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Social Sciences, Humanities and Education Journal (SHE Journal) Volume 4 (3) 445-458, September 2023 | ISSN: 2720-9946 (Online)
The article is published with Open Access at: http://e-journal.unipma.ac.id/index.php/SHE
Collaborative Governance in Zimbabwe’s Urban Local Authorities: Challenges and Considerations for
Improved Service Delivery
Tawanda Nyikadzino1; College of Business and Economics, University of Johannesburg, South Africa
Shikha Vyas-Doorgapersad2; College of Business and Economics, University of Johannesburg, South Africa
Abstract: Together with the influence of globalisation and sustainable development goals, urbanisation profoundly impacts the service delivery capacity of African subnational governments. Unfortunately, in the context of Zimbabwean local authorities, particularly urban councils, these amplified demands were not accompanied by increased capacity.
Unsurprisingly, service delivery woes have become the norm. The question that arises is: Are urban local authorities in Zimbabwe, without the involvement and active participation of other stakeholders, able to confront and overcome service delivery challenges, and spearhead local development? In this article, the researchers present the impediments to collaborative governance in Zimbabwe’s urban councils and insights towards an enabling environment for collaborative governance. The researchers gathered evidence to substantiate this line of argument through qualitative desktop research.
Keywords: Collaborative governance, local authority, local governance, service delivery, local government reform.
email [email protected]
Citation: Nyikadzino, T. & Vyas-Doorgapersad, S. (2023). Collaborative Governance in Zimbabwe’s Urban Local Authorities: Challenges and Considerations for Improved Service Delivery. Social Sciences, Humanities and Education Journal (SHE Journal), 4(3), 445-458.
Copyright ©2023 Social Sciences, Humanities and Education Journal (SHE Journal)
Published by Universitas PGRI Madiun. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
INTRODUCTION
The study and practice of local government have witnessed profound reforms across the globe. Over the past quarter century, local government reform has seen increased criticism of centralised governance models (Brandsen, Steen & Verschuere, 2018).
Centralised and obese public institutions were often perceived as unresponsive, rigid, corrupt and unaccountable (Conteh, 2016; Lewis, 2014). The increased criticism of centralisation gave rise to decentralisation reforms under the auspices of the New Public Management (NPM). Decentralisation, which seeks to enhance equitable distribution and allocation of resources and governing powers and responsibilities to local communities, became, arguably, one of the most popular post-cold war public reform policies (Conteh, 2016). Decentralisation was adopted and designed to address performance delivery challenges inherent in centralised development models. Although the heralded benefits are yet to be fully realised in practice, decentralisation sort to enhance accountability, citizen participation, responsiveness and improve allocative efficiency by tying services to local preferences (Rondinelli, 1981). This statement was supported by Vyas- Doorgapersad (2012) adding that the rationality behind decentralisation is, therefore, to devolve autonomy, authority and responsibility creating a local self-government that can satiate the needs of local constituencies.
Despite the enthusiasm around decentralisation reform, in practice, particularly in Africa, it downloaded government responsibilities to subnational governments without supporting resources. Consequently, decentralisation ended up choking local governance and local economic developmentservice delivery (Chigwata, 2018). In Zimbabwe, most post- independence decentralisation reforms, for example, amendment of local
government statutes, the Prime Minister's Directive on Decentralisation and Development (PMDDD) of 1984, the Thirteen Principles of Decentralisation of 1996 and the Local Government Amendment Act (LGAA) of 2007, were skewed towards administrative decentralisation (deconcentration) (Nyikadzino & Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2022a). Although these reforms were justified, in practice they entrenched and perpetuated central government control;
thereby undermining local government autonomy, which is an indispensable ingredient for effective local governance.
The dominance of the central government in local governance in ways that were not congenial to stakeholder participation undermined collaborative governance, public trust and, ultimately, service delivery.
The emergence of the democratisation wave in the 1990s, which emphasised citizen involvement and engagement in the public reformation agenda, birthed democratic decentralisation also referred to as devolution (Brandsen et al., 2018).
