Direct correspondence to Peter grabosky, RegNet, Australian National university, Cnr Fellows and garran Rds, Acton ACt 0200, Australia (e-mail: peter.grabosky@anu.edu.au); Neal shover, Department of sociology, university of tennessee, 905 mcClung tower, Knoxville, tN 37996-0490 (e-mail: nshover@utk.edu).
Forestallingthenextepidemic
ofwhite-collarcrime
Linking policy to theory
peter grabosky, Special Issue Editor
A u s t r a l i a n N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y
neal shover, Special Issue Editor
U n i v e r s i t y o f T e n n e s s e e
C
rime-as-choicetheoryisusefulnotonlyfororganizingthinkingaboutthecausesof white-collarcrimeepidemics,butalsofordrawingattentiontopotentiallypromis -ingwaysofreducingtheoddsofrecurrence.Threetargetareasforpolicyinitiatives standout:(1)reducingthesupplyoflure,(2)increasingprevailingestimatesofthecredibility ofexternaloversight,and(3)increasingtheuseofeffectivesystemsofinternaloversightand self-restraint.Effectivepoliciesaimedatoneormoreofthesepromisetoreduceboththesupply ofwhite-collarcriminalopportunitiesandthesizeofthepoolofindividualsandorganizations tempted,ifnotpredisposed,toexploitthem.ofself-regulation,pluralisticoversight,andnotionsofself-regulatingmarketsbypolicymakers andmanyacademicians.
lure reduction
Reducingthesupplyoflureisaformidablechallenge.Anincreasingsupplyinevitablyaccom -paniesthecomplexityofmodernlife(ShoverandHochstetler,2006).Whencoupledwithweak oversight,almosteverynewcommodityandgovernmentprogrampresentsopportunitiesfor criminalexploitationandattractsattentionfrompotentialmalefactors.Absentcredibleoversight, everynewtaxbecomesanopportunityforevasion.Everynewprogramofpublicexpenditure isapotentiallureforthosewhowouldappropriatefromitunlawfully.Thisisnolesstrueof policiesimplementedwiththebestofintentions;programsdesignedtoextendopportunities forhomeownershiptothosepreviouslyexcludedfromtheresidentialhousingmarkethelped createthesubprimemortgagedebacle(CollinsandNigro,2010,thisissue).Thechallengeis toenableuseoflureforlegitimatepurposes,whilereducingitspotentialforuseasaninstru -mentortargetforcrime.
Reducinglure,withoutstilingindividualinitiativeandprecludinglegitimateopportuni -ties,iscomplicated.Commandeconomiesandsocialistsystemshavetried,butwithnotable lackofsuccess.Thesesystems,moreover,tendtocreatesubstantialblackmarketsandoficial corruption.WhetherthesumptuouslevelsofexecutivecompensationthatprevailintheUnited Statescanbesigniicantlyreduced,isquestionable.Sotooaretheconsequencesofsuchpolicies forindividualinitiative.Ifimplemented,theeffectsofsuchrestraintwouldnotseebankers desertingtheirprofessioninfavorofacademiccareers.
Somelurecanbereducedbytechnology.Thankstotechnologicalinnovation,manyof thehazardsthatregulationexiststomitigatehavebeensigniicantlyreduced,ifnoteliminated. Sometraditionalproductsandpractices,alluringbutharmful,arenolongerattractive.Innova -tionsinpainttechnologyandthedevelopmentoflead-freepetrolhavesigniicantlyreduced theprevalenceofenvironmentallead.“Greener”productsthatrequirefewerrawmaterialsand energytoproduce,andwhichgeneratelesswaste,havecontributedtoacleanerplanet(van ErpandHuisman,2010,thisissue).Theappealofmidnightdumpingistherebysigniicantly reduced.Satelliteimagingcannowfacilitatemoreeficientagriculturalpractice,includingwater useandtheapplicationofagriculturalchemicalsandfertilizers.Irresponsibleorillegaluseof theseisnolongerseenastempting.
