2022 Strategi Perang Semesta Open Access
Published at 31 December 2022
STRATEGI PERANG SEMESTA
Journal of Modern Warfare and Defense Strategy
Battle of Ambarawa from The Perspective of The Universe War Strategy
Syamsul Hilal, Afrizal Hendra, Tri Legionosuko
JS PS -RI DU
How to cite this article:
Hilal, S., Hendra, A., & Legionosuko, T. (2022). Battle of Ambarawa from the perspective of the universe war strategy. Strategi Perang Semesta, 8(2), 145-154. http://doi.org/10.56555/sps.v8i2.1521
To link to this article: http://doi.org/10.56555/sps.v8i2.1521
Syamsul Hilal [email protected]
JSPS-RIDU 2022 http://doi.org/10.56555/sps.v8i2.1521
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA DEFENSE UNIVERSITY STRATEGI PERANG SEMESTA
Volume 8, Issue 2, 145 - 154. [2022]
e-ISSN: 2830-2877, p-ISSN: 2830-2869
BATTLE OF AMBARAWA FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE TOTAL WAR STRATEGY
Syamsul Hilal * Afrizal Hendra Tri Legionosuko
Ministry of Defence INDONESIA
National Resilience Council INDONESIA
Republic of Indonesia Defense University INDONESIA
Article history:
Received: September 18, 2022 Revised: October 3, 2022 Accepted: November 1, 2022
Keywords:
Battle of Ambarawa Total War
Introduction
World War II gave birth to a new spirit to achieve independence and was proclaimed on August 17, 1945, but the independence that had been achieved with the blood of these heroes wanted to be taken back by the invaders. At this time, the military leaders and the entire Indonesian people fought by giving birth to a military strategy called the total people's security defense system. Although, at that time, there was no formal legality about the term Sishankamrata, it was operationally practiced. The resistance of the total people, that is, through the thorough deployment of the people in various fields of professions, became a military force that was not matched by the Dutch and British war machines even though it had been carried out at that time.
The Total People's War, or The Defense of the Total its journey is almost similar to the cycle of the journey of Indonesian human life past, present, and future that must be faced ready or unprepared. Hanta's past is the time of Sishankamrata, which is the time of the struggle to maintain Indonesia's independence from the invaders in 1945-1949. For Indonesian people and Hanta, the past life is an accumulation of valuable experiences to understand its existence in the present, to be used as a foothold for future policies.
Therefore, the total war, according to General A.H Nasution, is "the effort of war is not just the effort of the war force, but and instead has become the effort of the people of the
Abstract
The battle in Ambarawa was reasonably crucial in the history of the Struggle of the Indonesian nation because the battle of Ambarawa was one of a series of events to maintain independence during the revolution. How the application of the universal war strategy in the battle of Ambarawa is carried out by the warrior figures and the goals to be achieved in Palagan Ambarawa, and the impact resulting from the battle becomes the goal of this historical research in addition to making historical knowledge that may one day be lost. The method used in this study is a historical method that follows the flow from heuristic steps, source criticism, interpretation, and historiography.
The Universal People's War Strategy or Incumbent System with Supit Urang tactics applied to the Battle of Ambarawa brought success and victory, apart from the factors of the superiority of infantry tactics and techniques, the superiority of the number of personnel deployed, the management of field administration operations Field logistics and better field health and the integration of operations involving all components of the nation. The victory in the battle in Ambarawa had a significant positive impact on the Struggle for the nation's daughters in cultivating a sense of trust in one's strength in continuing his Struggle, both militarily and politically
total in various sectors of their lives, each of whom is a participant in an entire effort, which cannot be neglected anymore." In another passage, he added "... The current war is no longer a war between the army and the army alone, it is no longer just a military war, but now the people are fighting."
Meanwhile, according to Gil Elliot that "total war is based on the complete dedication of a nation's energies to producing the means of war, and the readiness of forces in the field to destroy the enemy's men and materials to the completest extent ."This means Total war is based on the complete dedication of a nation's energy to produce the means of war and the readiness of the troops on the ground to destroy the enemy people and materials to the fullest. Meanwhile, according to Lt. Gen. TNI JS. Prabowo, in the form of a total war view, includes three elements consisting of Peoplehood, Total, and Territoriality and is the embodiment of utilizing all the potential possessed by the state as a fighting space in developing strategies.
