_______________________________________________________ PROCEDURE TITLE: STATUS: DATE ISSUED:

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_______________________________________________________

PROCEDURE TITLE:

STATUS:

DATE ISSUED:

REVIEW DUE ^:

PREPARED BY:

REVIEWED BY:

APPROVED BY:

_______________________________________________________

COB Emergency Action Plan

Revision 4

December 2011

December 2012

Robbin Britton

TrustPower Review Team

• Bruce Walpole

• Thomas Fritz

• Ciska Vogelzang

Deion Campbell

General Manager Generation

_______________________________________________________

Emergency Action Plan

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REVISION LOG

DATE REVISION NO.

DETAILS SECTION No.

PAGE No.

28/10/06 1 Procedure reviewed by PC &

generic format changes added 30/10/08 2 Annual update incorporating

generic changes (BCL File Ref:

TP1320, 30/10/08) 10/12/10 3 Annual update incorporating

generic changes (BCL File Ref:

TP1320, 10/12/10)

12/11 4 Annual update incorporating

generic changes (TPW File Ref:

TP1320/2011_Cobb 1/11/11)

LIST OF PLAN HOLDERS

Electronic copy published on TPL intranet. This document has been distributed to:

COPY

NO. DISTRIBUTION LIST/HOLDER

1 Te Maunga Operations Centre C/o Mr Bruce Walpole

2 Hydro Stations – Wairau C/o Mr John Brockway

3 For other recipients of these EAP and SOP documents refer to TrustPower’s Emergency Contact list titled “EAP Distribution List.xls”. This list which is updated regularly is available from TrustPower’s Te Maunga office. Other recipients include contacts of local CDEM personnel, regional and local authorities, Police and Fire Services etc.

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3

TrustPower, the scheme owner, is responsible for issuing, maintaining and updating this Emergency Action Plan (EAP), all SOP’s and the Scheme Contact List. These documents will be updated by TrustPower on an annual basis and issued to each Production Coordinator on the date stated on the cover of each document. Electronic copies will also be made available on TrustPower’s Intranet website.

4 DEFINITIONS

Emergency is a situation that has the potential to seriously and adversely affect the environment, lives or property external to TrustPower.

Emergency Declaration is made by the Generation Asset Manager who is the Emergency Manager. Refer Contact List for details.

Warnings are issued by the Production Coordinator in conjunction with the NZ Police directly to affected public repeating the Emergency Declaration in Appendix 1.

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5

5 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

5.1 Emergency Declaration & Procedure

An Emergency is declared when all attempts have failed using Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to control the situation. In the event of an Emergency being declared the procedure to be followed is that shown in Figure 5.1.

The declaration is made early enough to maximise the effectiveness of any actions and this is re-iterated in the SOPs.

The Generation Asset Manager (who is the Emergency Manager) declares the Emergency after receiving appropriate advice from the Production Coordinator and the Hydro Development Manager.

Upon Emergency Declaration Production Coordinator rings the people and organisations detailed in Section 5.2. The Production Coordinator gives them details of the situation and faxes the confirmation in Appendix 1.

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Figure 5.1. Emergency Procedure

Potential event identified

Event reported to TrustPower management

Emergency Manager determines whether EAP should be implemented

No

Implement SOP

Yes Emergency Manager declares Emergency and determines priorities (Refer Section 8)

Production Coordinator implements Notification Procedure (Refer Section 5.2)

Mitigation Action Phase (seek engineering advice)

Intensify surveillance

monitoring Identify

mechanism Assess criticality

Take mitigation actions

Assess effectiveness of mitigation actions and determine if further action required.

Yes

No Situation controlled/Emergency over

Notify all affected parties

Complete incident records

Update status every 3 hours and notify affected parties

Initiation PhaseEAP PhaseCompletion Phase

Continue routine monitoring

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7 5.2 Emergency Management Team

Established upon declaration of Emergency: Figure 5.2 is the notification procedure to be implemented in the event of an Emergency. Numbers show priority contact order. Refer to Scheme Contact List for phone numbers.