Increasing the credibility of External oversight
Vigilantanddeterminedoversightcanprovidesomeprotectionagainsttheworstexcessesof capitalism.MostobserversbelievethatweakoversightwastheprincipalcauseoftheGreat Recession,andthisviewisrepresentedbytheauthorsinthisissue(e.g.,Black,Reichman). Certainly,anydissentershavebeenconspicuouslysilent.PrudentialregulationinAustralia, Japan,andFinlandshieldedthoseeconomiesfromthedislocationexperiencedinpartsof Europe.Enhancingcredibleoversightmightbemoreachievablethanlurereductionasa meansofreducingtherateofwhite-collarcrime.Anumberofinstitutions—public,private, andnon-proit—areinapositiontoexercisesurveillanceoverinancialandothercommercial activities.Whennon-governmentalenergiescanbeharnessedinfurtheranceofpublicpolicy, ortotheextentthattheycanoperatespontaneouslywithbeneicialeffect,thiscancomplement oversightbyanoverburdenedstate.
Thecredibilityofexternaloversightisimportantnotonlyforwould-beoffenders,butalso forthegeneralpublic.Beliefinthefairness,effectiveness,andequityofaregulatorysystem isessentialtotheverylegitimacyofastate.LeonaHelmsleyoncestated“Wedon’tpaytaxes. Onlythelittlepeoplepaytaxes.”Totheextentthatcitizensbelievethattaxisoptionalforthe rich,thetaxsystem,andthestateasawhole,canfallintodisrepute(Levi,2010,thisissue). TheweakeningoftheGreekstateasaresultofineffectivetaxadministrationbecamestarkly apparentinApril2010.
Weliveinaworldinwhichsymbolsmatter.Intermsofconventionalcrime,reassuring statisticsarelessreassuringthanvisible“blueshirts.”Theresponsetosexoffenders(especially thosewhooffendagainstchildren)inEnglish-speakingdemocraciestendstobevengefuland unforgiving.Theenactmentofdraconianlegislationinthefaceofpublicanxietyisatime-honoredpoliticalstrategy,andtheimpositionofsavagesentencesservesasimilarfunction.The 150-yearsentenceimposedonBernardMadoffmightnothaverestoredtheinancialwell-being ofhisvictims,butsomeofthem,andmanymembersofthepublic,feltbetter(Pontelland Geis,2010,thisissue).Thedeterrentvalueofthisandsimilarsentencesmaybenil,however, andthecertaintyofdetectionandresponsefromoverseersprobablyhasamoresigniicantef -fect(Leighton,2010,thisissue).
itisacharacteristicallymoralandorganizationalresponsetomanagingavolumeofworkthat invariablyexceedsresources.
Globalization,asrelectedintherapidmovementacrossnationalbordersofinance, commodities,labor,ideas,andviruses(digitalandmicrobial),posessigniicantregulatory challenges,asitbothcreateslureandinhibitsdevelopmentofcredibleoversight.The“raceto thebottom”toindderegulatoryhavensindevelopingcountrieshasbecomeafamiliartheme. Shippingelectronicwastetothethirdworldmayridawealthynationofadisposalproblem, butinothercases,analogouspracticesmayreturntohauntone.Carbonemissionsgenerated inapoorcountrycontributetoclimatechangeforeveryone.Theglobalinancialsystemmight notbetotallyintegrated,butitissuficientlytightlycoupledthataprobleminonenationcould reverberateelsewhere.Globalinancialmarketssufferedin2008intheaftermathofthesub-primemortgagecrisisintheUnitedStates.Greekinancialwoeswerefeltnotonlythroughout EuropebutalsoacrosstheAtlantic.Institutionsofexternaloversightmustbeglobal,aswell aslocal,inscope.
