D
eutsches Asienforschungzentrum
www.dafz.org
The Jakarta Sarinah Attack,
14 January 2016
The Khilafah Is Coming?
The Radicalization of Society, Threats,
Implications & Considerations
Citation:
Wimmer, A. (2016). The Jakarta Sarinah Attack, 14 January 2016 The Khilafah Is Coming? Singapore: German Asien Research Center.
ISBN: 978-981-11-0889-1
THE JAKARTA SARINAH ATTACK, 14 JANUARY 2016 THE KHILAFAH IS COMING?
Source (Mende 2016): “Khilafah is coming”1
The Isla i “tate of I a a d the Le a t I“IL has e o e the p ee i e t te o ist th eat
because of its self-described caliphate in Syria and Iraq, its branches and emerging branches in other countries, and its increasing ability to direct and inspire attacks against a wide range
of ta gets a ou d the o ld. I“IL s a ati e suppo ts jihadist e uiti g, att a ts othe s to
travel to Iraq and Syria, draws individuals and groups to declare allegiance to ISIL, and justifies attacks across the globe. The ISIL-directed November 2015 attacks in Paris and ISIL-“i ai s claim of responsibility for the late October downing of a Russian airliner in the Sinai
u de s o e these d a i s.
James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence,
Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence February 25, 20162
2 http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/clappersfrwwt.pdf; accessed on
THE JAKARTA SARINAH ATTACK3, 14 JANUARY 2016 THE KHILAFAH IS COMING?
The unsuccessful and botched attack in Sarinah, Jakarta on 14 July 2016 by an Islamic State (IS) terror cell and subsequent developments in the national and global arena and the considerable amount of commentaries on the events surrounding the attack4, all provide important lessons for the public, policy makers, and law enforcement agencies that warranted this paper.
This paper does not attempt to find all the answers to the continuous and steady flood of information, and expert opinions following the attack; but, we aim to recapture the events leading up to the terror attack and draw some lessons learned, and examine the implications for stakeholders for the immediate future. Our paper developed some distinctive developments, which are not new, or revolutionary, but largely overlooked by the industry-size commentaries when it comes to Indonesian and regional terrorism issues. We hold the view these developments will increasingly gain more dominance in the near term future.
We assess the emerging trends and threats for the Indonesian public, the state, and the industry located in a few distinctive radical spectrums: the extremist right– i.e. jihadist groupings -, the extremist leftist factions – i.e. represented by the resurfacing of Marxist/socialist-inspired extremists’ factions and cells - and extremist anarchists, part of the global anarchist movement.
In Indonesia, the extremist factions, part of a political narrative that can be grouped into a simplistic formula of the political right, i.e. the Khilafah movement represented by groups such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the more radical Front Pembela Islam (FPI), and the resurfacing leftist Marxist movement, are seeking redemption for injustice suffered in 1965 but have, for some time, pursued power using political violence as part of the “people’s struggle”. The People’s Democratic Party/PRD (Partai Rakyat Demokrat) represents one brand list of political parties pursuing extra-parliamentarian, violent strategies. But, the boundaries between these diametrically opposed ideologies are eroding.
Social interconnectivity, social media, kinship, and adopting extremists ideology as a “way of life” has taken hold a broader segment of society. This can be seen in the arrests of a very different type of extremists surfacing. No longer is the firebrand cleric the sole responsible for misinterpreting the scriptures of the Koran, but the middle class self-radicalized, key board “jihadi” surfaces.
Additionally, new trends are emerging. Electronic disobedience is widespread and on the rise (Fulton 2016) creating a new and diversified pool of radical recruits who are subjected to an erosion of identity of traditional extremist doctrines. With exceptions, the radicalization on the Internet is a fixed feature. Although, as a generalization, the jihadists versus leftist extremists still holds true, the surfacing of the Black Bloc type of anarchist movements, named by some as tiny but deadly (Berger 2013) and who are eager to lose their innocence (Berger, Qantara.de 2013)and ready to step on the global stage of terrorism, are one of such trend.
3 https://en.qantara.de/content/interview-with-the-islamic-scholar-ebrahim-moosa-the-reinvention-of-islam; 4 Although Islamic State goes by ISIL, ISIS or Daesh (ad-Dawlah al-Islā i ah fī 'l-ʿI ā a-sh-“hā ) we opt to use
Secondly, we can observe a lateral movement of activists from leftist radicalized activists to joining radical jihadi factions. Although, this individually may not, as unique as it appears, we hold the view that the traditional alignments of group membership of one extremist group is no longer doctrine-based, but more of a social fade of the moment. The so-called conveyor-belt theory is, in our view, not the end of the radicalization process. Today, radicals are no longer bound by the single extremist narrative, - i.e. “Islamic State”, or “Jemaah Islamiyah”.
The surfacing of the left generates many dynamics and debates, especially in the authoritarian left circles (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Chavist activist groups) that dominate resistance movements (Gilbert 2011). For example, the 325.nostate.net site regularly reports on anarchist actions in Indonesia but the undertone of acts of terrorism and references - for example, an interview with the sister of Ulrike Meinhof (Augustin 2016), one of the leaders of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, better known as the Red Army Faction (RAF) - leave very little room for misinterpretation of the groups true revolutionary objectives.
Interestingly, both extremist groups on the opposing pole of the political violent actor’s spectrum, display striking similarities. For example, a Finnish cell of the anarchists, called the Wildfire Cell, on 9 May 2016, set fires to parked vehicles in the outskirts of Helsinki to resist the ‘city-prisons’ created by bulldozers, harvesters and excavators (325.nostate.net 2016). At the same time the Islamic State in its publication titled, Inspire,5 wrote, “Your soldiers are killing our people, we kill you. They drop hellfire’s, we start wildfires”. The warning to the Kafir’s and apostates are not mere propaganda statements. Symbolic communications and embedded messages are by now routine markers indicating future trends on both ends of the political extremist spectrum.
The post Sarinah attacks quickly resulted in a massive flow of assessments, some more accurate than others, with data points going beyond the Jakarta attack. The initial framework of this paper focused on the tactical and operational capability of the emerging Islamic State (IS) cells in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. However, we found growing underlining concerns of Khilafah doctrine in the rural areas, the rise of the Hizbut Tahrir Khilafah/Caliphate narrative and the recruitment of the young receiving little attention. Whereas the tactical battle was – as seen in the failed attack – easily defeated, once countered by an aggressive tactical police response, the outcome of the true battle over the ideological narrative6 is less certain. We highlight some concerning evolutionary developments in Indonesia.
We associate the lack of policy and industrial interest as the result of the subjects of recruiting and proselytization as less “sexy” but more important to dominate the “deep battle” space. In Riau, Sumatra, as indicative of the growing incubator culture of “Khilafah-ism” indoctrinating kindergarten, toddlers, and first graders (primary school) to be “future mujahidin”.
In the rural areas, largely ignored, mostly unsupervised, and least controlled, it begs the question about the scale and extend of these “jihadi cub” incubators.
