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Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, Vol. 23 No. 2, 2000, pp. 233-245.
#MCB University Press, 1363-951X
Pepper spray
A safe and reasonable response to
suspect verbal resistance
Michael R. Smith
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia, USA, and
Geoffrey P. Alpert
University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, USA
Keywords Police, Resistance
Abstract Explores the debate over the safety and efficacy of police use of force tactics in general, and pepper spray in particular. Introduces the force continua, checklists employed by US police forces to prescribe levels of force to be used in particular situations. Reviews the literature, discusses two recent studies and the legal and ethical issues involved. Suggests further research in less-than-lethal weapons.
Introduction
Research on police use of force has become a topic of considerable interest to practitioners and researchers. Historically, investigations on the use of force by police have been conducted only by Commissions and interested groups as a response to a specific incident or series of publicized events. Well-known incidents that created an uproar and led to civil disturbances and police reform include the beating death of Arthur McDuffie in Miami (1979) and the beating of Rodney King (1991) in Los Angeles, and the beating death of Malice Green in Detroit (1996). As a consequence of these and other events, police administrators and researchers have looked critically and comprehensively at the use of force, its justifications, levels, and methods.
In recent years, use of force continua have become prevalent in police policies and in police training. A recent survey conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum of 832 American law enforcement agencies found that 68 per cent had policies on the use of force that included use of force continua (Alpert, 1999). These continua present officers with a series of escalating steps in the use of force that they are required to follow whenever possible (Connor, 1991). Illustrations 1 and 2 are examples of common use of force continua extracted from police policies. Policies that incorporate continua such as these, typically state that officers should escalate their use of force along the continua as the suspect's resistance increases and should de-escalate their use of force as the threat or risk posed by the suspect diminishes. These policies also permit officers to skip steps within the continua if necessary, such as when a cooperative suspect suddenly produces a gun and threatens the
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officer with deadly force, or a violent suspect ends his resistance and surrenders.
Illustration 1. Police use of force continuum
(1) No force;
(2) Officers' presence in uniform; (3) Verbal communication; (4) Chemical agents;
(5) Light subject control, escort techniques, pressure point control, handcuffs;
(6) Physical tactics and use of weapons other than chemicals and firearms; (7) Firearms/deadly force.
Illustration 2. Use of force continuum resistance and response levels
Suspect resistance level: (1) Suspect presence; (2) Verbal resistance; (3) Passive resistance; (4) Defensive resistance; (5) Active physical resistance; (6) Firearms/deadly force.
Officer level of control (force): (1) Interview stance; (2) Verbal commands;
(3) Passive techniques (handcuffs, subject control, pressure points); (4) Chemical agents;
(5) Physical tactics/impact weapons; (6) Firearms/deadly force.
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weaponless tactics or control holds. As depicted in Illustration 2, other agencies place OC spray after hands-on weaponless tactics but before impact weapons. The recent PERF survey of American law enforcement agencies revealed that 86 per cent of responding agencies place pepper spray before physical control techniques on their use of force continua (Alpert, 1999).
The purpose of this article is to shed some light on the debate over the safety and efficacy of police use of force tactics in general, and pepper spray in particular. The article begins with a brief review of the literature on police use of force effectiveness. Next, it discusses two recent studies on police use of force and their implications for the use of pepper spray and its placement on the use of force continuum. The article continues with a discussion of the legal and ethical issues surrounding the use of pepper spray before concluding with suggestions for future research and development in the area of less-than-lethal weapons.
Prior research on the effectiveness and safety of non-lethal force used by police
With the exception of one published study, the few empirical studies that have attempted to measure the effectiveness of force used by police have focused largely on the use of the pepper spray. The most recent of these pepper spray studies, conducted by Kaminski, Edwards and Johnson (1999) in Baltimore County, Maryland, is discussed in a separate section below.
An initial study in Baltimore that used a portion of the same data analyzed by Kaminskiet al.found that pepper spray successfully incapacitated 156 out of 174 (90 per cent) persons against whom it was used in 1993 (Edwardset al., 1997). Additionally, there were few injuries to officers and suspects during encounters where pepper spray was used. A total of 21 (11 per cent) officers and 14 (8 per cent) suspects received minor injuries. None of the injuries required significant medical treatment or hospitalization. Reliable data on injuries prior to the adoption of pepper spray by the Baltimore County police department were not available. Thus, the researchers could not determine if the use of pepper spray reduced the number of officer and suspect injuries during use of force encounters.