Conidenceintheintegrityofmarketsisessentialtothestabilityandgrowthofinancial systems.Iftoomanycitizensbelievethattheirmoneywouldbesaferifkepthiddenundera mattressathomethanifdepositedinabankorinvestedinthestockmarket,theentireeconomy suffers.Onlythemostnonchalantoflaissez-faireeconomistswouldfavorareturntothelaw ofthejungle.Mostoftherestofuswouldconcurthatadegreeofcriminalenforcementisan essentialcomponentofaregulatorysystem.Whatiscontestedisthecontext in which the hard edgeofthestateisrequired,andthedegreeofseveritythatisappropriate.
Increasing Efective Internal oversight and self-restraint
Itwillbeextremelydificulttoengineerculturalchangetobringaboutgreaterself-restraint (NguyenandPontell,2010,thisissue).Corporateexecutivesoftenbringasenseofentitle -menttothejob(Friedrichs,2010,thisissue),andforsomepeople,enoughisneverenough. Themarginalsatisfactiontoahighlyingbankerofanadditional2%inbonusontopof$20 millionmightstrikeusmeremortalsasinsigniicant,butanybaseballplayerwouldratherbat .357than.350.Moreover,incentivesmattertomostpeople,andforbetterorworse,money isameasureofperformance.Inaddition,shareholdersgenerallyarehappytoacquiescein lavishrewardstochiefexecutiveswhoaresuccessful.Andwhentimesaredificult,itisalways temptingtocutcorners.
Crimeandunethicalconductbycorporatepersonneltypicallytakeplaceoutofpublicview, behindtherespectablefacadeoftheiremployer,anditcanbenearlyimpossibleforoutsidersto penetratethisorganizationalveil.Thisisonereasonwhywhistleblowersandinformantsrank amongthemostimportantsourcesofinformationaboutcorporatecrime,illegalities,andun -ethicalconduct(AssociationofCertiiedFraudExaminers,2010).Whistleblowersareemployees oflegitimateorganizationswhodivulgetooutsidersknowledgeorsuspicionsofwrongdoing intheworkplace.Recognizingtheirimportanceasasourceofoversight,vandeBunt(2010, thisissue)makesencouragementofwhistleblowingacenterpieceofhisproposalsforreducing corporatewhite-collarcrime.IntheUnitedStates,severalstatesandthefederalgovernment haveenactedlegislationprovidingemploymentprotectionandmonetaryrewardsforthem. Thisismeanttospurinsiderswithknowledgeofwrongdoingtocomeforwardandreportto authoritiesandtodosowithoutfearofreprisals.
Beyond self-regulation and pluralistic oversight
Theabsencethusfarinmostindustriesandbusinessirmsofclearorpersuasiveevidence oftheeffectivenessofself-regulationandcooperativeapproachestooversightincreasesthe importanceofexploringadditionalpolicyoptionsgroundedincriminologicaltheory(Laufer, 2010,thisissue).Thedominantparadigmofresponsiveregulationdoesnotprecludeinnova -tionandindeedinvitescontinuingreform.Recenthistoryhasseensomeisolatedinnovation inregulatoryreform,someofwhichmightbereplicable.Intheaftermathofabriberyscandal thatresultedinmarketingoftaintedproducts,theformerheadoftheChinaStateFoodand DrugAdministration,ZhengXiaoyu,wasexecutedin2007.Nothingcomparablehasoccurred inanyotherWesternnation.
Perhapsmorefeasibleispublicshaming.Onerecallsthatastheircompanieswerefailing, chiefexecutivesofthreemajorU.S.automobilemanufacturerslewtoWashingtonintheir corporatejetstoaskforfederalbailoutfunds.Althoughshamelessbehaviorsuchasthisleads onetodespairabouttheprospectofgoodcorporatecitizenship,forcefulchastisementisstill appropriate.ThereceptionthattheautoexecutivesreceivedonCapitolHillwaslessthanwarmly welcoming,andtheirridiculebythepresswasentirelyitting.Leighton(2010)suggeststhat theU.S.InternalRevenueServicepublishthenamesofdelinquenttaxpayers.Therewillalways bewhite-collaroffenderswhoareirredeemablyshameless,butthosecaptainsofindustrywho dependonamodicumofpoliticalandsocialsupportforthecontinuedviabilityoftheirbusiness ignorepublicopinionattheirperil.Andnearlyeverybodyvaluesrespect.Thepotentialutilityof ridiculeasameansofmobilizingpublicindignationis,inourview,worthyoffurtherattention. Wesaythisdespitethefactthatrefusaltoacknowledgethecriminalityoftheirconductisone ofthesharpestdistinguishingcharacteristicsofwhite-collarcriminals,onereportedinstudies usingavarietyofresearchmethodologies(Benson,1985;ShoverandHunter,2010).