One form of manifestation of the various total wars that have occurred in Indonesia in defending Indonesian independence is the Battle of Ambarawa in 1945, which is better known as Palagan Ambarawa. Similar to other struggles that have occurred in Indonesia, such as the Battle in Surabaya and the General Offensive in Yogyakarta, the Battle in Ambarawa was a battle to maintain the independence that had been achieved that the Dutch wanted to retake after the defeat of Japan in World War II. The allied forces (British) landed first in Jakarta on September 16, 1945, then on October 19, 1945, the allied forces and the Dutch landed in Semarang under the Command of Brigadier General Bethell carrying 1 Brigade complete with weapons and modern weapons supported by armored vehicles/tanks and panzers.
The initial purpose of the allied forces and the Dutch landing in Indonesia was to disarm the Japanese in Indonesia, accept power from the Japanese, and release European prisoners of war to be returned to their home countries, plus the allies' promise not to interfere in Indonesian internal affairs which made the Indonesian side accept the allies with open arms.
Nevertheless, in reality, what happened was that the Dutch wanted to re-seize Indonesian territory, including one of them was the Ambarawa area, which was the basis of military strength and power.
The strategic location of Ambarawa as the central city of the Dutch colony cities, defense base, logistics, and a connecting city from the cities of Yogyakarta, Salatiga, Temanggung, Magelang, Solo, and Semarang. This mapping had carried out by the Dutch during the colonization before the independence of the Republic of Indonesia. Evidence of Ambarawa being used as a basis for military strength and power, the Dutch had established Fort Pendem Ambarawa or known as Fort Willem I, named after the Dutch King Willem Frederik Prins Vans Oranje-Nassau (1815-1840).
The promise of the allied forces not to interfere in Indonesia's internal affairs made the Indonesian side accept the presence of allied troops in Semarang; there was even a welcome of allied troops from the Governor of Central Java by Mr. Wongso Negoro on October 21, 1945.
In the subsequent development, it turned out that the allies and the Dutch turned out to be tarnishing the trust of the Indonesian nation by showing a provocative, hostile attitude and actions that hurt the hearts of the people by spitting, hitting members of the people's army and fighting soldiers, even though along the convoy of allied troops from Semarang to Magelang the people welcomed with warmth like the customs of intimacy.
The peak of the anger of the Indonesian people, especially the leaders of the People's Security Army (TKR) towards the allied forces and the Dutch NICA, occurred when the Allied forces and NICA, after arriving in Ambarawa and Magelang to free the Dutch army prisoners, it turned out that the prisoners of war were instead armed and subsequently the Allied
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147 soldiers acted as pretentious rulers who tried to disarm the People's Security Army and create chaos.Furthermore, the TKR carried out an attack by besieging the position of the allied forces in Magelang, which eventually broke out a battle between the TKR which was supported by all components of society in the Central Java region, and allied forces in Magelang to Ambarawa. This is the background for the battle of Ambarawa at the end of 1945 in the early days after the proclaimed independence of Indonesia.
The battle of Ambarawa was a battle that greatly affected the morale of the troops, and the confidence of the TKR, pointing the nation's self-esteem to the allies, and this greatly affected the soldier mentality of the TKR in the subsequent battles that occurred against the allies and the Dutch in the context of the struggle to maintain the independence of the Republic of Indonesia. The critical momentum of the history of the Battle of Ambarawa, which occurred on December 12 to 15, 1945, was made infantry day and then changed to the Army's Kartika Fighting Day every December 15 every year.
The Palagan Ambarawa event is a starting point for the struggle of the Indonesian people to maintain independence, and it is interesting to study and research from the perspective of the total war as part of an effort to defend and enrich the knowledge of the history of the war that occurred in Indonesia so that it is not lost, by knowing how the total war strategy is carried out, Who are the figures who played a vital role in the battle and the impact of the battle of Ambarawa.
Method
The methodology used in writing this historical research uses historical methodology.
Where in the implementation of historical methodology research, a researcher must follow the steps in historical research, namely heuristics, source criticism, interpretation, and historiography. To enrich the historical explanation, an approach, especially from the social sciences, is needed.
