PDF Evidence Law - Theory - StudentVIP

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Evidence Law - Theory

Contents ... 1

Pleadings and Prosecuting Accusatorial Justice [1.1.2] ... 10

Pre-Court Processes [1.1.2] ... 10

Criminal Trials [1.1.5] ... 11

The Process of a Criminal Trial ... 9

The ‘Fundamental Principle’ of the Common Law [1.1.8] ... 12

Lee v NSW Crime Commission [2013] ... 12

Screening Weak Cases and Disclosure [1.1.10] ... 13

Regulatory Offences ... 13

Indictable Offences ... 14

Committal Hearings ... 14

Guiding Principles in Criminal Pleadings [1.1.12]... 15

Requirements of a Pleading ... 15

The Rule Against Double Jeopardy [1.1.16] ... 16

Guiding Principles in Prosecuting [1.1.17] ... 17

Commonwealth DPP Prosecution Guidelines [2009] ... 17

Likiardopoulous v The Queen [2012]; HCA ... 19

Prosecutors' Disclosure and Fairness Obligations [1.1.23] ... 19

Bar Association Rules ... 20

Criminal Procedure Act ss 141, 142 ... 20

Criminal Procedure Act s 144 ... 21

Proof, Adjudication, Advocacy and the Jury Trial Defence Disclosure [1.1.32] ... 22

Criminal Procedure Act s 143 ... 22

Adversarialism: Strength, Weaknesses and Rules of Engagement [1.2.2]... 24

Prosecutors' In-court Fair Trial Obligations [1.2.4] ... 24

Libke v R (2007); HCA ... 24

The Art of Proof [1.2.14] ... 25

Advocacy [1.2.14] ... 25

The Jury [1.1.16] ... 26

The Mechanics of Proof [1.2.18] ... 26

Substantiating Facts for Admitting Evidence [1.2.21] ... 27

Evidence Act s 142 ... 27

Judges [1.2.22] ... 28

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Aytugrul v R [2012] HCA ... 29

Introduction [1.3.2] ... 31

Fairness [1.3.3] ... 31

Right of a Fair Trial [1.3.4] ... 31

Rectitude of Verdict / Truth-Seeking [1.3.4] ... 31

Presuming Innocence – Accusatorial Trials [1.3.6] ... 32

Presumption of Innocence and the Accusatorial Trial: Practice [1.3.9]... 32

R v FEW (No 2) [2013] NSWSC ... 33

The Uniform Evidence Act [1.4.2] ... 37

The Structure of the UEA [1.4.5] ... 38

Starting with Relevance [1.4.6] ... 39

Evidence Act ss 55, 56 ... 39

Rationalism and Relevance (Vol. 1, Ch. 4, p. 7) ... 41

R v (Mundarra) Smith (2001) HCA ... 42

Evans v R [2007] HCA ... 43

Probative Value and Unreliability [1.4.13] ... 43

R v Burton [2013] NSW CCA ... 43

Discretionary Exclusions and the Mandatory ‘Discretion’ [1.4.26]... 47

R v Stephenson ... 48

The Danger of Unfair Prejudice [1.4.28] ... 48

Probative Value Outweighed by Danger of Unfair Prejudice [1.4.30] ... 49

Aytugral v R [2012]; HCA ... 49

Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v JG [2010]; NSWCCA ... 50

Discretion to Limit the Use to be Made of Evidence [1.4.38] ... 51

Papakosmas v R (1999); HCA ... 51

Discretionary Exclusion: Unfairness and Illegality [1.4.41] ... 52

138... : Exclusion of improperly or illegally obtained evidence 52 Witness competency [1.5.2] ... 53

Compellability and the Witness [1.5.7] ... 55

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The Witness in the Box [1.5.9] ... 57

