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EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON AUDIT QUALITY OF LISTED OIL AND GAS COMPANIES IN NIGERIA
BELLO, Mohammed Bamanga 1
1Department of Accounting, Federal University, Lafia Nigeria
Corresponding Author: [email protected] Tel.: 08033008241
MAMMAN Suleiman 2, ABUBAKAR Jibril Mammadi 2
2Department of Accounting Nasarawa State University, Keffi, Nigeria Abstract
This study examined the effect of ownership structure on the audit quality of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria. The study employed an Expost-facto research design. Secondary data was extracted from the audited annual reports of the sampled firms from 2012–2020.Logistic regression was adopted as a technique of analysis. The results revealed that institutional ownership, ownership concentration and foreign ownership have a positive significant effect on audit quality. While managerial ownership has a negative insignificant effect on audit quality. It is therefore recommended that the management of oil and gas companies in Nigeria should consider raising the share of institutional ownership, ownership concentration, and foreign ownership in order to increase audit quality and strengthen their monitoring role.
Keywords: Ownership Structure, Managerial ownership, Institutional ownership, ownership concentration, foreign ownership, audit quality
Introduction
Accounting scandals like Enron and WorldCom have brought attention to the relevance of audit quality and company governance. The essential role of audit, as well as ownership structure, as governance mechanisms is to decrease unequal knowledge between management and shareholders. In addition, the ownership structure generates several stimuli that affect financial reporting and the independent auditor. As a result, it is assumed that ownership structure has an effect on audit quality and that there is a reasonable relationship between these ownership structures and audit quality.
The ownership structure is seen to be an essential component in influencing the quality of a corporation's financial reporting, and it can be used to anticipate the audit quality. Because the ownership system mechanisms are thought to be capable of influencing executive decisions.
Jensen and Meckling (1976), suggest that a firm’s ownership structure affects its demand for independent auditing. When share ownership is dispersed and the majority of shareholders are composed of individual investors, there is an increased preference for credible financial information and thus for higher quality audits (DeFond, 1992; Francis and Wilson, 1988; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). When shares are concentrated and controlled by market-oriented economic entities and institutions, as opposed to government agencies, institutional investors have strong incentives to actively monitor firm management through independent auditing to promote the best interest of different institutions they represent (Bushee, 1998; Pound, 1988;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).
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Prior studies have found that the structure of ownership affects the audit quality (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976, Vidyata et al 2017). Several accounting studies have empirically examined the effect of ownership structure on audit quality. Exemplar studies include: (Abolfazl et al 2015, Khasharmeh, & Joseph, 2017, Khaled&Sara 2018, Aree, 2018, Ammar et al 2018, Salem 2019) However, most of these studies are foreign-based. Given the disparities like economies, the level of sophistication in the monitoring mechanisms and litigation risks faced by external auditors,studies from Nigeria may produce different results.
Also, most of the prior studies on ownership structure and audit quality in Nigeria such as Jacob and Kabiru, (2015) Sadat and Hussaini (2015), Abu et al (2018);Johnbest and Churchill (2020) focused more on institutional ownership, block ownership and managerial ownership even though the literature has listed other proxies of ownership structure. This approach limits the generalisability of findings concerning the effect of ownership structure on audit quality of firms in Nigeria in general and listed oil marketing companies which have been ignored by prior studies. A study that includes more variables such as foreign ownership is undoubtedly desirable as it provides a better understanding of the effect of ownership structure on the audit quality of firms in Nigeria. The inclusion of more variables such as foreign ownership is important because they are typically sophisticated investors, who are potentially professional with a wealth of experience and skills, This wealth of experience and skills gives added advantage to the firms with foreign investors against their counter-parts (firm with domestic investors).
Furthermore, the studies in Nigeria focused on financial firms listed on NSE generally, and not specifically concerning oil and gas companies. Nigeria's oil industry makes a significant contribution to the country's economic development. According to the Central Bank of Nigeria, the industry produces about 90% of Nigeria's foreign exchange profits (CBN, 2018).Despite its strategic importance, the operations of the oil industry have been associated with allegations of scandalous financial practices recently. For example, the Punch (February 2015) reported the case of non-remittance of funds to the federation account and excessive expenditure of oil proceeds by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Similar allegations are associated with listed oil marketing companies in Nigeria as exemplified by the case of African Petroleum (now Forte Oil) Plc, where a credit facility of 24 billion nairas was not disclosed in the financial statements of the company. Interestingly, this material omission occurred under the watch of a big 4 audit firm that is expected to constrain such unscrupulous practice.As a result, it is critical to examine the ownership structure of oil and gas businesses, as well as the extent to which ownership structures influence audit efficiency. Therefore, the underlining aim of this study is to examine how ownership structure influence audit quality, and to clear up the connection between ownership structure and audit quality.