Figure 5.2. EAP Notification Procedure

5.3 Team Roles

Generation Asset Manager (who is the Emergency Manager)

- If the Generation Asset Manager is unavailable then the Divisional Manager shall take up the role or appoint an appropriate nomineein his or her absence

- Has authority to co-opt additional resources such as TrustPower personnel and external support services

- Receives advice from the Production Coordinator and the Hydro Development Manager on the situation

- Declares an Emergencyand determines priorities for emergency management - Manages the Emergency Response

- Provides regular updates to the TPL Communications Manager Manager

Generation Division Deion Campbell

Emergency Manager:

Asset Manager Generation

Production Coordinator Cobb

John Brockway

Down stream landowners (if known – refer scheme contact list) On-Site

O & M Staff including

Duty Operator

Other Resources

e.g.

Regional Operating

Staff Surveillance

&

Monitoring Staff

Te Maunga Operations

Centre*

Dam Engineering

Advisers Riley Consultants

Ltd

TPL Human Resources Manager

TPL Communications

Manager Graeme Purches Hydro Development

Manager Peter Lilley

NZ Police Civil Defence

(CDEM), Regional and Local Councils

Ongoing Liaison Ongoing

Liaison

1 1

1

1 1

1

2

2 2

3

4

5

6

*Note: After an earthquake the Te Maunga Operations Centre may not be available.

*Please send a text if you get no reply, staff in meetings may read messages but not answer phones.

Media &

Other Stakeholder

s 2

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- Communicates with the Generation Division Manager

- Maximises continuity of service without increasing the scale of the Emergency - Liaises with insurers

Production Coordinator

- If the Production Coordinator is unavailable then the Emergency Manager shall take up the role or appoint an appropriate nominee in his or her absence

- Has authority to co-opt additional resources such as TrustPower personnel and external support services

- Takes advice from the Hydro Development Manager on the situation and makes recommendations to the Generation Asset Manager

- After the Emergency has been declared, informs the NZ Police, Local Council and CDEM and manages the ongoing liaison.

- Manages staff resources, equipment, plant and materials - Monitors financial commitments and status

- Ensures staff welfare

- Manages surveillance and monitoring activities

- Manages site response of Operational and Maintenance staff Duty Operator

- If requested by Production Coordinator, liaises directly with NZ Police, Regional and Local Councils and CDEM

- Only if requested by the NZ Police, issues any Warnings directly to specified affected parties

- Receives advice and recommendations from Hydro Development Manager - Manages site response of Operational and Maintenance staff

Hydro Development Manager

- If the Hydro Development Manager is unavailable then the Dam Engineering Advisors, Riley Consultants Ltd (Don Tate) shall step into and carry out the role of Hydro

Development Manager in his or her absence.

- Receives advice and recommendations from Dam Engineering Advisors - Provides engineering advice to the Production Coordinator

Dam Engineering Advisors

- Advises the Hydro Development Manager on appropriate surveillance and monitoring - Receives, analyses and interprets surveillance and monitoring data

- Provides results, conclusions, advice and recommendations to the Hydro Development Manager

Communications Manager

- Establishes and maintains effective communications with the media and other external stakeholders.

- Informs TrustPower staff of situations and development

Surveillance and Monitoring Staff

- Continue to implement the appropriate standard operating procedures

- Undertake additional or changed inspections as directed by the Hydro Development Manager

On-Site Operational & Maintenance Staff

- The Duty Operator is a member of the Operational & Maintenance Staff - Continue to implement the appropriate standard operating procedures - Undertake additional or changed actions if directed by the Duty Operator - Undertake Surveillance and Monitoring actions if no specialised staff on site Te Maunga Operations Staff – if available

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9 Regional Operating Staff

- Remain on standby and provide assistance as required.

5.4 Site Emergency Equipment

Item Location √ Item √ Location

4WD vehicle and petrol In TPL Surveillance Car

Access keys (standard TPL plus forestry access gate)

COB Power Station

Mobile phone With TPL Staff Laminated Inspection Checklists In TPL

Surveillance Car 2-way radio In TPL Surveillance

Car

Water sample bottles & labels COB Power Station Torch (water proofed),

batteries & spotlight

In TPL Surveillance Car

Hydraulic Portapack ?