History is not something that arises from outside human effort; thus, humans are the holders of a role in making stories or historical sciences, so it is unavoidable that historical science or historical stories are all subjects (Suswandari, 2003, p. 53). This is in accordance with Djoko Soerjo's opinion that history is a reconstruction of the past, that is, reconstructing what has been thought, done, said, felt, and experienced by a person.
In finding historical facts on questions from research, the author collects historical data objects through books, literature, journals and preliminary research, theses, theses, internet media, and other information that can be used in providing a more detailed and correct explanation of the historical events studied.
Results And Discussion
The battle in Ambarawa was quite a significant battle because the battle of Ambarawa was one of a series of events to maintain independence during the revolution. Because for Indonesia, the revolution aims to complement and perfect the process of national unification and awakening that has begun four decades earlier. However, on the other hand, for the Dutch, the revolution period was an era that was a continuation of the past to carry out colonization which, according to them, had been carried out for 300 years. At this time, Indonesia's right to independence and sovereignty in the name of revolution received much support from the Indonesian people. This is the basis that the Ambarawa war is categorized
as a total people's war because it characterizes and has the nature of 1. Peoplehood, that is, the orientation of the defense and security of the state, is enshrined by and for the benefit of the whole people. 2. The wholeness of the whole national resource is utilized for defense efforts.3. Territoriality, namely the title of the defense force, is carried out spread throughout the territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, in accordance with geographic conditions as an archipelagic state.
The arrival of allied forces to Magelang and Ambarawa with the cover of RAPWI (Rehabilitation of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees) or Rehabilitation of Allied Prisoners of War and Internment which caused the Indonesian nation to be deceived by the tricks of the allies and the Dutch in order to regain control of the Indonesian earth which is rich in natural resources.
The battle began from the first, when the allies, who were joined by the Dutch NICA after arriving in the city of Magelang on October 26, 1945, released prisoners of war, and the prisoners were instead armed. Second, the attitude of the allied soldiers so that they acted as rulers who tried to disarm the People's Security Army (TKR) and create chaos. These two things became the peak of anger on the Indonesian side, so there was a battle that started in the city of Magelang.
Seeing these conditions, the Magelang Regiment TKR led by Lieutenant Colonel M Sarbini, with the help of Major A. Yani, retaliated against the shock by besieging the position of the allied army in the city of Magelang such as at the Railway station, City Square, Susteren, Nitaka Hotel and SKJ Complex from all directions, so that on October 28, 1945, which began at 5 a.m. there was a battle in the city of Magelang which ended with the urgency of the allied forces as a result of the siege strategy TKR troops.
Feeling his troops pressed, Colonel Edward advised Brig. Gen. R.B.W Bethel asked Lieutenant General Philip Christison, who was in Jakarta, for help to stop the battle through diplomacy with President Sukarno. The fighting ceased when President Sukarno and Brigadier Bethell arrived in Magelang on November 2, 1945.
There was a negotiation until an agreement emerged from both sides. The contents of the Ambawara Battle Negotiations include:
1. The allied army and NICA were withdrawn to Semarang.
2. The cessation of the ceasefire.
3. Japanese captives in Magelang and surrounding areas will be taken care of by the Indonesian government and will be handed over to the Allies.
4. The Allies will continue to station their troops in Magelang to perform their obligations to protect and take care of the evacuation of APW.
5. The Magelang-Ambarawa highway is open to Indonesian and British traffic.
6. The UK will not recognize NICA's activities within the bodies under its control.
The result of the agreement in the next phase turned out to be violated by many allies, and this triggered a continuous conflict with the Indonesian side. On November 20, 1945, secretly allied forces left the city of Magelang for the city of Ambarawa under the leadership of Colonel Edward and Kolonek Pugh, escorted by P1 Mustang aircraft. During the resignation of troops to the city of Ambarawa, many maneuvers disturbed the people in the form of terror, destruction, torture, and other non-violence, and this action was retaliated against by the resistance of Indonesian fighters from areas passed by allied forces, start from the Pingit, Pringsurat, Rawa Pening, Bedono, Gumuk Gambir, Banyubiru areas.
