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DOI: https://doi.o rg/10.33258/birci.v5i3.6621 25749
Budget Politics in Indonesia: A Case Study of the House of Representative's Optimization Fund
Muhammad Dimyati Sudja1, Kumba Digdowiseiso2, Banu Abdillah3, Aditya Kusuma Rachman4
1,3,4Faculty of Social Science and Political Science, Universitas Nasional,, Jak arta
2Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Nasional, Jak arta k [email protected]
I. Introduction
Since the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia has changed from an authoritarian system of government to a democratic one. During this period, a series of institutional reforms have accompanied the political reform process. These include reform of government relations between the executive and legislature, reform of the electoral process, decentralization, and the establishment of the Constitutional Court and several national commissions (Crouch, 2010). Some scholars assert that the transition that began in 1998 has
Abstract
This study explores the nature of public budgeting through a study of the interaction between formal political institutions and informal practices in the Indonesian budget arena after the 2014 General Election. The study draws on a collection of theories related to the role of political institutions in budget making and engages in theoretical debates in a field study of the key roles of politicians and parties in the Indonesian political system since the advent of democracy. Based on data collected through literature studies, this study examines legislative behavior in the budget-making process. Based on the case study, that the relationship between the legislature and political parties and the behavior of the executive government is influenced not only by the constitutional power of the President in the budget, but also by electoral rules that encourage legislators to prioritize access to patronage resources over party affiliation. In other words, the budget-making process is driven by a combination of the executive's need to advance its budget agenda in a multiparty presidential setting, in the absence of party direction and discipline, and the legislator's need to secure patronage resources. These findings offer new insights not only into the budget process but also into the workings of the In donesian legislature. First, the case studies show that the presence or absence of a governing coalition is not the main determining factor in providing stability in the budget decision -making process. Second, they point out that, in the absence of an effective coalition, the use of constitutional budget-making powers to retain support from the legislature comes at a very high political cost. Third, this study reveals a form of cartel-like behavior among individuals, not parties, which challenges the application of cartel party theory in the Indonesian context.
Keywords
budget; multiparty presidential;
legislative–executive relations;
patronage; indonesia
www.bircu-journal.com/index.php/birci email: [email protected]
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effectively ended in 2004, as evidenced by popular acceptance of the democratic system, the absence of significant political forces that threaten to overthrow democracy, and the consensus among political actors that conflict should be fought. resolved through a constitutional framework (Liddle & Mujani, 2013). However, the consolidation of democracy in post-Soeharto Indonesia is far from over. As McLeod (2005, p. 368) points out, Indonesians now have the opportunity to choose their government, but those elected governments are holding a blackmailing legislature and an out-of-control judiciary; at the same time, decentralization has given rise to new political players who are involved in rent- seeking activities at the local level.
The opening of Indonesian government has been accompanied by the opening of a previously closed budget system (Juwono & Eckartt, 2008, p. 298). Although the level of institutional capacity of the national legislature is low, it now has almost unlimited power to amend executive budget proposals (Hawkesworth, Blöndal, & Choi, 2009; Juwono & Eckartt, 2008). There has also been a significant increase in the number of players involved in the budgeting process, not only as a result of a decrease in the level of executive control over the legislature, but also because of the increasing number of political parties now represented in the legislature. However, these developments have not stemmed the abuse of public funding by government officials and politicians. According to the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK ), more than Rp. 285, 23 trillion public funds were misappropriated between 2005 and 2017 (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, 2017, p. 214). Between 2004 and 2017, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) arrested 127 legislators at the national and regional levels, as well as 25 ministers and 17 regional government heads (Katadata, 2017). Significantly, this budget-related corruption case involves politicians from various political parties.
As with these examples, there is an ambiguous relationship between the governance reforms that have been introduced as part of the democratization process and budget-related corruption. On the one hand, government reforms especially the separation of powers between the executive and the legislature have strengthened the ability of the legislature to exercise oversight of the budget in relation to the role of the executive (Lienert, 2005, p. 6). On the other hand, as Kramer points out (forthcoming), the twin processes of democracy and decentralization have created opportunities for new forms of corrupt activity. For example, the emergence of greater political competition as a consequence of the introduction of an open list proportional system could increase the level of corruption. This is because the system encourages politicians to seek illegal resources through the budgeting process to cover the costs of their re-election campaigns (Chang, 2005). However, two decades after the advent of Reformasi, we still have little understanding of the mechanisms by which power relations between institutions and political actors influence the role of the legislature in budget decision-making, the institutional incentives that drive parties and individual legislators, or the informal practices that drive the budget-making process.
