Monopoly and Monopolistic Markets
From: Encyclopaedia of Islamic Economics, Vol. II ( Volume II editor. Monzer Kahf) , pp. 97-105, (Chief eds. Abdelhamid Brahimi, and Khurshid Ahmad). Encyclopaedia of Islamic Economics,London, 1430 AH/ 2009 AD
Muhammad Anas Al-Zarqa
Monopoly is a subject addressed by both classical Islamic Fiqh and modern economics, with a historical hiatus of 700 to 1000 years. The "classical" juristic views I refer to had been spelled out by 350H/961G, by the founders of the four schools of fiqh and their major pupils. The most significant later views are those of Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728H/ 1328G) and his disciple and advocate: Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751H/ 1350 G).
This article approaches the subject not historically but analytically. Section-I briefs non-economists on modern economic concepts on
monopoly; Section-II introduces concepts of monopoly in classical Islamic fiqh; followed in Section-III by comparisons and integration of the diverse views. Section-IV reviews five modern monopolistic situations from economic-juristic perspective; finally Section-V presents general conclusions
A question arises about the methodological soundness of comparing the ideas of jurists and economists. For, jurists focus mainly on the normative, what ought to be, i.e. is monopoly halaal (permissible) or haraam
(prohibited). In contrast, economists focus mainly on the positive, what is: e.g. what are the causes and effects of monopoly. Nonetheless, we shall see significant common ground between the two groups, validating a
I- Main economic concepts on monopoly
Economists distinguish among different market types by major distinctive characteristics, known as the market structure. Such structures differ in (1) the concentration of providers/sellers; (2) their relative shares of the market; (3) product characteristics (such as homogeneity or differentiation), and (4) barriers to entry in the market. Special attention has been paid to two polar cases:
- Pure competition, and - Pure monopoly.
In addition, there is a wide range of markets which stand at various distances from either pole. The most common are:
- Monopolistic competition (competition of the many), and - Oligopoly (competition of the few).
Pure competition
Pure competition is a market structure assumed by economists to meet the following requirements:
Condition 1: There must be so many sellers that each seller's share of the market is so small that any change in one seller’s sales or prices cannot influence the market share or performance of competitors.
Condition 2: The products (services) offered by the different providers must be so uniform that the buyer does not prefer one supplier to another. This is the condition of ‘product homogeneity’.
Condition 3: Ease of entry and exit to the industry. The market must be fully open to new entrants and provide for suppliers to withdraw at will.
Condition 4: Freely accessible information to potential buyers and sellers about products, including supply (quantities), prices, and characteristics.
Economists concede that pure competition is rare in the real world, because its conditions are hard to prevail. They nonetheless have analyzed it intensively because of its potential role, if realized, in boosting economic efficiency and benefiting the consumer.
Competitive structure has also been adopted as the standard against which the freedom and openness of markets are measured, and as an ideal to be approached as far as possible in restructuring of non-competitive markets.
Actual markets that are somewhat close to pure competition are the international markets of some commodities such as wheat, cotton and cement. I say somewhat because there are some large buyers and sellers whose decisions affect the market.
Pure monopoly
For a market to be labeled as pure monopolistic, it has to meet the two following conditions:
- Condition 1: There must be a single supplier, and
- Condition 2: The product (service) provided has no close substitutes.
The first Condition implies the existence of barriers to entry. For, the absence of such barriers leads to a multiplicity of suppliers.
Pure monopoly is quite rare without state protection.1 The most common
examples nowadays are in the fields of public utilities and municipal services such as water, electricity, transportation and communications.
Technically speaking, as the supplier and the industry are one and the same under pure monopoly, the demand curve facing the monopolist slopes downward to the right. Unlike competitors in pure competition, a monopolist can set the price of his product. He/she, however, has to accept the quantity buyers are willing take at that price. Conversely, she can fix the quantity she wants to produce (or supply) but has then to accept the price at which this can quantity will sell.
