We especially thank Farhana Razzaque for her continued critical support in the development of the report. We define liability as an obligation of the state/government to answer for their actions. This summary report, which aims to analyze the dynamics of SA and deliberative institutions.
We also argue that individual agency incentives of the actors should be analyzed at a granular level.
STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT
The report argues that these meta and micro variables should be explored in a recursive manner5 to understand the nature and effects of positive and negative feedback loops between the two variables. Such an analysis will help us better understand the dysfunctionalities or challenges – institutional and social – that these SA forums face and assess effectiveness. 5 This implies that the nature and effects of the subsequent feedback loop (linking meta-level structural factors to individual agencies), both positive and negative, need to be understood and explained. one evolving on its own and the other driven by the interventions of non-governmental organizations and the state) are presented below graphically (Figure 1).
SA forums remain as de-facto closed spaces (see footnote 30) or move towards invited space (see footnote 29).
METHODOLOGY
ANALYTIC NARRATIVES OF THE DYNAMICS OF SA/DELIBERATIVE
SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFICIENT AND TRANSPARENT IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL PROTECTION SCHEMES
The main task of the NFSP was to bring mass views to the policy makers for necessary policy reform. UN participation and "support" also ensured that elected officials took citizens' complaints seriously. They did not try to either positively engage or negatively influence the functioning of the social welfare forum; since members and presidents of the UP are themselves connected to the party in power, they could act on behalf of the party.
Many of the citizen respondents in the survey wanted the forum to be active again, as they realized that the active forum reduced irregularities in the social security schemes.
SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR
SA mechanism, meta-level determinants of the SMC and consequent micro-level incentives of the members need to be explained. Moreover, most of the SMC members were chosen based on their political loyalties or personal connections with locally influential political elites; Many schools were found to be effectively controlled by such political actors. Local political dynamics and the sociology of the local community are also manifested in the manner in which SMCs are formed, i.e.
As a result of the double dynamic, the formations of SMCs tend to differ significantly from the prescribed rules.9 The first dynamic is clear from the fact that SMC members are mainly chosen by a group of political elites. Most of the guardian members at the observed primary and secondary schools mentioned that they became SMC members at the request of school authorities or local political leaders. Only in rural primary schools do some of the guardians and general members tend to come from non-elite backgrounds.
In the case of selection, most of the SBR members (guardians and non-guardians) were selected by either school teachers or head teachers or SBR presidents. And by 'education quality' they understood: regular attendance of the students and teachers and the teachers. However, committees are moderately effective in improving education quality and require accountability from the teachers.
WC is supposed to select programs at the local level (development projects), implement such programs and ensure community participation in the implementation process. SSCs are formed at district level, consisting of seven members selected from the members of the local community.
DELIBERATIVE COMMITTEES AS SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
The management of the commissions (especially decision-making) should be monopolized by representatives of the UP. Such dominance and influence leaves very little room for citizen members to function effectively on committees. In such cases, it turned out that even members of the public were active in the process of purchasing material.
Yes Few citizens Ward councillor, UP secretary, & UP chairman UP chairman & ward council UP chairman Citizen members have no knowledge of it. Not regularly Few citizen members UP Chairman Parish Council, & UP Secretary UP Chairman & Parish Council UP Chairman Citizen members have no knowledge of it. Yes, but in some cases ward councilors or UP chairman also interfere in the selection process. YesGet citizen members UP chairman, secretary and social elites.
Yes, but in some cases ward councilors or UP chairman also interfere in the selection process. Yes Few citizen members UP chairman, UP secretary and parish councilor Parish council and UP chairmanUP chairman and parish council citizens have no knowledge of it. Not regularly Few SSC membersUP chairman, parish council member and local elites Parish council member and UP chairmanUP chairmanCitizen members have no knowledge of it. No FNGO interference Yes, but in some cases parish councilors also interfere in the selection process.