Knowing this movement of the decline of the allied forces and NICA, the TKR decided to pursue it with the aim of destroying the allied forces and capabilities early by taking the
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149 Ambarawa-Magelang railway as a pursuit route. The TKR was strengthened by troops of Division IX / Yogyakarta, Division X / Solo, Division IV / Salatiga, and other armed Struggle Agencies, including the Hezbollah / Sabillilah Army, where the command of the entire operation was led by Lieutenant Colonel Gatot Soebroto and Lieutenant Colonel Sutirto.During the pursuit of allied forces by the TKR, which passed through several areas in the Magelang area to Ambarawa, there were often fierce armed contacts between the two forces, especially in the Banyubiru area, which was controlled by the allies and then taken over by the TKR. The battle led to the death of fighters from both the allied and TKR sides.
Some of the TKR figures who died in the chase were Sutoyo (a young man from the IMAM / Indonesia Merdeka or Mati Troops), Major Kusen, a Battalion Commander from the Magelang Regiment including Lieutenant Colonel Isdiman who died during the handover of the Sector Commander in the Jambu area. One of the essential momentums in this battle was when the Mustang P1 aircraft or often called the Red Color, was successfully shot down in the Pening Swamp by Lieutenant Hadikusumo.
The death of Lieutenant Colonel Isdiman and several other essential figures did not cause the morale of the TKR troops to decline. On the contrary, it became a motivation and anger to be even more enthusiastic in the struggle and defend independence, including the Commander of the V / Purwokerto Division, Colonel Sudirman, who decided to go down directly to lead the troops in the battle in Ambarawa after the death of Lieutenant Colonel Isdiman.This chase and battle event is a historical link in the relationship between the battle of Magelang and the battle (Palagan) of Ambarawa, which cannot be separated.
Attack Plan
The choice of Ambarawa by the allies as an alternative zone and defense base because, according to Nugroho Notosusanto because this region is in a strategic position in various aspects of viewpoints, both geographically and economically, and politically which is considered by the allies if they control Ambarawa. It will automatically control the Central Java region, especially Surakarta, Magelang, and Yogyakarta. This opinion is different from the point of view of the TKR leadership, which thinks that the position and position of allies in the city of Ambarawa are in a pinched position, and it is very advantageous for the TKR to destroy the allied forces because they are on the killing ground.
Ambarawa Residency City is a small fertile city that is part of Semarang, which is easily reached by land and the Semarang-Magelang railway line. There are many villages, forests, rice fields, swamps, sewers, hills, and lots, and there are rivers, which from the military side, are an advantage and an obstacle if attacks are carried out by both offensive and defensive parties.
The strength of the allied forces and NICA in Ambarawa grew more and more day after General Bethell mobilized one-third of his strength to defend Ambarawa, namely 1 Brigade plus 3 Battalions plus one reserve Battalion consisting of British, Dutch, Indian (Gurkha), Japanese and Indonesian treasonists supported by modern troops, armored combat and tactical vehicles (tanks/panzers) plus red color fighters/P1 mustangs as aerial assistance fire, where the position of the allied command post is at the Van Rheeden Hotel as camp no.10, Fort Willem I, camp no. 6 St. Joseph's Church (Jago Church), camp no. 7 Mulo School, camp no. 8 former Zieken Heis military, camp no. 9 Military tangsi Battalion KNIL Ambarawa, using a circular defense strategy to overcome attacks from various directions.
Meanwhile, the strength of the TKR is four joint divisions located in Central Java which are supplemented by Hezbollah / Sabillah Warriors, Student Troops (Indonesian Student Association), Police Forces, BPRI Warriors, Barisan Benteng, Laskar Alap-alap, Student
Soldiers plus other Struggle Agencies and Women's Student Forces to get around logistics by establishing a Public Kitchen. The strength of the Indonesian troops numbered in the thousands of personnel with the support of Japanese and Dutch looted weapons plus traditional weapons in the form of pointed bamboo from parakan and other traditional weapons.
The next step taken by the TKR leadership in planning the General Attack on Ambarawa was to appoint Colonel Sudirman as the Commander of the MPP (Battle Leadership Headquarters) from the results of the PPKO (Center for Operational Activity Control) or Koops (Operation Command) meeting based on Jalan Jenderalan / Jalan Sultan Agung, Magelang. Then the Colonel divided four sectors of attack from the West, East, North, and South directions.