The effectiveness of pepper spray also has been examined in Portland, Oregon (Gauvin, 1995), New Britain, Connecticut (Nowicki, 1993), and British Columbia (Kingshott, 1992). Effectiveness ranged from 85 per cent in the Portland study to 95 per cent in the Connecticut study. During the two year period prior to the adoption of pepper spray by the Portland police, 69 per cent of suspects and 31 per cent of officers involved in use of force incidents were injured. After pepper spray became available, only 12 per cent of officers and suspects were injured during use of force encounters (Gauvin, 1995). In the Connecticut study, Nowicki (1993) reported that no officers or suspects were injured in 360 uses of pepper spray.
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the availability of pepper spray affects use of force decisions by police or resistance by suspects. They used an interrupted time series design and ARIMA modeling to determine that the introduction of pepper spray in Baltimore County, Maryland reduced the number of assaults on police by a statistically significant 15 per cent. Lumb and Friday (1997) found that the introduction of pepper spray into a small department in North Carolina reduced by 25 per cent the number of instances where officers responded to suspect resistance (hands and feet) with physical force. In addition, no suspects or officers were injured as the result of pepper during the time period when it was in use.
In 1994, OC spray and hand-held stun devices were introduced into the various detention facilities operated by the Maricopa County, Arizona Sheriff's Office. During a two year evaluation of their impact and effectiveness, deputies reported high levels of satisfaction with both weapons. With respect to the stun devices in particular, jail deputies reported that they were totally effective 52 per cent of the time when used and partially effective in another 25 per cent of cases. Although both inmates and deputies were more likely to suffer injury with the stun device than with pepper spray, stun devices produced slightly lower injury rates in the jails (11.6 per cent for inmates) than weaponless, hands-on tactics (14.2 per cent for inmates) (Hepburnet al., 1997).
In 1992, the Institute for Law and Justice (ILJ) surveyed US law enforcement agencies regarding their use and experiences with a variety of less-than-lethal weapons. A total of 378 police and sheriffs' departments responded to the survey, which asked agencies, among other things, to comment on the effectiveness of the weapons that they employed. Agencies reported that telescoping batons and OC spray were the most effective of the commonly used police weapons at subduing resistive suspects. Only stunning explosives (flash-bang grenades) received a higher effectiveness rating. Telescoping batons and OC spray also generated few citizen complaints and were judged to be relatively safe to both officers and citizens. Overall, OC spray was judged to be the safest and most effective of all of the weapons listed on the survey (McEwen and Leahy, 1994).
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encounters. Major or moderate injury rates for suspects ranged from a high of 80 per cent when a flashlight was used to zero when a chemical agent or the TASER was used. Major or moderate injury rates for officers ranged from a high of 36 per cent when officers punched suspects to zero for the use of chemical agents or TASERs.
Police use of force and injuries in Miami, Florida
Some of the most comprehensive data on police use of force and resulting injuries come from Alpert and Dunham's (1998) study of police use of force in Dade, Florida. They analyzed 882 use of force reports involving Miami-Dade police officers during the last quarter of 1993 and all of 1994 and 1995. These data were reported in the agency required forms by the officers' supervisors after talking with the officers, the suspects, and available witnesses.
The Miami-Dade data indicate that officers were most likely to use relatively low levels of force not involving a police weapon. As the information in Table I shows, the most common level of force used by officers against suspects was to forcibly subdue the suspect with hands (49 per cent). Another 24 per cent were subdued by the officer with force other than hands, and 20 per cent of the incidents involved just minimal force. The Miami-Dade Police Department requires the completion of a use of force report when an injury occurs, even if little or no force is used. Thus, Table I also reports the frequencies of these no-force incidents that resulted in injury. The frequencies are naturally quite low and range from between 1 and 3 per cent.