prohibitedfrompossessingsemi-automaticirearmsoroleoresincapsicumspray.Onecommits acrimebyproducingdatawiththeintentionthatitbeusedincommittingaseriouscomputer offense(bycreatingwormsandviruses).Whethercertaintypesofinancialinstrumentscould besimilarlyprohibitedisaninterestingquestion.IntheUnitedStates,Congresscurrentlyis debatingapotentialbanonderivativestrading.
Althoughtheremightbeno“magicbullet”intheofing,onecouldtakesomecomfort inthepotentialfortechnologicaldevelopmentstoenhanceregulatorycapacity,especiallythe capacityforcredibleguardianshipandoversight(Gibbs,McGarrell,andAxelrod,2010,this issue).Aswithcomputing,thedecreasingcostandincreasingaccessibilityoftechnologymake suchenhancedguardianshipincreasinglyfeasible.Satelliteimagingcandetectunauthorizedland clearingandwaterstorageonindividualfarms.Digitaltechnologycanidentifytheoriginof everyporkproductproducedintheNetherlands,downtothefarmwheretheanimalwasraised. Automatedsurveillancemethodscanidentifyanomalouspatternsoftradingonstockmarkets. Thepaceoftechnologicalchangeisgreatandgrowing.Itissafetoassumethatapplications unforeseentodaywillincreasethecapacityofregulatoryoversightinyearstocome.
AyresandBraithwaite(1992)observedthatpublicinterestgroupsplayacentralrolein someregulatorydomains,arolethatcouldeasilybeenhancedandexpanded.Theynotedthat manycountriesaroundtheworldhaveelectedworkersafetyrepresentativesthatcomplement stateinspections.Longbeforethewidespreadtake-upofdigitaltechnology,itwasrecognized thatordinarycitizensareinapositiontoplayasigniicantroleintheregulatoryprocess.In theUnitedStates,theBetterBusinessBureaus(BBBs)grewoutofthetruth-in-advertising movementintheearly20thcentury(Pannell,2002).Comprisedoflocalbusinesspeople, BBBsscrutinizedadvertisingfordeceptivecontent,gatheredevidence,andpresentedittolocal authoritiesforprosecution.
Consumerboycottsexemplifymassparticipationinfurtheranceofoversightreform.Such participationcanresultinthecreationofnewregulatoryprohibitionsinthefaceofrecognized harm,oradditionalexternaloversightthatcomplementsanexistingregulatoryregime.Harsh laborpracticesexperiencedbyCaliforniaagriculturalworkersgaveriseintheearly1970sto boycottsoflettuceandtablegrapes.Someameliorationofworkingconditionsfollowed.The riseoftheenvironmentalmovementhasseenaloweringofgrassrootsactivism,onlandand sea.Inrecentyears,theenvironmentalNGOGreenpeacehassentvesselstotheSouthernOcean tomonitorJapanesewhaling.Imagesofwhalesbeingharpoonedattractlittlesympathyforthe whalingindustryorforthenationsthathostit.
commissioneroncepubliclymusedthatfraudinvestigationmightsimilarlybeundertakenby theprivatesector.
