Take Home Exam
Conflict analysis
Workgroup teacher: Maartje Weerdesteijn
Elise Fellinger 57576960
Question 1
I argue that when looking at the conflict in Rwanda, the most elaborating approach is necessary. At first sight Brown (2001) seems to be the perfect candidate to analyse this conflict since Gourevitch (1998) provides us with many different events that occurred during this conflict and Brown (2001) has a stage for all of those events, but ceases to explain interactions between different aspects. And Although Mitchell (1981) has a very elaborating approach that explains a vicious circle of attitudes and behaviour that can occur before and during this conflict, it lacks a focus on constructing ethnicity is this particular case. Azar in Ramsbotham et al. (2011) focusses on the relationship between identity and the state. This is not only extremely relevant when thinking of the political influences of Hutu’s and Tutsi’s throughout history, and more importantly, he points out the intensity of the conflict. And since the conflict in Rwanda isn’t your everyday conflict, it asks for more than superficial, one or two-sides approaches. With the interdisciplinary approach of Azar’s preconditions of
protracted social conflict the understanding of the conflict in Rwanda will be more in depth. ‘’Protracted conflicts are hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity. These are conflict situations in which the stakes are very high - the conflicts involve whole societies and act as agents for defining the scope of national identity and social solidarity’’ – Azar et al. (1978, 50). I argue that the conflict in Rwanda is a ‘protracted social conflict’ because the conflict and especially the genocide that followed has left a huge impact on not just Rwanda, but on the rest of the world. The conflict has reinficated the identity of two constructed ethnic groups and has been going on since the colonization of Rwanda by the Belgians in 1918. Azar’s theory of ‘protracted social conflict’ divides the aspects of the conflict into four levels of analysis.
First Azar (in Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 100) addresses the importance of ‘communal content’, which implies putting a focus on the identity groups in relation to the state.
Gourevitch (1998, 50) explains that the Hutu and Tutsi only mattered in relation to state power. By this Gourevitch (1998, 50) means that when there was a Tutsi government, when Rwanda was part of the Belgian colonial legacy, The Tutsi identity would be superior to the Hutu identity since the Belgians were in favour of Tutsi’s according to Gourevitch (2011, 57). They found that Tutsi’s looked more like Belgians themselves, which frustrated Hutu’s to a maximum (Gourevitch, 2011, 57). But this changed when the Hutu’s gained political power and united their Hutuness with the ‘ Hutu Manifesto’ in 1957 (Gourevitch, 2011, 58). Now the Hutu identity was the one with power.
The second aspect of a protracted social conflict is the lack of human needs (Azar in Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 101). So because of the ‘Hutu Manifesto’ that called for a
democracy in Rwanda, the Hutu’s ended up getting all the power since they were the majority of the population (Gourevitch, 2011, 57). This turned out to be a need of political influence for the Tutsi’s but an attempt to gain political access needs. And soon enough the need of security began to rise for Tutsi’s, since lots of Tutsi’s were feeling unsafe, and with this need not being fulfilled, none of the other basic needs of Tutsi’s mattered anymore.
frustrated these needs further more. The genocide was a product of order and authority of the Hutu regime, according to Gourevitch (1998, 95). At first the Rwandan president
Habyarimana and his wife, both Hutu, tried to eliminate the Tutsi’s by collaborating with the ‘akazu1’ leaders but soon they changed to the more effective way, get the Rwandans to kill
each other (Gourevitch, 1998, 96). Also, it is important to address that Hutu’s were having the same lack of needs when the Tutsi’s had overall power. These are the lack of needs that formed a base for grievances.
Finally it is necessary to look at international linkages (Azar in Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 102). Besides the Belgian influences on constructing ethnic identities and setting a standard for ethnic frustrations, The French government influenced the conflict in a later stadium through ‘operation Turquoise’ in June 1994. This was supposed to be a humanitarian operation but as soon as the French arrived in Rwanda, they started to support the political leaders who were in charge of the genocide (Gourevitch, 1998, 158) and even speaking of a two-way genocide (Gourevitch, 1998, 156). So what ‘operation Turquoise’ ended up
providing was letting the massacres continue for another month while a genocidal command, together with lots of weapons, reached Zaire (Gourevitch, 1998, 158). The beginning of another conflict.
To conclude, the relations between these aspects are the causes of severe ethnic conflicts like this. And therefore Azar (in Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 105) points out, there is no simple solution to these kinds of conflicts. Long term development is necessary because genocides are like scars, at some point there will be no pain, but it will always be visible.
908 words (excerpts included)
Question 2
In this short essay I attempt to illustrate the documentary ‘We are all neighbours’’ (1993) through the concepts of ethnicity and the way in which ethnic violence can be triggered. The authors that provide these concepts are Ignitieff (1998) and Lake & Rothchild (1996). The documentary is about the effects of the war in Bosnia on a small Bosnian village called Visnijak, that turns neighbors into enemies.