Democratic decentralisation sought to address some of the governance weaknesses associated with generic decentralisation reforms by activating the voice of citizens. Given Africa’s colonial history and post-independence development aspirations, local government practitioners saw citizen participation in development planning as an inalienable element of socio-economic development (Nyama & Mukwada, 2022). The belief that colonial development challenges can only be resolved through governance reforms that give the local people an active voice in policy formulation and implementation characterised this transitional period. Thus, the democratic decentralisation wave was anchored on bottom-up development approaches. It was not only viewed as a "hallmark of a democratic society" (Bowen, 2007:65) but also a critical element in anti-poverty programming (Kamara, 2017). This
447 culminated in several devolutionary reforms in Africa designed to widen avenues for community participation in substantive local policy matters.
Academics and policymakers all over the world invested in citizen engagement in the local service delivery domain as a critical area in the service delivery reformation agenda. This is attributable to the worldwide recognition of citizens as central actors in policy processes and service delivery (Brandsen et al., 2018).
To further institutionalise citizen participation, local governments have embraced both physical and online participatory and consultative platforms such as budgetary consultative meetings, community feedback meetings, the creation of an interactive website, WhatsApp groups, tweeter, and facebook, among others.
However, despite improvements in citizen participation in local governance matters, service delivery woes persisted (Chigova & Hofisi, 2021; Brandsen et al., 2018). Rather, achievements in democratic decentralisation, particularly citizen participation, increase service delivery pressures on local governments, which are central in funding local development projects. According to Kamara (2017), local governments are oft bestowed with the power, authority and resources to provide public services.
In the context of Zimbabwean local authorities, particularly urban councils, the amplified citizens’ demands were not accompanied by increased capacity (Nyikadzino & Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2022b). The withdrawal of donor support and erratic central government support further alienated local governments. Unfortunately, local government's failure to cope with soaring citizens' demands has resulted in dwindling public trust and, subsequently, a broken social contract. It is therefore the argument of this paper that contemporary local governance challenges in Zimbabwe require new, inclusive and innovative governance models. Collaborative governance, a
multisectoral and cross-boundary governance model that involves
“processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government and/or the public, private and civic spheres to carry out a public purpose”
(Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2012:3), is one on the innovative models that several countries broadly are applying in resolving wicked and complex policy problems. A paradigm shift towards collaborative governance is, therefore, critical. The centralised top-down Weberian approaches to local governance, although they have some advantages, cannot sustain and cope with the 4th industrial era where stakeholders emphasise transparency, accountability, inclusivity, cooperation, effectiveness, quality, and public value (Chigova & Hofisi, 2021; Nyikadzino &
Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2022c). Against the dearth of collaborative governance literature in Zimbabwe, this article provides impediments to collaborative governance in Zimbabwe and insights towards creating an enabling environment for collaborative governance.
INTRODUCING THE
COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE CONCEPT
Contemporary public policy literature emphasises the central role of collaborative approaches in addressing wicked public problems (Head & Alford, 2015). Due to the complexity of contemporary public problems, the past decade has witnessed several cooperative and collaborative arrangements of different forms.
However, regardless of the popularity of collaborative governance, there is no definitional consensus on the concept.
Instead, collaborative governance has been widely defined in different ways.
Collaborative governance is a “fuzzy
concept” (Batory & Svensson, 2019) and continues to be “one of a series of woolly- words” (Osborne, Strokosch & Radnor, 2018) in public management and public policy. Broadly, collaborative governance, as a governance approach, hinges on the New Public Governance (NPG) paradigm, which underscores external stakeholders (citizens, business players, third sector organisations and other government departments) in development and service delivery processes (Chigova & Hofisi, 2021). The NPG approach holds that the public sector’s reliance on the Weberian model and markets is problematic. It argues for collaborative governance and active and engaged citizenship as the only way to solve wicked public problems, mobilise scarce resources and spur public innovation (Osborne, 2010).
Collaborative governance anchors on the word ‘governance’, and, as such, it is important to briefly unpack the latter before a detailed exposition of collaborative governance. Broadly defined, governance entails a set of rules and administrative procedures that regulate and enable the delivery of public goods and services (Lynn, Heinrich &
Hill, 2001:7).
