BOOK CRITIQUE:
The Lost World of Genesis One: Ancient Cosmology and the Origins Debate By John H. Walton,
Probability’s Nature and Nature’s Probability: A Call to Scientific Integrity By Donald E. Johnson,
&
Seven Days that Divide the World: The Beginning According to Genesis and Science (Appendix B)
By John C. Lennox
BY
DARREN M. SLADE
FRIDAY, JUNE 26, 2015
ii CONTENTS
Introduction ... 1
Brief Summary ... 1
Critical Evaluation ... 6
Conclusion ... 19
Bibliography ... 20
Annotated Bibliography ... 23
1 Introduction
When reviewing John Walton’s book, The Lost World of Genesis One, Michael Heiser remarked, “I see Walton's work as an essential primer on the realia of Genesis 1 and a much- needed corrective to the inconsistent hermeneutics found in apologetics material on origins.
Frankly, this is a book that needed to be written and was long overdue.”
1Similarly, Sean Cordry concluded that Walton’s book is “paradigm shifting,” explaining, “The thesis has tremendous potential to reshape much of the ‘science-religion’ debate.”
2Using eighteen different
“propositions,” Walton intends to expound on the cognitive environment of the ancient Near East by exploring the literary parallels of Genesis to other ancient cosmologies. The purpose of this review is to present Walton’s approach to Genesis and then to evaluate the arguments of two opposing viewpoints by authors John Lennox and Donald Johnson. In the end, Walton’s book withstands the scrutiny and argumentation of these two authors. His study on Genesis is a refreshing and scholarly approach to the creation narrative that appropriately stresses the need for a literary comparison between Genesis and other ancient Near Eastern creation accounts.
Brief Summary
The Lost World of Genesis One argues that a philological and literary comparison to the
ancient Near East is the most faithful approach to the text’s authorial intent, insisting that readers must understand the cognitive environment of ancient Israel. Methodologically, this requires recognizing that ancient Israelites ascribed to the same cosmological and ontological beliefs as
1
Michael S. Heiser, review of The Lost World of Genesis One: Ancient Cosmology and the Origins Debate, by John H. Walton, Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 53, no. 1 (March 2010): 161; italics in original.
2
Sean M. Cordry, review of The Lost World of Genesis One: Ancient Cosmology and the Origins Debate,
by John H. Walton, Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 62, no. 3 (September 2010): 228.
2 the surrounding cultures. In Walton’s first proposition, he demonstrates that Genesis is a clear example of ancient cosmology and attacks “concordism,” the attempt to read modern scientific details into Genesis. He argues that concordism disregards the intentions of the ancient writer, who would not have known or been concerned about the natural sciences. Moreover, modern science is a dynamic field of study that is in perpetual flux. Current cosmology may change and, thus, should not direct someone’s interpretation of Genesis. Walton argues that God
accommodated to the language, culture, and conceptual worldview of the original inheritors of Scripture and, thus, did not intend to correct ancient cosmology.
3Walton’s second proposition is that ancient cosmology was function oriented. While modern ontology confers existence to something based on its material properties, the ancient Near East possessed a “functional ontology,” which rendered the existence of something to its function in relation to society and culture.
4Thus, “creating” for the ancient world meant to bring order to a previously nonfunctional, chaotic state. Walton demonstrates this functional ontology through a lexical analysis of the Hebrew verb “to create” ( א ָרָבּ), whose syntactical objects are not usually material items. Therefore, Genesis did not originally intend to present material creation ex nihilo, though this concept does appear in other biblical passages.
53
John H. Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One: Ancient Cosmology and the Origins Debate (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009), 5-20. Walton provides an excellent example of divine accommodation: “In the ancient world people believed that the seat of intelligence, emotion and personhood was in the internal organs, particularly the heart, but also the liver, kidneys, and intestines….when God wanted to talk to the Israelites about their intellect, emotions and will, he did not revise their ideas of physiology and feel compelled to reveal the function of the brain. Instead, he adopted the language of the culture to communicate in terms they
understood….Through the entire Bible, there is not a single instance in which God revealed to Israel a science beyond their own culture” (Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One, 16-17).
4
Walton writes, “Since in our culture we believe that existence is material, we consequently believe that to create something means to bring its material properties into existence. Thus our discussion of origins tend to focus on material origins” (Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One, 22-23).