The composition of the troops and the duties of the TKR Unit as the Core of the Movement and the Struggle Bodies and the Warriors as Combat Assistance (Banpur), each sector consists of: the Southern Sector, entrusted to the TKR from the V / Purwokerto Division and the IX Division / Yogyakarta led by Colonel Sutirto and Colonel Sunjoyo, the Eastern Sector, entrusted to the TKR from the IV Division, Division XI, the Surakarta Struggle Agency and Laskar led by Lieutenant Colonel Sutojo Haryoko and Lieutenant Colonel Sunarto Kusumodirjo, The Northern Sector, entrusted to the TKR Division IV and led by the Division Commander Colonel GPH Jatikusumo, West Sector, was entrusted to the TKR the joint forces of the Magelang Regiment, the 14/Temanggung Regiment and the Ambarawa TKR led by Lieutenant Colonel Sarbini and Lieutenant Colonel Bambang Sugeng. Furthermore, each sector is determined by the target of the attack and the plot of the attack so that there is no misdirection between TKR troops.
Communication lines of command and transportation between units using the Caraka and Tobang (liaison) systems. Logistics used pre-logistics of the region with Public Kitchen and Nuk System, rice with vegetables, and side dishes wrapped in leaves were brought to the front by Tobang. Health support from PMI and doctor Wirorono and doctor Marjuki who is a Japanese education doctor who is a pro-struggle Indonesian nation.
A few days Colonel Sudirman accompanied by intelligence officers and his trusted staff officers conducted a field survey to determine the strategy of the battle on foot, combing various sectors from the western, eastern, north, and south sectors. Sudirman met all TKR members in these sectors. Sudirman encouraged TKR members to continue to persevere in capturing the city of Ambarawa again, as well as checking the readiness of ammunition logistics.
The presence of Colonel Sudirman brought a "fresh new breath" to the movement of the troops of the Republic of Indonesia. In fact, it will be a turning point that determines the course of the battle on the Ambarawa battlefield. In a short time, there has been a creation of coordination and consolidation among the armies. The movement of the TKR troops was increasingly successful so that the siege could run smoothly. In addition, the infiltration into the city is even neater. The Interception of the Allied army convoy was neater (Maskur Sumodiharjo, 1974, p. 205).
On the evening of December 11, 1945, at a Carik house in the village of Ambarawa village, Colonel Sudirman held negotiations by gathering TKR sector commanders and commanders of the agency to deliver the following Operation Order: "We must seize Ambarawa with simultaneous attacks because Ambarawa is the key for them to control all of Central Java and Jogjakarta. This would jeopardize the Position of the Republic. We admit frankly that we could be more decisive in our arsenal. Nevertheless, this kind of state of affairs does not hinder us nor reduce our desire to defend our country. We ourselves have determined a strategy,
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151 namely simultaneous negation with the tactics of Mangkara Yudha or Supit Urang. The Commander of the attack was held by the Commander of the TKR sector. Troops of the army of the body of struggle as a rearguard.The strategy that will be used in the liberation of Ambarawa is a quick and simultaneous attack in all sectors and at the exact second. The command of the attack was held by the commanders of the TKR sector. The troops of the struggle/class body were the rearguard.
The offensive began yesterday morning, December 12, 1945, at 4:30 a.m., with TKR troops moving toward their respective targets.
The association was to discuss the plan of a general attack to liberate the city of Ambarawa (Soepardjo, 1986, p. 24). Based on the reports of the TKR sector commanders, Colonel Sudirman concluded that the enemy's position had been squeezed. Then it is necessary to immediately launch the last attack, namely: The negativity attack is carried out simultaneously from all sectors. Each sector commander led the attack. The troops of the fighting bodies (warriors) were prepared as reserve human resources. Finished the meeting, the Commanders matched the hours.
Execution of Attacks
Colonel Sudirman in carrying out an attack on Ambarawa with a total war strategy involving all forces in Central Java, both from the military and from civilian elements, where the TKR was the Core force, the Struggle Agencies and the Warriors as the reserve and supporting forces, besides that on the backline Colonel Sudirman established a logistics center in the form of a Public Kitchen, communication/liaison facilities and preparing health support for wounded victims due to fighting.