Monopolistic competition
Both pure competition and monopoly are rare in the real world. Most existing markets are median structures containing elements of both
1 Among the rare examples of pure monopoly are De Beers in South Africa ( in diamonds) and for
competition and monopoly. Two of the most prevalent in the real world are : ‘monopolistic competition’ and ‘oligopoly’.
In monopolistic competition:
- There are many suppliers each holding a small share of the market; - Entry in the industry is easy,( because the minimum viable
investment is not large, etc.) , and
- There is ‘product heterogeneity’, i.e. real or perceived differences among the products of different suppliers; so customers deem them close but not full substitutes.
Difference among substitute products include quality differences ,both true or perceived, brand name, packaging, sale terms and conditions, the time and place where the product is supplied, and the supplier’s conduct with the customers.
Monopolistic competition is common in the retail industries, clothing, food, furniture, fresh foods and home appliances. Medical, educational and private services (e.g. haircutting) also fit under this market structure.
As product heterogeneity is a distinctive feature of this market type, its meaning should be made more clear.
First: whether two products (or services) are similar or different is NOT in the present context an objective fact that experts decide. Rather, it is subjective, depending on customers' perception. For instance, two brands of aspirin may in fact be medically identical (perfect substitutes), but if consumers think they are different we count them economically as heterogeneous
It comes as no surprise then, that monopolistic competition is among the most common market types throughout history.
Oligopoly
Oligopoly, also known as competition of the few, is closer to pure monopoly than pure competition. It is characterized by:
- The relatively small number of producers/suppliers (each with a substantial share of the market). Hence, each supplier’s performance is highly sensitive to the actions of his competitors. If, for instance, one firm runs an aggressive promotion campaign, the others will immediately feel it through the decline of their sales.
- The existence of barriers to entry, such as very large minimum capital, special technical know-how or patents.
- Products/services in this market may either completely identical (homogeneous) or slightly different but are still regarded as substitutes, (e.g. car models).
- Differences in market shares of suppliers’ may be quite large.
Hence this market structure is the least uniform and most varied in terms of possible outcomes.
Moreover in oligopolistic markets, "economies of scale" often obtain; whereby average unit costs can be significantly reduced by increasing the scale of output. If, however, demand is not large enough to absorb the additional output, small scale producers will be driven out of the market and only few large producers can survive.
Obviously, if markets as large as the United States or Germany can sustain only a small number of car makers, steel producers or airlines, smaller markets such as in Turkey, Egypt or Malaysia can sustain even fewer players, sometimes only a single supplier, in the absence of significant export opportunities. Economies of scale are a major factor that has led to the rise of oligopoly in the big industrial countries, and is expected to prompt a similar pattern in smaller countries, with a higher tendency towards pure monopoly.
II- monopoly in classical Islamic fiqh 2 The legal texts:
2 The substantive source for this section is the Kuwaiti Juristic Encyclopedia
Numerous Prophetic traditions (aÍÉdÊth) proscribe monopoly. One of them was authenticated by Muslim (r.a.) in two versions: “He who monopolizes is a wrongdoer” and “ only a wrongdoer monopolizes”. No legal text however defines outlawed monopoly, leaving the matter to juristic efforts of the Companions and later scholars.
Two juristic tendencies
A survey of jurists’ views unveils two main tendencies with regard to monopoly. The first, endorsed by the majority of jurists, restricts the scope of outlawed monopoly ( henceforth I refer to it as : the restrictive, or the majority or mainstream view). The second, a minority view, advocates a wider scope for actions and situations that fall under outlawed monopoly. All classical jurists seem intensely aware of the fact that both "legitimate trade and productive activity" , and "outlawed monopoly" , involve a similar buy-keep-sell cycle. Understandably, they went to great pains to distinguish what they deem "outlawed monopoly", lest they prohibit legitimate trading activities that Shariah not only permits but clearly encourages.