Literature Review
Concept of Ownership Structure
The ownership structure is defined as the allocation of equity in terms of votes and capital, as well as the identity of the equity owners, (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). These processes are critical in corporate governance because they determine managers' incentives and, as a result, the financial success of the companies they control. Douma, et al (2006) used a proportion of common ownership identity shares such as foreign, institutional, and corporate investors, as well as domestic ownership, families, and managers, to conceive the structure of ownership.
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Davies, et al (2005) defined managerial ownership as the percentage of a company's stock held by its board of directors and management. To put it another way, managers own a considerable number of shares in the company and hence have a high level of ownership concentration.
Executives and directors make up the makeup of managerial ownership. According to Ross (2010), the larger the company's shareholding, the more involved the management appears to be in the interests of investors, in this case, the management itself. Managerial equity ownership will connect the interests of managers and shareholders, allowing managers to reap the benefits of their decisions while also sharing the costs of poor decisions.
Institutional ownership refers to the percentage of a company's shares held by institutions compared to the total number of shares issued. Institutional ownership, which includes equity investments, is described by Murwanigsari (2009) as an institution with a large investment.
Daniel (2008) has made institutional investors operational, consisting of pension funds, life insurance companies, and mutual funds.
The concentration of ownership is categorized as the amount of the shares of a firm owned by some major shareholders (Sanda, et al 2005). Pongsaporamat (2016) views ownership concentration as the proportion of shares held by shareholders owning 5% or more of a firm’s shares.
The term foreign ownership comprises all forms of foreign private investment which confers control and ownership over a package of resources in a foreign country (Herbert, 1995). Chai (2010) defines foreign ownership as the percentage of total shares held by foreign owners.
Concept of Audit Quality
Audit quality is not a new concept in accounting literature, although it does not yet have a universally accepted definition. The most generally used idea of audit quality, according to DeAngelo (1981), is "the market-assessed joint chance that a specific auditor would both (a) detect and (b) report a breach in the client's accounting system." This idea is anchored by the external auditor's honesty and independence. Furthermore, Bedard et al (2010) connected audit quality to the auditor's adherence to widely accepted auditing standards (GAAS). They claimed that GAAS is undertaking a high-quality audit to provide appropriate assurance that the audited financial statements and disclosures are reasonably presented under widely accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
Empirical Review
Qasim (2011) studied the effect of ownership structure on audit quality listed firms in Jordan.
The study used logistic regression as a technique for analysis. The results show that foreign and institutionalownership has a significant positive effect on audit quality. Whereas ownership concentration has a negative significant effect on the quality.
Abolfaz, et al (2015) examined the relationship between managerial ownership and audit characteristics in the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) for the period of 2002 to 2012. With the aid of regression, analysis evidence showed that the ownership concentration has a positive significant association with audit quality.
Sherliza and Nurul (2015) examined the effect of ownership structures and auditsof Malaysian companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. The results show a significant positive relationship
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between audit fees and firms with larger foreign ownership and government ownership but no significant relationship with firms with higher managerial ownership.
Jacob and Kabiru (2015) investigated the relationship between ownership structure and audit quality of deposit money banks in Nigeria. Using multiple regression models to analyze the data, the result shows that there is a significant relationship between block ownership and audit quality.
Hussein and Nympha (2017) examined the effect of ownership structure upon audit quality. The results indicated that the foreign ownership variable has a significant relationship with audit quality.
Majid, et al (2017) investigated the relationship between institutional' ownership and financial leverage with audit quality in companies listed on Tehran Stock Exchange during 2010 - 2014.
The findings indicate that institutional ownership has a significant effect on audit quality.
Abu, et al (2018) studied the effect of institutional and block-holder ownership on audit quality of listed manufacturing firms in Nigeria. The results show that institutional ownership has a negative and significant effect on audit quality while block-holder ownership has a positive and significant effect on audit quality.