Evidence Act ss 26, 27, 28, 29 ... 57

Children as Witnesses [1.5.9] ... 57

Inter-Cultural Communication [1.5.12] ... 59

Evaluating Witnesses [1.5.14] ... 59

State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions (1999) HCA ... 59

Whisprun v Dixon (2003) HCA ... 60

Measures for Special Types of Witnesses ... 61

Evidence Act ss 30, 31 ... 61

Structure of a Trial [1.5.18] ... 61

Examination in Chief [1.5.18] ... 62

Leading Questions (Vol. 1, Ch. 5, p. 19) ... 62

R v Gordon-Brietzke [2012] Canada ... 64

Testifying After Time [1.5.25] ... 65

The Lying Witness [1.5.27] ... 65

The Unfavourable Witness [1.5.29] ... 67

Adam v R (2001) – HCA ... 68

R v SH, MV and KC (2011) – ACT SC ... 69

Gilham v R (2012) – NSWCCA ... 70

DPP v Bourband (2011) – Vic SC ... 71

Re-Examination of Own Witness [1.5.46] ... 72

Prior Consistent Statements & Rehabilitating Credibility [1.5.46] ... 73

KNP v R [2006] NSWCCA ... 73

Reopening the Prosecution Case [1.5.49] ... 74

R v Chin (1985) HCA ... 74

Cross Examination [1.6.3] ... 76

Credibility [1.6.5] ... 77

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R v Peacock ... 77

The Credibility Rule [1.6.7] ... 77

Evidence Act s 101A ... 78

Determining Whether Evidence is Relevant Solely to Credibility [1.6.10]... 79

Piddington v Bennett and Wool Pty Ltd (1940) HCA ... 79

Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) HCA ... 80

Cross Examination and Credibility Evidence [1.6.15]... 81

R v Lodhi [2006] NSW SC ... 81

Exceptions to the Finality Rule [1.6.19] ... 82

Companhurst Shire Council v Watt [2005] NSW CA ... 82

Bias, Motive for Being Untruthful [1.6.22]... 83

Nicholls v R [2005] HCA ... 83

Kamm v R [2008] NSW CCA ... 83

Has Been Convicted of an Offence, Including an Offence Against the Law of a Foreign Country [1.6.26] ... 84

Prior Inconsistent Statements ... 84

Adam v R (2001) HCA ... 85

Copmanhurst Shire Council v Watt [2005] NSW CA ... 85

Inability to be Aware of Matters to Which His / Her Evidence Relates [1.6.29] ... 85

Knowingly or recklessly making a false representation despite a legally imposed obligation to tell the truth [1.6.30] ... 86

The Ambit of Questioning [1.6.30] ... 86

Stack v the State of Western Australia [2004] WA CA ... 86

Improper Questioning [1.6.33] ... 86

The Rule in Browne v Dunn [1.6.40] ... 88

Ashby v Slipper [2014] FCAFC ... 88

Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd [2011]; HCA ... 89

New South Wales v Hunt [2014]; NSWCA ... 90

R v Birks (1990); NSWCA ... 90

MWJ v R (2005); HCA ... 91

The Hearsay Rule [1.7.1] ... 93

History of the Hearsay Rule [1.7.3] ... 94

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What is Hearsay? [1.7.10] ... 95

Representation [1.7.11] ... 95

Evidence Act Dictionary ... 95

Previous Representation [1.7.12] ... 96

Evidence Act Dictionary ... 96

Made by a Person [1.7.12] ... 96

Hansen Beverage Co v Bickfords (Australia) Pty Ltd [2008] FCA ... 96

The Purpose Test [1.7.14] ... 96

Intended Assertions of Fact [1.7.17] ... 98

Non-hearsay previous representations [1.7.19] ... 99

Exception – First Hand Hearsay [2.8.7] ... 102

s 65 – criminal proceedings, maker of the representation unavailable ... 103

UEA Dictionary ... 105

Section 65(2)(a): Representation Made under a Duty [2.8.21] ... 107

Section 65(2)(b): Representations Made in Circumstances that Make it Unlikely that there are Fabrications [2.8.22] ... 107

Section 65(2)(c): Representations made in circumstances that make it highly probable that they are reliable [2.8.26] ... 108

Section 65(2)(d): Representations made against interest [2.8.28] ... 108

Section 65(3)-(6): Evidence in an Australian proceeding [Vol 2.8.30] ... 109

Section 65(8): Defence Evidence [2.8.31] ... 109

Section 65(9): “Retaliatory hearsay” [2.8.35] ... 110

Section 66: Criminal Proceedings, maker of the representation available [2.8.36] ... 110

Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 66 ... 110

Section 66A: Contemporaneous Representations about a Person's Health, Feelings, etc [2.8.44] ... 112

Second Hand Hearsay and Business Records [2.8.47] ... 113

Representations with Dual Relevance – Hearsay and Non-Hearsay [2.8.55] ... 115

Adam v The Queen [2001]; HCA ... 115

Welsh v The Queen; NSWCA ... 115

Reliability warning [2.8.62] ... 116

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Who are Defendants? [2.9.2] ... 117