This study addresses the gap by analyzing the interactions between formal and informal political institutions that govern interactions among budget actors, focusing on how legislators behave towards political parties and the executive. This is done by studying the distribution of power and resources among these budget actors through three case studies, namely capital injections into state-owned enterprises, optimization funds and aspiration funds. By analyzing the constraints imposed on the process by the political environment, the interactions between the executive and the legislature, and the incentives available to different budget actors, it contributes to our understanding of how political fragmentation and open list proportional electoral systems affect how the legislature works in the budget-making process.
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II. Research Methods
This study focuses on the formal political institutions that govern the budget-making process and the behavioral patterns and strategies of state budget actors in the decision- making arenas associated with them budget committees, standing committees, political parties and less formal political groupings within the legislature many of which act as an informal institution. This study does not examine the politics of budget formulation in the executive environment. Instead, concentrate on budget decision-making within the legislature, as that is the arena in which budget players with different political backgrounds and interests interact.
Asking how the power and influence is distributed is exercised by budget players within the institutional framework of budgeting in other words, who gets what? In an attempt to answer this question, it answers three further questions, namely:
1) What is the decision-making mechanism in the budget process, both formal and informal?
2) In what ways do these formal and informal institutions affect the distribution of power among budget actors?
3) What incentives (explicit and implicit) are available to various budget actors, and how do these incentives influence their behavior in the budgeting process?
III. Discussion
In a coalition presidential system like Indonesia, the legislative power to change the budget is a critical point in the relationship between the executive and the legislature. This centrality of power in the budget process obliges the executive to allocate resources in a way that serves the interests of legislators, in order to gain support for the proposed budget. As the literature on multiparty presidential systems acknowledges, a fragmented legislature presents the executive with the means by which it can win support for its budget proposals (Chaisty et al., 2015; Limongi & Figueiredo, 2007; Pereira & Mueller, 2004).
Legislators, meanwhile, use their power to make amendments to maximize the benefits of the budget to their constituents and to increase their chances of re-election. According to Pereira and Mueller (2004), who studied legislative behavior in Brazil's budget process, the legislature's power to change the budget provides the executive with a low-cost instrument to win support. In the case of Indonesia, one consequence of this power is the emergence of a pool of uncommitted funds known as optimization funds.
3.1 Development of Optimization Fund
To understand how the legislative power to change the budget affects the budget process, it is necessary to begin with an analysis of the interaction of the formal rules and informal norms that govern the interactions of the main players in budget discussions. This includes the distribution of power, the role of each of these players in the budget process and the incentives provided to them under that process (Hallerberg et al., 2009; Santiso, 2005).
The formal rules governing budget deliberations consist of constitutional provisions and statutory budget laws, which together shape the decision-making process. However, the way in which budget players exert power in the actual process is also governed by unwritten traditions and informal norms. The discussion begins with a review of the formal rules and informal practices governing the relationship between the executive and the legislature in actual budget discussions. It then analyzes the use of optimization funds, which have led to corruption cases and a decision by the Constitutional Court to limit legislative power over the budget process.
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After the political reforms of 1998, the relationship between the executive and the legislature shifted from being dominated by the executive to one characterized by a more proportional distribution of power. After a series of constitutional amendments, the legislature no longer serves only as a rubber stamp for government budget proposals. In fact, the legislature has come to play a much stronger role in the actual budget-setting process than the rules that formally regulate the legislative budget power.
