taking
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Little’s arguments on the issue of equality one can quickly notice that the colonial approach to wealth creation and distribution discriminated against the blacks. Using the principle of equality, the discriminatory economic policies and approaches of the colonial authorities in the SADC were unethical. The discriminatory practices and policies left many blacks economically compromised, thus reducing their welfare compared to the whites. From the perspective of equal welfare ethics, the colonial policies fail the test.
One challenge with the African economic ethic of African economic indigenisation is its discriminatory model which seeks to reverse the colonial powers’ economic superiority through laws and policies which aim to undo socio-economic inequality through discrimination. From the principle of equality this could be unethical (Moore, 1912, but if a moral reason is given then the ethic of indigenisation can be viewed as ethical. One reason would be to improve the welfare of the poor majority in order to deliver equal welfare to all at the end of the day. The long term effect is to have equal welfare. It would be difficult or impossible to bring equality in a society without employing reverse constructive discrimination. The welfare inequality that was caused by the colonial powers is unethical and the discriminative approaches such as indigenisation will be ethical for the moral reason of restoring welfare equality. The moment the ethic fails to deliver equal welfare or at least working towards that then it would lose the moral reason that justifies it as ethical.
Waldron (2003) observed that in all modern societies there is co-existence between great prosperity and extreme poverty. Acknowledging the controversy and how difficult it is to define poverty, Waldron (2003:38) however understood poverty as “…a long term predicament that requires members of a given household to repeatedly make hard choices between satisfying various needs for one or more of their members. Shelter or, minimally nutritious food but not both; or basic medical care or shelter, but not both; or medical care, shelter, and minimally nutritious food, but not adequate clothing and so on”. While poverty is difficult to measure the state of poverty defined above is typical of most African families in most post-colonial SADC states. This condition prevails despite the recorded fast economic growth rates in some countries.
Poverty has been defined with reference to different methods of measurement such as levels of monthly income, annual income and poverty datum lines all defined by different countries. What is beyond question, even in the diversity of methods of measuring poverty, is the fact that
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poverty and inequality are the most persistent socio-economic challenges facing African countries today, the SADC included. Oloruntoba observes that the recorded fast economic growth rates in some countries have done little to reduce poverty and inequality. He further argues for a new approach in dealing with poverty (Oloruntoba, 2015).
An attempt by independent African states to address this challenge of poverty has been through policies such as indigenisation of black economic empowerment and affirmative action. The success of these initiatives, as Murove (2010) noted, has been largely questionable, again suggesting the need to rethink the African economic ethic of indigenisation. Clearly, a wealth redistribution model is imperative. The key argument is that the inequality in the distribution of wealth was largely a result of the skewed and discriminatory colonial policies and practices. The practices marginalised the black or indigenous people. The way such wealth was acquired raises ethical questions which will be discussed later in this chapter. Attracting equally similar ethical scrutiny are the approaches to reverse the inequalities such as the African economic ethnic of indigenisation which has been popular in most SADC states. But before getting into the ethical issues relating to wealth redistribution to deal with poverty the writer will attempt to put into perspective what can be regarded as prosperity being the opposite of poverty. This is with the understanding that if the inequality gap or poverty is to be addressed in the SADC there has to be some kind of wealth redistribution from the prosperous to the poor. Waldron (2003:38) described prosperous families as those families which “…have income and other resources which enable them easily to satisfy all the needs of all their members, and devote an amount to items going well beyond need that would be sufficient, if spent differently, to satisfy all the basic needs of many more” In Waldron’s (2003) understanding of prosperous families there is an indication of excess resources and income that if redistributed would improve the welfare of others without jeopardising the source. Waldron’s definition conforms to utilitarianism in that it would improve the aggregate welfare of both the poor and the rich or prosperous. It is however difficult to define poverty in a universal way which would be valid in all circumstances (Sen, 1992). The main reason for this is because poverty is defined in terms of need which is relative to the circumstances of a given society. Braybrooke (1987) argued that what counts as the basic need in an American urban society would be different from the needs of a rural African Society.
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What cannot be doubted even in this relative difference in the understanding of poverty is that the welfare of the needy in Africa is worse off than that of the needy in developed countries. This understanding adds weight to the need for wealth redistribution in Africa in order to achieve better social utility and improve the wellbeing of the poor in the SADC. Even when the concept of ‘needy’ is redefined further to imply requirements for survival, in which case the failure to provide for the need would be life threatening, the threat to life for poor African people would be greater and more apparent. This justifies the need for wealth redistribution in poor SADC countries further.
Even when this whole concept of poverty remains contested with no precise definitions, the challenges of income and wealth inequalities remain a serious issue in modern society.
(Waldron, 2003). The social and economic needs for the poor African are likely to be exacerbated by the pressures of global neo-liberal capitalist practices. The pressure for redistribution in Africa will continue increasing. In the SADC the pressure is even made worse building from the historical links attached to how income and wealth inequalities were introduced by deliberate colonial policies and laws. The well-off will continue to resist the arguments for wealth redistribution. Some of their arguments are based on the morality of some of the redistribution methods. Such is the African economic ethic of indigenisation. Some of the resistance has not come from the local prosperous but external investors who in some countries are given conditions for investment which require them to accommodate more indigenous people in their business ownership structures.