Mainstream jurists restrict the scope of "outlawed monopoly"
These jurists include the three schools of Hanafis, Shafi'is and
Hanbalis. Their posture is well expressed in the Hanbalis’ definition of monopoly as the buying of victuals and withholding them (from the market) in anticipation of selling at higher prices. In explicating this definition, jurists emphasize that: (A) the term victuals ( توق ) is more specific than food (ماعط), and is confined to basic essential items which can sustain humans for extended periods. Fruits and non-essential foods are not victuals.
(B) Buying victuals for own consumption is not monopolistic, unlike buying for trade when prices are high. (C) The definition also stipulates buying as a requisite for monopolistic behavior. Thus saving the crops of one’s own farm is not monopolistic. (D) Importing victuals from outside and withholding them for selling at higher prices is not monopolistic. This stands to reason; for a sinful monopolist buys from the local market thus putting town people in a straitened situation, while an importer increases local supply if he sells, and doesn't reduce it if he withholds.
The MÉlikis generally, Abu Yusuf from among the Hanafis, and Ibn Taymiyyah from among the ×anbalis are a vocal minority who define unlawful monopoly as: withholding commodities in a way that harms the public. As such, their definition includes not only withholding the products bought from the local market, but also those imported or saved from one’s own produce beyond one’s family’s needs. Besides, the scope of unlawful monopoly is not restricted to victuals or even food products, but extends to any product whose withholding is assessed as harmful to the general public.
Ibn Taymiyyah and his disciple Ibn Al-Qayyim, both late ×anbali jurists, adopted this expansionist view. They also drew attention to another type of unlawful monopoly they termed ‘labour monopoly’ (iÍtikÉr al-Ñamal); whereby a group of artisans supplying a commodity/service (e.g. bakers or carpenters) collude at a time of high demand to force higher wages. Abu
×anifa also, though otherwise sharing the majority restrictive view, disallows real estate surveyors ( نوماسقلا ) to form a cartel, as they would then force people to pay them more.
Characteristics of unlawful monopoly
Restrictionists and expansionists agree that for monopoly to be unlawful, the purchase and withholding of products must put the general public in a straitened situation. This happens when the monopolist buys at a time of high prices for reselling when prices become still higher. Conversely, buying products when they are plentiful and cheap, to sell them later when dear at higher prices, is not unlawful monopoly, but a commendable act.3
The major difference between the majority restrictive and the minority expansive views focuses on the commodities that may be subject to monopoly ( victuals vs. any commodity ) not on actions deemed monopolistic. Thus Imam MÉlik, and AbË YËsuf in some reports, both among the minority, do not regard withholding one’s harvest or imported products as monopolistic.4 However, Ibn Rushd, a prominent MÉliki jurist,
deems the withholding of one’s harvest in times of dearth an unlawful monopoly.
Famine situations
3 Ibn Hazm , question No.1568; also Al-Nawawi, pp. 130-31; and imam Malik as in
footnote 8 below.
It is important to note that throughout this article, the discussion and all juristic opinions are meant for normal situations. In case of famine or impending starvation, all jurists agree explicitly that withholding food in excess of one's family needs is prohibited. Public authority can then force holders of excess food to sell it at normal prices, or to extend it as loan-in-kind to be repaid later.
Monopolyof a class-of-goods (IHTIKAR al-sinf)
According to Ibn Al-Qayyim, this happens when the general public are prevented from selling a certain class of goods, with trading exclusively restricted to some people. Importers of such goods have to sell to the exclusive buyers, who then set the prices at which they sell to the public. Ibn Al-Qayyim condemns such behavior as “mischief on earth and rain-inhibiting injustice”.5 Abu Ishaq Al-Shatibi also prohibits restricting to
specific people the exclusive right to provide a particular job or service (such as slaughtering animals).6 This type of monopoly has been condemned
and disallowed by expansionists and restrictionists alike.
