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commentary
Lorenzo Capisani, PhD in Modern Chinese History, Catholic University of Sacred Heart
onth after month, Xi Jinping’s r e-form plan for China unveils its solid grounds. The recent move for unlimited presidential terms
caused quite a stir, but the National People’s
Congress has surprised analysts for the
par-t ’s cohesion around Xi’s leadership. Premier
Li Keqiang reported on government activities
and stressed China’s achie ements in ec
o-nomic innovation, infrastructures, and re-sponses to national and international
chal-lenges, such as last ear’s flooding in the
Yangtze area or the G20 Hangzhou Summit.
Yet Li’s commitments for the ne t fi e ears
anticipate something further: a working
frame ork for “ne era” socialism, enacted through reform of the People’s Republic’s
governing body.
The State Council is indeed the top-level in-stitution in China. Chiefly, its reshuffle has been a common practice for Chinese politi-cians, adjusting organization charts to new strategic goals. For example, the importance of space technology was marked in 1982 by
the transformation of an unspecified seventh department into the Ministry of Aerospace Industry. Six years later, it was merged with the aviation bureau, thus giving a perspective more centered on technological develop-ment for civil use.
Today, the focus is on streamlining the ma-chine. Central approvals for administration regulations were reduced by a third in 2017. The management of many services and or-ganizations needing government supervision was standardized. Shortly before the opening
of the People’s Congress, the reform of the
council was announced and has been re-cently approved. Overall, it shall remove eight ministerial figures and seven deputy figures. Competences are being reassigned among institutions and a longer list of ministries is going to handle previously dispersed duties. If combined with Xi Jinping’s efforts to fight corruption, the State Council reform indicates a renewed stress put on political education and training, especially regarding local ca-dres. On the one hand, cutting expenses and
Commentary, April 6, 2018
HOW XI PLANS TO DEAL
WITH INTERNAL DISSENT
LORENZO CAPISANI
2
lowering the central monitoring level should admittedly require decentralization to local authorities. On the other, the move to prevent misuses of public funds and graft should give
the state stabilit b fostering an “optimal”
administrative mechanism.
The problem of party discipline and internal dissent is consequently becoming central. In this regard, one major change concerns anti-corruption policies. The Ministry of Supervision and the National Bureau of Corruption Preven-tion have been merged into the newly created
National Super ision Commission. This “ant
i-corruption organization with Chinese
charac-teristics” as said to take efforts to a hole
new level. It will be under the direct orders of the State Council and will work in conjunction with its counterpart inside the party. At local levels, the commissions will become state structures, being accountable only to the highest authorities. Clearly, the Commission may represent a new frontier for the promo-tion of political rectitude, and might be a pow-erful tool to get rid of internal disagreement. However, party dissent might still be provoked
b Xi’s prospecti e third mandate, since it ill
likely overshadow the next generation of party leaders and block institutional turnover.
Xi and his entourage really seem to envisage a
“ne era”. “Deepening the reform of the part
and state institutions is an inevitable require-ment for strengthening long-term
govern-ance”, declared Liu He, Xi’s Har ard-educated
and prominent economic advisor since 2012, who is now promoting government
restruc-turing. In a commentar in the People’s Dail ,
he criticized the overlapping of government ministries, leading to unsatisfactory results and inefficiencies. As the removal of the two-term limit lea es little doubt about Xi’s intentions, then the reforms might be meant to rely on the idea of a strong presidency.
Historically, China can be seen as floating between collegial and presidential forms of government, at least since the times of the First United Front. While opposing the cabi-net-based government of Wang Jingwei in 1927-1928, Chiang Kai-Shek pushed for new organic laws and more agile rule by the lead-er. Nonetheless, he ultimately failed to solve the internal problems of the Nationalist Party, raising internal opposition for almost a decade. As for the present, China might be undergoing a real transformation in coming years, and this would not be unusual for the CPC. The growth
of Xi’s po er is indeed remarkable and it