Where does the Defendant sit in Court? [2.9.3] ... 117

The Defendant in the Witness Box [2.9.5] ... 117

Cross-Examining the Defendant on Credibility Evidence [2.9.5] ... 117

Evidence Act s 108B ... 118

Prosecution Cross-Examination of the Defendant [2.9.7] ... 118

R v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 455 ... 119

The Cut-Throat Defence Trial [2.9.13] ... 121

Madubuko v R [2011] NSWCCA 135 ... 122

The Co-Accused Cross Examination of the Defendant [2.9.13] ... 122

Calling Expert Evidence of the Character of a Co-Accused (Vol. 2, Ch. 9, p. 14) ... 122

Unavailable Defendants [2.9.19] ... 123

R v Gee [2012] SA ... 124

R v Iliev ... 125

The Right to Silence in Court [2.9.24] ... 126

Burke v R [2013] VSCA 351... 128

The Defendant’s Lies [2.9.40] ... 131

SW v R [2013] NSW CCA ... 132

Defining ‘Character’ [2.10.4] ... 134

What is a Person’s Character? [2.10.6] ... 134

Overview of the Tendency and Coincidence Rule [2.10.9] ... 135

Evidence Act ss 97, 98, 101 ... 135

Makin v AG (NSW) [1894] AC 57 ... 137

Evidence adduced other than for a tendency or coincidence purpose [2.10.14] ... 137

Relationship Evidence [2.10.14] ... 138

Context Evidence [2.10.17] ... 138

Transactional evidence [2.10.20] ... 138

Tendency Evidence [2.10.22] ... 139

DAO v R [2011] NSWCCA ... 139

R v PWD [2010]; NSWCCA ... 140

Concoction, unreliability and significant probative value [2.10.37] ... 141

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Coincidence Evidence (Vol. 2, Ch. 10, p. 45) ... 143

Gilham v R [2012] NSW CCA... 143

Samit & Djait v R [2008] NSW CCA ... 144

R v Pfennig (1995) HCA per McHugh J (dissenting, but dissent confirmed in Ellis) ... 145

R v Ellis [2003] NSW ... 146

R v Folbigg [2003] NSW CCA ... 147

An Abridged History of Character Evidence and Directions [2.11.1] ... 148

Evidence Act Part 3.8 Character (ss 109-112) ... 148

Bishop v R (2013) – VSCA ... 149

Huges (a Pseudonym) v R (2013) ... 150

Intro to Opinion Evidence [2.12.2] ... 154

The exclusionary opinion rule in s 76 [2.12.4] ... 154

Lay Opinion Evidence in s 78 [2.12.5] ... 155

R v Whyte (2006) – NSWCCA ... 155

R v Smith (1999) – NSWCCA ... 156

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs (s 78A) [2.12.12] ... 157

Expert Opinion evidence: s 79 UEA [2.12.13] ... 157

In the matter of Pan Pharmaceuticals Limited (in liquidation) [2008]; FCA ... 159

Ad-hoc expert evidence (i.e. frauds doing expert impressions) [2.12.29] ... 159

Li v R [2003] NSWCCA ... 160

R v Tang [2006]; NSWCCA ... 160

Expert reports and Codes of Conduct [2.12.35] ... 161

Experts Code of Conduct (Uniform Civil Procedure Rules) ... 161

Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Association (Europe) OV v Jetopay P/L [2000]; FCA ... 162

'Common Knowledge' and 'Ultimate Issue' rules: s 80 UEA [2.12.38] ... 162

Cadbury Schweppes P/L v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops P/L [2007]; FCA ... 162

Expert evidence of 'fact' [2.12.41] ... 163

Misidentification and Miscarriages of Justice [2.13.2] ... 164

Innocence Projects and Miscarriages of Justice [2.13.7] ... 164

Recognising the Need for Caution: Admissibility, Weight and Warnings [2.13.8]... 165

Domican v R [1992] HCA ... 165

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The Uniform Evidence Act and Identification Evidence (Vol 2, Ch 13, p. 13) ... 166

Evidence Act dictionary ... 166

Recognition, Identification and Circumstantial Identification Evidence [2.13.14] ... 167

Evidence Act s 114, 115 ... 167

Festa v R [2001]; HCA ... 169

What Else is Left Out of the UEA? [2.13.17] ... 170

Overview of Australian Law on Voice Identification [2.13.17] ... 170

Section 114 and Visual Identification Evidence [2.13.23] ... 172

Evidence Act s 114... 172

Ilioski v R [2006] NSW CCA ... 173

DPP v Walford [2011] NSW SC ... 173

Identification from Images [2.13.30] ... 175

R v Carpenter [2011] ACT SC ... 176

Assisting the Jury in their Assessment of the Reliability of Identification Evidence [2.13.51] ... 177