Building on the preceding definition, collaborative governance, therefore, is a term that covers "the study and practice of cross-sector collaboration" (Emerson, 2018:2) in which the public, private and third- sector organisations work together is formulating laws, policies and rules that regulate political communities and facilitate the provision of public goods and services. Ansell & Gash (2008:544) comprehensively defined collaborative governance as an arrangement in which public organisations partner with external stakeholders in mutual and consensual policy formulation and implementation processes to enhance public value. Emerson et al. (2012:3) built on and broadened Ansell & Gash’s (2008) definition to cover policy initiatives and processes that involve
government, private and civil actors in executing public programmes.
Emerson et al. (2012)’s comprehensive and broader definition covers wider cross-boundary processes, structures, partnerships and actions that enable across organisations/sectors cooperation. This broader form of collaborative governance also includes civic engagement and citizen participation in cases where public participation and support are crucial for the effective implementation and performance of public programmes.
Simply put, collaborative governance covers a wide range of partnerships between and among governments, the private and civil society sectors (United Nations Agenda 2030, Goal 17).
Collaborative governance emphasises a shift towards networked governance hinged on mutuality, reciprocity and shared responsibility which places stakeholders at the centre of development. According to Brandsen et al. (2018) in practice, collaborative governance is often used to incorporate a variety of phenomena, for example, public-private partnerships, networked governance, co-production, co-creation and cooperative governance.
THE VALUE OF COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE
Collaborative governance is currently one of the cornerstones of public sector management reforms across the globe.
The 21st governance challenges call for collaboration based on what Levy (2013, (in Osborne et al., 2018:163) calls “doing development differently” and “with-the- grain approach” to poverty reduction and improved development. Research the world over has shown the value of collaborative governance. Inter alia, collaborative governance is presented as a valuable route to public value (Chigova
& Hofisi, 2021) and to policy formulation and effective service provision (Osborne et al., 2018); a strategic response to democratic gaps (Ansell & Gash, 2008)
449 and a way to active communities and stakeholders (Batory & Svensson, 2019);
and as an additional resource mobilisation strategy (Brandsen et al., 2018). Given the complexity and interconnectedness of contemporary local governance challenges, Chigova and Hofisi (2021) hold that collaborative governance is an essential vehicle for sustainable development. Collaborative governance becomes central because of the multidimensional (environmental, socio-cultural and economic) community demands. Taute’s (2021) empirical study on the utilisation of collaborative governance in South African municipalities revealed that collaborative governance helps public organisations to meet increased public demands. Through strategic partnerships, collaborations strategically position local governments to effectively and sustainably provide public goods and services by taking advantage of external stakeholders’ skills and competences.
Uys and Jessa (2019) argue that the effective implementation of collaborative governance generates public value (PV) through stakeholder involvement, which strengthens good governance pillars, such as oversight, accountability, inclusivity, feedback and transparency in policy processes. Given that collaborative governance is anchored on consensus building between local governments, other arms of government and units, the private sector, third-sector organisations and citizens, its success builds trust and social capital (O'Leary, Gerard, Keast, Mandell & Voets, 2015:754). A local government with public trust stands a better chance of success in the implementation of public programmes and projects (Nyikadzino & Mataire, 2022). The benefits of collaborative governance will not, however, be achieved by chance; it requires a conducive operational environment.
Inclusivity is one of the cardinal pillars of effective collaborative governance.
Emmerson (2018) argues that local
authorities should engage stakeholders and communities in all matters of the policy or project life cycle.
METHODS
The researchers used qualitative desktop research in collecting and analysing data.
Through qualitative research, the researchers gained a thorough and in- depth narrative of social practice under study (Sibanda, 2015, in Bangani & Vyas- Doorgapersad, 2020:2). Unobtrusive methods such as documentary review and literature review were utilised.
Unobtrusive research techniques are non-reactive and information about the respondent is gathered though public documents (Auriacombe, 2016:6;
Nhlapo, 2020:33). Documentary review involves an in-depth analysis of documents containing important data on the phenomenon under study (Mogalakwe, 2006). Through documentary review, the researchers managed to collect useful data from the Constitution, auditor general’s reports, Acts of Parliament, government policies and organisational reports. Literature review was also an important source of qualitative data for this study. Literature review was used to gather data from published peer-reviewed journal articles and books. The researchers analysed the collected data through qualitative content analysis, which is a method used for coding and analysing textual and identifying recurring patterns and themes (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005:1277).