As shown by the data in Table II, the most common type of force used by officers was hands and arms (77 per cent). Eight per cent used handguns, and another 7 per cent used police canines. In 3 per cent of the incidents, officers used their fists. Only 4 per cent of incidents involved the use of a less-than-lethal weapon[1].
As the data in Table III indicate, officers most often used force to grab or hold the suspect (64 per cent). The next most common use of force was to strike or hit the suspect (10 per cent). In 8 per cent of the incidents, the officer discharged his or her weapon, and in 7 per cent the officer used some type of restraint. Police dogs bit suspects in 6 per cent of the cases, and officers pushed
Table I.
Level of force used by the officer Frequency Percentage
No force used ± but officer injured 8 1
No force used ± subject complained of injury 28 3 Minimum physical contact ± officer injured 25 3 Minimum force to guide or control suspect 167 20 Forcibly subdued suspect with hands 415 49 Force other than hands was used to subdue 208 24
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or pulled suspects in 5 per cent of the incidents. Again, the data show that the majority of use of force encounters involved low-level, weaponless control tactics by the police.
One advantage of the Miami-Dade use of force reports is that they capture officer and suspect injuries. For officers, the most common injury was bruises or abrasions (64 per cent), followed by sprains or strains (15 per cent) and lacerations (15 per cent). Two per cent of the officers were bitten by the suspect, and another 2 per cent suffered broken or fractured bones. Only 1 per cent of the officers was injured by a gunshot. These data are presented in Table IV.
Although more suspects than officers were injured, suspect injuries showed a pattern similar to officer injuries. The information in Table V shows the most common type of suspect injury was a bruise or abrasion (48 per cent). The next most common was lacerations (24 per cent).
Of the suspects, 10 per cent had injuries not related to the incident with the police, and another 7 per cent had dog bite injuries; 4 per cent had injuries from gunshots.
Table II.
Type of force used by officer
Frequency Percentage
Hands/arms 621 77
Fist 21 3
Foot/leg 9 1
Handgun 60 8
Shotgun 5 <1
Radio 3 <1
Flashlight 6 <1
PR-24 11 1
K-9 53 7
Chemical agent 4 <1
Special weapon 9 1
Lateral neck restraint 1 <1
Total 803 100
Table III.
How force was used by officer
Frequency Percentage
Threaten 3 <1
Grab/hold 529 64
Push/pull 38 5
Strike/hit 79 10
Bite (K-9) 48 6
Throw 2 <1
Discharge of firearm 65 8
Restraint 57 7
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Table VI describes the chances of officer injury (not including simple soreness) according to a number of the more common ways in which the Miami-Dade officers reported using force[2]. These figures suggest that Miami-Dade officers were significantly at risk of injury any time they used force, but particularly when they used hands and arms to control a suspect or when they struck a suspect with their fists. Because most use of force incidents involved the use of hands, arms, or fists (80 per cent), Miami-Dade officers were most at risk of injury when using precisely the type of force that they reported using most frequently.
Table IV.
Type of officer injury Frequency Percentage
Bruise/abrasion 197 64
Sprain/strain 46 15
Laceration 45 15
Bite 6 2
Puncture 1 <1
Broken bone/fracture 5 2
Internal injury 1 <1
Gunshot 3 1
Soreness 1 <1
Injury not related 3 1
Total 308 100
Table V.
Type of suspect injury Frequency Percentage
Bruise/abrasion 306 48
Sprain/strain 21 3
Laceration 154 24
Bite 45 7
Puncture 3 <1
Broken bone/fracture 5 <1
Internal injury 2 <1
Gunshot 28 4
Soreness 2 <1
Injury not related 66 10
Total 632 100
Table VI.
Chance of officer injury by type of police force used Type of force Chance of injury (%)
Hands/arms 43
Fist 48
Foot/leg 22
PR-24 27
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Table VII summarizes the chances of suspect injury when various types of force were used by the Miami-Dade police. The chances of suspect injury were significant no matter what type of force was used. Interestingly, a suspect was more likely to suffer injury if struck with a fist than if struck with a PR-24 police baton. This may be due to the training that police receive in how to use the baton in a manner that minimizes the risk of injury, or it may reflect the anecdotal belief on the part of many officers that the PR-24 is an ineffective weapon. In any event, the chances of a suspect being injured during a use of force incident were greatest when the officer used his or her hands, arms, feet, or legs during the encounter.