Ibn Al-Qayyim’s strong condemnation of a-class-of-goods monopoly reflects his perception that it is a grand sin. In modern economic terms, such monopoly creates an unjustified barrier to entry into a particular market/industry. Depriving people of freedom of entry to any market without legitimate reason is thus a grand economic sin.
Ibn Al-Qayyim seems to be aware that occasionally such monopoly may be inevitable. If so, he suggests state intervention, “to fix prices at normal levels", adding that ".. jurists are unanimous that suppliers must then be restrained from buying and selling except at such normal prices”. A modern instance will be seen in the forthcoming discussion about public utilities.
III- Comparisons and integration of views
The common denominator: Monopoly is outlawed for harm
All jurists agree that for monopoly to be outlawed, it must lead to tangible or potential harm to the general public. But what is meant by that harm? And how significant should it be to lead to outlawing monopoly ?
The dual criteria for "outlawed monopoly" agreed by all jurists
Recall first the tripartite fiqh classification of products into necessities, conveniences and supplements. For monopoly to be outlawed, two conditions must obtain jointly:
(A) the product ( goods or services ) affected must be a necessity ( victuals, in the majority view) ,or a major convenience ( in the minority view). No classical jurist applied "outlawed monopoly" to supplements.7
(B) the monopolistic action must put the general public in a straitened situation, by which jurists mean a significant increase in price. Or in modern jargon, an increase in cost of living for the common people, in whose budget the share of food and major conveniences is high. A straitened situation may also include dearth of the products in question.
Jurists spelled out factors usually leading to a straitened situation, and designated them as "conditions" for outlawing monopoly :8
Location: to take place in a town where a straitened situation can easily arise. Many jurists noted that this is the case in Makkah, Al-Madinah and in the remote towns at the boundaries of the state, where transportation is irregular and local production may not be commensurate with the population size. They noted further that this is not the case in Baghdad and Al-Basrah, which are easily reached by ships.9
Timing: to buy and withhold at times of high prices and dearth, not at times of plenty.10
Source: to obtain the products by buying from the local market, thus reducing supply, not by own production or importation from outside.
Purpose: the products in question are bought for later trading, not for own consumption or use.
An economist's view of the dual criteria
7 This may be gleaned from many juristic quotations. See for instance Qahtan Al-Doori ,
"Monopoly".
8 I skipped over minor differences among jurists in these conditions. See direct
explanatory quotation from Imam Malik in Al-Baaji explication of Muwatta Malik ,Jami Al-Fqh Al-Islami ,bab al-Ihtikaar.
9 Direct quotation from Imam Ahmad Bin Hanbal is given in Sharh Sunan Abi Dawud by
al Azeem Abadi, Bab al-Ihtikaar.
Criterion (A) relates to market demand, and implies that it is price inelastic, as is usual in necessities and major conveniences.
Criterion (B) relates to supply. The location condition implies that supply has low or zero price elasticity in the short run. Under each of the other three conditions, local supply is reduced (the supply curve shifts the left) by the amount withheld by the monopolist.
The dual criteria thus obtain in a market with low price elasticity in both
demand and supply. Analytically, a given reduction in supply leads to higher price increase the more inelastic the demand or the supply curves. Thus when both are inelastic, price increases even more, putting the public in a straitened situation.
Clearly, the jurists' logic is economically impeccable.
A comparison between jurists’ and economists’ concepts of monopoly
Classical jurists observed more than ten centuries ago a world where productive units were small, numerous and generally competitive. Monopoly then was largely the result of local commercial behavior, within regular commercial activity.
The industrial revolution in the 18th Century brought economies of scale, mass production, and persistent innovation, all connected with production, giving rise to the non-competitive market structures analyzed by modern economists.
Whereas classical jurists focused on commercial monopolistic actions directed at socially important products, modern economists focus on market structures that motivate and facilitate monopolistic producer behavior in many kinds of products.
From an economist’s perspective, monopolistic decisions as regards quantity, quality and selling price are mostly taken by the producers rather than the vendors. The monopolistic policies espoused these days by many pharmaceutical and computer software companies exemplify this.