5
Ibid., 21-45. Walton provides an expanded translation of Genesis 1:1: “In the initial period, God created
by assigning functions throughout the heavens and earth, and this is how he did it” (Walton, The Lost World of
Genesis One, 45).
3 A further proposition argues that the beginning state prior to “creation” was
nonfunctional. Other ancient accounts describe the presence of primeval cosmic waters, which was emblematic of the nonfunctional chaos that resided in darkness and other liminal spaces (e.g.
the sea, the desert, etc.). When God concluded that things were “good,” he meant that everything was functioning properly. This is clearest when God said it was not good for Adam to be alone (Gen. 2:18), indicating that “good” did not have a moral value but a functional quality (Adam needed assistance tending to the garden and naming the animals).
6Walton’s fifth proposition is that the first three creation days also established a cosmic function. The first day established the function of timekeeping (1:3-5), day two established the function of weather (vv. 6-8), and day three established the function of growing food (vv. 9-13).
7The next three days installed cosmic functionaries. For example, God installed the sun and moon for keeping track of time, seasons, and years. Day five installed birds and sea creatures to populate the air and the sea. On day six, animals populated the land while God appointed humanity to act as his vice regent in subduing the planet.
8Walton then discusses the functional role of the Sabbath, arguing that any ancient reader would have recognized the first chapter of Genesis as a temple inauguration. This is because in ancient literature, the local deity would
“rest” in a recently constructed temple at the end of a seven-day cycle. The term “rest” ( תבשׁ) did not mean a cessation from normal activities (cf. Deut. 12:10; Josh. 21:44; 23:1). Rather, it meant that God had subdued chaos and could now operate the ordered system with regularity.
96
Ibid., 46-52. See also, John H. Walton, The Lost World of Adam and Eve: Genesis 2-3 and the Human Origins Debate (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2015), 104-15.
7
Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One, 53-61.
8
Ibid., 62-70.
9
Ibid., 71-76.
4 For the ancient Near East, temples acted as microcosms of the entire universe, which commonly affixed gardens next to sacred spaces. In Genesis, God instituted the functionality of the entire cosmos to act as a temple.
10This helps answer the question of whether the Hebrew word “day” ( םוֹי) is a literal twenty-four hour period or a long epoch. Since Genesis is not describing material creation but, instead, is describing the inauguration of God’s cosmic temple, the “days” in Genesis are normal, twenty-four-days. Walton explains that the reason modern interpreters want to read material origins into Genesis is because that is how modern readers view the world. However, interpreters cannot superimpose their modern concepts onto the text. If the Genesis account is about the inauguration of God’s cosmic temple, then the biblical creation narratives contribute nothing to the debate about the age of the earth or evolution.
11In proposition eleven, Walton defends his cosmic temple thesis by arguing that it offers
“face-value exegesis.” Walton addresses Young Earth Creationism, arguing that making the text engage in a debate with evolution would overlay an anachronistic agenda onto the biblical writers. It is methodologically questionable to suppose that God divinely implanted scientific information into the text that would be relevant only for an audience several thousand years into the future. Walton also addresses Old Earth Creationism, commenting that their attempt to make the text align with current scientific theories is proof of human ingenuity and not proper
hermeneutics. The “framework hypothesis,” on the other hand, rightly stresses a literary and theological approach to Genesis. However, the ancient Israelites would not have viewed the text
10
“Thus says the L
ORD: ‘Heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool; what is the house that you would build for me, and what is the place of my rest? All these things my hand has made, and so all these things came to be,’ declares the L
ORD. ‘But this is the one to whom I will look: he who is humble and contrite in spirit and trembles at my word’” (Isa. 66:1–2, ESV; emphasis added. Cf. 1 Kings 8:65; 2 Chron. 7:9).
11
Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One, 77-100.
5 solely in literary terms.
12Walton concludes, “Science cannot offer an unbiblical view of material origins, because there is no biblical view of material origins aside from the very general idea that whatever happened, whenever it happened, and however it happened, God did it.”
13Walton then explains the metaphysical differences between science and Scripture. The ancient Israelites attributed all natural phenomena to deity (“ultimate divine causation”).