First Aid kit In TPL Surveillance Car

3m tape COB Power

Station

Water well dipper COB Power Station Wet weather gear In TPL

Surveillance Car

Camera With Production

Coordinator

Tow rope In TPL

Surveillance Car Note book and pencil In TPL Surveillance

Car

Hard hat COB Power

Station

Shovel In TPL Surveillance

Car

Chainsaw COB Power

Station

Can of dazzle COB Power Station Waders In TPL

Surveillance Car Wheel Chains (in case of

ice and/or snow)

At Cobb station Oil Spill Equipment COB Power

Station Bolt cutters In TPL Surveillance

Car

Binoculars In TPL

Surveillance Car Air horn In TPL Surveillance

Car

Gas meter¹ COB Power

Station 5.5 Response Actions in Periods of Darkness and Adverse Weather

Personnel involved in implementing this EAP and associated procedures should familiarise themselves beforehand of actions they may need to take during periods of darkness and/or adverse weather. Actions include:

• Keeping oneself safe at all times.

• Reviewing EAP access maps and other scheme layout drawings in Appendix 3. Maps show scheme access gates, primary and secondary access routes, best mobile and radio communication points, helicopter landing sites, roads best accessed by 4WD’s

• Familiarising oneself with the location and manual operation of back-up power supply arrangements at each of the key civil structures such as control gates. Use of back-up power supplies may become necessary in the event of a mains power supply.

• Obtaining copies of monitoring & surveillance instrument data sheets for key observation points identified in this EAP and associated procedures. Refer to TPL Monitoring & Surveillance Data Manual for instrument sheets.

A table outlining the location coordinates (NZTM) of suitable helicopter landing pad sites is included in Appendix 2 of this EAP. However it should be noted that it is up to the pilots to assess suitability of any landing sites due to the proximity of forestry activities/trees and 110kV overhead power cables etc

1 A gas meter must be used whenever entering galleries or other confined spaces under emergency conditions.

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6 POTENTIAL HAZARDS & CONTINGENCY PLANS

Table 6.1 below outlines the potential hazards from hydraulic structures, the likely consequences, contingency plans and warnings that may result from a breach of the structure. Refer to drawings in Appendix 2 showing scheme location.

Potential consequence descriptions have been prepared on the basis of sudden failure of a structure during a sunny day. If a large flood causes the Emergency then the incremental consequence will be less at most but not all locations. Flood maps showing inundated areas resulting from a dambreak of Cobb Dam during a dry day are shown in Figures 6.1, 6.2a and 6.2b provided in Appendix 3.

Specific hydraulic structures are classed according to their Potential Impact Categories (PIC). These categories, as defined in the Building (Dam Safety) Regulations (2008), are based on the potential impact a dam failure could have on people, property and the environment (Refer s4.3, Dam Safety Scheme: Guidance for Regional Authorities & Owners of Large Dams, September 2008).PIC ratings are colour coded as follows:

High PIC is Red Medium PIC is Yellow Low PIC is Green

If time or personnel are limited then complete key operations for those structures categorised greater or equal to Medium PIC.

Aerial maps titled Cobb Hydro – Index Sheet 1, EAP Access Maps Sheets 1 to 4, Drawing L27383, Figure 1 and Drawing 8/1242/83 found in Appendix 3 of the EAP shows the scheme route march including the key visual observation points, monitoring instruments, structures and operations.

Structures are numbered and correlate to numbers given in the checklist tables.

Table 6.1 Potential hazards, consequences, contingency plans and warnings

Breach Of: Hazard Potential

Consequence Actions

Reference in Hydraulic Operating Procedure

Cobb Earth Dam (7)

Water released into the Cobb River

Sudden increase in flow and water level in river.

Scour of abutments, stream banks and erosion damage.

Damage to the spillway and stilling basin structures.

Open the spillway gates (8).

Increase generation at Cobb power station– If no damage to generation facilities and approved by the Production Coordinator (1).