Technologycouldenhancenotonlythecapacityofstateoversight,butalsothepowerof privateparties.Wearenowwellintotheinformationrevolution,andtheenormouspotential fordigitaltechnologytoenhancetheregulatorycapacityofordinarycitizensisbecomingap -parent.Morethaneverbefore,privateindividualsandinstitutionsareinapositiontoengage intheco-productionofregulatoryservices.Torgler(2010,thisissue)notestheimportanceof themediaintheregulatoryprocess.Inyearspastitwassaidthatfreedomofthepressbelonged tothepersonwhoownedone.Today,thankstodigitaltechnology,individualsaroundthe worldcancommunicateinstantaneously,tomillionsofpeople,andatnegligiblecost.Mobile phonescanserveascameras,videorecorders,orlisteningdevicesandcancaptureactivities thaterrantcompaniesorgovernmentagentswouldrathernotshare.Thenotoriousimagesof prisonerabuseatAbuGhraibwerebroadcastaroundtheworldin2006.Investigativereport -ingisbynomeansthemonopolyofjournalistsemployedbygreatmetropolitannewspapers. Indeed,theeconomicsofthenewspaperindustryhavebeguntomilitateagainstserious(i.e., expensive)journalism.Instead,individualbloggersandotherdigitalnewsentrepreneurshave beguntodevelopanincreasingproile(e.g.,seeslate.com/,wikileaks.org/,andpropublica.org/). AProPublicareporterwasawardeda2010PulitzerPrizeforInvestigativeReporting.
policy adoption and Implementation
Rothe(2010,thisissue)isonlypartlycorrectthat“policysuggestionsaredificulttoconcep -tualizeandtoimplement.”Developmentandpromulgationofpolicyproposalsisanything butdificultandthediversepolicyessaysinthisissueattesttothis.Seeingproposedpolicy adoptedandimplementedfaithfullyisexceedinglydificult.Conspicuouslyabsentfrommany ofthepolicyessaysincludedhereisdiscussionofhowtheproposedpoliciesmightbeputin placeandobstaclestoimplementation.Snider(2010,thisissue)isoneofthefewauthors whohighlightsthecriticalimportanceofpowerrelationshipsinconstructingandgaining passageofnewrulesandoversight.Regulatoryspaceisalmostalwayscontested.Proposals foroversightreform,regardlessoftheirintrinsicmerit,invariablymeetwithoppositionfrom someone,somewhere.Notallreformsarecostless;thosewhoareaskedtothebearincreased costsresultingfromregulatoryinitiativesmightunderstandablyobject.Routinely,proposed oversightinitiativesencounteroppositiongroundedinideologyorpoliticalpartisanship.More importantperhaps,strugglesforreforminvariablyarewagedwithinthepoliticalandideologi -calconinesofthepolitical–economiccontext.Giventhisfact,fundamentalandfarreaching policychangeslikelywillnotoccur;onlyproposalsforincrementaltinkeringwillbedeinedas legitimateandpotentiallyworkable.
Windows of Opportunity
Thestrategicenvironmentforreformischangeable,but“toeverythingthereisaseason”(Eccle -siastes3:1–8).Muchreformisbornofcrisis.Acuteproblemsdemandsolutions.Emergent structuralcontradictionsinthepoliticaleconomycangiverisetoproblemsthatcannotbepapered overwithcosmeticreforms.Inthesehistoricallyopportunecircumstances,acuteproblemscan producemassdisaffectionandcausecitizenstoorganizeandtodemandoficialaction.Atthe veryleast,crisisconditionscancausealossoflegitimacyandforcedacquiescencefromthose whonormallyresistoversight.Thestockmarketcrashof1929andtheGreatDepressionthat followedusheredinadegreeofgovernmentactivitythatwashistoricallyunprecedented.The FederalDepositInsuranceCorporation(FDIC)andtheSECarebuttwooftheinstitutions createdatthattime(Schlesinger,1958).TheWatergatecover-upwasfollowedbyenergeticpros -ecutorialandlegislativeoversightactivityindefenseofpublicsectorintegrity(Katz,1980).The S&Lcrisisofthe1980sgaverisetotheFinancialInstitutionsReform,Recovery,andEnforce -mentActof1989(FIRREA).CriminalscandalsbyEnronandotherlargecorporationshelped launcheventsthatculminatedintheSarbanes-OxleyActof2002.Thislegislationmandated newstandardsofcorporategovernanceandpersonalresponsibilityforcorporatereportingby high-levelexecutives.BythetimethisspecialissueofCriminology & Public Policyappearsin print,wemightknowifthewindowofopportunityopenedbytheGreatRecessionwaswide enoughtoallowsigniicantreformsofinancialsectoroversight.