The Miami-Dade use of force reports do not indicate the extent to which the level of force used by the officer incapacitated the suspect or aided the officer in making an arrest. For this type of data, we turn now to a discussion of the effectiveness of pepper spray as recently reported in the literature.
The effectiveness of pepper spray in Baltimore County, Maryland Recently, Kaminski, Edwards and Johnson (1999) examined 878 uses of pepper spray (OC) by the Baltimore County Police Department from July 1993 to December 1996. These researchers used police OC incident reports to develop three measures of effectiveness. The first dichotomous measure indicated whether officers felt that OC spray helped them make the arrest. The second dichotomous measure was based on the officers' descriptions of suspect behavior after OC spray was used and indicated whether the spray was effective (suspect was incapacitated or submissive) or ineffective (suspect resisted, fled, fought, or was unaffected by spray). The final measure used officer responses to rate effectiveness on a five-item Likert scale:
(1) totally effective;
(2) effective;
(3) minimally effective; (4) ineffective;
(5) totally ineffective.
Against the dependent variable of ``effectiveness,'' Kaminskiet al.correlated the independent variables of suspect age, race, gender, height, and weight. Other
Table VII.
Chance of suspect injury by type of police force used
Type of force Chance of injury (%)
Hands/arms 65
Fist 81
Foot/leg 67
PR-24 64
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independent variables included the suspect's perceived condition (drinking, on drugs, mentally disturbed, other) and the distance from which the OC spray was used (0-2 ft, 3-4 ft, 5-20 ft).
Overall, officers reported that the use of OC spray helped them make an arrest 85 per cent of the time and that 71 per cent of suspects were incapacitated or submissive after being sprayed with OC. The officers reported that OC spray was totally effective 28 per cent of the time, effective 42.5 per cent of the time, minimally effective 15 per cent of the time, ineffective 10 per cent of the time, and totally ineffective 4 per cent of the time.
Using a variety of multiple regression models, Kaminski et al. examined which of the independent variables separately and together explained the effectiveness or non-effectiveness of OC spray. Significant predictors of effectiveness included the age and weight of the suspect, the distance when sprayed, and the condition of the suspect (drinking, on drugs, mentally disturbed, other). The regression analysis showed that younger and older suspects were more susceptible to OC spray than middle years suspects. Increases in suspect weight were associated with an increased chance that the pepper spray would be ineffective. Increases in spray distance slightly increased the likelihood that the spray would be ineffective as well. Surprisingly, suspects under the influence of alcohol were more susceptible to the effects of OC spray, while suspects on drugs were consistently less likely to be affected by the spray than those not under chemical influence. The findings with respect to mentally disturbed suspects were either statistically insignificant or were mixed on the question of effectiveness.
Use of force continua revisited
As the PERF survey indicated, many police agencies that include use of force continua in their policies and training permit officers to use pepper spray before physical control techniques. The findings from the Miami-Dade and the Baltimore County study support this approach. Officers and suspects are most likely to be injured when officers attempt to use physical force to control resistive persons. This is true even when officers use low-level force to push, pull, or grab a suspect. If officers can avoid attempts to control resistant suspects with hands-on physical force, then fewer injuries are likely to occur. Until the widespread adoption and use of OC spray, however, officers had little choice but to engage suspects in wrestling matches.
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pepper spray is a safe and effective alternative to other types of force, particularly in marginal use of force situations (Gauvin, 1995; Hunter, 1994; Nowicki, 1993).
Moreover, the rate at which OC spray incapacitates suspects or facilitates the arrest process compares favorably with the effectiveness of the physical control tactics reported by Meyer (1992). Furthermore, OC spray achieves high levels of effectiveness with much lower rates of associated injuries. Since most officer and suspect injuries occur when officers use weaponless control tactics or strikes, allowing officers to employ OC spray before engaging suspects with their hands may prevent the type of hand to hand struggles that most frequently result in injuries to officers and suspects. Agencies that train their officers to use pepper spray before attempting physical control measures and which construct policies that reflect this training have taken a significant step forward in reducing suspect and officer injuries without compromising arrest effectiveness.