Under the 1945 Constitution, the legislature is mandated to take a key role in budget deliberations. The constitution clearly stipulates that the President must submit budget proposals to the legislature for approval. The DPR has the right to reject the bill and force the government to maintain the previous budget (Article 23 Paragraphs 2 and 3, 1945 Constitution). In the implementation of government politics in the regions, it is not possible to only prioritize one aspect (economics) but it is important to pay attention to other aspects, namely environmental sustainability so that the implementation of green government is very important in supporting environmental sustainability in the political process of government in the regions (Dama, 2021). The Government of the Republic of Indonesia was formed to protect the whole of the Indonesian people (Angelia, 2020). The legislature now has the power to reject the Budget Bill. In practice, budget deadlocks never occur, but power remains regularly invoked as a means to intimidate the executive. This was confirmed by Ahmadi Noorsupit, Chairman of the DPR Budget Committee from Golkar, in Farhan (2018) that the Government and the DPR have relatively equal bargaining positions with respect to legislation and supervision, but the DPR has a stronger position in terms of budgeting.
Apart from having the constitutional power to reject the Budget Bill, the legislature also has the power to amend the budget, as regulated in Law no. 17/2003 on State Finance. This law allows the legislature to amend proposed revenues and expenditures as long as the amendment does not result in an increase in the projected budget deficit (Article 15 paragraph 3). Legislative amendment powers can also be used to create non-committed budget allocations called optimization funds which legislators can use to fund certain activities as part of the budget, for example to secure additional infrastructure projects for their own constituencies. Therefore, It is the power of legislative amendment that gives the Budget Committee and Sectoral Commission the ability to create optimization funds. As mentioned earlier, the Budget Committee has the power to amend the budget on the revenue and expenditure side, while the power of amendments to the Sectoral Commission is limited to spending within individual ministries. Eka Sastra in Farhan (2018) explains how to generate optimization funds, namely by increasing the target income for oil production and economic growth. Then reduce government spending, to be more efficient, for example by cutting unnecessary goods. This combination of increased revenue and reduced expenditure results in optimization funds. The Budget Committee has the power to amend the budget on the revenue and expenditure side, while the power of amendments to the Sectoral Commission is limited to expenditures within each ministry. Eka Sastra in Farhan (2018) explains how to generate optimization funds, namely by increasing the target income for oil production and economic growth. Then reduce government spending, to be more efficient, for example by cutting unnecessary goods. This combination of increased revenue and reduced expenditure results in optimization funds. The Budget Committee has the power to amend the budget on the revenue and expenditure side, while the power of amendments to the Sectoral Commission is limited to expenditures within each ministry. Eka Sastra in Farhan (2018) explains how to generate optimization funds, namely by increasing the target income for oil production and economic growth. Then reduce government spending, to be more efficient, for example by cutting unnecessary goods. This combination of increased revenue and reduced expenditure results in optimization funds. Eka Sastra in Farhan (2018) explains how to generate optimization funds, namely by increasing the target income for oil production and
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economic growth. Then reduce government spending, to be more efficient, for example by cutting unnecessary goods. This combination of increased revenue and reduced expenditure results in optimization funds. Eka Sastra in Farhan (2018) explains how to generate optimization funds, namely by increasing the target income for oil production and economic growth. Then reduce government spending, to be more efficient, for example by cutting unnecessary goods. This combination of increased revenue and reduced expenditure results in optimization funds.
In addition to changing the income and expenditure side of the budget, optimization funds can also be generated or increased by changing macroeconomic assumptions.
Macroeconomic indicators used in preparing budget proposals consist of economic growth, inflation, exchange rates, interest rates, international crude oil prices, oil production and gas production. This is an important indicator used in formulating revenue, expenditure and financing targets. As outlined in Article 13 of the state finance law, the government must submit its fiscal policy and macroeconomic framework to the legislature during initial budget deliberations. In theory, the government then uses the indicators agreed upon during the initial budget discussions to formulate its budget proposals,
However, in reality, macroeconomic indicators were discussed again when the government submitted a budget proposal to the DPR, which led to a revision of the position of the revenue, expenditure and financing budgets. Macroeconomic assumptions related to energy, such as oil prices, and oil and gas production, were discussed by Commission VII, while Commission XI discussed the rest of the macroeconomic assumptions. The Budget Committee then uses the macroeconomic adjustments agreed upon by Commissions VII and XI to formulate the budget position, with implications for either the revenue or expenditure side of the budget.