Dupas v R [2012] Vic SC ... 177

s 116 – the obligation to warn the jury (identification evidence) [2.13.39] ... 178

Ilioski v R [2006]; NSWCCA ... 179

Dupas v R [2012]; VICSCA ... 181

First Generation of Judicial Warnings: Corroboration [2.14.3] ... 183

Second Generation of Judicial Warnings: Post-Corroboration 'Modern' Warning [2.14.6] ... 183

Delay and Forensic Disadvantage [2.14.8] ... 184

The Causes and Impacts of Delay [2.14.10] ... 184

The Delay Warning [2.14.13] ... 184

Evidence Act s 165B ... 184

The Third Generation of Judicial Warnings: Evidence of a Kind that May be Unreliable [2.14.17]... 185

R v Grey ... 186

Other Directions ... 186

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The Process of a Criminal Trial

Indictment •Separate hearing

Opening

•Crown Opening

•Defence Opening

Crown Case

•EIC of each witness by prosecutor (constructive process)

•Crown witnesses XX'd by defence (destructive process)

•Option for prosecution to re-examine Crown witnesses.

Defence Case

•EIC of each defence witness

(traditionally, the accused is first to give testimony if he decides to do so)

•XX by Crown

Prosecution re-opening

•Exceptional

Closing

•Prosecution

•Defence

•Judge's summing up and directions

Jury deliberations

•Verdict - jury determine facts in issue.

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Pleadings and Prosecuting

Accusatorial Justice [1.1.2]

‘Accusatorial justice’ is defined in X7 v Australian Crime Commission [2013]:

The whole of the process... is accusatorial. It is accusatorial in the sense that an accused person is not called on to make any answer to an allegation...or charge...until the prosecuting authorities have made available to the accused particulars of the evidence... And even after that information has been provided, the accused person need say or do nothing more than enter a plea of guilty or not guilty to the charge... He or she is entitled to put the prosecution to proof of the charge and, as part of that process, to test the strength of the evidence which the prosecution adduces at trial. The only relevant limit on the accused person’s testing of the strength of the prosecution’s case is provided by [their] instructions to their lawyer. The lawyer cannot test the prosecution case in a manner inconsistent with the accused person's instructions.

Pre-Court Processes [1.1.2]

Court processes are greatly influenced by pre-court processes which determine whether a trial takes place, a charge is laid, and whether a case is weak or strong.

• Traditionally, the common law adversarial/accusatorial model sees the pre-trial stage as preparatory, and the trial is the ‘main event’. [Compare with America which is a ‘system of pleas, not a system of trials,’

emphasising the concept of ‘negotiated justice’.]

• Crime investigation involves identifying suspects, gathering evidence (witness statements, real evidence (eg, objects), electronic surveillance, phone intercepts, etc) and sometimes electronically recording interviews with suspected persons (ERISPs).

o s 306U Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) – Electronically recorded allegations may also be used as a complainant’s examination-in-chief in court where the complainant a “vulnerable person” (e.g. a child or cognitively impaired person).

• Not all evidence will be admissible at trial. Some of it (such as witness statements) will be used primarily to indicate the oral evidence a witness is expected to give at the trial itself.

Presumption of innocence: provides that suspects are not obliged to assist the State in its prosecution of criminal charges. The most obvious pre-trial rights related to the presumption of innocence are:

• Right to Privacy: Police cannot just march into a suspect’s house to search for evidence;

• Right to Silence: Police cannot demand a suspect explain his or her whereabouts, motivations or feelings;

• Right to liberty: Police cannot detain or lock up a suspect because it is more convenient than allowing them to remain at large.

However, these rights are not absolute. The defendant is not always trusted and the State is not always adequately scrutinised or controlled. This is particularly true when a suspect is in police custody.

• Issues include: corruption, misconduct akin to police-sanctioned kidnapping, ‘verballing’ (script-writing

‘confessions’), evidence tampering and manufacture.

• Reforms include: electronic recording of interviews, custody officers, statutory obligations to inform of, caution about and provide direct protection for rights.

• Gatehouse symbolism: (Kamisar 1965), police stations as the ‘gatehouse’ to the courtroom

‘mansion’/‘temple’ where the accused’s rights were respected.