movement,forerunnertotheNewDeal,intheUnitedStates(vonDrehle,2003).Thedisastrous SantaBarbaraoilspillof1968wasapowerfulcatalysttodevelopmentoftheenvironmental movement(Molotch,1970).InApril2010,anexplosioninanundergroundcoalmineinWest Virginiakilled29miners,andafewweekslater,adrilledbutuncappedunderseawellspewed perhapsmillionsofgallonsofoilintotheGulfofMexico.Asthisessayiswritten,thelowofoil hascontinueduninterruptedformorethaniveweekswithnoendisinsight.Thelong-term impactsofthespillareinestimable.Mineexplosionsandoilspills,particularlywhenthereis reasontobelievethatlaxoversightcontributedtotheiroccurrence,areopportunitiesthatdo notcomealongeveryday.
Opportunities,however,areonlyasgoodasthosewhowouldexploitthem.Theskill -fulpolicyentrepreneurmightsucceed,wheretheineptwouldfail.Inaddition,therelational distancebetweenpolicyentrepreneursandsourcesofpotentialresistancemightbehighly signiicantinexplainingthesuccessorfailureofreforminitiatives(Black,1993).Consider RichardNixon,conservativepresidentoftheUnitedStates.TheNixonAdministrationsaw thecreationoftheEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)andtheOccupationalHealthand SafetyAdministration(OSHA).
Social Movements
Intheabsenceofacutecrisis,publicconsciousnessaboutagivenharmandsupportforregu -latoryreformmaygrowslowlytogetherwithcallsforremediation.Insomecasesthispublic consciousnesscanbeboostedbyalandmarkpublication.Amongtheearliermanifestationsof riskidentiicationandinformationwastheclassicnovel,The Jungle (1906),bytheauthorand journalistUptonSinclair.ThebookledtotheenactmentofTheMeatInspectionActandthe PureFoodandDrugAct.
Ahalfcenturylater,thenaturewriterRachelCarsonpublishedSilent Spring(1962), whichlednotonlytothestrengtheningofpesticideregulationintheUnitedStates,butalso tothegrowthoftheenvironmentalmovementmoregenerally.Threeyearsafterpublication ofCarson’sbook,RalphNaderpublishedUnsafe at Any Speed (1965),acritiqueofautomobile safetyintheUnitedStates.Nader’sbookcontributedtotheenactmentofthe1966National TraficandMotorVehicleSafetyAct,whichestablishedtheNationalHighwayTraficSafety Administration.Reformsthatemergealmosteffortlesslyfromchangingpublicconsciousness andspontaneouscallsforactionaretheexception.Morecommonarereformsthatowetheir adoptiontoorganizedandsustainedmovements(Snider,2010).
Voluntary/Private Actions
betrustedtoimplementeffectiveinternalcontrols,todetectandrespondtorulebreaking,and toreporttheincidentstostateagencies.
Forcorporateoficials,however,trustistreatednotassomethingwhichcontinuallymust beearnedindaytodayactionsbutinsteadasanentitlement.Therearecountlessactionsthey couldtaketodemonstratethattrustismerited.Oneischangesinpoliciesofcorporategover -nance. Corporate governancereferstoavariegatedmixofstructuralandproceduralchangesput inplacebybusinessirmstoreducethelikelihoodofinanciallosstoshareholdersorinvestors causedbydistracted,incompetent,oroverlyself-interestedmanagers.Exemplaryinitiatives includechangeinthecompositionofboardsofdirectors,revampedcompensationschemesfor managers,andmorerobustinternalmonitoringsystems(DenisandMcConnell,2003).But theimportanceofcompliancewithexternallyrequiredstandardsofconductandperformance isalmostentirelyabsentfromcorporategovernancecodes;theemphasisinsteadislimited almostentirelytotheimportanceofhonestyininternaldealings.Revisionstocodeofethics andinternalgovernancedocumentsthatemphasizetheobligationtoobeythelawwouldsend aclearsignaltothoseskepticaloftheintegrityofrespectabilityofcorporateactors.Theyalso mightpromoteself-restraint.