In addition to these formal procedures, informal practices have also developed in the allocation of optimization funds. Although the law outlines the legislative power to amend the budget, it does not regulate how the use of surplus funds should be determined; this is the responsibility of the executive. Article 13 Paragraph 2 Government Regulation no. 90/2010 concerning the Formulation of the Minister's Work Plan and Budget states that the government must refer to the direction of the President's policy in the use of budget allocations from optimization funds. However, this regulation does not apply to the legislature, so in practice the allocation of optimization funds is decided by the Budget Committee and Sectoral Commission (Farhan, 2018).
3.2 Corruption Scandal
The legislature's power to substantively change the budget attracted public attention when several members of the Budget Committee were charged with corruption in connection with their optimal use of funds. These scandals take place in a context where corruption among politicians has dominated public discourse since 2009 (Kramer, 2013), and they eventually led to restrictions on the power of the legislative budget. In this regard, four members of the Budget Committee, known as the 'budget mafia' (budget mafia), were found to be involved in corrupt practices, mostly related to bribes in exchange for allocations to certain projects or to arrange for certain companies to handle projects. identified projects (Table). The groups involved believe that budget corruption stems from the power of the legislative budget as referred to in Law no. 17/2003 concerning State Finance and Law no.
27/2009 on Legislative Structure. They questioned the permanent status of the Budget Committee, the legislative power to intervene in budget details, its power to block certain budget items, and the budget revision process (Constitutional Court, 2014).
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Table 2. Corruption Scandal, 2011–2013
Perpetrator Party Case Description
Muhammad Nazarudin
Democrat Received a fee of Rp 4.6 trillion in return for arranging a project tender for Wisma Atlet and securing a budget allocation from optimization funds for the project. In court, Nazaruddin claimed that other members of the Budget Committee were also involved. Nazaruddin also plays a role in managing the allocation of optimization funds for the Hambalang Sport Center project. He is suspected of being involved in several other corruption cases that are still in process
Waode Nurhayati PAN Received a fee of Rp 6 billion in return for securing the budget allocation through a fiscal transfer called the Infrastructure Adjustment Fund. During the court case, Nurhayati observed that all members of the Budget Committee have a quota where they can allocate money from the optimization fund as they please.
Angelina Sondakh Democrat As the budget coordinator at Commission X, which is the commission in charge of education and sports, he received bribes of Rp 12.5 billion in return for arranging budget allocations for construction projects at certain universities and Wisma Athletes.
DzulkarnaenDjabar Golkar As a member of the Budget Committee of Commission VIII which oversees the allocation to the Ministry of Religion, Dzulkarnaen received a fee of Rp. 14.3 trillion in return for arranging the allocation of the optimization fund and intervened to obtain a contract for a colleague company to procure computers for Islamic Middle Schools and Al printing houses. -Quran
In May 2014, the court issued a ruling limiting the role of the DPR in the budget process, to the extent that it no longer has the authority to discuss activities and types of expenditure in the detailed budget known as 'Unit 3'. The legislature was also prevented from blocking the disbursement of funds after the Budget Bill was approved (Constitutional Court, 2014). This ruling has substantive implications for the budget process. In actual budget discussions, legislators still have access to detailed budgets, although they are not allowed to discuss and amend the budget through this activity.
3.3 Implementation of Post-Election Optimization Funds
The Constitutional Court's ruling limiting legislative budgetary powers, which came into effect from the 2015 budget onwards, changed the way optimization funds operate. From now on, the Budget Committee can no longer allocate optimization funds at will. As Figure 2 shows, optimization funds must now be shared with the Sectoral Commissions and, through them, the Ministry of Finance.
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Figure 1. Optimization Fund Operation
In this discussion we examine the ways in which the shifts affected budget deliberations in the 2015 budget revision and in the 2016 budget. As the discussion shows, the changing institutional environment in which optimization funds now continue to operate and is an important part of the structure in which the government obtains support from the legislature.
In this new environment, the benefits of funds are shared not only among all legislators, but also deployed to serve the interests of the government. These collective benefits, in turn, have reduced the role of political parties and coalition identities in budget discussions.