Khaled and Sara (2018) investigated the effect of different ownership structures - (concentration, foreign, and institutional ownership on audit quality of listed companies in the Amman stock exchangefrom 2005 to 2016. The results provide evidence of a positive statistically significant relationship between the audit quality and that of companies both with foreign and institutional ownership.
Mashallah and Fatemeh, (2019) investigated the impact of concentration of ownership on the relationship between institutional owners to the directorate independence and audit fee accepted companies in the Tehran stock market during the period from 2011 to 2016. The result showed that concentration of ownership moderates the relationship between the directorate and audit fee of listed companies in the Tehran stock market.
Agency Theory
Addressing the preposition of agency theory, the concept agency theory was introduced by Jenson and Mecklin (1976). They applied the notion of agency cost to clarify issues linked with the separation of ownership and control in a large company, consistent with Berle and Means's (1932) blueprint. The ultimate component in agency theory is the conflict of interest concerning principals and agents. Hung (1998) argues that the theory of agencies is a significant theory for understanding the oversight position of the auditor. The theory indicates that managers' shareholdings help match their interests with those of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Also,Agency theory suggests that monitoring by institutional ownership can be an important governance mechanism (the efficient monitoring hypothesis). Institutional investors can provide active monitoring that is difficult for smaller, more passive, or less-informed investors (Almazan, et al 2005). Nevertheless, ownership concentration at a high level offers an opportunity for controlling shareholders and managers to take part in preventing expropriation from minority shareholders (La Porta, et al 1999; Shleifer &Vishny 1997). More so, foreign investors may act
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as a monitoring force to mitigate the decisions of managers or insider owners that may be costly to other shareowners. They can improve corporate governance by becoming board members or outside large shareholders (Choi et al 2012). They are believed to have the ability to monitor managers and give performance-based incentives that will unite the interests of managers and shareholders and thereby improve the quality of auditors.
Methodology Research Design
An Ex-Post facto research design was used due to the nature of the study.
Population and Sampling Techniques
The population of the research comprises the ten (10) oil and gas companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) as of 31st December 2020. The list of the ten oil and gas marketing companies and their year of the listing is presented in Table .1:
Table 1 Population of the Study
S/No Name of Company Year of Listing
1 Forte Oil Plc 1978
2 MRS Oil Nigeria Plc 1978
3 Total Nigeria Plc 1978
4 Mobil Oil Nigeria Plc 1979
5 Conoil Plc 1989
6 Afroil Plc 1990
7 Oando Plc 1992
8 Eterna Oil & Gas Plc 1997
9 Japaul Oil & Maritime
Services Plc
2005
10 Beco Petroleum Products
Plc
2009 Source: Compiled by the author 2021
The number of companies was reduced to a working population of nine (9). Afroil Plc was excluded from the study population because it was delisted in 2014 and so had no published financial reports for 2012--2020
Method of Data Collection
The study fundamentally makes use of secondary sources of data, whereas the data was extracted from the annual report of the sampled firm, for the period of nine years (2012 – 2020). This is due to the fact that, the nature of the data permits using measurable data and quantitative methods of analysis.
The technique for Data Analysis
The logistic regression technique was adopted. Logistic regression is a technique for making predictions when the dependent variable is a dichotomy, and the independent variables are continuous or discrete. A test for multicollinearity is conducted for the variables within the logistic regression.
245 Model Specification
AQ = α + β1MO + β2IO + β3OC+ β4FO+ e Where:
AQ = Audit Quality
MO= Managerial ownership IO= Institutional ownership OC= Ownership concentration FO= Foreign ownership
e = Error term
β 1, β 2 >0 β 0 …….. β 4 = Coefficient Model specification
Table 2: Variables Measurement- Independent and Dependent Variables
Dependent Variable Measurement
Audit Quality Defined as the largest global big four audit firm (Deloitte, PWC, Ernst & Young, and KPMG). Measured by dichotomous variable
„1‟ for all the years a firm is audited by one of the big four, and otherwise 0
Independent variables
Managerial ownership The proportion of shares owned by the firm’s directors to the total number of shares issued.
Institutional ownership The proportion of shares owned by Institutions to the total number of shares issued.
Ownership concentration The proportion of shares owned by the largest shareholders to the total number of shares issued.
Foreign ownership The proportion of shares owned by the
foreign investors to the total number of shares issued.