Legal and ethical issues surrounding pepper spray
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court decidedGrahamv.Connorand set forth the constitutional limitations on the use of force by police. The plaintiff in
Graham was a diabetic who was injured during a violent encounter with Charlotte, North Carolina police officers. He sued the police department and the officers involved alleging that his Due Process rights under the fourteenth Amendment had been violated. The Supreme Court held that all claims of excessive force by the police must be judged under the reasonableness standard from the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the Court held that police officers may use no more force than an objectively ``reasonable officer'' would have used under the circumstances. The Court declared that the reasonableness of an officer's use of force depends upon the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee. Because the reasonableness of an officer's actions depends upon the unique facts and circumstances of each case, it is difficult to draw ``bright line'' rules that separate legally reasonable force from illegal excessive force. However, most excessive force cases that result in criminal or civil liability for the police involve a significant degree of pain or injury inflicted on the suspect. Pepper spray seems to be an ideal solution to problems of excessive force because it effectively controls resistive suspects while inflicting little or no lasting injury.
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spray is used and that emphasize rapid decontamination are a necessity, particularly if officers will be allowed to use pepper spray more readily under a revised use of force continuum.
Conclusion and directions for future research
Police-citizen contacts often include the officer using his or her authority to resolve a situation. This authority ranges from verbal direction to deadly force. The vast majority of the contacts are resolved with no more than verbal direction or the threat of force. Unfortunately, when the contact turns into a conflict, then the possibility of resistance by the suspect and physical force by the police increases. In these situations when the suspect does not follow the orders given by the police, there is a need to remove the threat created by the suspect and possibly take him or her into custody. Often, these encounters result in a physical confrontation. When that occurs, the police must be provided with the tools and training to overcome physical resistance without using unreasonable force or causing unnecessary injuries.
As the previous sections of this paper demonstrate, precious little is known about the effectiveness of the various types of less-than-lethal force used by police. Although some empirical research has been conducted on the effectiveness of OC spray, this research is limited to evaluating a single type of police response, leaving most other areas of less-than-lethal force unexplored. As noted, little research was located that examined the effectivness of other types of commonly used police weapons and tactics in controlling resistive persons. Moreover, knowledge about the safety of various less-than-lethal force options is limited and needs further development.
Knowledge of the effectiveness of various use of force tactics and weapons is crucial to police policy development, training, and the production of new non-lethal weaponry. From a policy perspective, it is problematic for police agencies across the country to adopt a use of force continuum if the force levels that appear in those continua are ineffective or are improperly arranged. Likewise from a training perspective, it makes little sense to spend more time than necessary to train officers adequately in hand-to-hand tactics or the use of non-lethal weapons if the tactics ultimately will be ineffective on the street or worse, cause unnecessary injuries.
Explaining how and why non-lethal-force options are effective is critical to the development of new, non-lethal weapons. Research and development personnel must be equipped with the knowledge of which existing weapons and tactics work and which do not in order to design and build new safe and effective less-than-lethal weapons. As new less-than-lethal technology becomes available, its safety and effectiveness must be evaluated in the real world before it is widely distributed to police agencies.
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whether the tactics and weapons used by the officers cause injury to themselves or to suspects, and which suspect, officer, and environmental variables help predict effectiveness. Results from such a study would assist police agencies and researchers in developing safe and effective less-than-lethal force technology.
Notes
1. Chemical agents are not provided to Miami-Dade patrol officers. Chemical spray is issued only to the SWAT team and other tactical units.
2. The Miami-Dade use of force reports typically report the highest level of force used by officers. Thus, the percentages in Tables VI and VII reflect the chances of injury given the highest level of force used in an encounter. It is possible that officers and suspects may have been injured by some lower level of force that was used but not reported on the use of force reports.
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Hunter, J.C. (1994), ``Pepper spray'',FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Vol. 63 No. 5, pp. 24-6. Kaminski, R., Edwards, S. and Johnson, J. (1998), ``The deterrent effects of oleoresin capsicum on
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Lumb, R. and Friday, P. (1997), ``Impact of pepper spray availability on police officer use-of-forcedecisions'',Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 136-48.
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