14Science, on the other hand, investigates “secondary natural causations” within the world. By current definition, the natural sciences are unable and unwilling to investigate non-natural mechanisms. While God could operate through any naturalistic mechanism he chooses, science must take a decidedly neutral stance toward observing or speculating about teleology. Genesis simply does not communicate the mechanisms through which God created, whether it was purely miraculous or evolutionary. He suggests that the only aspect of the natural sciences that is
contrary to Scripture is philosophical naturalism, which is a dysteleological assumption. Walton also discusses the issue of science education and the need for science to remain metaphysically disinterested when presenting evolution. Neither design nor randomness is scientifically
provable. Simultaneously, creationists should not appeal to Genesis to discuss the origins of life since Genesis lacks a material ontology. Intelligent Design and creationism belong in the theology and philosophy departments but not in the fields of natural science.
1512
Ibid., 101-12. Walton writes, “Scientific theory cannot serve as the basis for determining divine intention” (Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One, 104).
13
Ibid., 112.
14
Walton writes, “God is always the ultimate cause—that is our belief whatever secondary causes and processes can be identified through scientific investigation” (Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One, 115).
15
Ibid., 113-23, 151-60.
6 Finally, Walton argues that Christians are free to accept biological evolution as God’s mechanism for creation. Walton clarifies, however, that he is not endorsing Darwinism or any other scientific theory, though he reminds the reader that evolution itself is not the problem.
Philosophical naturalism is the problem. Walton concludes that his cosmic temple approach admonishes Christians to resist the exploitation and overuse of creation, recognizing that the whole universe is God’s sacred space. Thus, Christians need to incorporate an ecological sensitivity into their theology. Similarly, Christians should honor the Sabbath by stopping their work to recognize God’s enthronement and total control of the created order.
16Walton summarizes his approach as the “cosmic temple inauguration view,” where God established the universe in a functional manner to act as his temple from which he resides and controls the cosmos. The ancient Israelites possessed a functional ontology and not a material ontology. Whatever mechanism science proposes to explain the origin of life in the universe, Christians can confidently assert (metaphysically, not scientifically) that God was involved in the process. Christians are also free to reject or accept evolutionary theory so long as they realize that Genesis does not address the issue except to renounce philosophical naturalism.
17Critical Evaluation
In Appendix B of Seven Days that Divide the World¸ John Lennox provides a scathing critique of Walton’s work, arguing that his approach shows little evidential support and is unconvincing both methodologically and historically. Lennox contends that the Bible differs so significantly from the ancient Near East that even if the ancient world did think in functional
16
Ibid., 131-50.
17
Ibid., 161-67.
7 terms, Israel most definitely did not share their worldview or thought processes.
18This argument is the foundation of Lennox’s critique against Walton, attempting to prove that the Bible does not parallel other ancient Near Eastern literature. Unfortunately, Lennox makes the mistake of
assuming that ancient cultures perceived the world in contemporary Western concepts,
suggesting that the two cognitive environments are similar. This contention is in direct conflict with his other assertions that Genesis possesses an ancient Near Eastern perspective.
19Regrettably, Lennox takes a very selective approach to his philological and literary comparisons, overemphasizing only those cultural and theological differences present in the texts of the ancient Near East. However, the recognition that Genesis is an ancient artifact with
significant parallels and deliberate adaptations of other ancient writings is so widely accepted by most biblical scholars that the dismissal of this reality is intellectually dishonest and naïve.
20Lennox should not force what is exegetically unlikely in order to preserve harmony with his
18
John C. Lennox, Seven Days that Divide the World: The Beginning According to Genesis and Science (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011), 132.
19
Cf. Lennox, 43, 119-27. Lennox admits, “[The Bible] is from the ancient Near East, so we cannot simply read it as if it were a contemporary Western document written to address contemporary Western concerns” (43), but he concludes, “The universe to which Genesis introduces us is no mythical construct; it is our familiar world” (123).
