Most of the included essays were originally presented at a conference on his thought held at the University of Chicago Divinity School in 1981. Hartshorne left Harvard to join the faculty of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Chicago; in 1943 he was jointly appointed to the faculty of the Divinity School and thus to the. Johnson, he thought that the origins of the church could only be explained by the miraculous resurrection of Jesus as told in the Gospels.
At Haverford College, there was Rufus Jones, an expert on mysticism, supposedly a mystic himself, and probably the most philosophical. theologian in the history of the American Society of Friends. This was a compliment, for Morris knew that most of the great idealists were dead, including Peirce and Whitehead. Later, the main reinforcement and generalization of the same position was Peirce's “Doctrine of Necessity Examined.” None of my teachers had much to do with this decision.
Existence and Actuality: Conversations with Charles Hartshorne by John B
Methodology in the
Metaphysics of Charles Hartshorne by Eugene H. Peters
The Experience of God
Critical Reflections on Hartshorne’s Theory of Analogy by Schubert M
Ogden
The other part of the claim is made equally necessary by what we now see as the specific requirements of the criterion of fitness. This is to say, then, that God must be said to be in some sense the subject of the experience of others and of oneself, lest the fundamental claims of Christian theology fail to accord with the apostolic witness which is their . norm. However, when you become aware of such implications, you immediately realize why asserting the experience of God in this part of the statement is indeed the case.
This strongly suggests, I believe, that any claim that God is subject to the experience of others is sure to create a particular problem for theology today. 34; literally," that is, that terms are "literally" in the strict sense of the word when, within any single logical type, they apply in the same sense, and not in different senses, to all the different entities belonging to the type. But this is not the place to pursue these or any of the others further.
Gamwell (eds.)
It is one of the future tasks of logico-linguistics, on the one hand, and of logico-theology, on the other, to provide them. But in any case, it is similar to it, certainly closer than that of the process theologians. God, in the sense of the letter "On God and Primordiality", is explicitly shown to be both.
To establish that it is would require a considerable elaboration of the view or views. However, in the approach in terms of options, theism is not proven, but simply listed as one of the options. It is to be feared that Hartshorne's version of the ontological argument did not take the matter further.
This principle will be a "necessary" metaphysical principle in theory, ensuring that God is not one of the "products" of the creative process. But God's being "defined as eternal" does not exclude that he can be one of the conceivable products of the creative process, namely as self-producing. And unfortunately, it is precisely on this veil that most of the accusations against classical theism are based .
It would be interesting to see this proof written in detail in terms of the concept of semantic truth. Freedom is in the exact way of forethought, not in what is foreseen. It is unique in the history of ideas and is something like my substitute for the Hegelian dialectic of the unity of.
And as for the whole process of time, there is no such whole completed once and for all.
Hartshorne and Aquinas: A Via Media by William P. Alston
Is each party's position on this point in any way connected with its position on the properties of the first group. I do not see that the neoclassical characteristics of our first group are incompatible with the correctness of the propositions just made. First, he takes the position of being committed to a temporal beginning of the world, a bringing the world into existence at a time.
Classical theologians have repeatedly emphasized that creation ex nihilo does not necessarily involve a temporal beginning of the universe. Hartshorne links his opposition to the classical doctrine of omnipotence with his rejection of the classical doctrine of creation.19 It is true that one can accept creation ex nihilo while acknowledging some limitations of divine power (apart from logical contradiction). If God is what he is partly because of how he relates to the world, and if the world is in different states at different times, thereby entering into different relations with God at different times, it follows that God must be in different states. at different times.
The existence of the created world (or, less doubtfully, of things other than God), and every part of it, is contingent. Now extend the deceptive present to all time, and you have a model for God's consciousness of the world. In laying out this doctrine, Whitehead appeals to James's concept of the deceptive present, but it is clear that he goes beyond that concept.
The concept of the specious present predicts process in the object and lack of succession in consciousness; does not provide for the joint instance of these from the same subject. And Anselm's idea that "God is whatever it is better to be than not to be"33 is pole apart from the notion of the actualization of all possibilities. Thinking about God's perfection along Anselmian lines, it remains to show that there is any logical impossibility in this being exemplified in a single state of being.
For now I examine the implications of the common ground -- that God could have created a world other than the one He did create.
Some Aspects of
Hartshorne’s Treatment of Anselm by John E. Smith
Nature, God, and Man by Paul Weiss
These, together with finite, transitory, actual entities, determine the character and course of the cosmos. Then we can envisage the knowledge of the most diverse religions, taking them to be occupied with different specializations of different ultimate realities. It is difficult to exaggerate the brilliance and daring displayed in Whitehead's account of the way in which the present instances of unity combine past and future, and a.
Nature is a place of natural wholes and individuals in their diversity and together. If we were cosmically dealing with finite units, but as subject to the conditioning of only one finite reality (say with Hartshorne, God), we should add that the finite reality is specialized in the form of the unitary natures of living beings. These beings can modify the effects directly produced by the interaction of God and finite units.
Natural wholes and individuals, the natural world that embraces them, and the nature in which the individuals are grouped all make a difference to the function and interrelationship between the ultimate units contained in the individuals and what these use. In these the activities and relations which men have to each other, and the activities and interrelationships of the ultimate entities which they contain, differ from those which they exhibit in the cosmos, as well as from those which they exhibit in nature. I hope that the indications here given as to how Whitehead's and Hartshorne's views are to be modified, and how they might be extended and filled out — while.
To defend a metaphysics today, one must therefore relate it to the challenge of the process view. For God, my career up to now is one of the most concrete, albeit multiple, realities there is now. In one, the non-identity of the subjects -- I say now -- is determined by the times; in the other it is the predicates that include the temporal.
Only knowledge of the orderliness of careers leads us to speak of a career as that of a substance.
Hartshorne and Peirce
Individuals and Continuity by Manley Thompson
Overcoming Reductionism by John B. Cobb, Jr
It is now clear that the properties of the whole are not found in the parts unless they are organized into that whole, and that for this reason the reductionist program is not. The effect of learning internal relations on the understanding of the nature of physical existence is radical. At least in the case of the living cell, Whitehead believed that the constitutive entities were not all physical in the usual sense.
It is these events, and not the molecular structure of the cell, that account for the life of the cell. The doctrine of internal relations and the assertion of cases in the empty space of living cells still do not answer the reasons why complex entities cannot be explained by the simpler ones of which they are composed. Although Leclerc's critique of Whitehead's doctrine of causality is based on a misinterpretation of the texts, Leclerc continues to draw.
This applies not only to physical ones, but also to those in the empty spaces of the cells and them. Whitehead saw that the problem had arisen because he had described society in terms of the derivation of a common character from. Even in the case of the human living person, the site is not the brain as a whole.
His work is, as he says, exclusively in the field of natural philosophy. If so, then the tree's internal relations with its environment can be located in its cells. Does this mean that the tree level can be reduced to the cell level.
For example, we enjoy consciousness, whereas probably none of the brain events are thus favored.