Only if approved by

Generation Asset Manager:

Raise the sluice gate.

Remove the concrete membrane first (10).

Contingency Plan and Warnings

In conjunction with NZ Police and CDEM arrange to dispatch warnings to watercourse users downstream of the breached dam.

Cobb Surge

Chamber (3) No action required as this is a dry chamber.

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11

Breach Of: Hazard Potential

Consequence Actions

Reference in Hydraulic Operating Procedure

Cobb

Penstocks (2)

Water discharges down the

penstock slope towards the Cobb River and

possibly the powerhouse

Scour and erosion of penstock slope.

Possible flooding of Cobb powerhouse.

Close Cobb penstock valves, located at the tunnel outlet portal (if penstock over velocity mechanism has not worked) (6)

Close Cobb dam intake gates (manually on-site) (5).

Only if approved by

Generation Asset Manager:

Raise the sluice stoplogs and open the sluice valve (10).

Contingency Plan and Warnings

In conjunction with NZ Police and CDEM arrange to dispatch warnings to watercourse users immediately downstream of the penstocks and power station. Evacuate Cobb power station personnel.

7 EMERGENCY DEWATERING PLANS

In the event that reservoirs require emergency dewatering then the following procedures outlined in the COB Hydraulic Operating Procedure shall be followed. TrustPower will be developing comprehensive Hydraulic Operating Procedures in 2010/11’

Reservoir Dewatering Procedure Reference

Lake Cobb Section(s)…[state section number(s)..]

8 COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

In the event of an emergency communication will be means of telephone, radio telephone, facsimile and email. Telephones exist at the power station, the tunnel outlet portal and intake structure housing.

Radio telephones exist in three TrustPower vehicles. Presently there is no cell phone coverage in the scheme area.

9 TESTING AND TRAINING IN THE USE OF EAP AND SOP’S

TrustPower will test the EAP and its associated SOP’s as part of its emergency preparedness procedures. Testing may be undertaken as part of a training exercise which will include relevant personnel from TrustPower, and external agencies such as Civil Defence officers and NZ Police.

10 EVENT IMPROVEMENTS REGISTER

Any issues that arise during the EAP and SOP tests, events and emergencies shall be recorded in Appendix 4 namely the ‘Event Improvements Register’.

11 ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

Local Contractors and Material Suppliers are listed on in the regularly updated spreadsheet titled “Scheme Emergency Contact List.xls” under worksheet “Regional Resources”TrustPower has formal agreements in place with its dam engineering advisers and other external resources (such as contractors and consultants) that may be called upon, at short notice, to assist in the implementation of this EAP and associated procedures.

In the event that a Local or Regional Civil Defence Emergency has been declared wherein external resources are difficult to acquire due to competing priorities TrustPower’s Emergency Manager will:

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• Commit available resources to those schemes considered higher priority under the circumstances that exist at the time of the emergency

• Request assistance from other hydropower generation companies. Assistance might be in the form of providing station operators and/or surveillance & monitoring staff to help TrustPower staff.

12 CONTINUITY OF SERVICE

The Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act places expectations on electricity generators to function to the fullest possible extent during and after an emergency. This procedure and the referenced SOPs are part of TrustPower’s commitment to fulfill its obligations in this respect and are aligned to TrustPower’s risk management and asset protection policies.

The Emergency Manager will take these obligations into account during management of the emergency.

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13 APPENDIX 1 EMERGENCY DECLARATION FAX TO POLICE & COUNCILS

COBB SCHEME

EMERGENCY DECLARATION

Date: Time:

To: NZ Police Nelson

Fax:03 545 8960

Tasman District Council Richmond

Fax: 03 543 9524

CDEM Nelson

Fax: 03 546 9523

From: Production Coordinator Cobb Cobb Power Station

Phone: Mobile:

Message Follows:

TrustPower Limited has declared an Emergency in accordance with its Emergency Action Plan Situation:

Likely Development:

Effects:

Please continue to liaise with the following TrustPower employee:

Name:

Position:

Phones:

Name ……….. (Production Coordinator Cobb)

Signed ………

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APPENDIX 2 POTENTIAL HELICOPTER LANDING PADS

Potential helicopter landing pad sites are shown on Cobb Hydro EAP Access Map – Sheet 1. The associated New Zealand Transverse Mercator Projection (NZTM) coordinates are provided in the table below.