Through content analysis, the researchers managed to draw useful insight into the factors undermining collaborative governance in Zimbabwe's urban councils from books, journal articles, reports, newspapers and laws.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
This section presents and discusses the study’s main findings.
Impediments to collaborative governance in Zimbabwe’s Urban Councils
Corruption
Corruption erodes respect for the law and deters honest people from entering the public service (Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2007; 2022). Corruption, which has become a buzzword in Zimbabwe’s local government, has tarnished the image and reputation of most urban councils profoundly. Corruption in local governments is a pervasive wicked problem in Zimbabwe. There is evidence that corruption has become rife in Zimbabwe's devolved tiers of government. Several surveys, reports and studies have shown how deeply embedded corruption in local governments is. For instance, the Auditor-General’s (2019) Report on Local Authorities shows that local authorities remain vulnerable to the scourge of corruption due to ineptitude and lack of adequate control mechanisms. The International Republic Institute's (2021) survey revealed serious corruption concerns in Bulawayo and Mashonaland East. When asked about corruption at the local government level, 91% and 80% of the respondents in Bulawayo and Mashonaland East, respectively, indicated that corruption is a very serious or somewhat serious problem. Similarly, a report by the Zimbabwe Anti-corruption Commission (ZACC) (2022) showed that 80% of the respondents had bribed local officials for local goods and services. An Afrobarometer’ (2022) survey also found disturbing corruption trends. As the table below shows, 51.5%, 27.6% and 5.4% of the respondents think some of the council members, most of them and all of them are involved in corruption.
Cumulatively, 84.5% of the respondents think their local government officials are involved in corruption.
TABLE 1. Respondents' Perception of Corruption among Members of the Local Government Council
Urba Ru M Wo To n ral en men tal None 2.2 8.8 5. 7.4 6.4
3
Some of 45.5 55. 49 53.9 51.
them 1 .1 5
Most of 38.1 21. 30 24.6 27.
them 4 .6 6
All of 7.4 4.3 5. 5.1 5.4
them 8
Refuse 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.2
d
Don’t 6.6 10. 9. 8.5 8.9
know/ 2 2
Haven’t heard
None 2.2 8.8 5. 7.4 6.4 3
Source: Afrobarometer (2022:47).
In her speech on the Inaugural Implementation Matrix Signing Ceremony in Harare, ZACC) Chairperson, Justice Loice Matanda Moyo highlighted a disturbing trend of corruption among urban and rural local authorities. She revealed corruption cases involving political interference in local government administrative processes.
Councillors interfered in administrative affairs by manipulating local government management’s decisions on tendering, housing, human resources management and other operational affairs (Mukucha 2022).
The preceding excerpt clearly shows that political and administrative local officials often abuse public offices to accumulate wealth through corrupt practices. This has led to widespread service delivery woes, public discontentment, and, ultimately, a broken social contract. High levels of corruption and associated reputational damages have made it difficult for local governments to attract lucrative national and international partnerships. Even the residents are reluctant to participate in the local government process through
451 paying rates and attending council consultative meetings (Marumahoko, Chigwata and Nhete, 2018; Nyama and Mukwada, 2022).
The high levels of corruption in local authorities are, however, not a surprise. The levels of corruption in Zimbabwe's local governments are reflective of the situation in the whole country. In the Corruption Perception Index (2016), Zimbabwe was ranked 136 out of 176 countries in the index. This makes Zimbabwe one of the worst corrupt countries in the region. What is worrisome is that these high levels of corruption are being recorded regardless of the country’s comprehensive and multifaceted anti-corruption reforms.
Dwindling Public Trust
Public trust in local governments is one of the central collaborative governance building blocks. As aptly captured by Masunungure, Ndapwadza, Sibanda &
Choguya (2005:1), public trust “is a component of social capital and is a key resource in the governance of a polity”.
Similarly, Nyikadzino & Mataire (2022:28) argue that public trust is an indispensable social capital essential for reciprocal, harmonious and dependable relations and healthy communities. In the contemporary world, public trust is one of the important cardinal pillars of governance that underpin collaboration and cooperation between the governing authorities and the people.