5 Spring 2016, Issue no. 15
6 We must stress the exceptional work on Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia by Sidney Jones and other academics
Dr Mohamad Nawab, author of Transnational Network of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, wrote,
“In the minds of HTI leaders, Singapore and Malaysia are part of the Caliphate as they were part of the Johore-Riau Sultanate, which came under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire.” (Nawab 2010)
His paper goes on further,
“This was affirmed by Al-Khaththath when he said, ‘If I am the Caliph in Indonesia, there is no doubt that I will “take over”Malaysia and Singapore’. When questioned on how this was to be achieved, Al-Khaththath said that each of these countries would be invited to join the Caliphate, failing which they would be invaded.”7
Although at the time of compiling this, paper a large body of public testimonies, studies are present considering the resurgence of Jemaah Islamiyah as more pressing threats to Indonesia and the region are emerging. The evolution of terrorism is seldom a linear affair, a mix of holding some territory and increase of overseas terror attacks are within the plausible scenarios facing Indonesia and the region.
A defeat on the battlefield in Syria and Iraq will shift the focus on to various overseas entities of Islamic State, including possible transfer of funds and expertise. The first sign of a global presence is present with Uighurs in Indonesia and Mohammad Khattab, a Moroccan bomb maker, killed by Philippine security forces in Basilan early April 2016 (Pareño 2016)8. Although no immediate evidence is presented to the public, the surfacing of Uighurs in Thailand (Yee 2016)9 and Indonesia highlights the transnational nature of the emerging threat and changes in radical environment.
In testimony to the Homeland Security Committee recently, the speakers point out the Islamic State internal debate to hold ground in Syria and Iraq or decentralize the movement and convert to a global terror organization. This represents a paradigm shift for Indonesia and the region. This paper will address the strategic thread of the Islamic State narrative, trying to gauge the threat of Islamic State and raising the big question: What comes next for Asia?
Author’s note.
Since the publication of this examination of the Sarinah attack some developments emerged. The multiple bombings in Thailand (12 August), the Singapore rocket plot (5 August), Santoso was killed in a shoot (18 July), continuous arrests of Islamic State sympathizers in Malaysia (20, July, 23 July and 9 August), the emerging of
traditional “tradecraft” changing of operational names such as the ‘Black Crow’ (Gagak Hitam) in Malaysia and
Katibah Gonggong Rebus (KGR) in Indonesia.
New trends of more sophisticated technology devised to conceal the attack and use arson as a tool and cause to cause damage surfaced. For the first time, although speculated for a long time, Southern Insurgents are operating outside the traditional Area of Operations in the South. The verdict on ‘who-done-it’ is still outstanding but no longer is terrorism a taboo subject discussed behind closed doors fearful of upsetting authorities. Terrorists hitting the tourist’s spots of Thailand, a crucial form of state revenues and Malaysian Counter Terror officials warned from new possible grenade attacks10. The region is changing. Terrorism continues.
7 Ibid.
8 The Malaysian Mohammad Najib Hussein alias Abu Anas was killed in December 2015.
9 Two Uighurs Mieraii Yusufu, 26, and Bilal Mohammad, 31, alias Adem Karadag, were charged with
premeditated murder and illegal possession of explosives. Of the 17 arrests warrant issued, 15 suspects remain at large believed to be in Turkey or are Turkish nationals (see; 25 February 2016)
I. SUMMARY
"Whatever is happening today in Indonesia is a spillover of problems from beyond our territory, it is from Syria and Iraq," (Chan and Soeriaatmadja 2016)
We consider the response by the Indonesian authorities as a success, but this paper is not about the counter-terror capabilities11, the close battle, but refocuses on the ideological evolution and capabilities, the deep battle (Ryan 2013), an area not sufficiently addressed. In this examination, we hold the view that the implications for businesses and society are greater than the actual current tactical capabilities of Islamic State.
This paper was based on two main premises of our argument: First, Islamic State may have misread the situation based on recent publications made by Malaysian officials and Indonesians experts but believes having gathered sufficient mass to support its ideology. The “rise of the masses” did not happen. Islamic State regurgitates the creation of a Malay-Islamic state and the extremist’s apocalyptic doctrine of Islamic State. Not unlike the Khmer Rouge, Islamic State believes it will eradicate the existing Islamic order, besides targeting the West, by overthrowing the monarchies in Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
Second, we argue the successes of Islamic State in Iraq and the absence of a structured response by the West and the Islamic world, set the stage for the analytical miscalculation by the Indonesia and Asia-based members of the Islamic State to act. This results in tactical disruptor actions, tactically newsworthy but strategically unsound. The attack in Jakarta was a strong indicator that it was part of the “near and far abroad” strategy adopted by Islamic State (Keane 2015).
However, in the same breath of not overstating the perpetual struggle in a public statement to the U.S. Homeland Security Committee on 18 November 2015, some of the comments made by Gen. Keane should be kept in mind while considering the “nearer and further abroad” strategies of Islamic State.
“ISIS the most successful terrorist organization in modern history, it is driven by religious based ideology with significant geopolitical objectives, with establishing an extensive Caliphate.” (Committee 2015)
“Throw out the policy of "strategic patience" which is an excuse for a lack of an aggressive, coherent strategy. Recognize that dragging out the war provides ISIS with a degree of invincibility, a sense of destiny, shrouded in the aura of success.” (Keane, The Rise of Radicalism: Growing Terrorist Sanctuaries and the Threat to the U.S. Homeland 2015)12
“Clearly ISIS is not contained and is far from defeated. The United States and our allied partners need to wake up. ISIS is at war with us and civilization, but America is not truly at war with ISIS – not the President, nor the Congress and certainly not the American people.”13
11 A recent handling of a suspect in custody leading to the death of the suspects blemished the record of the
Densus 88. See this; 21 April 2016 and this; 13 March 2016
The rise of the Islamic State in Indonesia – and greater Southeast Asia - is consistent with grand jihadi strategies such as Abu Bakr Naji and has adopted a five-year plan strategy (Sharma 2015, 2). At the same time, well-read academic records point out that the threat of Islamic State is overshadowed by Jemaah Islamiyah’s (JI) attempt to rebuilding its military wing and operational capabilities (Subcommittee 2016) (Liow 2016).
Adding to the misreading of western and moderate Islamic societies, such as Indonesia, is the strategic thought adopted by the jihadist worldview. Examining al-Qaeda and Islamic State’s strategy, we find their origins in the writings of Cold War communist adversaries (Ryan 2013, 4) and similar conclusions were reached in a recent study by the U.S. Marine Corps Academy (Corps 2015).
Strategic writings from the majority of jihadist authors may begin and end with Islamic references but their core arguments have less to do with Islam and sound more like communist ideologies (Ryan 2013, 5). Reflecting Marx and Lenin with a pinch of Stalin and in the Asian context, Mao and Giap, many of the jihadi strategists translate the communist ideas more accessible to Arab (and Asian) jihadists (Stout 2014). Jihadists do read western narratives extensively, hence, understanding the global view of the deep battle reflects increasingly in the region of the close battle requirements. For example, Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi14 (Zabel 2007), examined the western concept of asymmetrical warfare, or “Fourth-Generation Warfare”, in detail. He wrote,
“Some American military experts saw that it would be the form of most wars of the twenty-first century. Those experts named this form [of warfare] “fourth-generation warfare,” whereas others named it “asymmetrical warfare.”