Prosecutors do not supervise police. However, sometimes their failure to investigate misconduct in pre-trial procedures has meant trials rely on distorted or false information.

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• Gaudron J in Deitrich v R [1992] notes that a ‘perfect investigation is impossible.’ She believes that the trial stage of the criminal process should respond to any pre-trial disempowerment of the suspect that has gone unchecked, stating that the trial stage is ‘the stage for a retrospective check on evidence gathering, investigation and prosecution decision-making. It is the locus of redress for a defendant who claims to have been wronged by investigators. The court reviews and rules on police misconduct. It can retrospectively, within boundaries, make good lost rights, though it cannot substitute its own view for that of the police or the prosecutor’s decisions. Instead, investigative illegality and impropriety is addressed through the judicial discretion to exclude evidence so obtained.

• Compare this with Kirby J in Em v R [2006]: he observed that ‘subterfuge, ruses and tricks may be lawfully employed by police, acting in the public interest. There is nothing improper in these tactics where they are lawfully deployed in an endeavour to investigate crime so as to bring the guilty to justice.’

Criminal Trials [1.1.5]

Whilst many perceive of the criminal jury trial as representing the gold standard of justice, it cannot guarantee perfect justice. One only needs to examine documented miscarriages of justice to recognise that there are larger social, political, human and resource challenges that pervade the criminal justice system more generally.

There are two main systems of trial operating in the world: [p4]

Adversarial Trial Inquisitorial Trial

• Parties determine the witnesses they call, the evidence that is before the court, the questions to be asked of witnesses and the issues to be contested.

• Presiding judge defers to the parties on the substance of the ‘contest’ while ensuring rules of process and evidence are adhered to. Judges cannot raise new issues or XX witnesses.

• Has a more nuanced division between crime investigation and charge adjudication.

• A judicial figure overseas an investigatory inquiry and compiles a dossier which is before the judge at the trial phase who conducts the main questioning. Adversarialism is

‘muted’.

• The trial is not the ‘main event’. Rather, the matter proceeds via episodic hearings where issues are clarified further. Rules of evidence tend to be minimal because it is for the court to weigh all the evidence, even including criminal histories.

• It is often observed that the inquisitorial and adversarial traditions are converging, but in Australia this is generally limited to the civil sphere in which case management is now the norm.

• Victims: Unlike France and Germany, Australia does not recognise that the alleged victim has a special place in the trial and therefore victims have no entitlement to separate representation or compensation.

• ‘Convergence’ of the two systems is imperfect and will remain so because the inquisitorial and common law traditions are informed by different philosophies; the State as ‘safe hands’ vs the parties as ‘drivers’.

o Inquisitorial: State guides the process. [p5]

o Our CL system places the most trust in the individual rather than the State. Parties direct the process.

o An example of ‘ideological chafing’ bw the two models is the insertion of an inquisitorial element into the adversarial framework through compulsory examination powers exercised by commissions of enquiry, (eg, Australian Crime Commission (ACC)) (ie, investigative bodies have inquisitorial powers).

- Hayne and Bell JJ: It is repugnant to fundamental civil liberties and accusatorial justice to restrict an accused’s right to silence. In the accusatorial system the accused is not called on to answer any allegations, need not say anything, entitled to put the Pros ‘to proof’. [p8]

- Hayne and Bell JJ have noted that forcing a defendant to give information under compulsion prejudices their defence to pending charges, as the accused would have to shape their defence in light of the answers they gave (esp. self-incriminating) under examination (X7 v ACC).

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- ‘Direct use immunity’ applies to information gleaned from compulsory examination; ie it is inadmissible in criminal proceedings. Answers given may be used to find other ev.

• Conclusion: Legislature may try to change the criminal justice system but they can’t prevent the philosophical resistance or practical legal limitations of potential convergence.

o Note: Under the ‘principle of legality’ any legislative change must conform to Constitutional

protections and where it seeks to take away rights its must do so by clear express words or intention (X7 v ACC). General words will rarely be suff to show a clear intention to abrogate fundamental rights, freedoms or immunities.

The ‘Fundamental Principle’ of the Common Law [1.1.8]

It is a fundamental principle of the common law is that the prosecution must discharge its onus of proof without compelling the accused to give evidence.

The principle is recognised as a human right in international instruments.

Approach of the HCA to the fundamental principle:

o X7 v ACC - HC held a strong rights-protective stance.

o Lee (No 1) - Less rigorous approach to rights, no danger of prejudice to his defence.

o Lee (No 2) - Heavy emphasis of the fundamental principle.

o Zhao - Back to previous vigilant protective stance towards rights of the accused.