246 Result and Discussions
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean SD Min Max
AQ .6296296 .4859127 0 1.
MO .0749188 .054605 .01 .285
IO .2044931 .10312 .002352 .394008
OC .4967986 .151459 .145208 .775131
FO .1004616 .0172678 .06747 .135
Source: STATA Output, 2021
The results in Table 3 indicate that the measure of audit quality (AQ), which is the big 4 of the sampled oil and gas companies has an average value of .6296296 (63%) with a standard deviation of .4859127 (49%) respectively. The minimum and maximum values of audit firm size during the study period were 0 and 1 respectively.
More so, from Table 3 above, the average managerial ownership of the quoted oil and gas companies that constitute the study sample is .0749188 (7%), institutional shareholding accounts for .2044931 (20%), ownership concentration .4967986 (50%), and foreign ownership account for .1004616 (10%) respectively. The minimum value for managerial ownership is 0.01 and the maximum value is .285 (29%). The proportion of managerial ownership represents a relatively negligible amount of the total shares outstanding (less than 1). Whereas institutional ownership has a minimum value of .002% and a maximum value of .394008 (39%) , the minimum value indicating that there was a particular firm in a certain year within the observations that have 2%, institutional investors. for ownership concentration as the minimum value of .145208 (15%) and .775131(78%) respectively. On the other hand, foreign ownership has a minimum value of .06747 (7%) and a maximum value of .135 (14%) respectively.
Table 4 Correlation Matrix of Dependent and Independent Variables
Variables AQ MO IO OC FO
AQ 1.0000
MO -0.0248 1.0000
IO 0.2618 0.1584 1.0000
OC 0.3160 0.2634 0.6165 1.0000
FO 0.0696 0.1819 0.0491 0.1232 1.0000
Source: the output of correlation matrix obtained from STATA, 2021
The correlation matrix table revealed that the correlation coefficient between audit quality and managerial ownership is 0.0248. The result indicates that managerial ownership has a negative relationship with the audit quality of oil and gas companies in Nigeria. The correlation matrix also shows that the correlation coefficient between audit quality and institutional ownership is 0.2618. This implies that there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and audit quality of oil and gas companies in Nigeria. The result suggests that as institutional ownership increases the amount of audit quality increases, thus, the higher the institutional ownership, the higher the audit quality and vice versa.
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Table 4 shows that the correlation coefficient between ownership concentration and audit quality is 0.3160. The result means that ownership concentration has a positive relationship with the audit quality of oil and gas firms in Nigeria. It implies that an increase in ownership concentration will increase the audit quality of oil and gas companies and vice versa.
Table 4 further revealed that the correlation coefficient between the audit quality and foreign ownership is 0.0696. This means that foreign ow
nership has a positive relationship with the audit quality of oil and gas companies in Nigeria. The result implies that as foreign ownership increases audit quality increases. Hence, an increase in foreign ownership will increase audit quality.
However, Table 4 shows that all the correlation coefficient between the pairs of the independent variables is less than 0.8, thus, suggesting that the four independent variables can be well fitted into one regression model.
Table5: VIF Test for Multicollinearity
Variable VIF 1/VIF
MO 1.13 0.883809
IO 1.62 0.619134
OC 1.62 0.619134
FO 1.07 0.934222
Mean VIF 1.39
Source: output from STATA 2021
Although there is the presence of correlation among the independent variable, from Table 5, it could be seen that the tolerance values were consistently higher than 0.1, indicating the absence of multicollinearity problems. Also, the variance inflation factors were substantially lower than 10, also indicating a complete absence of multicollinearity in this study. This shows that the four independent variables are appropriate and fit well into the model.
Table :6 Summary of Logistic Regression
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|
MO -.1864183 .1190088 -1.57 0.117
IO .062955 .0173621 3.63 0.000
OC .5640355 .2415157 2.34 0.020
FO .0459029 .0188068 2.44 0.015
Pseudo R2 0.42771 Wald chi2(4) 157.90 Prob > chi2 0.0004
Source: STATA Output Result, 2021
A close check of the Pseudo (R2) which is also called McFadden's (R2) which serves as an analog to the squared contingency coefficient, with an interpretation like R-square. The Pseudo R2 with a value of 0.42771 indicates that the independent variables explained around 42% of the total variations in the dependent variable audit quality, from the coefficient of determination (R2 value of 0.42771). This implies that about 42% of the total systematic variation in the dependent
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variable (AQ) is caused by managerial ownership, institutional ownership, ownership, and foreign ownership of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria. The table also shows that the model is fitted from the Wald chi2 of 157.90 which is statistically significant at 1% level of significance (as indicated by the P-value of 0.0004).