“…But [the raid of September 11] exceeded these other attacks in the pain [it caused] because it forced America to prepare all members of its society psychologically and practically for all contingencies. That is an exorbitant price economically and psychologically, especially for a society that had not been exposed to the effects of war since the American Civil War (1861–1865)…”
“…The Islamic movements must give more space to media activity—a serious and targeted propaganda—because this exposed front is one in which the Americans and their lackeys have made conspicuous gains to the point that now, after silencing or encompassing every media voice, opposing or neutral, America wishes to destroy the great psychological achievements translation of “fourth-generation warfare”—287 the mujahedeen gained through military action, and [to destroy] what accrued from the reverberation of these acts of heroism in terms of positive impact of sympathy and victory in the Islamic world….” (M. W. Ryan 2013)15
This paper attempts to examine if Islamic State in Asia is becoming a far-battle theatre as part of its diversionary survival strategy, mixed with its usual utopian worldview of establishing a far-reaching caliphate to impose a new Islamic State. Whereas the Intent is present, the Capability has not reached mass, and the victory of the deep battle, the battle over the
14 A summary of Abu Ubayd Qurashi and other jihadi strategists such as, Abd Aziz Muqrin, Abu Bakr
al-Naji, and Abu Musab al-Suri can be found here
ideological doctrine is uncertain (Garfinkel 2003)16. Indonesian political leaders lack the aggressiveness to push back the threats their society faces. That it may get worse before it gets better, is a conclusion that can be drawn from the lack of political firmness by the Jokowi administration.
Punters were quick to blame police officials for being “duped” by the terrorists while some even called it an intelligence failure; even seasoned Asian experts wrote that “people were caught off guard” (CNN 2016); however, anyone who ever combatted terrorism will recognize the difficulties any intelligence organization faces whilst balancing source protection, threat level and policy decision making when it comes to preventing the act of terror or arresting the perpetrators. Some commentators may be surprised about the low level of casualties; we certainly are not.
Terrorism is predictable; ample signs were present prior to this attack. These signs were detectable and Indonesian authorities reacted aggressively prior to the attacks, and since the attack by arresting suspects thereby thwarting attacks prior to the Sarinah attacks on 14 January 2016. Since the attack, least thirty-three (33) (Straitstimes 2016) – a number that steadily grows – Indonesian IS members have been arrested.
The boldness of the Sarinah attack shows not a simplistic operation as initially thought, but a web of networks and actors known to authorities coming together to act in unison and lead from behind prison bars (Sucahyo 2016). This is the result of an erosion of groups, individual alliances and crossovers to be best described as strength in numbers where everyone wages jihad. This shows a lack of strength. Which, in turn, provides predictability.
Almost instantaneously, seventeen suspects (17) were directly linked to the Sarinah attacks – we initially estimated approximately fifteen suspects (15) were associated with other factions, such as Hendro Fernando (Panjimas.com 2016)17 alias FS alias AJ alias JT (Arnaz 2016)18, who received 135,000 SGD from proxies in Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey and was planning to attack Jakarta’s main airport and national police headquarters19. In the region, Malaysia and Singapore have equally reacted to the network of Islamic State cells, “lone wolfs”, and emerging networks and continuously arrested identified networks and actors.
16 Abu Musab al-Suri, quoted by Mark Stout, states that tactical or close battles are, in fact, argued by jihadi
strategies as unwinnable, hence, a leaderless resistance model, copied from the western NGO narratives and the death by a thousand cuts are increasingly gaining momentum. See this; quoting Simson L. Garfinkel: Leaderless Resistance Today
17 Hendro Fernando was previously imprisoned
18 Suspects named included DS alias II alias YY from Cirebon, AH alias AI alias AM alias AIS from Indramayu, C
alias J alias AS from Cirebon, AM alias LL alias A, F alias AZ alias AB, DS, WFB alias AA. The group around Hendro arrested were named as Fajrin bin Selan alias Fajrun from Balikpapan (East Kalimantan), Sutrisno alias Gondrong alias Polo alias Ahmad, Siadi Fitriana alias Cungkring alias Ceking, Budiono alias Abu Malik. EF from Bogor part of the Hendro group. Agung Prasetyo alias Ayas Huda, Khoribul Mujid alias Pak Mujid, Induroh alias Hamam alias Hanif, Jaenudin alias Gee and Emirat Berlian Nusantara alias Emir. Syaiful Anam alias Mujadid alias Brekele alias Joko.
19 A report in early January suggested Edo Aliando is Hendro Fernando. This requires additional research. Edo
For example, in the past two years, Malaysian Special Branch arrested 170 Islamic State-linked extremists (Leong 2016)20 and Singapore acted against two Islamic State Bangladesh (ISB) (Straits Times 2016)21 networks of Bangladeshi radicals (Kok 2016), (Hussain 2016). This included a 44-year-old European English teacher who joined Al Qaeda in terror activities in Afghanistan and Bosnia and a 29-year-old African national who studied in a private college (Yusof 2015).
Prior to the Sarinah attacks, Islamic State terror cells were discovered by Malaysian Special Branch including a 31-year-old Indonesian mechanic arrested in Johor who facilitated travel to join Islamic State in Syria. A 51-year-old tailor, from Kota Bahru, Kelantan, and a 25-year-old Bangladeshi working as a technician arrested in Selangar completed the cell. This dispersed pattern shows the diversity of the cells across the Malaysian peninsular. The cells reached operational momentum to the shores of Singapore. One of the arrested was quoted,
“Rahman Mizanur has said he would carry out an attack anywhere if he was instructed by ISIS to do so, though there are no specific indications that Singapore had as yet been selected as a target,"22
At the Sarinah attack, a second group, led by “Helmi”, attempted to plant a car bomb in the Jakarta police complex and the business district. A third group planned stabbing attacks on traffic police officers and police posts (Straitstimes.com 2016). Reports suggests the third cell was put together by Nazarudin Mukhtar23 alias Abu Gar (Chan and Soeriaatmadja, Straitstimes.com 2016). This confirms previous presentations on both, methods and tactics, are adopted by the IS fractions in Indonesia. Amateurish at this stage, but if we follow terrorism studies, evolutionary.
With an increase of operational experience of the IS ideology in Indonesia, we must accept the difficulties any police force or intelligence service would face. In fact, data examined for this report supports the narrative that the Indonesian police and security services likely have prevented serious loss of life unlike what happened in Paris or Nairobi. However, the lack of access to assault rifles has without doubt prevented a serious loss of life. This may change if the movement is able to draw on weapons caches in Aceh or establish an arms supply system like other more serious terror groups. So far, taken the Sarinah attack as a current gauge, Indonesian jihadists have not mastered the weapon supply system.
Taken into account a handgun in retail goes for 300-600 USD, the funding of 135,000 SGD produced only nine firearms24 without ammunition and homemade explosives merely better than deadly firecrackers highlights the cap in intent versus capabilities. Early 2016 reports show the Philippine Islamic State groups (and the Abu Sayyaf Group) attempted twice to
20 Some reports list the number higher at 177 arrests (see this; 17 May 2016) and 193 (see this; 22 May 2016) 21 Ansar Al-Islam, previously called Ansarullah Bangla Team, began gaining strength in 2013 to 2014; Al-Qaeda
in Bangladesh, like Al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent, known as AQIS. AQIS headquarters in Pakistan did not approve of the idea and suggested Ansarullah be renamed Ansar Al-Islam and work as the Bangladesh branch of AQIS.
22 Ibid.
23 Nazarudin Mukhtar alias Abu Gar, Romli, Rudi Hadianto, Muhammad Toha and Badrodin were arrested on
19 February 2016 (about 1900 hrs) at a raid targeting a militant training camp in Mount Sumbing, Central Java. A total of 38 suspects were arrested but later released. Mukhtar served prison time in 2004 attacking a police station in Maluku (see this; 22 February 2016)
smuggle weapons to Indonesia. The efforts were, on both occasions, thwarted by Philippine authorities in cooperation with partner agencies in Indonesia (Gunaratna 2016). Whereas reports claim weapons are widely accessible to jihadists (Chivers 2016), the evidence concerning Indonesian groups is not supporting this view, for the time being. Our findings disagree with the commonly held view on firearms as being widely accessible. But, we anticipate this will change once recidivists released from prison rejoin the fray.