• X7 v ACC: HCA held the legislation didn’t show a clear intention to restrict an accused’s right to silence, so no compulsory examination prior to a pending criminal prosecution (even if it is secret).

Lee v NSW Crime Commission (Lee (No 1)) [2013] HCA

Held: [HCA, 4:3 split] Held that the governing legislation was adequate in its clear treatment of accused rights (including the fact that criminal asset recovery occurs concurrently with criminal charges and a

Supreme Ct judge had inherent power to protect the fairness of the processes.

Keifel J at [174]:

• The golden thread of criminal law is that it is the prosecution’s duty to prove the accused's guilt.

This is consistent with the presumption of an accused's innocence.

It finds expression as a fundamental principle of Australian common law.

• The ‘fundamental principle’:

The Pros must discharge its onus of proof without compelling the accused to give ev.

o “The privilege against self-incrimination reflects the long-standing antipathy of the CL to compulsory interrogations about criminal conduct” (French CJ).

• EPA v Caltex: The Pros cannot compel the accused to assist in the discharge of its burden of proof.

• Trial by jury is a constitutional right under s 80 of the Constitution and any derogation from this institution raises Constitutional questions.

The golden thread has given rise to substantive and procedural rights and protections, including:

o The Pros must prove its case BRD: s 141(1) Ev Act.

o An accused person is not competent to give evidence as a witness for the prosecution: s 17(2) Ev Act.

o Evidence of a statement made by a person under arrest is obtained improperly if the person was not cautioned: s 139(1) Evidence Act.

o The magistrate hearing committal proceedings must discharge the accused if they consider the evidence incapable of satisfying a jury to the requisite standard that the accused has committed an indictable offence: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW).

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o ‘Right to silence’: persons suspected of committing a crime are immune from having to answer police questions (more accurately, a right that no one is required to be his own betrayer). There are therefore rules about involuntary or unfairly obtained confessions.

Fair trial: “so elementary as to need no authority to support it”

To ensure a ‘fair trial’, it has been said that the following are needed:

o Sufficient particulars of an alleged offence should be provided by the Pros;

o The prosecution should make available material evidence;

o The judge should give such directions to the jury as are necessary to ensure a fair trial;

o The accused should give notice of an alibi, etc.

However, there has been no judicial attempt to list exhaustively the attributes of a fair trial.

Lee (No 2) [2014] HCA

Issue: Would it prejudice the accused’s rights to be compulsorily examined wrt their financial affairs?

Disclosure of info from the Lees’ compulsory examination to Prosecution.

Held: Unauthorised disclosure amounted to a removal of the privilege against self-incrimination and fundamentally altered the position of the trial. [unanimous verdict]

o The wrongful release and possession of the confidential ev was contrary to the legislation’s purpose of protecting the fair trial of accused persons.

AFP v Zhao (Zhao) [2015] HCA

Facts: Jin concerned that if the civil proceedings went ahead he would be XX’d wrt his property and source of his funds, which was directly relevant to his criminal charges. Ie, waive his right to silence.

Issue: Would Jin’s right to a fair trial be prejudiced by having to give ev?

Held: Zhao granted stay of proceedings for recovery of proceeds of crime because if he defended the civil action it he would compromise his defence in a criminal trial.

o Risk of jeopardising fair trial rights / prejudicing his defence in the criminal trial.

Cts will not grant a stay of proceedings merely because related criminal charges are pending.

Screening Weak Cases and Disclosure [1.1.10]

The traditional division between summary offences (those determined summarily by a magistrate) and indictable offences (determined by a jury in a higher court) has faded due to statute redefining and refining the nature of offences and how they can be summarised. Nowadays regulatory offences are more prominent.

In addition to the court process acting as a way of screening a case to determine its strength prior to trial, the DPP undertake a similar task, with guidelines stating that a prosecution should not proceed if there is no reasonable prospects of a conviction (CDPP Prosecution Policy (2009) [2.5], see also ODPP Prosecution Guidelines (2007) s 4).

Regulatory Offences

Pro-prosecution (eg absolute liability); bureaucratic transaction encouraged

Regulatory offences are those where the mens rea standard is one of strict or absolute liability.

• Eg, driving /parking infringements, fishing without a recreational license, taking a plant from national park.

The process of determining regulatory offences is more like a bureaucratic (or consumer) transaction than traditional, court-based adjudication.