Public trust builds networks that provide a firm foundation for building collaboration. According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2022), “trust is the foundation upon which the legitimacy of democratic institutions rests. Trust is crucial for ensuring the success of a wide range of public policies that depend on behavioural responses from the public" (OECD 2022 https://www.oecd.org/governance/trus t-in-government/). Without it, stakeholders may not support local
government initiatives. The quest for local governments to revamp public trust has attracted attention among policymakers and academicians, and Zimbabwean local authorities must strengthen corporate governance to achieve such a goal (Nyikadzino, 2022).
Public trust plays a pivotal role in building a strong social contract and collaborative networks, yet indices are showing public trust gaps (Marien &
Hooghe, 2011; Nyikadzino, 2022). The Afrobarometer Survey (2021:40) showed that more Zimbabweans trust non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (79%) and religious leaders (78%) than political office bearers, for example, the president (48%), Members of Parliament (44%), local government councillors (38%).
Figure 1: Trust in Public Institutions
Source: Afrobarometer Survey (2021) The above table shows that local government councillors who are the local policymakers are among the least trusted public actors in Zimbabwe. Although the Afrobarometer Survey (2022) indicates an improvement in levels of trust (54.4%) in local government councils, still sizeable number (45.3%) distrust local governments compared to religious leaders’ command high levels of public trust (71.1%).
Table 2: Trust in Local Government Council and Religious Leaders
Urb an Ru ral M
en Wo men To
tal Not at all 23. 15. 18 18.1 18.
2 5 .6 3
Just a 23. 29. 29 24.6 27.
little 5 0 .3 0
Somewh 32. 28. 31 28.4 30.
at 7 6 .9 1
A lot 15. 24. 17 25.2 21.
3 8 .2 3
Refused 0.2 0.2 0. 0.2 0.2 2
Don’t 5.2 1.9 2. 3.5 3.2
know/H 8
aven’t heard
enough to say
Source: Afrobarometer (2022:44)
Table 3: Respondents' Perception: how much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Religious leaders?
Urb Ru M Wo To an ral en men tal Not at all 15. 5.3 8. 10.2 9.1
6 1
Just a 15. 19. 20 14.7 17.
little 0 5 .9 8
Somewh 33. 34. 37 31.0 34.
at 1 9 .5 2
A lot 33. 39. 32 41.7 36.
1 1 .0 9
Refused 0.2 0.2 0.1
Don’t 3.1 1.1 1. 2.2 1.8
know/H 5
aven’t heard Enough to say
Source: Afrobarometer (2022:44)
Such trust gaps limit local governments’
capacity to attract partnerships profoundly. The more that stakeholders, who happen to be current and prospective partners, fundamentally distrust their local government, the more
difficult it becomes to inculcate and inspirit collaborative governance.
Therefore, understanding the public trust challenges in Zimbabwe's local authorities to proffer strategic interventions could be an important stride to ensuring sound governance, and therefore better positioning local governments for building partnerships.
Excessive Central Control and Power Politics
For effective collaborative governance, local government autonomy and self- governance are key. If local governments do not have the autonomy and capacity to partake and discharge their devolved powers and responsibilities, the collaborative governance efforts, initiatives and projects will be manipulated by stronger central government actors (Ansell & Gash, 2008). The problem in Zimbabwe is that the central government views local governments as threats to power rather that strategic partners in the national development discourse (Nyikadzino &
Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2022a; Nyikadzino
& Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2022b; Chigwata Murumahoko, & Madhekeni, 2019;
Madhekeni, 2020). Due to the vertically divided authority which has characterised Zimbabwe's local governance, particularly the urban areas, the central government has tightened its grip on local government (Nyikadzino, 2022). Since the 2000s, opposition political parties have dominated local government elections. In the 2018 harmonised elections, for example, the Movement for Democratic Change–
Alliance (MDC-A) (the then main opposition party) won 28 out of the 32 urban councils. Consequently, the Zimbabwe African National Unity–
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) ruling party saw the popularity of opposition parties as a threat to their one-centre of power doctrine (Nyikadzino & Vyas- Doorgapersad 2022b). To retain control of urban councils, the ZANU-PF-led
453 government uses political, fiscal and administrative supervisory powers to micromanage local governments (Chigwata et al., 2019; Madhekeni, 2020). The central government’s insatiable desire to retain power through the micromanagement of local governments has created a cat-and- mouse relationship that eroded local autonomy thereby undermining local innovation and creativity.