Yes Few citizens UP chairman, ward councillor, & UP secretary The committee & UP chairman UP chairman Citizen members have no knowledge of it. No (check the data) UP chairman and ward councilor YesNo HNGO intervention No, UP chairman and ward councilor interfere in the selection process.
WARD SHOBHA AND OPEN BUDGET MEETING AS SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FORUMS
Even some UP ward councilors lacked knowledge of the OBMs' goals and agendas. They feel that UP chairmen and ward councilors pay more attention to the opinions of influential people. As previously mentioned, UP managers have incentives to obtain information about and address the priority needs of the local communities.
For example, some poor members of the community felt that it was impolite to ask UP chairpersons and members these questions in a formal Shobha. They also have the perception that UP chairmen and Ward Councilors paid more attention to the opinions of the influential parts of society. Not surprisingly, many poor and less educated participants expected the rich and educated participants to speak for the whole community.
In contrast, local elites did take advantage of government-provided forums to express their concerns about the general well-being of the community. With the introduction of these forums, citizens are now aware of the social protection programs. Role of UP Chairman in Shobha as prescribed by law. Who played the most dominant role.
Were UP representatives responding to citizens' demands (fulfilling their election promises and actual delivery of services). Were UP leaders responsive to citizens' demands (fulfilling their electoral promises and actual delivery of services).
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
Its effectiveness, as a SA forum, is significantly influenced by the operation of the meta-level dynamics of both local politics (sometimes even national) and sociology of the community. SMC members who enjoy higher social status tend to be more motivated than others (due to social status-related incentives, as discussed earlier) and these individuals are found to be more able to demand accountability from the school teachers . Discussions of the four cases suggest that apart from SMCs, the available formal SA spaces tend to remain largely dysfunctional unless activated and nurtured by the NGOs.
Key reasons for the dysfunctionality of these SA institutions are linked to the strong incentives of the elected leaders of the local government to avoid accountability so often: their financial and other activities are not transparent. 25 Presidents of SMCs usually belong to the highest level of the social hierarchy of the local community. Functional deliberative democracy contributes to increasing citizens' sense of dignity as valued members of the community, to boost their morale and thus contribute to the development of pro-active citizenship. 26.
This will also require the intervention of external actors who will provide the necessary resources (knowledge, information, skills) to build the capacity of the local community to act together. This means that the co-creation of social capital will require the synergy of local communities and external non-governmental organizations. Currently, in various cases of SA institutions as well as in other NGO intervention management initiatives, NGO interventions tend to be short-term project-oriented, and usually when the intervention ends, citizen participation falters and perverse incentives from political leaders or UP leaders and whatever else re-emerge. social capital, which was formed in the community through interventions, is quickly running out.
In high school SMCs, other elite members of the committee are able to participate proactively in the deliberation process so that the space cannot be monopolized by the president and head of school. The following table 6 summarizes our assessment of the status of deliberative democratic practice in the studied SA institutions. Relatively more guardians are usually involved in fund management and monitoring the school's development activities.
Such transformative possibilities have been noted in the case of FSP intervention, indicating possible shifts in disempowering norms due to the new and unexpected experiences of the participating citizen members.
SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS
The collaboration between state and NGOs, as proposed, does not preclude the direct involvement of state officials in SA institutions/fora. Their role would be important to evade any possible attempts to undermine the SA institution. As noted earlier, NGOs generally avoid addressing governance issues, such as the dominance of UP leaders and the monopolization of deliberative spaces, and pursue their interventions by sidestepping these politically sensitive and challenging issues.
Moreover, if civil servants participate in the SA forums, UP leaders will be motivated to show more desirable behaviour. All of this leads to a virtuous circle – officials' presence increased increased response from UP leaders which in turn motivates citizens to get more involved in the SA forums. Finally, regular funding allocation in the national budget will not only indicate the government's strong commitment, but also help sustain the activities of the SA and deliberative institutions in a more efficient and inclusive manner.