But steady since 2010, primarily to avenge the arrests and deaths of extremists at police hands, but also to try and secure additional weapons, the main methods used against police were drive-by shootings and targeted assassinations, so contrary to some news reports on the Jakarta attacks, the use of guns was not a new development (Jones 2016). In December 2015, plans were disrupted of targeting the Jakarta Polda Metro Jaya station and Shiite communities across Indonesia (Wockner and Erviani 2015) enacted on Christmas Eve25.
It is a stark warning that the regional coalition amongst jihadists is attempting to overcome the logistical gaps of the terror groups. Hence, establishing connections with Aceh-based GAM members is another indicator of jihadists reaching out to all spectrums of the extremist spectrum.
Although, the evolution of the IS in Indonesia is of concern to Indonesia and the region, the threat must be seen in perspective. For example, in India, 531 terror attacks were recorded in 2012 (Terrorism 2013)26, the Philippines only had 141 attacks in comparison,27 and the German Ministry of Interior reported in its 2014 annual report 43,830 “potential jihadists”. In 2016, a sharp increase of Salafist/Islamic State-inspired actions surfaced ranging from knife attacks to attempting bombing attacks against minorities (Poensgen 2016)28 or inter-group “hits” (Bild 2016). About 8,650are categorized as Salafists (Bild 2016) but only a fraction is classified as extremists. In comparison, Indonesia has about 1,000 “or so” known terrorists.
Recent figures that “1 percent of the Indonesian population is involved in some form of terrorism” raises the question if this figure includes all spectrums such as leftist extremists, anarchist, or are only jihadist estimates (Hamdi 2016). Viewing these figures critically as the implications of this data point is significant.
The need for more statistical work is to obtain a more accurate map of the emerging extremist terrains in Indonesia. We address the figure in later section of the report. We are more concerned if the 1-percentwould convert from non-violent radical ideology being attracted to violence and enter the ranks of violent groups. It is argued if the Sarinah attack is part of a bid to unify under a common Islamic State ‘Wilayah’ province under unified command (Australia/Israel Jewish Affairs Council 2016). This may not be the factual presence.
The BNPT presentation, based on 2012/2013 data, was a collective effort by the Indonesian intelligence community to assess the range of the problem and the level of radicalization of its
25 Police discovered (5) kilograms of urea fertiliser, 18 boxes of paraffin, three kilograms of nails, seven lamps,
four cleavers, four boxes of CO2 tubes and one nine-volt battery. The two attack groups aimed to target the Shiite communities in Pekalongan, Central Java, Bandung in East Java and Pekanbaru in Sumatra. The second group was related to a weapons factory in Klaten, East Java in 2014.
26 Accessed on 15 February 2016 27 Ibid.
society. A 2013 Pew study interpreting Sharia law shows a majority of Indonesians favored Sharia law29 but the numbers are in decline. The 2015 Global Attitude survey shows a decline in support for the Islamic State (The Malay Mail 2015) in Indonesia, but a proportional increase of support for extremist Islamic State doctrine in Malaysia. These concerning developments will reflect in the change in organizational structure and as attempts to restart the jihad.
These type of studies will, in our view, gain importance in somewhat gauging the security environment in Indonesian and Southeast Asia. As a point of consideration in Malaysia, 86 percent of the population favors making Sharia the law of the land, in Thailand 77 percent and Indonesia 72 percent favor Sharia law. 11 percent of Malaysians (Methodology 2015)30 hold a favorable opinion of Islamic State compared to 4 percent of Indonesians (Survey 2015). This makes Indonesia the most liberal of the countries in the region putting the country at par with Jordan and Nigeria (71 percent).
In many of the studies, the shift in Malaysia emerging as the most conservative country in the region surfaces. The “Arabization” of Malaysia promoted by a small but dedicated group of elite fundamentalists within the rank of Malaysian intelligentsia has shifted the country to the ultra-right of the Islamic spectrum. This, in our view, contributes to the radicalization of Malaysian society.
Since dismantling of Jemaah Islamiyah, the Indonesian terror scene has been unable to plan and execute a sustained campaign of violence. What is left is divided, debating over targeting, strategy, tactics and ego, but most of all, the inability to effectively reorganize in the face of a constant dragnet by regional security forces31.
The appearance of IS groups in Sumatra should be seen as one of the indicators the IS ‘diplomacy’ trying to form alliances of convenience. This paper will address some of the indicators present. The increase in the likelihood of IS in Indonesia has been on the radical landscape for some time now. In August 2014, researchers warned that the IS will form a new threat if the Indonesian government does not recognize the threat the group poses. Research suggested that returning combatants might establish new military-like structure (Yunanto 2014)32 and that, at least, a hundred military trainers may return to Indonesia within two to three years33. Combined with the early indoctrination process on-going by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and other Khilafah movement, combined with online radicalization, it will provide the volume to swell the ranks.
However, we argue that the regional cooperation between the Philippine sanctuary and the regional jihadists has produced a long list of transnational, regional terrorists for some time.
29 Interestingly, the Pew study showed diversified views in Indonesia concerning the interpretation of Sharia law
and we recommend to read the entire study to measure the extremely complex topic of Sharia law; for example, Indonesians are split over the definition of sharia law has single or multiple interpretations. Whereas in Indonesia the views are split (44/45) in Malaysia and Thailand the views are more annunciated (Malaysia 35 vs. 43 %, and Thailand 29 vs. 51%); See http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-beliefs-about-sharia/; 30 April 2013
30 In Indonesia and Malaysia, the sampling consisted of 1,000 each face-to-face interviews; accessed on 23 May
2016
31 Ibid.
For example, Umar Patek not only trained the rising star Muamar Askali, he also trained Rajah Suleiman Movement’s (RSM) members such as Ricardo Ayeras and Dino Amor Rosalejos Pareja aka “Khalil Pareja” (Independent Strategy and Intelligence Study Group 2015)34. This is not the exception but the general rule of jihadists in the region.
Reports suggest the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) had received warning of attacks taking place on the 9 January 2016 and Bahrun Naim attempted to organize an attack in Central Java from Syria as early as August 2015 (Jones, The Lowy Institute for International Policy 2015) thereby attempting to start a proxy war in Indonesia (Chan, Straits Times 2016). Critiques argue BIN’s, BAIS capability needs to be improved since Indonesian terrorism has gone global, and its capability of tracking individuals is widely overstated (C. A. Subcommittee 2016)35. The new jihadists made the threat clear; “we are coming for the army, the police (Soeriaatmadja 2016)36, and the state”37.
On 5 January 2016, Aman Abdurrahman’s birthday, a mobile app message circulated within jihadi circles calling for its members to migrate to IS, take up arms and wage jihad at home (Chan and Soeriaatmadja, Straits Times 2016). The use of ‘jihad with everything by everyone’ is not a new phenomenon but is emerging as an alternative trend in the Asian context of threats against the public as part of a more globalized counter strategy targeting Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. The rise of “knife jihad”, an evolution of the “Knife Intifada” executed by Palestinians and eagerly adopted by the new jihadists in Bangladesh (Flood 2016) is be expected to appear in Indonesia, Malaysia and even Singapore (Shanmugam 2016)38.