20
For the overwhelming evidence of this, see Richard J. Clifford, Creation Accounts in the Ancient Near East and in the Bible, The Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series 26 (Washington, DC: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1994); Bernard F. Batto, In the Beginning: Essays on Creation Motifs in the Ancient Near East and the Bible, Siphrut: Literature and Theology of the Hebrew Scriptures 9 (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2013); Peter C. Craigie, Ugarit and the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1983); Cyrus H. Gordon and Gary A. Rendsburg, The Bible and the Ancient Near East, 4th ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997); Victor H. Matthews and Don C. Benjamin, Old Testament Parallels: Laws and Stories from the Ancient Near East, 3rd ed. (New York: Paulist Press, 2006); Adele Berlin, The Dynamics of Biblical Parallelism, revised and expanded ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2008); Michael D. Coogan, A Reader of Ancient Near Eastern Texts: Sources for the Study of the Old Testament (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Wolfram von Soden, The Ancient Orient: An Introduction to the Study of the Ancient Near East (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994); Loren R. Fisher,
“Creation at Ugarit and in the Old Testament,” Vetus Testamentum 15, no. 3 (July 1965): 313-24; Bill T. Arnold, Nancy L. Erickson, and John H. Walton, eds., Windows to the Ancient World of the Hebrew Bible: Essays in Honor of Samuel Greengus (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2014); John H. Walton, Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament: Introducing the Conceptual World of the Hebrew Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006);
and John H. Walton, The NIV Application Commentary: Genesis (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2001).
8 concordist approach to Scripture.
21It is because Walton views Genesis from an ancient mindset that his methodology and interpretation succeed where so many others have failed.
Likewise, Lennox criticizes Walton’s assertion that ancient Israel possessed a functional ontology, remarking that if this were true, both ancient and scholarly literature would have references to this fact.
22Lennox is unaware that other scholars have noted that ancient
cosmogonies are “function-bound,” highlighting that creation predominantly involved assigning roles to temples, animals, and humans.
23Regardless, the appearance of a new theory does not invalidate Walton’s assertions. The scholastic community expects revisions and further insights with the discovery of new information. Lennox appears to have a “knee-jerk” reaction to this new paradigm simply because he has never heard of it before. Lennox explicitly ascribes more truth to previously heard information than he does to new concepts.
24Also, he fails to realize that Walton intended his work for a popular audience, which is why the book gives a brief overview of major points, has a limited index, lacks a bibliography, and does not use highly technical terminologies. If Lennox is interested in reading Walton’s highly technical manuscript, which
21
Lennox summarizes his eisegetical agenda as one that attempts to find mathematical and scientific information in the texts of Genesis: “The major thrust of my argument so far, then, is that there is a way of
understanding Genesis 1 that does not compromise the authority and primacy of Scripture and that, at the same time, takes into account our increased knowledge of the universe” (Lennox, 62).
22
Lennox, 132.
23
See for example, Clifford, 55-73.
24
This is a cognitive bias known as the “validity effect” (see Catherine Hackett Renner, “Validity Effect,”
in Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory, Pbk. ed., ed.
Rüdiger F. Pohl [2004; repr., New York: Psychology Press, 2012], 201-13). This is similar to the “Semmelweis Reflex” or the “backfire effect” observed by Lawrence Sanna and Norbert Schwarz’s debiasing research, which indicates that people tend to react to the possibility of counterevidence and alternative outcomes by strengthening their original beliefs and by assuming that their conclusions are the only inevitable and correct possibility. In other words, the more difficult it is for people to conceive of alternative conclusions, the more they tend to dismiss alternative outcomes and become convinced of their original beliefs (see Lawrence J. Sanna and Norbert Schwarz,
“When Debiasing Backfires: Accessible Content and Accessibility Experiences in Debiasing Hindsight,” Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 28, no. 3 [May 2002]: 497-502).
9 provides scholarly references and citations, he should read the technical edition of the book, Genesis 1 as Ancient Cosmology (Eisenbrauns, 2011).
25As Walton explains, intellectually honest scholars should always be ready to allow new discoveries and facts to correct their interpretations of Scripture if those interpretations conflict with demonstrable facts.
26Lennox further attacks Walton’s linguistic evidence, suggesting that the word “create”
does not possess a functional dimension. Rather, the context of Genesis indicates that the passages are discussing material origination. He cites the formation of the heavens and earth (Gen. 1:1), the sea creatures (v. 21), and Adam and Eve (v. 27) as proof. He also cites the New Testament as evidence for a material ontology, primarily referencing Hebrews 11:3 to indicate that the ancient world believed Genesis discussed creation ex nihilo.