Anotherwayofdemonstratingthatcorporateactorscanbetrustedtobehaveresponsibly isbyspendingfundsforresearchonseriousnon-complianceandcrime.Historically,empirical researchintothesemattershasbeenfundedalmostentirelybystateandothernon-corporate sources.Researchsupportedbycorporateinterestsbycontrasthasfocusednarrowlyoneconomic misconductthatvictimizesbusinessirms(BussmannandWerle,2006).Iftrustandcompliance withoversightarepriorityconcerns,businesscoulddemonstratethisbycommittingresources tosupportresearchintoillegalactionsthatharmoutsidersandthegeneralpublic.Thecoststo victimsoftheirexperienceatthehandsofcorporatecriminalsisatopicpregnantwithpotential symbolicmessagesoftrustandresponsibility.Researchintoawiderandlessself-centeredrange oftopicswouldsendapowerfulsignalofcommitmentandmightleadtomoreeffectiveinternal oversightandself-restraint.Trustincorporateoficialscouldbeenhancedalsobyreforming theirapproachtoandtreatmentofwhistleblowers.
actorsapparentlyhavemadelittleefforttofundstudiesoftheimplementationandeficacyof “trust-and-hope”oversight.Itisdificulttocredittheirgoodwillwhentheyseemdisinclined tocommitresourcestoidentifyingbestpracticesofinternaloversight.Theelectronicsindustry CitizenshipCoalitionnotedbyvanErpandHuisman(2010)mightbeanexception.
Discussionsofhowtodeviseandgainadoptionofpoliciesthatlimitlure,reducetheranks ofthosewhoarepredisposedortemptedtoexploitit,andincreasethecredibilityofoversight canbeoverlytechnocraticinfocusandneglectlargerconstraintsandobstacles.Thedominant politicaleconomy,itsstructuralintegrity,operatingpremises,andpowerrelationshipsseverely constrainconsiderationandadoptionofpolicyoptions.Prominentamongtheseconstraints istheperceivedneedtoavoidanyactionsthatwouldjeopardizebusinessconidenceandthe stabilityofthemarkets.Theycancauseadvocatestolosesightofthefactthattheightagainst corporatecrimeislinkedinextricablytotheightforsocialjustice.Itisaightinwhichwealth, accesstopolicymakers,andotherresourcesgenerallyaredeterminative.Butpopulistsocial movementscanmakeadifference.Crises,scandals,andaccidentswillcontinuetooccur,giv -ingrisetoepisodicdisaffectionandattemptsatreform.Theoddsofsuccesswillbeaffected signiicantlybypolitical–economicconditions.Reformishardertoresistandmorelikelyto succeedduringeconomicboomtimeswhenproitsareup.Futureattemptstolimittheharm causedbywhite-collarcrimelikelywillmirrorthepast,andwhetherornottheGreatRecession willinspireorganizedandunrelentingdemandsforchangeinthepracticeofgovernmentsand thechoicesmadebyindustryremainstobeseen.Thecontributorstothisspecialissuehave shownwhatformthesemighttake.
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peter graboskyisaprofessorintheSchoolofRegulation,Justice,andDiplomacyatthe AustralianNationalUniversity.HeholdsaPh.D.inpoliticalsciencefromNorthwestern University,andhaswrittenonregulation,criminaljustice,andpublicpolicy.Hismostrecent book(coauthoredwithJulieAylingandCliffordShearing)isLengthening the Arm of the Law
(CambridgeUniversityPress,2009).GraboskyisamemberoftheAcademyoftheSocialSci -encesinAustralia.