Source: Straits Times39 quoting Abu Mohammed al-Adnani40
34 The Tanum Group, a faction of the Abu Sayyaf Group member Muamar Askali, who is a bit of a rising star in
the Filipino jihadist o u it . This is i po ta t e ause it highlights ho e tai ele e ts ithi A“G s “ulu wing are moving away from Sahiron and getting more in-line with the Black Flag ideology of their Basilan and Mindanao-based counterparts. Hatib Sawadjaan is leading the faction. Muamar Askali was a student of Umar
Patek, a asso iate of Ah ed Faisal i “a ija aka )ulkifli a d )ulkifli i Hi aka Ma a killed i hat
become known as the Mamasapano massacre. A good description of the family business of kidnapping and links to former and serving PNP police officers can be found in the write up.
35 Patrick Skinner, 15:24 min
36 In 2005-2009 twelve police officers were killed, in 2010-2014, the number doubled to twenty-five. In 2012, a
computer service technician, Santhanam, attempted to poison police officer with cyanide spiked chili pots at hawker stalls.
37 Some experts interviewed in Indonesia in preparation for this report suggested
38I espo se to the i eased th eat of lo e olf atta ke s, the “i gapore Police Force has restructured its
rapid response capability.
39 18 March 2016
40 Abu Mohammed al-Adnani listed as the spokespe so fo Isla i “tate; i k a ed the atta k dog fo
The use of knifes, motor vehicles, meat cleavers and other primitive forms of attacks has a long history and should not require further explanation41. It allows the attacker to adopt a quasi-high ground justifying the attack as part of at the Muslim outrange against the apostates and non-believers and not limited to the urban setting. Moreover, the line is thin of being a random act of violence of premeditated terror attack42.
Examination of why the attack team’s tracks were lost by the surveillance teams and why changes in the date of the attack were made by the terror cell is expected to emerge in due time43. The attack also shows the radical scene is becoming more clandestine in its planning and execution of actions, but these are detectable. This evolution is, however, not particularly new or unexpected. Actionable intelligence and police response has paid off to prevent large loss of life. Nevertheless, IS/Daesh has publically displayed a somewhat limited but lethal capability, intent, and resources allowing the practitioner to draw observations for the near term future. The attack’s intent to have propaganda value trying to copycat a large body count was not achieved either. We agree with a commentary by the Lowy Institute that Thursday’s attack was poorly organized, poorly executed, and poorly received by the people of Jakarta (Croft-Cusworth 2016).
To conclude, whereas the current tactical capability of Islamic State in Indonesia is limited, the more pressing undercurrents of the Khilafah movement, indoctrination of the young, and intersecting and competing interests with Jemaah Islamiyah and its factions, as well as the expansion of the Islamic State “near and far abroad” strategy is shifting the global threat. This is not the end of Islamic State in Indonesia or the end of radicalization of Indonesian society.
CHAPTER I. STRATEGIC THREAT OF THE ISLAMIC STATE
1. THE KILAFAH IS COMING
Whereas the initial framework of this paper was designed to review the attack and its implication, the strategic implications of the current struggle between moderate pluralism and radical change in society receives not the attention it should deserve. The tactical examination is given ample focus by a large body of experts.
Today, the ideological Khilafah narrative is part of the wider Islamic State struggle and a bigger threat to Indonesia than the struggle by arms. In our paper, besides reflecting on the tactical consideration, we focus on more concerning emerging trends: a) the recruitment amongst the young, b) the role of hate speeches in the rural areas, c) the question if the Internet liberties are applicable in the Asian context and if more governance must be imposed.
The struggle for (re)-establishing the Khilafah are not merely fancy posters and slogans but reflects a large group on the social media space. The Hizbut Tahrir spokesperson, Ismail
41 Bertrand Nzohabonayol attacked with a knife a small police station injuring three police officers on 20
December 2014 before being shot dead. His brother was on a terror watch list; see this; 12 January 2015; On 21 December, car attack in Dijon injured 13; one of the victims 11-years old, see this; 22 December 2015
42 The Graz car attack was executed by a 26-year-old, de a ged lo e assassi , killi g th ee, a o gst the a
four-year old boy and injuring 34. The attacker was a devout Bosnian Muslim migrant, Alen ‘iz a o ić, who, at one point, stabbed an elderly couple. The attack was later determined to be premeditated and no mental illness was found as a cause; see this; 22 June 2015
43“o e e pe ts o BIN e p essed the ie the o ga izatio s fo e ell-known surveillance capability needs
Yusanto, is quoted on the HTI website as, “publically rejecting the “existence of ISIS” as an “attitude derived from their Takfiri ideology”. He goes on, “Through their Takfiri ideology fellow Muslims can be easily confused.” (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 2015). However, social media examination shows a glorification of HTI members killed in Syria blurring the lines since the HTI is calling for the establishment of the Khilafah.
Examining the symbolic narrative and the global message, the strategic aim of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is not one of peace and democratic transformation but one of violence as part of the wider global struggle. Indonesia is called the strongest base for the HTI movement.
Source: Piyungan Online, Melawan Media Fitnah (Aulia 2015)
Whereas Indonesia never banned the movement, in 2015, the Malaysian Selangor Fatwa committee declared Hizbut Tahrir a deviant group (The Malay Mail 2015). Hizbut Tahrir was quick to distance itself from Islamic State repeatedly (5 Pillars 2014), (Media 2015), (Trianita 2015). It is yet to be seen if the Indonesian religious, political and security leadership recognizes the threat this group poses.
Even seasoned academics refuse to classify HTI as part of the jihadi ideological political movement. The argument is since HTI has no violent history it does not qualify for classification under a terrorism legal regime. Richard Bulliet wrote,
“A true caliph must be an Arab descended from the Quraysh tribe of the Prophet Muhammad. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi claims such descent, but the Saudis cannot. If King Salman were to fudge matters by assuming the title of Caliph now in response to ISIS, his subjects would see him as a hypocrite. The historic rivals of the Saud family, the Hashimis, were and are direct descendants of the Prophet and are still honored as such by pious Muslims, particularly those living around Mecca and Medina.” (Bulliet 2015)
Although HTI rejects Islamic State, denying a critical examination of HTI fails to recognize the ideological battle waged within Islam that has expanded to Indonesia.
declared an Islamic caliphate. It has not yet achieved the definition of a legitimacy (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 2014)44.
Viewed from the extremist’s perspectives, declaring a “province”, a Wilayah, would provide the legitimacy, in the eyes of the jihadists, to its cause. Its expansionist policy is on display in a map produced by the Washington Post in late 2015 (Lazaro Gamio 2015).
Source: Washington Post (Lazaro Gamio 2015)
By the end of 2015, Islamic State operated twenty (20) Wilayahs mainly focusing on Syria and Iraq. In November 2015, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced eight new Islamic State provinces in Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Algeria. This was the first time Islamic State had formally claimed territory outside its domains. Of the eight new provinces, three in Libya are successfully controlled territories. In January 2015, Islamic State formed a new province on the Afghan-Pakistan border (Roul 2015) that traditionally was the core of Al-Qaeda (Lazaro Gamio, The Washington Post 2015).