The tactics used in the battle of Ambarawa Colonel Sudirman used Supit Urang. The Supit Urang tactic was a breakthrough movement by striking troops from south and west to east towards Semarang. Furthermore, the movement is followed by a clamping movement from the proper hull and the left hull, just as is the movement of a shrimp clamping its prey.
In this case, both ends of the suit are met on the outside. As colonel Sudirman reiterated that the primary purpose of the attack was that the Allies should be expelled from Ambarawa as soon as possible so as not to make the city of Ambarawa a base to capture Central Java.
According to Raffles in his book titled "History of Java." The source of Supit Urang is the story of Bharata Yudha during the civil war between the Pandavas and Astina families in which Abimanyu, son of Arjuna, was his Senapati. Tata Yudha Supit Urang can also be met in the story of Damar Wulan when Menak Djingga Raja Blambangan fought with the Majapahit kingdom because his proposal was rejected. In the Java War of 1825-1830, Prince Diponegoro also implemented tata Yudha Supit Urang's war tactics against the Dutch.
Before the general attack was carried out, the TKR had intervened with the allied forces in Ambarawa by destroying allied posts on the main road of Semarang-Ambarawa, blockading logistics routes, attacking logistics warehouses, guarding water vessels used by allied soldiers, and the most extensive intervention carried out by the TKR and fighters was sabotage by clogging the flow of tap water leading to allied and Dutch headquarters or camps, and this incident is also considered to be the trigger for the battle in Ambarawa.
On December 12, 1945, the entire army approached the target, and at 04:00, the whole sector was ready to be on standby in the raid area with all the combat equipment and just waiting for the attack order; the weather at that time there was heavy rains filled with dark clouds in the city of Ambarawa which was very supportive of a raid. The attack began with first controlling the axis of the main road between Ambarawa - Semarang because it would facilitate the siege of the allied forces in the city of Ambarawa by squeezing opponents from
all directions so that the allied army only had the opportunity to escape the Ambarawa- Semarang main road.
In accordance with the plan, The eruption of fire signaling the start of the general offensive of liberation echoed at exactly 04:30; the mother force moving from the south direction invaded and broke into the opponent's defense. The submachine karabien weapons barked as a gesture of command for the start of a general offensive against the Allied (British), NICA, and Japanese positions in Ambarawa. The thunderous sound of the submachine was followed by rifle fire thumping cannons and the explosion of grenades.
Surprise attacks from the TKR in all sectors of the battle sent British, NICA, and Japanese forces into a panic, and foggy Retaliatory fire was fired by the allied forces indeterminately in the direction of retaliating against the TKR attack.
An hour and a half from the beginning of the raid, TKR troops had already managed to squeeze and surround the enemy inside the city of Ambarawa. For the Allies (British), there is only one way out, namely the Ambarawa-Semarang main road. The general attack in Ambarawa was in the form of a breakthrough by striking troops from the south and west to east towards Semarang. Along with the breakthrough, followed by a clamping movement from the right and left hulls as well as the movement of Supit Urang clamping its prey whose ends meet in the outer part of the city towards Semarang. The mighty TKR soldiers continued to advance from all over, like bulls the patriots kept charging at the enemy, boarding Tanks and overstepping mines while penetrating a hail of bullets from Allied weapons with the unanimous determination of "Rawe-rawe rantas malang-malang putung," liberating the city of Ambarawa or falling as a nation.
For four days and four nights, the fighting lasted from 12 to December 15, 1945.
Ambarawa's air was filled with gunpowder smoke islands, and explosions echoed throughout Ambarawa. Meanwhile, on the one hand, the fighting spirit of the TKR was getting higher, and on the other hand, the British, NICA, and Japanese soldiers were getting weaker both physically and mentally. Such circumstances were known to the Supreme Leader of the TKR, who immediately prepared for the final attack on the strongholds of the British, NICA, and Japanese armies, namely at Fort Willem I.
Furthermore, the TKR leadership directed the last joint attack on the position of the Allied army, namely at Fort Willem I, the strength of the Allied forces here turned out to be decreasing; most of them had died since the battle in Magelang, as well as in the battle of Interception and pursuit carried out by the TKR between Magelang-Ambarawa.