What is a monopolistic institution?
To jurists, "outlawed monopoly" signified a particular behavior, in circumstances likely to cause significant price increase of socially important products.
Two modern legal approaches to restrain monopoly
Two legal approaches emerged in Western countries to maintain competition and curtail unlawful monopoly: The "rule of reason" and the " per se" rule.
The rule of reason here refers to an appraisal of the positive and negative economic ramifications of a particular monopolistic situation. It is then permitted or disallowed based on the predominant outcome.
The per-se rule, postulates that certain market regulations must be accepted for their own sake; i.e. without attempt on part of the court to weigh up their economic benefits and costs. This is reminiscent of the famous juristic principle of ‘preventive restraint’ (sadd al-dharÉiÑ): outlawing lawful deeds when quite likely to lead to unlawful consequences.
The dual juristic criteria for outlawed monopoly seem closer to the "rule of reason" approach. However Muslim jurists clearly took a "per se" approach in emphatically disallowing:
(a) collusion among buyers or sellers in any market ( not elaborated on in this article).
(b) formation of a cartel by real estate surveyors, and (c) monopoly of a class- of-goods in any product.
It is fair to conclude that any realistic policy must use both approaches. A good example can be seen in Articles 85 and 86 of the European Common Market’s regulations (The Treaty of Rome) 11:
Article 85 prohibits as unlawful competition,
[…] all agreements between undertakings, decision by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market.
In other words, such practices are prohibited per se, without weighing up their advantages and disadvantages.
Article 86 stipulates that, any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market, or in a substantial part of it, shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States
Note that it is not the "dominant position" (i.e. the control of a substantial share of the market) that is outlawed, but its abuse, which definitely requires applying a rule of reason.12
IV- Some contemporary monopolistic situations
I review briefly now five contemporary market situations that have monopolistic aspects.
The first two (patents, public utilities) are legal monopolies granted and protected by a public authority and usually justified by the public interest. The next two (monopolistic competition and oligopoly), enjoy no legal protection but can arise from free market operations.
The fifth is a pernicious contemporary mutation of a-class-of-goods monopoly.
1. Patents:
Patents give innovators temporary legal monopoly (often for 15 years) on the use of their invention. This is usually justified by
it by giving the innovator time to recover costs and make a profit before competition catches up.13
Do patents meet the dual criteria for outlawed monopoly? One can see that if the product patented is not socially important (i.e., not a necessity or a major convenience), then the first criterion is missing, and that particular patent monopoly is not objectionable.
If the product patented is socially important, it becomes an open question. My conclusion is that a patent does not put the public in "a straitened situation", nor does it close any prior advantages open to society. Rather a patent usually opens new opportunities in
processes or products, hence does not meet the second criterion of outlawed monopoly.14
Exceptional cases however may justify from Shariah point of view a different approach. For instance, a new patented drug may protect from or cure a dreadful disease. This may justify the state buying the patent for a just price (high enough to encourage future innovators) , then availing it to the public at reasonable price. 15
2. Public Utilities:
In many cities around the world an exclusive license is given to only one
operator to provide certain municipal services (e.g. electricity, water, or
13 See more details in Vickers, pp. 4-5.
14 The International Fiqh Academy approved patents without addressing their monopolistic aspect
(Resolution no.43(5/5) ,on 15-12-1988).
15 An important partial alternative to patents, which where applicable is both more just
sewage disposal). This is definitely a-class-of-goods monopoly which is strongly prohibited unless justified.
The compelling justification is that this is a natural monopoly where the total cost of one provider is much less than that of several providers supplying the same market.16 This is due to the high initial investments
required for setting up a network and connecting to users. With competition, there will be much socially wasteful duplication of
investments, which from Shariah point of view is a case of big israaf (extravagance, or severe loss of efficiency). Thus we have here two competing rules: Avoiding israaf or avoiding a-class-of-goods
monopoly. The lesser evil is to grant a legal monopoly to one provider and then socially control the selling price and service terms. This is in line with the earlier Ibn al-Qayyim suggestion regarding unavoidable monopoly of a class- of-goods.