As a matter of organizational behavior, an expansion into Asia is a foregone conclusion. In February 2014, Islamic State announced the formation of a Wilayah in the South Asian region (Rafiq 2015). Although seen at this time at the lower end of the threat spectrum, the Malaysian, Indonesian and Philippine groups do not have large affiliates but remain dangerous nonetheless (J. Berger 2016). The regional expansion also surfaces in India with Islamic State creating “to have hatred for the kuffar/kafir (disbelievers). In this land you get to perform jihad”. An Indian identified as Abu Salman al-Hindi operates in the Syrian province of Homs (Miglani 2016). The Islamic State claims to revenge the Babri mosque, violence against Hindus in a train attack in Gujarat, the home state of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and independence for Kashmir.
However, the militant narrative and call for replacement capitalism at a conference in Jakarta in 2013 shows the political ambition of the movement of arguing economics, political system, and new governance under a Khilafah structure. The creation of a shadow agenda is not unlike the Marxist ambitions or the Aceh Freedom Movement (GAM) with its separatist ambitions.
Hence, the line between the almost academic presentation of creating a new program of replacing capitalism with living under a new economic regime of the Khilafah, effectively replacing pluralistic order and the symbolic adaptation of the Shadada of Islamic State works
44 The website provides an overview how HTI Indonesia perceives the legitimacy issue surrounding the Islamic
as a powerful symbol that is very difficult for Muslims to oppose (Al Jazeera 2014). The spread of the Khilafah through a structure like Hizbut Tahrir is, hence, difficult to differentiate since one takes power by (perceived) peaceful means compared to the other (Islamic State) through a conquest of arms.
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia calls for a Jizya – also called Jizyah - a tax imposed on non-Muslims and Ghanimah, the spoils of war. Whereas largely dismissed by the Islamic communities, HTI, Islamic State and Taliban attempted to recreate the concept of Jizyah. One blog argues war with the people of Singapore and Australia classifies, notable not Malaysia, qualifies for Ghanimah with property and assets divided between those who fought and partly put into a state treasury (Hizbut-Tahrir 2014).
Source: author’s collection
Enslavement of the defeated is not merely a concept but has been practiced in Syria by Islamic State and is promoted by HTI ideology in the Indonesian narrative. Although utopian in nature, many in the extremists/radical scene in Indonesia look with great interest to the exploits of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.
The role of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is somewhat minimized by academics since it does not engage in the use of arms but the widespread proselytization provides a platform for mobilization of a larger segments of Indonesian faithful to indoctrinate a wider audience to the Khilafah, and hence the jihadist/Islamic State narrative. We provide some examples in this paper.
2. HATE SPEECH & RADICALIZATION OF THE MASSES
The phenomena of the attraction for Islamic State is being debated for some time now. Experts, since 9/11 and before, debated extremist motivation to ad nauseam. After each major terror attack, a large volume of academic, policy and media publications is being produced attempting to address this question. The Brookings Institute warned about western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq in November 2014 (Shapiro 2014) and, hence, no surprise about the rise of Islamic State in Asia should be on display. The warning signs have been here for some time.
Most of the studies are inconclusive about motivation and often come across as a search for the silver bullet to answer a multi-dimensional, cultural complex issue that increasingly points into the direction of economic wealth rather than an ideological base. In absence of economic wealth, extremism seems to rise. However, this does not eliminate jihadist extremism. Fareed Zakaria argued that many are radicalized first, before being Islamized (Zakaria 2015).
This further supports our view of an erosion of ideology being experienced in the ranks of most extremist groups attracting a broader spectrum of the population in comparison to the purist Jemaah Islamiyah. It explains the spectrum of radicalized Islamic State members arrested in Malaysia ranging from hairdressers to members of the armed forces. To belong to something that has a purpose has a greater appeal than the actual ideology. A commentator recently stated, “It would surprise Usama Bin Laden with joy seeing Islamic State driving captured US heavy weapons in Syria and Iraq”.
How is this relevant for the Indonesian situation? During the field research for this paper, the question on radicalization of the public was apparent. In discussion with different segments in society, the radicalization through the mosque system was noted and events in Iraq and Syria are debated more frequently. The views are wide-ranging but continue to paint a picture of anger, which resonates with the Indonesian public. Comments suggested that most of the Friday prayers in mosques include a fifteen-minute segment on anti-foreigner rhetoric. Whereas this could be misconstrued as a nationalistic narrative, the delivery mechanism is distinctively radical oriented.
Although one interviewee argued the national religious policy is pluralistic, which it is, the grass roots are firebrand radicals holds true – and similar examples exist in Christianity and other religions – the issue remains. If the Jokowi administration does not address the radicalization at the grass root level with deep-rooted ideological and political reform, the radicalization of the larger segments of society will escalate rapidly.
trend is of concern. With a population growth of five percent per annum, the potential for radicalization of this population remains a cause of worry.
According to an Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) study, radical Islamic ideology has spread freely on secular university campuses across Indonesia, with students from science and engineering majors more susceptible to infiltration, researchers warned.
LIPI senior researcher Anas Saidi said that while students who studied social and political sciences, humanities and philosophy were more resistant to radical beliefs, those who studied hard sciences were at greater risk of indoctrination. The researchers wrote, “...while terrorism was a significant threat for Indonesia, …..radicalism hidden within society was actually a greater problem for the nation in the long run, as its development was unseen and unpredictable.” (Sapiie 2016) In the context of social media field research, we agree with this assessment.
3. RECRUITMENT OF THE YOUNG
In 2012, RSIS wrote, “...the Poor governance could render the people susceptible to radical ideas, which they see as a solution for their problems. Like a mutating organism, the terrorists always adjust to their circumstances and try to find the weakest parts of the society to exploit.” (Priamarizki 2012)
The recruitment of the young is another emerging trend. In the section Jihadi cubs, we address the appearance of proselytizing youth into the ranks of the Khilafah movement and hence producing the ideological factory for indoctrinated young at large scale. We agree with the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) study that a lack of monitoring on the activities of Muslim student organizations may have resulted in the systematic dissemination of fundamentalist movements brought by hard-line Islamic communities such as Ikhwanul Muslimin (IM) and other transnational Islamic Wahhabi groups (Wahyuni 2014).
Whereas most of the research focuses on students in universities, examination of social media shows a much earlier evolutionary process of recruitment and indoctrination. A 2014 research by the Search for Common Ground suggests positive results on countering and preventing radicalization in Indonesian pesantren45 but the evidence shows continuous work is needed to reform the schooling system and prevent early radicalization.
De-radicalization projects targeted pesantren affiliated to the traditional Islam Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and at the same time, it empowered the mainstream moderate Islam that has been seen as ‘silent majority’ and was identified as a successful response. Subsequently, it provided a countermeasure against the ‘vocal minority’ extremists in the country46. However, more needs
to be done.
4. IS ISLAMIC STATE IN ASIA GOING ASYMMETRIC?
Besides the ideological battle, the geopolitical situation plays a role in the rise (and fall) of Islamic State in Asia. The allied campaign against Islamic State in Syria and Iraq is likely increasing the threat to the Southeast Asian region with Islamic State defeated on the
battlefield, dispersing its followers with many following the jihadi fantasy moving to Iraq and Syria and likely to flow back to their native countries.
But, the Islamic State wars in Syria and Iraq provide the sophistication to the militants with finances, strategy and operational knowledge (J. S. Jani 2016). Islamic State legitimized citizens of a defunct global caliphate and their sub-state provinces provide the religious legitimacy for its groups and factions. Whereas Islamic State fears the returning fighter because of an expansion policy, we view this more as the result of defeat in Syria and Iraq but also part of a policy of foreign expansion by Islamic State.