Lake and Rothchild have argued several strategies of ethnic groups that can lead to an ethnic conflict. The first concept that Lake & Rothchild (1996, 46) introduce as a strategy of the ethnic group is called ’information failures’. This is the lack of information as a cause of ethnic conflict. When groups lack information about the interests of the opposite group a gap is being created between the ethnic groups (Lake & Rothchild, 1996, 46). This is visible in the documentary when a few Catholics explain that they could not visit their Muslim neighbours because that would make them think that they are being spied on. The people in Visnijek are insecure about what the other is after, so they start assuming the other’s intentions. Because of these assumptions, they start to feel unsafe. Lake & Rothchild (1996, 46) argue that feeling unsafe can also trigger ethnic violence. This is what they call ‘the security dilemma’. This feeling can be seen as connected to the lack of information since the Muslims in Visnijek had become afraid of their Croatian2 neighbours, because they weren’t aware of their real
intentions. Thirdly, Lake & Rothchild (1996, 51) explain the problem of credible commitment as a possible cause of an ethnic conflict. This is a problem that arises when the balance of ethnic power shifts (Lake & Rothchild, 1996, 51). So when the Muslims in Visnijak were excluded from several needs such as security, income and political influence, the Croatians broke the ethnic contract3 that promises
equality.
Ignitieff (1998) focusses on minor differences that turn into major differences as a cause of ethnic conflicts. Ignitieff (1998, 50) argues that it is power that turns minor into major. When the Croat army tried to get control over Visnijak, ethnic identity became all that mattered, and in this case the Catholics were the ones with power. So an ethnic identity, something that was once a minor difference, had become a major difference, for the power was linked to ethnicity. Ignitieff (1998) also addresses fear as a key aspect when it comes to causes of ethnic conflict. Fear, Ignitieff (1998, 56) argues, is the cause of minor turning into major because fear stimulates blame. This makes the people in Visnijek believe that the fault lies with their neighbour.
I argue that the concept of the narcissistic nationalist that Ignitieff (1996) introduces does not apply to the people in Visnijek. The polarization and the framing is there, but neither the Muslims or the Catholics feel like they are superior. They just feel like the other group has
2 I use the distincion between Croats and Moslims because it has become reinficated through the conflict in Visnijek, but it is not always a correct distincion. Especially the identity of a Croat is sometimes ascribed to a Catholic Bosnian.
I argue that this could be an interesting addition since Ignitieff (1996) suggests to find the solution within the people, by making sure that the individual becomes the central aspect instead of the ethnic identity. Lake & Rothchild (1998) find a solution to be more top down through the intervention of a third party. Therefore I suggest that the present situation in Bosnia is added to the documentary so we can figure out how the Muslims and the Croats can be neighbours once again.
Question 3
In this essay I argue that genocide as an exercise of community building should be seen in a way that it is a strategy used by elites to gain support, as well as a device for Hutu nationalists to achieve unity. I use the Rwandan genocide (1994) to illustrate this argument.
Genocide as an exercise of community building is seeing the goal of wiping out an entire ethnic group as a product of the establishment of a social cohesive group. According to Gourevitch (1998, 95) Rwandans started to refer to the genocide as ‘the logic’. This explains that the presence of another ethnic group, in this case the Tutsi’s stood in the way of achieving and maintaining a Hutu society and therefore the obstacle had to be removed. I want to stress that this drive to decimate Tutsi’s was caused by several different factors, but the actual act of killing was triggered by elite manipulation. When the Rwandan president, Habyarimana, was killed on the 6th of April 1994, the RPF was blamed and the ’akazu’4 called out to all Hutu’s
to start killing Tutsi’s, before they could kill Hutu’s, since all Tutsi’s were assumed to be the constituency of the RPF (Gourevitch, 1998, 83). This manipulation by elites to gain support from an ethnic group is what Demmers (2012, 30) describes as the ‘elite theory’. The elite theory explains that whenever people feel attacked because of their identity, they start to feel more part of a group that is based on this single aspect of their identity. This makes the genocide a political strategy to gain power. Ignitieff (1998, 50) argues that power is the key concept that turns minor differences into major differences. So because of the power of the Hutu government and the ‘akazu’, the Hutu’s started to see themselves as the superior race5 more and more as opposite of a Tutsi, even though the two
groups are so much alike that you could not tell them apart (Gourevitch, 50). According to Gourevitch (1998, 50) the ideas of the ethnic identity of being Hutu or Tutsi were largely framed as opposite identities instead of identities defined by taboos or cultural characteristics that mark the boundaries of the ethnic group. So because the Hutu’s wanted their identity to be real, they had to get rid of the Tutsi’s. And as Iginitieff (1998, 50) explains, it is because the differences are minor that they have to be expressed more aggressively.
And while being manipulated by the ‘akazu’, most Hutu’s felt like genocide was a simple solution towards unity, and towards the nationalist dream of one ethnic group within the borders of Rwanda. Ignatieff (1998, 46) explains that for nationalists, it is impossible to have multiple belonging. That is why besides killing all Tutsi’s, all Hutu’s in favor of Tutsi’s had to be eliminated as well in order to create sameness in the community (Gourevitch, 1998, 18).