Hypothesis
Ho1: Managerial ownership has no significant effect on the audit quality of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria.
Table 6 indicates that managerial ownership (MO) has a negative insignificant effect on audit quality of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria, from the coefficient of -.1864183 with a Z- value of -1.57, which is statistically insignificant at a 5% level of significance (p-value of 0.117). This implies that for every 1% increase in managerial ownership, there is a consequent 18% decrease in audit quality holding all other variables constant. Because of this, the study fails to reject the null hypothesis one (H01) which states that,managerial ownership has no significant effect on the audit quality of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria.
Ho2: Institutional ownership has no significant effect on the audit quality of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria.
Moreover, the coefficient for institutional ownership reveals a positive significant effect on audit quality. It shows a coefficient of .062955 and z-value of 3.63 and a p-value of 0.000. The implication is that for every 1% increase in institutional ownership, the audit quality increase by 6%. This implies that institutional ownership has a positive significant effect on the audit quality of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria. Therefore, the study rejected the null hypothesis two which stated that institutional ownership has no significant effect on the audit quality of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria.
Ho3: Ownership concentration has no significant effect on the audit quality of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria.
The coefficient for ownership concentration reveals a significant positive effect on audit quality since the coefficient is .5640355, z-value is 2.34 and p-value is 0.020. This implies that for every 1% increase in ownership concentration there is a resulting 56% increase in audit quality.
By implication, ownership concentration increases with an increase in audit quality of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria. This provides a basis for rejecting the null hypothesis three which stated that ownership concentration has no significant effect on the audit quality of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria.
Ho4: Foreign ownership has no significant effect on the audit quality of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria.
Furthermore, the coefficient for foreign ownership reveals a positive significant effect on audit quality. It shows a coefficient of .0459029 and z-value of 2.44 and a p-value of 0.015. The effect is that for every 1% increase in foreign ownership, the audit quality increases by 5%.
Therefore, the study rejects the null hypothesis four which stated that foreign ownership has no significant effect on the audit quality of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria.
Discussion of Findings
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The study discovered that managerial ownership had a negative statistical influence on the audit quality of listed oil and gas firms, implying that managerial ownership does not improve the audit quality of listed oil and gas companies throughout the study period. The present finding lends support to the study of Sherliza and Nurul (2015) who found a negative relationship between managerial ownership and audit quality. This Suggests that increases in managerial ownership do not enhance the audit quality predicted by the agency theory.
This study also found a positive significant effect of institutional ownership on audit quality.
The rationale can be attributed to the fact that institutions can monitor management activities in different ways and that they also have the financial strengths to recruit and fire and are also able to get the desired replacement in terms of both the best professional auditors and the best management at the moment. This aligns with the finding ofQasim (2011); Sadat and Hussaini, (2015); Majid, et al (2017)who showed that institutional ownership is positively and significantly associated with audit quality.
The result further revealed that ownership concentration is positively and significantly associated with audit quality. This means that by hiring a high-quality auditor such as Big 4 to audit the financial report, major shareholders minimize the agency dispute and similarly maintain the company's credibility. The results are in line with Mashallah and Fatemeh, (2019)who found that ownership concentration isa positive significant effect on audit quality It is not consistent with the findings of Qasim's (2011). Who found that ownership concentration has a negative insignificant effect on audit quality.
The study further revealed that foreign ownership has a positive significant effect on the audit quality of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria. This signifies that foreign ownership contributes positively to audit quality. The study result is consistent with the findings of Khaled and Sara (2018), Hussein and Nympha (2017).
Conclusion and Recommendation
The study presented an empirical indication of the association between the structure of ownership and the audit quality in the context of oil and gas companies in Nigeria. The study concludes that managers' equity ownership does not interact with the audit quality of the firms sampled. The study also concludes that institutional ownership, ownership concentration, and foreign ownership are important determinants of audit quality. The study, therefore, recommends that the management of oil and gas companies in Nigeria should consider raising the share of institutional ownership, ownership concentration, and foreign ownership in order to increase audit quality and strengthen their monitoring role.
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