Given the high levels of central government involvement and interference in local affairs, Zimbabwe has weak local governments that cannot govern on their own initiatives (Nyikadzino and Vyas-Doorgapersad 2022b). Since the abolishment of executive mayors through the Local Government Amendment Act of 2008, urban councils are run by ceremonial mayors who are “not assigned any executive powers and hardly wield any authority and influence” (Marumahoko et al., 2018:206). Consequently, ceremonial mayors lack executive decision-making powers and as a result, most of their decisions are subject to central government approval. This gives the central government the power to determine what sort of collaborations can happen at the local government level.
Surely, if not regulated, the central government's unfettered powers will choke collaborative efforts. Those collaborative arrangements that can potentially transform the fortunes of the locals, and give political visibility to opposition parties will not be approved.
The deepening levels of polarisation and political intolerance have worsened the situation. In Zimbabwe, it is difficult for people from different political parties to cooperate in local governance processes.
Marumahoko et al. (2018:205) hold that citizens and political actors only attend those meetings organised by their respective political parties and boycott those organised by their political rivalry.
Thus, decisions on whether to attend or not are largely influenced by political considerations rather that the
importance of the meeting itself. High levels of polarisation, power politics and political intolerance have undermined the prospects for the adoption and full implementation of collaborative, participatory and cooperative efforts in local governments, particularly in urban settings.
Pseudo and Cosmetic stakeholder engagement
While Zimbabwe has made important strides towards participatory local governance (as enshrined in the Constitution of 2013 and the Devolution and Decentralisation Policy of 2020, stakeholder engagement is often done as a ritual. Several studies have highlighted stakeholder participation and engagement gap in local governance processes. For instance, an empirical study done in the City of Kwekwe by Marumahoko et al. (2018) revealed that stakeholder consultation has been reduced to a mere ritual done as a prerequisite for good governance and a dummy to manage increased citizens’
demands to local government affairs.
They further added the participation is cosmetic and meant to mislead innocent residents into approving internally developed budgets (Marumahoko et al., 2018:200). As a result of such gaps, 60%
of the respondents complained that budgets were not as responsive as they expected. Another survey by Nyama and Mukwada (2022) in Murehwa Rural District showed that 50% of the residents felt that the local leadership side-lined them in development planning. The shared cases demonstrate that Zimbabwe’s local governments lack a collaborative governance culture characterised by frank engagements, transparency, cooperation, mutuality, and bottom-up approaches to local governance. Due to low levels of stakeholder participation and engagement and responsiveness to local needs, the citizens end up being disenfranchised and disinterested in governance processes. This builds
distrust, which results in non-payment of rates, low participation in local budgetary and other consultative meetings and other counterproductive behaviours. As succinctly captured by Mapfumo (2019:110), “due to limited participation, there has been a seismic decline in citizen's trust in both politicians and political institutions given policymakers' open disdain towards citizens and reluctance to accept input from the same constituency”.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The multiple and sometimes complex service delivery demands of central governments, the public, civil society organisations, the business community and other international and national development partners strain urban local governments across the world. In addressing the preceding question, this article argued that collaborative governance anchored on multisectoral, networked and cooperative governance is a critical innovative way of addressing contemporary local government service delivery challenges and demands. The article further argued that although collaborative governance offers a promising alternative, urban councils in Zimbabwe should create an enabling environment for them to fully benefit from collaborative governance.
The complex service delivery challenges in Zimbabwe’s urban local authorities are daunting. Collaborative governance anchored on networked and cooperative governance provides an innovative path forward. While collaborative governance offers a promising alternative, this paper presented impediments to its implementation in Zimbabwe’s urban councils. Some of the identified constraints to collaborative governance include corruption, dwindling public trust, poor corporate governance, excessive central government control and power politics, and pseudo and cosmetic stakeholder engagement. The
paper made a strong case that for effective collaborative governance, urban local authorities should develop comprehensive and holistic strategies to address the preceding shortcomings.
Following the identified shortcomings, this paper ended with some insights towards creating an enabling environment for collaborative governance in Zimbabwe's urban local authorities. The authors argued for the strengthening of local democracy, leadership capacity-building programmes, local autonomy, trust- building programmes and sound corporate governance as critical considerations for effective and sustainable collaborative governance in Zimbabwe.
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