Important new developments in public utility economics and policy uncovered novel ways to open competition in production, and to give all producers the right to use the same monopolized network for a just fee.17
3. Monopolistic Competition:
Is monopolistic competition objectionable according to classical juristic criteria?
provided goods and services which where close substitutes. No classical jurist deemed such markets objectionable per se. For if a firm in such market raised its price or withheld its supplies, close
substitutes are readily available, and the public faces no “straitened situation “.
4. Oligopoly (Competition of the few)18
One can reach here the correct fiqh conclusion by posing a series of questions about a given oligopoly,
(A) Is it legally protected, with no justification based on the public interest?
(B) Is there collusion among the oligopolists?
If the answer to either question is affirmative, then it is an "outlawed monopoly" per se regardless of the product or the effect on prices. If however the answer to both questions is negative, then only we pose a third question:
(C) Is the product or service socially important (a necessity or high convenience)? If not, then the oligopoly as such is not objectionable from fiqh point of view.
Even if the product is socially important, there is still no fiqh basis for objection. But the public authority must keep a close watch lest the
oligopolists collude, or otherwise abuse their power.
Two useful analytical results are worth remembering here:
(1)The fewer the number of oligopolists the easier it is to collude, and
18 For a different view, generally rejecting patents, oligopoly and monopolistic
(2)The larger that number, the closer that market approaches the competitive ideal in price and quantity. Public policy can help approach such ideal in several ways including:
(a) Encouraging an increase in the number of firms, if no significant loss of efficiency is expected.
(b)Facilitating imports.
(c) Facilitating exports so more firms can survive.
5. Monopoly of a class- of-goods in developing countries
A modern mutation of this type of monopoly is now a common form of corruption in developing countries. It is easy to see why.
For if the public authority wants to grant financial favor to someone, it can get him paid from the public treasury. But this is a direct cost to the treasury, and more importantly, faces legal and publicity hurdles. By granting that someone a monopoly of some class-of-goods, the burden is stealthily shifted to the general public by increasing their cost of living, in amount equal to the above-average profits of the monopoly.
Granting such monopoly is often done in exchange for illegal favors,
outright bribe, or sharing in the fruits of that monopoly. To cover things up, this type of corruption can infect the public licensing process, which is now required to start any business. Many apply, only a few favorites get a license, with the remaining applications “still under consideration”.
In another mutation, certain economic activities are publicly disallowed , but a blind eye is turned to the lucky few who engage undisturbed in the
costs result from the corruption of economic incentives, diverting them from productive pursuits that generate social value added, towards “rent seeking” pursuits that are negative-sum games.
Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Al Qayyim, in their clear appreciation of the serious impact of this type of monopoly have scored a pioneering insight both in fiqh and economics.
V- General Conclusions
1. Islamic Shariah and modern economic theory both deem monopoly
undesirable and competition desirable. Shariah prohibited monopoly, and supported that prohibition by other measures including protection of freedom of entry to any market, and explicit prohibition of collusion among sellers or buyers.
2. Trading, including the buying and withholding of goods for later sale, is generally permissible. It becomes "outlawed monopoly" only if it meets the two monopoly criteria, spelled out by jurists:
i. occurs in a good or service which is socially important.
ii. Leads to significant harm to the general public. What is deemed socially important is subject to ijtihaad (juristic reasoning), and to changes in living conditions.
3. Freedom of entry into any market is a major Sharia requirement, and may be curtailed only for clear public interest.
4. The concept of monopoly among economists is much wider than
5. Policies to implement Shariah rules relating to monopoly and markets require deep knowledge of Shariah, economic analysis, and actual market conditions. Such policies must also be informed by the accumulated human experience of different countries in curbing monopoly and promoting competition.
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