27However, Lennox is guilty of an anachronistic and retrospective reading of Genesis. As one young earth creationist admits, the Hebrew word for “create” does not denote material creation, and neither do the Greek words, either. “Etymological studies of cognates in languages such as Akkadian, Arabic, Phoenician, Aramaic, and Ugaritic suggest that the basic idea of this word is that of ‘shaping,’ ‘fashioning,’
or ‘building.’ ”
28When read with a functional perspective, none of Lennox’s proof-texts demand material creation, especially since Genesis 1:1 is a literary introduction that summarizes the activities in Genesis, not the creation of the heavens and earth.
29Similarly, the text mentions both sea creatures and humans only in relation to their assigned roles: the proliferation of sea
25
John H. Walton, Genesis 1 as Ancient Cosmology (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2011).
26
Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One, 167.
27
Lennox, 132-35.
28
John S. Feinberg, No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God, Foundations of Evangelical Theology (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2001), 552.
29
See Walton, The NIV Application Commentary, 67-70. This is why the NJPS translation states, “When
God began to create heaven and earth” (emphasis added).
10 creatures indicates jurisdiction and breeding (vv. 20-23), whereas Adam and Eve’s function is to act as vice regents in exercising dominion over the rest of the created order (vv. 24-31).
30Finally, citing the New Testament to help elucidate the meaning of Genesis neglects the dramatic differences in metaphysical and ontological perspectives between ancient Israel, Hellenistic Judaism, and Christianity. Lennox appears unaware that the early church’s
hermeneutical practices were retrospective and usually did not consider the original context of the Hebrew Bible. Hellenism, Greco-Roman rhetoric, and the apocalyptic views of Second Temple Judaism significantly influenced how the early church exposited its Scriptures.
31In an egregious display of special pleading, Lennox criticizes Walton for using Isaiah 66:1–2 as proof that the ancient Israelites viewed the cosmos as a temple. Lennox argues that Walton should not use Isaiah because the book appears “much later in Israel’s history.” Lennox also argues that because the word “temple” is not in the first chapter of Genesis, readers cannot assume the text is discussing a cosmic temple.
32Oddly enough, Lennox just utilized the New Testament book of Hebrews to interpret Genesis, which has an even greater distanced than Isaiah in both time, culture, location, and language. This is a double standard since Lennox enforces criteria that he himself fails to apply to his own methodology.
30
Walton, Genesis 1 as Ancient Cosmology, 122-78; The NIV Application Commentary, 126-32.
31
See Peter Enns, “Apostolic Hermeneutics And An Evangelical Doctrine Of Scripture: Moving Beyond A Modernist Impasse,” Westminster Theological Journal 65, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 266-79; G. K. Beale, Handbook on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament: Exegesis and Interpretation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012), 14-18; Richard N. Longenecker, Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999); Steve Moyise, The Old Testament in the New: An Introduction (New York:
T&T Clark, 2001); Klyne Snodgrass, “The Use of the Old Testament in the New,” in The Right Doctrine from the Wrong Texts? Essays on the Use of the Old Testament in the New, ed. G. K. Beale (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 1994); John J. Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to Jewish Apocalyptic Literature, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998), 256-79; and Greg Carey, Ultimate Things: An Introduction to Jewish and Christian Apocalyptic Literature (St. Louis, MO: Chalice Press, 2005).
32
Lennox, 136-37.
11 Note also that Lennox’s interpretation of Genesis inserts words and concepts that do not appear anywhere in the text: “In Genesis 2:7 it … affirms that (human) life has a chemical base, but Genesis denies the reductionist addendum of the materialist—that life is nothing but
chemistry.”
33This is an abhorrent example of reading into the text what is simply not there.
According to Lennox’s criteria, Genesis is not discussing the “chemical base” or reacting to
“materialist” notions of humanity since the words “chemical base” and “materialist” are not in the text. Besides, no one can seriously argue that “dust” ( ֙רָפָע, Gen. 2:7) is the primary ingredient of human biology, and ancient Semitic beliefs about humans were predominantly materialist in nature.
34The idea that humans appear from pieces of the ground was a common motif for describing the mortality of humanity. In other words, by saying Adam came from the ground, Genesis is saying that God created him mortal. Thus, Genesis 3:19 remarks, “…till you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken; for you are dust, and to dust you shall return” (3:19, ESV).
35The text does not attempt to describe the chemical composition of human biology.
Lennox ignores the fact that the cognitive environment of the ancient Near East heavily involved temples to which the Isaiah passage is a clear example.
36In many creation accounts, the gods establish a temple for rest through a seven-day inauguration cycle. As Walton remarks,
In the ancient Near Eastern literature, the seven-day building or dedication practice is also apparent. In Ugaritic mythology Baal takes seven days to construct his sanctuary. On the seventh day of the Akitu festival (annual Babylonian enthronement festival on New Year’s Day), the god made the procession from the Akitu house outside of the city to assume his place in his temple and his role as suzerain. As mentioned earlier, Gudea’s
33
Ibid., 69.
34
Keith Ward, The Big Questions in Science and Religion (West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton
Foundation Press, 2008), 138-39. Ward writes, “In the main Jewish tradition, humans are viewed as thinking, acting lumps of matter” (138).
35
See Walton, The Lost World of Adam and Eve, 70-81 and Walton, Genesis 1 as Ancient Cosmology, 74- 86.
36
This is especially true since Isaiah imitates the same verbiage as found in Genesis. See footnote 11.
12 account of temple building and construction in Sumerian literature also indicates seven days for the celebration of the temple’s commencement.
37Lennox also objects to Walton’s claim that the Bible does not provide scientific
information, remarking, “Such convergences between the Bible and contemporary science add to the Bible’s credibility in a skeptical world.”
38This is an example of the author’s fallacious appeal to personal circumstances and motives. Here, Lennox suggests that his readers should reject Walton’s position in order to provide Christianity with an apologetic value. However, this is irrelevant to the truthfulness of Walton’s book. The apologetic value of concordism does not warrant forcing the text to say something that it never could have meant.
39Interestingly, Lennox later asserts that Genesis “is written in language that the readers can understand and not (for very obvious reasons) in technical scientific language.”
40It is dubious to attempt making Scripture conform to current cosmology because of science’s dynamic nature. If the text conforms to modern science, then that would mean the text was unintelligible to the last generation’s scientific consensus and will be equally irrelevant to the consensus of the next generation, as well. It also completely disregards the authorial intent of the text by forcing it to treat issues that the original author and the original audience could not have possibly understood.
41Throughout much of Lennox’s book, the author presents ad hoc rationalizations for his adherence to concordism, where he oftentimes defends an idea or a belief without first
37
Walton, NIV Application Commentary, 155.
38
Lennox, 142.
39
As Gordon Fee and Douglas Stuart pointedly remark, “A text cannot mean what it never meant,” (Gordon D. Fee and Douglas Stuart, How to Read the Bible for All Its Worth, 3d ed. [Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2003], 30; italics in original).
40
Lennox, 145.
41
Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One, 14-17.
13 determining whether it is true. This is evident in the final statement of Appendix B: “I find Walton’s insistence that Genesis 1 has nothing to do with the material origin of the universe unconvincing for a further reason. It leaves the Bible without an account of that origin in the very place where it would be expected to occur, and where generations both of ordinary people and of scholars have thought it to be.”
42Again, this is an irrelevant argument. The author believes that Genesis possesses a material ontology because, in effect, he expects it to treat material origins.
However, concluding that an idea is true because the consequences of it being true are more desirable, in addition to appealing to historical preferences, are not valid arguments. An interpretation’s desirability or historicity provides little substance to its legitimacy.
It is interesting that Lennox admits, “Walton is a Hebrew specialist” while admitting that he is “not a Hebrew specialist,” but only a mathematician. He even suggests that he may have misunderstood Walton.
43Since Lennox is neither a biblical nor an ancient Near Eastern scholar, it appears arrogant that he would challenge Walton’s expertise on Genesis. Lennox consistently superimposes mathematical or modern insights onto Scripture while regurgitating the same faulty interpretations that permeate “pop-Christianity.” In one case, Lennox astonishingly suggests that snakes once had legs and could stand upright.
44Genesis nowhere indicates this. On the contrary, the statement “on your belly you shall go” (Gen. 3:14) was a common curse in the ancient Near East directed against serpents. It is an indication that the serpent will not lift its head in an attack posture (similar to the depiction of snakes on a Pharaoh’s crown). The curse meant to make the snake more docile and less threatening.
45It seems fair to say that Lennox
42
Lennox, 147-48.
43
Cf. Lennox, 131, 141, 146.
44
Ibid., 83.
45
Walton, The Lost World of Adam and Eve, 129-30.
14 should relegate his scholastic endeavors to areas with which he is fluent and not attempt
coaching a well-renowned ancient Near Eastern scholar on biblical exegesis.
Finally, the last area to consider is Walton’s case against the Intelligent Design
movement and Donald Johnson’s Probability’s Nature and Nature’s Probability. Here, Johnson attempts to show that metaphysical naturalism of Darwinian evolution lacks verifiability.
Johnson also argues that Intelligent Design uses observable and measurable evidences and is, thus, a legitimate science. He argues that it is a double standard to label theories such as multiple universes (“String Theory”) or a “prebiotic soup” as science when they are just as unfalsifiable as other faith-based theories. The author begins by giving an overview of how probabilities work mathematically and how to calculate the likelihood of something occurring by chance or by design. Using the scientific principle of “uniformitarianism,” which suggests that the way nature operates today is the way it has operated in the past, Johnson uses “irreducible complexity” and the apparent fine-tuning of the universe to postulate that an intelligent designer is a naturalistic and highly probable conclusion behind these life-critical elements in the universe.
46Regrettably, as Walton points out, the assertion of an intelligent designer is a
metaphysical conclusion, which the natural sciences cannot verify. This is because Intelligent Design infers a teleological purpose behind life’s existence, something that is indiscernible and unobservable. Similarly, Intelligent Design fails to provide a scientifically rational alternative to Darwinian evolution, choosing instead to engage in polemics rather than naturalistic
explanations. Science has limited itself to only natural explorations because only naturalistic mechanisms are empirical and testable. Explanations outside of this methodology are also
46
Donald E. Johnson, Probability's Nature and Nature's Probability: A Call to Scientific Integrity
(Charleston, SC: Booksurge Publishing, 2009).
15 outside the realm of scientific inquiry. As Walton concludes, Intelligent Design merely presents a “God of the gaps” hypothesis for every instance that current neo-Darwinism fails to explain a particular phenomenon. Nevertheless, the Intelligent Design community is correct to criticize some neo-Darwinists who also assert philosophical naturalism alongside Darwinism. Because purpose is undetectable, scientists cannot assume the absence of an intelligent designer.
47Walton is ultimately correct in his evaluation of the Intelligent Design movement. The empirical sciences seek verifiable naturalistic explanations for the universe. They are unable to measure whether those mechanistic explanations have intent, purpose, or design simply because all of those appearances could be illusory or explained away by future naturalistic discoveries and causations. Johnson even appears to acknowledge this inadequacy when he writes, “Perhaps someday science will come up with a verifiable undirected natural model to explain the apparent fine-tuning that is evident, and science should certainly seek such knowledge.”
48Nevertheless, the author continues to assert that science should look for a metaphysical designer or an
unknowable intelligence.
He uses the trilobite eye as an irreducibly complex system that suddenly appeared in the
“Cambrian explosion” with no known ancestry. He argues that this is proof against life gradually evolving according to Darwinian mechanisms.
49Unfortunately, Johnson’s example poses
47
Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One, 124-30.
48
Johnson, 23.
49
Ibid., 72-75. One of the Intelligent Design movement’s favorite examples of “irreducible complexity” is the bacterial flagellum, which appears to be a microscopic rotary engine that could not have appeared through gradual evolution (see Johnson, 79-81). However, Kenneth Miller argues that even the flagellum is not without its smaller subsystems that could have appeared through gradual, adaptive changes (Kenneth R. Miller, “The Flagellum Unspun: The Collapse of ‘Irreducible Complexity,’” in Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA, ed. William A.
Dembski and Michael Ruse [Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2004], 81-97 and Finding Darwin's God: A Scientist’s Search for Common Ground Between God and Evolution, Pbk. ed. [1999; repr., New York:
Harper Perennial, 2007], 129-64).
16 multiple problems, aside from the fact that biologists have a reasonable explanation for the so- called “Cambrian explosion.”
50The discovery of new fossils can easily overturn the conclusion that an intelligent designer is responsible for the trilobite’s eye. Intelligent Design speculations would dissolve if future scientists discover the fossilized remains of all trilobite ancestors and transitional forms that explain the organism’s sight. Interestingly, awareness of this fact makes the Intelligent Design movement dependent on the absence of new discoveries because they capitalize on inadequate fossil records or insufficient information, which would in turn give the movement reason to limit future scientific research.
The Intelligent Design movement is also guilty of faulty suppositions because it presumes the existence of design in order to demonstrate the existence of a designer. This is evident in Johnson’s assumption regarding information coding in DNA: “Random processes can never produce information.”
51This statement is simply unverifiable. If scientists were somehow able to prove without a doubt that there was no intelligent designer and that all life appeared through natural processes, the material universe would still have the same appearances of design.
Johnson criticizes the natural sciences for limiting their research to only natural causes, thereby predetermining an incorrect solution if a non-natural intelligence truly existed.
52Ironically, Johnson does not realize that concluding an intelligent designer eliminates the search for other naturalistic explanations that may in fact be correct. Postulating an intelligent designer inhibits
50
See Darrel R. Falk, Coming to Peace with Science: Bridging the Worlds Between Faith and Biology (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2004), 93-95.
51
Johnson, 47; emphasis added.
52
Ibid., 107. For a discussion on viewing arguments for design as perception rather than logical inferences, see Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 236-64.
17 further exploration of nature’s mechanisms because it merely postulates an untestable,
unobservable, and unverifiable designer.
These conclusions are a result of Intelligent Design’s question-begging methodology.
Johnson admits that he “begins with the observation that intelligent agents produce complex and specified information” and therefore, if there is design in the universe, nature will display high levels of complex and specified information.
53Johnson assumes the very thing he is trying to prove and falsely believes that analogies equate to verifiable evidence. He misapplies the principle of uniformitarianism and commits the fallacy of the undistributed middle. He argues that because an intelligence produces complex information today, and because nature contains complex information, then an intelligence must have also produced nature, as well. A logical problem with Intelligent Design is assuming that when two categories have some characteristics in common, one category must necessarily be an illustration of the other. Johnson presumes that a resemblance between nature and complex machinery today establishes a common origin or causality. He fails to realize that even today scientists cannot observe an intelligent designer and, therefore, cannot legitimately include this belief within the principle of uniformitarianism.
Likewise, many of the polemics against Darwinian evolution are unfounded, especially when Johnson produces conclusions that are unwarranted by his premises. For instance, Johnson states that because scientists cannot generate life in a laboratory or detect the mechanisms of a
“prebiotic soup,” then the probability of life occurring through “undirected natural causes” must be zero.
54This is a fallacious conclusion because all it demonstrates is that scientists have not generated life or detected the appropriate naturalistic mechanisms yet. It does not rule out the
53
Ibid., 103.
54
Ibid., 41.
18 likelihood of all undirected natural causes. Johnson also argues that belief in Darwinism leads to human rights violations, dictatorships, murder, robbery, and rape. He even elicits Hitler as a supporter of evolution.
55Sadly, this is merely alarmist rhetoric that uses guilt by association. The belief in a gradual ascent of life from a common ancestor does not result in mass chaos, murder, or destruction. Lastly, Johnson oftentimes engages in “straw man” attacks against Richard Dawkins, erroneously presenting him as the representative of neo-Darwinian evolutionists, though most scientists do not support Dawkins’ apologetic use of Darwinism.
56Lastly, Johnson misrepresents Darwinian evolution by arguing specifically against “an undirected process such as natural selection.”
57However, natural selection does not exclude the workings of God from using this mechanism to create life. The natural sciences merely
acknowledge that purpose is undetectable. This is something that even Johnson recognizes when he quotes from proponents of Darwinian evolution who admit that their theory does not
inherently conflict with Intelligent Design. They remark that a designer is simply indiscernible.
58Ironically, Johnson admits this, as well: “It should also be noted that the specific ‘purpose’ of design in nature is not scientifically knowable (even though design implies purpose), and therefore believing a specific purpose is not required for accepting the detectable evidences of design.”
59Either Johnson is unable to see the inconsistency of his beliefs or he is purposely
55
Ibid., 94.
56
Cf. Johnson, 97-98 and Alister E. McGrath, “The Ideological Uses of Evolutionary Biology in Recent Atheist Apologetics,” in Biology and Ideology from Descartes to Dawkins, ed. Denis R. Alexander and Ronald L.
Numbers (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 329-51.
57
Cf. Johnson, 89.
58
Cf. Ronald L. Numbers, “Creationism, Intelligent Design, and Modern Biology,” in Biology and Ideology from Descartes to Dawkins, ed. Denis R. Alexander and Ronald L. Numbers (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 302-28 and Jonson, 84.
59