The 2015 budget revision is critical for two reasons. First, the budget deliberations occur at a time of high political tension between the majority opposition coalition and the minority government coalition. Second, the budget proposal itself is unusual, because the fuel subsidy was halved and capital injections to SOEs were increased 14 times. The results of the revision were surprising, to the extent that the Budget Bill was passed by the legislature without significant changes, despite the weak position of the ruling coalition. This section argues that this surprising result can be explained by the capacity of the optimization fund to accommodate the interests of all legislators, meaning that the fund provides the necessary incentive for the legislature to pass the Budget Bill. In the process, the optimization funds led to the blurring of the identity of the political parties in the two coalitions,
In this special budget round, optimization funds are not generated by adjusting macroeconomic variables to increase state revenues. In fact, as reported by the Minister of Finance in a working committee meeting, almost all macroeconomic indicators were revised downwards, leading to a decline in income. As shown in Table 3., the economic growth indicator decreased by 0.1 percent, while inflation remained at 5 percent. International crude oil prices are assumed to be reduced by USD 20 per barrel and oil production by 24,000 barrels per day. This adjustment resulted in non-tax revenues from natural resources amounting to Rp. 14.27 trillion (Minutes of Budget Committee Meeting, 6 February 2015).
As a consequence of this change in macroeconomic variables, the projected revenue will decrease by Rp. 7.3 trillion.
Ministry Priority Program Spending
Ministry Shopping Aspiration Fund
Parliamentary facilities (salary,
new building, etc.) Optimization
Fund
Transfer to
Region Region Aspiration Fund
Budget Financing Deficit Reduction
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Table 3. Macroeconomic Indicators and 2015 Budget Revision
Indicator/Item Budget
Proposal
Enforced Budget
Margin
Economic growth (%yoy) 5.8 5.7 (0.1)
Inflation (%yoy) 5.0 5.0 0
Rupiah exchange rate (Rp/USD) 12,200 12,500 300
Average 3-month interest rate (%) 6.2 6.2 0
International crude oil price (USD/barrel) 70.0 60.0 (10) Oil production (one thousand barrels per
day)
849 825 (24)
Gas production (one thousand barrels per day)
1,177 1,221 44
Revenue (in trillion rupiah) 1,768 1,761 (7)
Expenditure (in trillion rupiah) 1,995 1,984 (11)
Surplus/Deficit (in trillion rupiah) (226) (223) 3
Instead of adjusting for macroeconomic variables, the 2015 optimization fund was generated through a reduction in spending. Bambang Brodjonegoro, Minister of Finance, stated that 'the reduction in spending is higher than the reduction in income, which means that there may be additional allocations' (Minutes of Budget Committee Meeting, 6 February 2015). He continued by explaining that the biggest decrease in spending was caused by a decrease in fuel subsidies of Rp. 17.1 trillion. Furthermore, the Committee and the government also agreed to suspend social protection funds for two months, which resulted in Rp 6.5 trillion.
Importantly, however, it is clear that decisions on the distribution of optimization funds are not made in the working committee meeting. The Committee did not discuss the distribution of funds; only report decisions that have been taken outside the formal meeting of the Budget Committee. As an official from the Ministry of Finance explained, 'Discussions [on optimization funds] between the Minister of Finance and the Chair of the [Budget Committee] are not open. It takes place in a lobbying forum, and the results of those discussions are presented to a formal meeting of the Budget Committee for approval. This was confirmed by Eka Sastra in Farhan (2018), who explained that the informal meeting where the allocation was determined was attended by key parliamentary stakeholders.
Despite the fact that the decision has been taken in an informal forum, it is clear that the distribution of optimization funds to ministries is not based on a formula proposed by the government. The government has identified three criteria that are consistent with the 2015 Government Work Plan: that the allocation be efficient, effective and accountable, with tangible outputs. In practice, this criterion is only invoked for legitimate decisions that have already been taken. As shown in Table 4., several ministries received the same amount of optimization funds, indicating that the distribution was not based on program or ministry needs.