A lot of interesting ethical debates and issues come up in relation to the whole idea of wealth redistribution. Some of the wealth inequalities arise from the neo-liberal capitalist market practices. In this case liberal capitalist practices are perceived as good for improving economic efficiency or wealth maximisation (Waldron, 2003:39). For most poor and economically weaker African people they have no capacity to compete with economically and technically more efficient and powerful global players making them sink into perpetual poverty. In this context neo-liberal capitalist practices can be said to be good for wealth creation but poor in wealth distribution. The need for deliberate measures to regulate the so-called free market becomes unavoidable if wealth is to be distributed or redistributed is in order improve the welfare of the poor. By redistribution wealth is moved from the prosperous to the poor. For the prosperous they
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may not realise any harm or threat to their well-being while for the poor an improvement in their wellbeing would be expected. This conforms the utilitarianist thinking of welfare maximisation through the realisation of ‘betterness’ in the lives of those who were economically less privileged. In this perspective, wealth redistribution would be taken as ethical. The well-off would argue against redistribution as unethical on the basis that it rewards irresponsible behaviour in the poorer members of society. Furthermore, they would argue that redistributive efforts disrespect the fact that the well-off are morally entitled (Waldron, 2003: 39). At least for wealth that is acquired through market rules such as “transfers to be done with consent”, the arguments of the well-off will be valid. In this case the poor would be assumed to have become poor because of their free-will or choice. But in circumstances where the well-off would have acquired wealth through discriminative practices or laws, then the arguments of the wealth would require recasting. Ill-gotten wealth would be illegal wealth requiring that it be given back to those who were deprived through some form of compensation or restitution. The challenge is on how far back one should go in tracing for the rightful acquisition of property. Little (2003: 39) suggested that not more than one transaction backward would be acceptable. His suggestion was informed by the fact that it would difficult to trace from the earlier generation that benefitted through to the present generation and identifying the exact beneficiaries of ill-gotten wealth.
Nozick (1974) noted that past unjust acquisition, caused harm to many people. His entitlement theory is anchored on just acquisition. Nozick (1974) noted further that it is difficult to identify the descendants of those who were affected by unjust acquisition. But for the African society the challenge of identifying the descendants of beneficiaries and victims of unjust acquisition may not be difficult as not so many generations have passed from the colonial era.
One form of wealth redistribution is through tax systems. This approach has been criticised by philosophers for making it compulsory for those with resources to take care of the poor and less privileged. Helping the poor is regarded as morally right but the tax system makes it compulsory for people to contribute to the welfare of others. By making it compulsory, the tax systems take away the liberty and freedom of choice from those being taxed. That aspect has been criticised as immoral. Those wishing to assist in poverty alleviation should be allowed to do it freely out of their own will. This would give them the moral satisfaction of having exercised their freedom and liberty to distribute their wealth (Waldron 2003).
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Distinguishing the case of taxation from redistribution arising from historical injustices such as what informs the African ethical of indigenisation, Waldron (2003) argued that those with ill- gotten wealth have no reason to refer to such efforts as unjust. Waldron (2003: 44) argued that where the poor complain that their poverty was a result of past injustices, where there was unfair treatment and discrimination of their ancestors in the initial distribution or accumulation of wealth, then those who benefitted, or their descendants will have a weak argument. Those deprived of wealth would argue that their wealth and livelihood were stolen, and they were never given an opportunity through the justice system then to claim back their wealth and restore their livelihood. Waldron compared this case to that of a burglar who would complain when their ill- gotten wealth is taken back to their victims. This would not in any sense be immoral. Poverty alleviation becomes the least that justice can do in cases where there was injustice in the initial wealth distribution (Waldron 2003). Indigenisation is one such ethic which has been conceived by the post-colonial African states to redistribute wealth to the poor black people who argue that they were treated unfairly by the colonial system and deprived of the opportunity to acquire wealth. The fundamental principle of wealth redistribution from those who acquired it in unjust ways, or their descendants, to those who were discriminated against, or their descendants, is morally beyond question, for as long as the redistribution itself is not done in a way that creates another favoured social group. A fair way of redistributing the wealth will have to be found. The redistribution should not benefit the few well-connected leaving out the majority. While the issue of poverty becomes an issue of welfare rights which invites its own moral debate it must be understood, as Little (2003) argued, that the poverty in most post-colonial African states can be attributed to earlier injustices and discrimination.
Other than addressing the issue of wealth redistribution from a welfare rights perspective, the need to secure justice for those who were economically subjugated by colonial manipulation is unquestionable. Nozick (2001) also argued that a distribution of wealth is just if it is as a result of another just distribution through legitimate means. A just way of acquiring property or wealth requires agreement guided by free will in the transactions by both the receiver and the giver.
Furthermore, both the giver and receiver must be availed with equal opportunities to all options available. This comes from the justice of fairness as argued by Rawls (2001: 178). Rawls (2001) argued that social and economic inequalities such as those of wealth and authority can be
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regarded as just only if they lead to compensating benefits to everyone. In this view, redistribution policies such as the African economic ethic of indigenisation can be regarded as delivering justice because they lead to compensation even though there is unequal treatment.