Recent announcements by Islamic State to attack Australian targets in cyber space, declaration of Thailand under an Islamic State flag and the 15 November 2015 meeting between Abu Sayyaf, the Islamic State, and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Sulu. In the meeting, several resolutions were agreed upon, including mounting attacks in Malaysia, particularly Kuala Lumpur and Sabah (Raj 2013). Reports claims eight Abu Sayyaf and Islamic State suicide bombers were already on the ground in Sabah while another ten were in Kuala Lumpur (Chin 2015).
Since 2012, Malaysian Special Branch has prevented at least four bombings. This includes a Carlsberg beer factory in Petaling Jaya (Chew 2014), discos and pubs (Spencer 2014), government buildings, political figures and business tycoons to be held for ransom. Whereas Malaysia was seen in the past as a transit point, Islamic State now sees Malaysia as a political center for the politicization of Islam and, therefore, receptive to the Islamic State ideology. Reports suggest the threat is no longer limited to Sabah’s east coast but has spread across the state with militants appointing “Panglimas” from the Sulu Sultanate (The Straits Times 2016) in every State Legislative Assembly constituency across the state (The Straits Times 2016) to revenge the failed 2013 attempt by the Sulu Sultan Jamalul Kiram III in Lahad Datu.
And, Islamic State’s reading of public studies provides the justification for ongoing offensive having reached critical mass. The Malaysian Transport Minister, Liow Tiong, publically stated Malaysia has approximately 50,000 Islamic State supporters (Al Jazeera 2015). Less than a month later, the Sarinah attacks and attempted attacks in Kuala Lumpur appeared.
Brookings Institute publications stated, that 39 percent of the Malaysian Muslims surveyed believed that violence could be justified against enemies of Islam (Liow, Brookings 2015). A 2013 Pew Institute study titled, ‘2013 Pew Global Attitudes Survey’, noted “in Malaysia . . . roughly a quarter of Muslims (27 percent) take the view that attacks on civilians are sometimes or often justified.”47 Significantly, Indonesians polled only 18 percent on the same question (1 percent “often,” 5 percent “sometimes,” and 12 percent “rarely”)48. A 2015 study came to similar conclusions.
Although the use of political Islam is a deliberate move by a group of committed Islamists hidden in the Malaysian state and bureaucracy to create a Malay-Islamic state (Chin, Malaysia: Pseudo-democracy and the making of a Malay-Islamic State 2015), not a mere theocratic state49, the calculations by this group like in other countries in pursuit of a radical conversion will likely backfire and create an environment of political instability.
With Islamic State being defeated by arms, the group will be converting to an asymmetric terror campaign, is a logical evolution. Striking a balance between fixing the force in Syria and Iraq and destroying Islamic State or dispersing the enemy creating a replication in many Asian countries with Islamic State forming new alliances as already underway are the realities of 2016 and beyond.
However, the returning Asians may not be as problematic as expected since first reports of disgruntled Islamic State fighters returning show the fallacy of IS in Syria. The study views the ideological recruitment and mobilization of large sways of citizens, even percentile insignificant politically, represents a bigger threat to the stability in Southeast Asia.
In our view, returning jihadists provide recruitment, counter narrative, and law enforcement opportunities to dismantle the networks. We share the common view held by many interviewed for this paper that Indonesia, including other countries in Southeast Asia, is entering a new period of recognizing the that threat is with the fascination of the extremist Khawarij/Takfiri ideology of the Islamic State.
5. SOME CONCLUSION
To conclude: Islamic State is a violent power structure allowed to operate in a political, military and social vacuum as a result of flawed foreign, regional and national policies in the Middle East. It pursues a policy of eradication, total societal change with ethnic cleansing as radical as the Khmer Rouge, the Serbian extermination campaigns, or the Rwandan genocide of its Tutsi minority. Its political aim is to destroy Mecca as the religious center for Muslims, destroy the Jordanian and Saudi Arabian monarchies, and erode the legal boundaries of states in the Middle East. It has conducted a campaign of gross human rights violation and has initiated an expansion policy because of its attraction to the wider radicalized public.
In its bizarre quest for power, it has executed a policy of destruction, committed extra-juridical mass execution of Iraqis and Syrians of all ages, sex, and religion. Islamic State has committed violations of every possible United Nations charter of human rights, National laws, and legislation governing terrorism. It wages a war of terror on the innocent and is rejected by Islamic scholars as a Takfiri in violation of Islamic jurisprudence. Scholars declared Islamic State identical to the Khajirites of early Islamic period.
Although the capability of Islamic State in Asia is limited on the national level, a unification of regional groups under an over-arching Islamic State narrative is developing. Whereas capability and resources may not match aspiration, Islamic State in Asia is a regurgitation of the Al Qaeda regional structure.
Whereas the tactical threat of arms is manageable by most of the tactical capabilities in the region, the political and societal resilience is yet to be tested in societies with multi-ethical and religious diversity. Another attack in Bali, or knife attack in Singapore, an attack against tourist targets in Thailand and a multi-shooter scenario as seen in Paris in any of the capitals of the region will create a strain within the sensitive social fabric that exists.
The threat stems from the absence of firm national, regional, and local policies that counter radicalization. In the climate of demo-crazy, a term coined by Indonesians in the post-1998 period, everything goes allowing harmful doctrines to flourish and largely go unchallenged, unchecked, and unpunished.
Early detection of radicalization of groups is met with a lack of political narrative, national identity and an absence of doctrinal identity that would counter Islamic State doctrine. The academia is divided over the roles of radical Islamists not to be confused with extremists, anarchists, and terrorists. This primarily political definition provides a complex mix of what is acceptable.
For examples, Font Pembela Islam (FPI) is well known to have links to the police. Other groups are linked to the armed forces. The use of these state-sanctioned vigilantes operating in the open and without objection by the state raises the question: how extreme is extreme? The inconsistency of policy governing the militant factions operating under the Islamic flag of war are thin and set the stage for blowback (Crisis Group 2012) if the groups are perforated by Islamic State doctrine.
The Crisis Group wrote,
“..The 2011 suicide bombings of a police mosque in Cirebon, West Java and an evangelical church in Solo, Central Java were carried out by men who moved from using sticks and stones in the name of upholding morality and curbing “deviance” to using bombs and guns. They show how ideological and tactical lines within the radical community have blurred, meaning that counter-terrorism programs that operate on the assumption that “terrorists” are a clearly definable group distinguishable from hardline activists and religious vigilantes are bound to fail..”50
We agree with the 2012 position and warn of an increase in adopting cross-group doctrines moving closer to an Islamic State/ HTI doctrine than adopting democratic principles. Current Indonesian and former Counter Terror officials interviewed for this paper noted the prevalent western perspective of what defines Indonesian terrorism centers on a pro-western definition of terrorism.
A limited narrative on what are emerging trends in the radical scene is seen as not allowing the Indonesian voices on terrorism being heard. The limited range of academic perspectives is leading to confirmation bias of what are the emerging trends in the radical scene.
Today, Islamic State and its proxies in Asia are a threat to the public.