Description Easting

Northing

Cobb Power Station car park, Note weather vane pole need to

be lowered before use

1577505 5451626

Drummonds Flat 0.9 Km down stream of Station

1578050 5452200

Tunnel Outlet Portal, Land on penstock bridge or 0.9km

downstream by AB9

1575912 5450704

Cobb Earth Dam, On top of Dam or West of Stilling Basin down

stream of dam

1573783 5449641

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15 APPENDIX 3 AERIAL MAPS & DRAWINGS

See « Aerial Maps » section of folder.

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Figure 1 – Schematic of Cobb Power Scheme

1 2 3

4 5&10

6

7

8&9

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17

Food Maps Section:

Figures 6.1, 6.2a and 6.2b show flood inundation areas resulting from a dam break failure of Cobb dam. The sunny day failure is assumed to result from an internal erosion type failure of the earthfill dam whereby the estimated peak breach outflows range between 2,900 – 4,700 m

³

/s.

Source: Works Consultancy Services, G Webby (1996) ECNZ Central Generation Cobb Power Station: Cobb Dam Break Study, Wellington (TPL Document Reference:

COB/R96/2 – 001)

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APPENDIX 4 EVENT IMPROVEMENTS REGISTER

The purpose of this Event Improvements Register is to record issues arising or problems encountered during (or immediately after) EAP/SOP tests, events or emergencies. Suggested resolutions will be considered during the subsequent update of the relevant EAP and/or SOP.

No. Date Test/Event/Emerg

ency Details EAP or SOP Document

Reference Issue & Suggested

Resolution Status of

Recommendations 1.

Septemb er 2008

Annual Exercise &

Training Workshop held at COB Power Station

EAP, Flood and Earthquake SOP’s

Summary of changes arising from an annual exercise are documented in file note BCL File Ref:

TP1310, 30/07/08.

2. Decemb er 2008

2008 CSR by T Pickford

Hydraulic Operating Procedures (Refer s3 in EAP) and Dewatering Procedures (Refer s7 of EAP)

These have been outstanding for some time and should be prepared as soon as practical to satisfy best dam safety practice and CSR examiner comments.

To be actioned in 2010/11

3. June 2011

KMI Generic Changes

incorporated M Bailey

Possible Rd blocks established, colour coding for High PIC sections etc

Photo Id to be provided to all staff to avoids any access issues

Actioned ES

4.

5.

6.

_______________________________________________________ PROCEDURE TITLE: STATUS: DATE ISSUED:

_______________________________________________________

PROCEDURE TITLE:

STATUS:

DATE ISSUED:

REVIEW DUE :

PREPARED BY:

REVIEWED BY:

APPROVED BY:

_______________________________________________________

COB Emergency Action Plan

Revision 4

December 2011

December 2012

Robbin Britton

TrustPower Review Team

• Bruce Walpole

• Thomas Fritz

• Ciska Vogelzang

Deion Campbell

General Manager Generation

_______________________________________________________

Emergency Action Plan

REVISION LOG

DATE REVISION NO.

DETAILS SECTION No.

PAGE No.

LIST OF PLAN HOLDERS

COPY

NO. DISTRIBUTION LIST/HOLDER

CONTENTS

COBB SCHEME

EMERGENCY DECLARATION

Figure 1 – Schematic of Cobb Power Scheme

Food Maps Section:

Figures 6.1, 6.2a and 6.2b show flood inundation areas resulting from a dam break failure of Cobb dam. The sunny day failure is assumed to result from an internal erosion type failure of the earthfill dam whereby the estimated peak breach outflows range between 2,900 – 4,700 m

/s.

Source: Works Consultancy Services, G Webby (1996) ECNZ Central Generation Cobb Power Station: Cobb Dam Break Study, Wellington (TPL Document Reference:

COB/R96/2 – 001)

REVIEW DUE ^: