This is due to the fact that it would be too great a risk to be part of the challenger's coalition (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Smith & Siverson 2003). Note that some members want to defect regardless of the risk of not being part of the winning coalition. In addition, some countries within my research offer things that democracies are only expected to be efficient in delivering and improving conditions to improve their economies.
Now, oil is the main export of many of the countries included in my study, and many of these countries generate their wealth from this main export.
Factors that Influence Regime Survival
In addition to this, due to many authoritarian regimes delegating power to councils or prime ministers, as well as holding things like elections, many wonder if the MENA region wants to democratize itself. Last but not least, although there may be efforts to establish quasi-democracies with the MENA region to improve economic conditions, there are also efforts by other countries within the MENA region to halt the progress of democratization (Ehteshami 1999). Ehteshami also claims that while some countries may only use policies of democracy as part of a sham to improve economies, there are many forces trying to keep the MENA region as authoritarian as possible (Ehteshami 1999).
The MENA region itself does not have an even distribution of these things across its region, so it is important to note that if these influential countries are pushing other countries to implement these policies, because lesser-known countries within the MENA region whose economies are suffering may not be able to avoid their advances.
Regime Breakdowns and Transitions
These countries are members of OPEC and they have access to many resources and wealth. One should also note whether the countries that favor the entire region remaining authoritarian are some of the influential members. If these countries are not some of the influential countries, such as booming members of OPEC, that other countries may have to quit in order to keep their economies going, then their actions may not have as great an effect as expected.
This is essential as countries do not perform well in these areas to where the regime collapses or transitions, one's economy and/or economy.
Chapter Three: Hypotheses
My reason is that many of these autocratic countries in the MENA region export oil and as a result many of these countries have generated a lot of wealth because of this. In addition to the fact that these practices are already better equipped to target economic failures, I expect that autocratic regimes in the MENA region that exercise these institutions will experience growth in their economy and their development. Authoritarian countries in the MENA region, which are rich in resources and labor, will be the most developed.
And because they have the tools to be economically efficient than those countries within the MENA region that do not have these things, they may also be in a better position to improve their social development because they already possess the tools what is needed to do it.
Chapter Four: Regime, Power, and Level of Authoritarianism Charts 4.1 Regime Chart and Explanation
Who Has Power?
After identifying the types of authoritarian regimes, I noticed that I had quite a few countries that were classified as monarchies, but I wasn't sure if the level of power remained the same among them. As a result, I conducted a search to identify the level of power that the leader(s) of each monarchy in my sample study possessed.
Level of Authoritarianism
- Level of Authoritarianism Explained
Although these countries may have a leader who exercises full control despite delegating some of his power to other institutions, and although they may design their quasi-democratic policies to go as they expect, these countries are not considered to have high authoritarianism because they have implemented these forms within their.
Chapter Five: Data Procedure
And by observing the annual growth GDP per capita, I can see how well the regimes in these countries are doing over time when determining whether these two variables were appropriate. Furthermore, it would enable me to see how the economic growth reacts with and without these favorable moments (Barro 2003). Consequently, I need to see how well these nations decide to approach these issues and whether or not their approach affects their economies in a beneficial or harmful way.
I decided that the life expectancy index and human development index variables would be appropriate variables to measure this because they allow you to observe how well the economy is doing when domestic conditions are both good and bad. Last but not least, LEI was chosen as an appropriate indicator of social development based on a study by Gabriel Gulis, who states that measuring life expectancy through different environmental factors allows us to assess the overall impact of these variables on health of the individual. (Gulis 1999). This period was chosen to allow sufficient time to observe the influence of the variables, but within a period that was not too late or during a difficult period for countries with unusual events such as the Arab Spring.
Each country was placed in one of the two groups, one of which was only members of OPEC, and the other of non-OPEC members. The variables relating to the non-OPEC members were measured first to observe how the following variables would affect autocratic countries that were not major exporters of oil. These values were then compiled into a spreadsheet where the total as well as the average of the variables were calculated for each country between the years 2000-2010 and then combined to calculate the total and average of all the countries in the group over the time period.
Then, the mean for each country within this group was tabulated and a t-test was performed. The graphs also included who held power within these regimes (since the explicit roles of power were previously unknown) and how much power they held.
Chapter Six: Data
- GDP per capita (PPP) for non-OPEC members
- GDP per capita (PPP) for OPEC members
- GDP Annual Growth for Non-OPEC Members
- GDP Annual Growth for OPEC members
- Life Expectancy Index (LEI) for Non-OPEC Members
- Life Expectancy Index (LEI) for OPEC Members
- Human Development Index (HDI) for Non-OPEC Members
- Human Development Index (HDI) for OPEC Members
The only country within the data set of non-OPEC members that could be classified as an absolute monarchy was Oman, and with this factor of economic development, Oman performed well above the expected average. To reiterate, this is one of the first factors observed, so it is too early for the data regarding this hypothesis to be irrelevant. Regarding hypothesis 1, the data matched my predictions about authoritarian regimes possessing quasi-democratic institutions.
Due to Qatar experiencing the highest annual growth and Saudi Arabia showing the lowest, the data were not in favor of Hypothesis 2. Again, as mentioned before, Qatar does have one of the largest oil reserves in the world, but Saudi Arabia has the largest within the dataset and its annual. After observing the GDP per capita and the annual growth of these countries, I predicted that the data regarding this hypothesis would not be valid.
Qatar and Saudi Arabia performed above average, with Qatar scoring the highest of the data set. After collecting all the information from the variables, I assumed that the data for all the observed variables and the countries that practiced quasi-democratic institutions would not be significant. There was no consistent pattern in the data set to infer that there was any correlation between authoritarian regimes exercising quasi-democratic institutions producing high levels of economic growth and social development.
The two RRLAs in my data set, Syria and Yemen, obtained the two lowest HDIs presented in the data. Taking all the variables into account, my theory didn't seem to be supported by the data I collected. My data reflected that half of the members in the data set performed at or above the expected average HDI, most of these members were those who had a lower level.
As a result, it showed signed that the hypothesis was not confirmed with either data set.
Chapter Seven: T-Tests T-Test Analysis
With non-OPEC GDP per capita, the first comparison group of high and low authoritarianism had a p-value less than .05, which was found to be significant enough to reject hypothesis 1. The remaining comparison groups were quite significant in that , that both contained values that were lower than 0.01, hence my hypothesis. As for the OPEC members of this variable, they all had a p-value of ***p < 0.01, which was enough evidence that all my hypotheses regarding this variable proved false.
The comparison group of high and low authoritarianism with non-OPEC members contained the only p-value that was significant enough for me to reject the null hypothesis. The other comparison groups contained values that were greater than 0.05, so Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 still hold for this variable. With the annual growth of OPEC members, all comparison groups had a p-value that was higher than 0.05, resulting in all three hypotheses still being valid because there was insufficient evidence to refute them.
Each pair of the three comparison groups expressed the same p-value of p < 0.01, which is quite significant to reject the null hypotheses. Regarding OPEC members' performance on this variable, only the comparison group of high and low authoritarianism was not significant enough to invalidate. Last but not least, I found that Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 were rejected with the non-OPEC members involving this variable because they all expressed a p-value of **p <.
Regarding the OPEC members regarding this variable, all the p-values resulted in the rejection of. Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, where the latter two comparison groups contain more evidence to reject their hypothesis than the first comparison group.
Chapter Eight: Conclusions
Chronology of Major Events in the Iraq War.” The New York Times, The New York Times, August 31. Survival of oil and autocratic regime.” British Journal of Political www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/jordan-constitution-give-king-power. Institutions and economic development in the MENA region.” The Impact of Formal and Informal Institutions on Economic Growth: A Case Study on the MENA Region, by Constanze Dobler, NED - New Edition, Peter Lang AG, Frankfurt Am Main, 2011.