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Table 4. Allocation of Optimization Funds in the 2015 Budget Revision
Ministries/Agencies Commission Amount
(billion rupiah)
Ministry of Defense I 4,725
Police III 3,850
Ministry of Villages and Remote Areas V 2,100
House of Representatives 1,635
Ministry of Research and Higher Education VII 1,200
Ministry of Law and Human Rights III 450
Regional Representative Council III 375
Ministry of Youth and Sports X 374
People's Consultative Assembly III 365
State Intelligence Service I 200
National Cryptography Agency I 200
National Search and Rescue Agency V 200
Ministry of Foreign Affairs I 150
Audit Board XI 100
Supreme Court III 100
National Security Agency I 100
National Security Council I 100
Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics Agency
V 50
Ministry of Cooperatives and Small Business VI 50
Total 16,324
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2015
In the 2015 budget revision, the optimization fund also provides direct benefits to all legislators. A total of rp 1.6 trillion was allocated for the improvement of parliamentary facilities, for example, the design of a new parliament building, the provision of an operational budget for the member constituency offices (Rumah Aspiration), providing funds for legislators to visit their constituents, and support for staffing and salaries. These measures benefit members of the opposition coalition and the government. Arif Budimanta, a member of the Advisory Team to the Ministry of Finance and also a former legislator from PDIP explained that one of the reasons why the conflict between the Red-White Coalition and the Greater Indonesia Coalition did not appear in the 2015 budget revision because in the budget discussion the political interests of each coalition member had been accommodated in the budget.
In summary, changes in macroeconomic indicators and revenue projections in the 2015 budget revision do not limit the ability of the Budget Committee to generate substantial optimization funds by cutting the proposed expenditure items. Although the Constitutional Court has acted to limit the legislative power to amend the budget, the government allows it to do so because the benefits of optimization funds are shared by the executive, which wants to reduce the budget deficit, and by spending ministries, which seek to increase their budget allocations. In addition, the distribution of optimization funds, which have been decided in private, benefits all legislators regardless of their coalition affiliation, in turn weakening their political identity. In other words, incentives from optimization funds push the legislature toward individualistic behavior rather than
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party or coalition oriented. In this way, a minority government can obtain legislative approval for its budget by ensuring that it also serves the interests of each legislator.
IV. Conclusion
As the discussion has shown, the executive may have power over the formulation and execution of the budget, but the legislature uses its amending powers to generate optimization funds that serve the interests of both the legislature and the government. Moreover, the legislature is clearly the more dominant actor in the actual budget discussion. Although the legislature's power to amend the budget is limited by regulations governing the size of the budget deficit, the budget must be approved by the legislature, and this power of approval can be used to intimidate the executive.
Legislative approval powers mean that it is impossible for government budget proposals to be passed without informal mechanisms to the benefit of individual legislators.
This continued even after the Constitutional Court decided to limit the powers of legislative amendments. Indeed, the Court's decision has little effect on the ability of the legislature to generate optimization funds. The decision did reduce the dominance of the Budget Committee, but did not have the effect of eliminating optimization funds. Its benefits can now be shared more widely, but optimization funds continue to function primarily as a means to reward legislators for passing budgets.
The distribution of optimization funds is based on an informal understanding between the executive and the legislature. The legislature and executive agreed to divide funds into three categories, following the current legal framework by allocating funds in a way that reduces budget deficits and advances government priorities. This agreement is the basis for the negotiation process leading to the allocation of optimization funds. The negotiation process benefits legislators, who can lobby for allocations through ministry spending or through special allocations to regions. This mechanism also serves the interests of ministry spending, as it provides an alternative channel through which ministries can maximize their funding, especially in areas they have lost during the budget formulation process within government.
Since the optimization fund process is based on the mutual exchange of benefits between the executive and the legislature, it runs smoothly. For the executive, the optimization fund provides an instrument to advance the budget agenda while accommodating ministerial spending interests. Sectoral Commissions may offer funds to spending ministries seeking budget increases in return for compensation, for example, relocation of programs to their constituencies. Optimization funds also provide direct benefits to all legislators in the form of salary increases and additional spending for electoral district meetings. It has even given them a new building. The optimization fund also allocates fiscal transfers to the regions, which can be used as electoral district development funds by members of the Budget Committee.
In short, there is no significant difference of opinion regarding the distribution of optimization funds between the legislature and the executive, because both benefit from its existence. Therefore, optimization funds generated through legislative power to change the budget are a form of political currency, which the government can use to avoid deadlocks in budget discussions. Because optimization funds are distributed discreetly and equitably, party affiliation has little influence on the behavior of individual legislators in budget discussions.
In other words, the demarcation of party identity is subverted, because each legislator has equal access to the benefits of optimization funds. However, given that the distribution of optimization funds ignores party alignments, it is an expensive executive tool.
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