CHAPTER II. MEASURING THE THREAT, BLACK SWANS & (NOT SO) SURPRISES
1. INDICATORS: ISLAMIC STATE (& TERRORISM) IS DETECTABLE
“si Jesús viviera, sería guerrillero”
(If Jesus were alive today, He would be a guerrillero)
Camilo Torres Restrepo51
Increasingly, a number of historical similarities from other extreme brutal terror movements can be drawn that show a similar, if not identical, trajectory of Islamic State. For example, the internationalization of the struggle Islamic State and its expansionist policy of terror can be found in the Spanish civil war in the formation of the International Brigades, the Red Army Factions (RAF), the extreme German Revolutionäre Zellen (the Revolutionary Cells)52, the Provos/IRA, FARC and many other known terror groups. At one time or another, terror groups go global. Recent references to the early Islamist extremists, the Khawarij (The Humble "I" 2015) (anglicized Kharijites53) reflect on the historical truth that most – if not all – societies experienced some form of extremist nihilistic narrative in their past. Asia, in this context, is no exception.
As early as mid-2014, discussions within the various security circles focusing on the rise of IS in Asia were lively and intensive. By the end of 2014, with the appearance of Southeast Asian fighters in Syria, YouTube videos of Islamic State on 25 December 2014 taking the fight to the Indonesian police and the army were dismissed by Indonesian security officials as “propaganda” (Rochimawati 2014). At the time, factual evidence was limited. Evidence on capabilities, weapons and tactical skills, leadership, communications structures and group size were “rumortual” rather than “factual”.
Source: Online screengrab 2016 (ISIS Study Group n.d.)54
51 Camilo Torres Restrepo was a revolutionary member of the Columbian National Liberation Front attempted
to conciliate Marxism with Catholicism. He was killed on his first combat patrol trying to ambush a Columbian army patrol. A similar attempt is being made by Indonesian leftist of the Peoples Democratic Party (PRD), successor of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)
52 Who cooperated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – External Operations (PFLP-EO) 53Also efe ed as Kha a ij those ho e t out ; Refuting ISIS: A Rebuttal of Its Religious and Ideological
Foundations. Sacred Knowledge. pp. xvii–xviii.
The Sarinah attack was part of a long series of plots, attempted failed attacks, and narrow escapes since 2014. Named as “Plan B”, after a series of arrests disrupted the terror plans for Christmas and New Year, more attacks were expected to come (Jakarta Globe n.d.)55.
For a protracted period, the IS has dispatched teams to execute bombings or planned suicide missions in Indonesia and Malaysia. Not unlike swarming attacks, the repeated appearance of cells, groups, and a confusing array of attempted acts of terror – although failed – were an indication of things to come and is becoming the new normal. It can be argued that due to an increase of intervention in Syria by state-actors, the group is dispersing to bringing the fight to the soils of Europe and Asia and is an indication that Islamic State is, in fact, losing the battle in Syria.
Even seasoned experts like Sidney Jones wrote in November 2015, “There is as yet no ISIS structure for Indonesia, and that pressure from some pro-ISIS quarters to form a unified organization has not yet succeeded” (Jones, The Interpreter 2015). A similar view was expressed by the Head of the National Intelligence Agency, BIN, who announced in early December 2015 that the “likelihood of attacks is low”. He argued that it was not the style of the terror group to warn their targets. “They would strike without talking,” he was quoted as saying (Cleary 2015).
A rethinking is clearly required and taking place with the Indonesian police and army offering to rescue ten seaman held hostage by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) after its ship, the Anand12, was hijacked (Chan and Dancel, The Straits Times 2016) by a cell led by Alhabsi Misaya (Navy the Best 2014)56.
The use of the army units for counter terror/insurgency operations is the domain of the army and in line with other countries. The politicization by human rights organizations and political commentators’ attempts to undermine the need for a strong army counter-terror capability. However, new realities in the regional fight against terrorism will likely result in a greater role of the TNI engaging in bilateral counter terror operations (Alim 2016) with the Chief of Kostrad, Edy Rahmayadi, proclaiming the Philippine armed forces are unable to handle the hostage crisis (Sayyaf 2016).
Taking the IRA as an example, however, announcing the intent is not uncommon within terror groups, and at the time of the statement, the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) was already on the lookout for planned terror plots since early November 201557. All this indicates that things were changing.
At the time, Khatib Nusantara (KN) was officially three-months old. IS/ISIS/ISIL/Daesh, which was formed on 8 June 2013, was about shy of two years. On 29 June 2014, the ISIL/IS Sharia self-proclaimed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi58 as Caliph Ibrahim becoming its head of state
55 no date
56 Alhabsi Misaya is responsible for the beheading of Malaysian businessman Bernard Then in November 2015.
The Malaysian was kidnapped from a resort in Sabay in May 2015.
57 Long-time experts in Indonesia have argued BIN capability needs to be improved with the IS threat operating
beyond the borders of Indonesia.
58Who is also k o as D I ahi , A u Du a. His offi ial aliphal a e is A u Bak Al-Baghdadi Husseini
and theocratic absolute monarch (Barie 2015)59. Choosing the nom de guerre, Caliph Ibrahim, is to instill Islamic legitimacy60.
Although Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has been around since 2003, he helped found the Jamaat Jaysh Ahl al-Sunnah wa-i-Jamaah (JJASJ), while the appearance of the Indonesian/Malaysian branch of IS was, in 2014, only a year old. The Bahasa Indonesia-speaking fighters located in Al Shadadi, Hassakeh, Syria with Naim were rumored to reside in Raqqa, the self-proclaimed IS capital.
Whereas, in post-attack Sarinah, the media, public, and most security pundits flooded the public space, the early debates were inconclusive, spotty and mixed in intelligence value since the exact structures were not understood or seriously examined that allowed determining the threat of IS in the region.
However, reviewing some of the recent court documents, a repeated appearance of known IS sympathizers with a long history in jihadist causes shows a greater analytical understanding of jihadist networks’ movement and inter-group movements are needed. The constant inter-group movements and broadening of the IS hopefuls is changing the dynamics converting from a purist Jemaah Islamiyah organization to a cruder, but broader mobilization of the radical desiring to join the “jihadi action”.
For example, Febriwansyah, now serving a five-year sentence, participated in March 2014 at a rally near Hotel Indonesia pledging alliance to the IS. Helmi Muhammad Alamudi alias Abu Roya, now serving 3.5 years for facilitating financing terrorism, raised 257 million IDR (26,500 SGD) for smuggling 39 Indonesians to Syria joining the IS. He served as a guard at an IS camp in Syria. Reports suggest members of the IS visited Aceh province in 2013 to recruit former jihadists from Jemaah Islamiyah and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT). For 20 million IDR (approximately 2,000 USD) (Liow 2016), recruits were flown to Syria to receive real combat experience.
Another jihadist, Ahmad Junaedi, now serving three-years, was a meatball seller (Bakso). He participated in a firearms training but left Syria disgruntled after Abu Jandal cheated him out of a large sum of promised money61. This show the frictions within the terror group are not unlike any other known organization. Close relationship to others such as Ridwan Sungkar, Abdul Hakim Munabari, Aprimul Henry and Koswara Ibnu Abdullah, now serving five-years prison term and recruited Helmi, Ridwan Ahmad and Abdul Hakim Munabari (Sarma 2016), is observed.
The recent arrests of twenty-seven (27) Bangladeshi workers in Singapore (Lee 2016)62, the detection of multiple sets of plots to execute copycat operations in Indonesia and Malaysia and the continuous war in Iraq and Syria has shifted the terror threat picture towards internationalizing the IS. But prior to the arrests, Singapore was identified as a possible target for attack. M. Arifil Azim Putra Norja’i, a 20-year-old polytechnic student, made plans to assassinate President Tony Tan and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Long if he could not travel. He planned to use easily available knifes to carry out the attack in public places. His radicalization
59 slide 33 60 Ibid. slide 34