On December 15, 1945, the Allied forces broke through to the outside of the siege of the TKR troops at Willem I Fort. The TKR troops entered the Willem I Fortress and can now be fully controlled by the TKR troops. With the fall of Fort Willem, researcher, as the center of the last Allied defense in Ambarawa, all the keys to the control of the city of Ambarawa by the TKR were opened. Allied forces were forced back to Semarang. The Battle of Ambarawa became a heroic event and became an important event in the history of Indonesian resistance during the physical revolution and the success of the Ambarawa Palagan, which was impliedly recognized by Colonel Sudirman.
Impact of the Battle
The success of the TKR forces that made the Allied army retreat from Ambarawa must be acknowledged to have had a positive impact on the son of the nation in cultivating confidence in his own strength in continuing his struggle, both militarily and politically, especially the struggle in AMB (Dutch Military Aggression) I Dated July 21, 1947, and AMB II December 19, 1948.
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153 Palagan Ambarawa has apparently taught us all how vital modern military strategies and tactics are as well as traditional ones such as the Supit Urang tactic. The success of the Battle of Ambarawa is a battle that is not only able to heighten the morale of TKR soldiers, struggling bodies, and Warriors but also able to be an inspiration for struggles for other regional communities outside Ambarawa and its impact in the title of the strength of TKR troops facing the Allies, NICA, and Japan which is recorded in the Eight Palagans That Determine the struggle of the nation in all corners of the Indonesian homeland.Because the TKR only used conventional military strategies and tactics, the suitable attack patterns and the combination of army units with people's strength in the form of Classkaran Bodies facing modern Allied forces and training turned out to be able to make the opposing troops retreat in the fighting area starting from Magelang retreating to Ambarawa and de Ambarawa retreating again to Semarang. The combination of force by combining army units, people, lascar, and struggle bodies is a characteristic of the struggle with the Sishankamrata strategy used in expelling allied forces from the city of Ambarawa.
The success of the TKR and the struggle and class agencies in winning the battle against the Ambarawa Allied forces was essentially due to the factors of the superiority of infantry tactics and techniques, the superiority of the number of personnel deployed, the management of field administration operations Field logistics and better field health and the integration of operations involving all components of the nation. For the reasonable when, at present, the glorious victory in Ambarawa with the culmination of the struggle on December 15, 1945, is used as the Army's Kartika Fighting Day, which is commemorated every year. The struggle is undoubtedly only meaning and inspiration for the TNI bag but also for the Indonesian nation as a whole.
History records that almost all the problems that occurred after Ambarawa by developing and using resistance strategies and tactics in Ambarawa against the invaders so had perfect operation planning, so the time span of resistance was not so long with the number of victims being armed by themselves could be minimized. The militancy of the TKR forces with the Classkaran struggle agencies in several areas after Ambarawa was very patriotic and heroic.
Conclusion
The Battle of Ambarawa or more commonly called Palagan Ambarawa, is one of the battles that took place in the cities of Ambarawa and Magelang between the Allied (British) forces against the Indonesian forces (TKR) to maintain the independence that had been achieved by the Indonesian nation and wanted to be recaptured by the allied forces by piggybacking on the Dutch NICA army who wanted to regain control of the archipelago. The reason the allies came to Indonesia was to release Dutch prisoners of war and return the Japanese army to their home countries. After Japan declared the defeat of World War II, then the allies armed the prisoners of war, and this became the leading cause of the anger of the Indonesian nation, causing the Palagan Ambarawa to occur.
The Total People's War Strategy or The Total People's Incumbent System with the Supit Urang tactics applied by Colonel Sudirman at the Battle of Ambarawa brought success and victory to the TKR side, apart from the factors of the superiority of infantry tactics and techniques, the superiority of the number of personnel deployed, the management of field administration operations Field logistics and better field health as well as the integration of operations by involving all components of the nation.
The victory in the battle in Ambarawa had a significant positive impact on the struggle for the nation's daughters in cultivating a sense of trust in one's own strength in continuing his struggle, both militarily and politically, especially the struggle in AMB (Dutch Military Aggression) I dated July 21, 1947, and AMB II December 19, 1948. History records that almost all the problems that occurred after Ambarawa by developing and using resistance strategies and tactics in Ambarawa against the invaders so had excellent operation planning, so the time span of resistance was not so long with the number of victims being armed by themselves could be minimized. The militancy of the TKR forces with the Classkaran struggle bodies in some areas was patriotic and heroic.
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