So when we
4 A core of political, economical and militairy systems, a synonym for ‘hutu power’ (Gourevitch, 1998, 81).
differences of Hutu’s and Tutsi’s were minor and pretty much invisible, it is understandable that genocide plays a large role in constructing and maintaining ethnic identities and is in every way a means to an end.
Question 4
I will present an overview on the mobilization of the anti-separatist movement ‘right sector’ and the pro-Russian movement ‘strong hold’. Mobilisation refers to how conflict groups are formed and organised for the pursuit of collective goals (Fumerton, Lecture ‘mobilization’ on October 11th). I will categorize three aspects of mobilization introduced by King (2007, 117) and apply them on both movements. And although King (2007) stresses that violence is not automatically related to social mobilization, I will not analyse these concepts separately since the mobilization of the riots is connected to social violence in this particular case.
First King (2007, 117) presents the concept ‘opportunities’ as a tool to realize mobilization. In this context opportunities is a very broad concept, that can include several different aspects. Resources as weapons are opportunities to mobilize, but also compensating weaknesses is part of the opportunities to mobilize. In the documentary ‘The battle for
Ukraine’ (2014) the opportunities of ‘right sector’ appear to be way less than the opportunities of the ‘strong hold’ movement. ‘Strong hold’ has weapons like Kalashnikovs while ‘right sector’ has to find a way to protect itself with car tires and crush barriers. But even if there are no material opportunities, immaterial opportunities like bluffing and scaring the enemy can be sufficient enough. This is a tactic that ‘right sector’ uses when they run towards the riot police unarmed, just to scare them. Also, one of the members of ‘right sector’ was capable of making jokes, while he thought he was going to die. I argue that personality characteristics like a sense of humour are also opportunities and resources to mobilize since it can provide strength within the group.
Secondly, King (2007, 117) argues that organization is a key concept towards
mobilizing. I argue that Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, uses manipulation as a tool to mobilize a large group of riots in favour of Russia and its influences on Ukraine. Putin claims to be protecting the Ukrainian civilians against the ‘right sector’, even though the ‘strong hold has caused much more violence compared to their enemy. But if you think that Putin is the indirect founder of the ‘strong hold’, you could be mistaken. It appears to be that some leading ‘strong hold’ riots are being paid to fight and educate volunteers. So providing salary is also a way of organizing a large movement. On the other hand it appears as if the leader of the ‘right sector’ uses feelings of patriarchy to organize his movement.
Finally, framing is a tool that makes mobilization possible, according to King (2007, 118). Something which King (2007, 121) calls: ‘the power to present a conflict’. By this he means the several strategies that can be used to essentialize the enemy while manipulating local people. At some point during the conflict in Ukraine, the Russian television only highlighted the Ukrainian nationalist past that is connected with the Nazis ("The Battle for Ukraine." 2014) This is a way of framing the enemy, manipulating people into supporting your own regime.
As shown, all three of the means to mobilization contain lots of different possibilities. Also, these three aspects of mobilization are intermingled, for ‘framing’ and ‘opportunities’ can be seen as means to organize. A critical note towards the literature surrounding
locals. Since according to Fumerton (Lecture ‘mobilization’ on October 11th) mobilization
refers to the process by which ‘’Participants are recruited/ drown into a larger movement for collective action and the process by which an organization assembles, commits, and
establishes control over the resources needed for collective action in pursuit of common goals and interests.’’ To conclude I argue that since, as I have argued before in this text, a sense of humour is a resource and this resource is not controlled by the core of the organization but by the individual, the extent to which agency influences the possibilities of mobilization should be involved in this theoretical framework.
Bibliography
Azar, E., Jureidini, P., McLaurin, R. 1978. Protracted Social Conflict; Theory and Practice in the Middle East. Journal of Palestine Studies, 41-60
Brown, M. 2001. "The Causes of Internal Conflict: an Overview." Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, 3-25, Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Demmers, J. 2012. "Identity, Boundaries and Violence." Theories of Violent Conflict, 20-40, New York and London: Routledge
Disappearing World. 1993. "We are all neigbours." Accessed 20 September 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uip50amKMdw
Frontline. 2014. "The Battle for Ukraine." Accessed 11 October 2016. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/battle-for-ukraine/
Fumerton, M. 11 October 2016. Mobilization, Lecture 5 of the course: ‘Introduction in Conflict Analysis’.
Gourevitch, P. 1999. "We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families."New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Ignatieff, M. 1998. "Nationalism and the narcissism of minor differences." The Warrior’s Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, 34-71, London: Vintage.
King, C. 2007. "Power, Social Violence, and Civil Wars." Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, 115-130, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.
Lake, David A., and Rothchild, D. 1996. "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict." International security 21, no. 2: 41-75
Mitchell, C. R., 1981. The Structure of International Conflict. Macmillan Press, LTD. 15-69
