The Druze are Arabs by ethnicity, yet their allegiance lies with the state of Israel. Since 1956, Druze men in Israel have been required to serve in Israel's national army, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), as part of the country's conscription law, which gives them a common territory. Service in the IDF requires the Druze to fight against Arabs in Palestine whom some Druze consider their brothers.
Many questions arise from the unique paradox of Druze service to a Jewish state, and this dissertation seeks to explore the place of the Druze community in Israel. The dissertation begins with a brief history of the Druze in general and the Israeli Druze in particular to provide a better understanding of the niche community. Carmel in the Haifa district, the Druze have no part in 'the normal way of life in Israel'. The Pew Research Center reports that 83% of Druze disclosed that “all or most of their close friends belong to the Druze community” (Pew, 2016).
Police work can be a dangerous profession, and two members of the Druze community experienced the full capacity of this reality. To do this, Israeli government made calculated efforts to drive a wedge between the Druze and the rest of the Arab population.
The Israeli Druze
The Golani Druze are excluded from the analysis because many of those in the occupied Golan Heights hold strongly differing views, reinforcing the idea that the Druze are nationalistic. Perhaps because conversion is forbidden, the Druze religion is shrouded in secrecy, and few people, including some Druze themselves, know the specifics of the religion. During the pre-Israeli Palestinian-Jewish conflict, the Druze in the region were largely neutral on the issue.
A member of the Joint Bureau wrote to a leader of the Jewish Agency, stating: “It is worth while to win their friendship…” and that the Druze delegates “believe that the brotherhood [of the Joint Bureau and the Druze] will continue to grow” (Gelber, 1995). Words like "brotherhood" and "brotherhood" are often used to describe the relationship between the Jews and the Druze. The Joint Office, and ultimately Israel, benefited from the informal alliance and maintained further relations with the Druze.
It is unclear why the Druze initially chose to actively cooperate, but they could sense the potential benefits of a Jewish-Druze alliance. Because the Jews and the Druze were both minority communities, the Druze could not publicly support the Jews or advertise that they were cooperating with the Joint Office. That would have put the Druze community at great risk of attack by Arab rebels.
At this time, the Druze felt it was safe to declare their commitment to the Jewish people. The Druze covenant to the Jewish people is now called a “blood covenant” (Nisan, 2010). Because of this lack of clarity, the Druze community is in the unusual position they are now in, entangled in a web of Arab, Druze, and Israeli identities.
The Druze have a separate school system and curriculum that includes the history of the Jewish-Druze relationship in Israel.
The IDF: Preserving the “normal way of life in Israel”
Yet the Druze are not part of the popular narrative describing Israel's two-sided tug-of-war. Examining the creation and development of Israel's national army points to the status of the Druze in the newly established Jewish homeland. Like most other national armies, the IDF was founded to protect the nation and its people, but this does not provide details about who its people are.
A review of the IDF's mission statement and code of ethics, found on the Israeli government's website dedicated to the IDF, provides a little more clarity. This mission statement confirms the original premise that the IDF wants to serve everyone who lives in Israel, except perhaps those who pose a threat to the state. The goal of the IDF is to protect the existence of the State of Israel and its independence, and to thwart all hostile efforts to disrupt the normal way of life in Israel.
It makes one wonder, "What is the 'normal way of life in Israel' and who exists outside the norm?" The logical assumption is that the norm is established by the majority: the Jewish people. The code of ethics is much longer than the IDF mission and raises many questions about what and who the IDF is actually designed to protect. The Spirit of the IDF calls on soldiers to “.. fight, to devote all their strength and even sacrifice their lives to protect the State of Israel.
This leads one to question what benefits the State of Israel in general and the IDF in particular offer the Druze in exchange for the potentially fatal sacrifice of their service. Learning more about the origins and beliefs of the Israel Defense Forces only leaves us with more questions about why the Druze began to serve and continue to serve so willingly. The next chapter discusses the role of the Druze in the IDF to find out what the IDF means to the Druze and, conversely, what the Druze mean to the IDF and the nation it protects.
It also compares Druze service with that of the Arabs to further piece together the larger puzzle of Arab-Israeli and Jewish relations with the Druze.
Druze Role in the IDF
IDF service functions as a right of passage for young Israelis; when the law was changed, the Druze community was invited into Israeli popular society for the first time. Were it not for their fraternization with leading Israelis in the IDF, the Druze might have remained a complete enigma to other Israelis. The inclusion of Druze in the service shows Israeli officials' opinion of the Druze community and ability to trust the minority group.
Perhaps just as important as the Druze position in the IDF is the Arabs' role, or lack thereof. The inclusion of the Druze and the exclusion of Arabs may serve as the facade for an Israeli scheme to separate Arabs from the Druze and other Israelis or simply a practical precaution designed to avoid a conflict of loyalty between Arab-Israelis and prevent their close Palestinian brothers. Some Druze and Arab Israelis claim that Druze soldiers are placed in areas of higher conflict to ensure intimate fighting between the two communities.
They believe the Israeli government is using the Druze service to create friction between the two communities by pitting the Druze against Arab-Israelis and further isolating them from their Arab heritage. It also prevents Arabs from participating in Israeli life and reaping the benefits of full Israeli citizenship unlocked for the Druze when it is mandatory. IDF service is one of the few ways for the Druze to have a typical Israeli experience.
It removes them from the isolated villages where they spend most of their lives, requires them to use the national language of Israel, Hebrew (instead of the mother tongue Arabic) so that they have the possibility of linguistic assimilation in the country of theirs and demonstrates the dedication of the Druze. to Israel and their enduring commitment to the Covenant. Mandatory conscription for the Druze improves their relationship with the Israelis by allowing them to get to know the Druze through their shared experience. Some Arab-Israelis hate the Druze for defending their enemy country, and others simply feel an unwanted sense of detachment from their Arab brethren.
In the following chapter, the extent to which the military and security services affect the Druze experience and their relationship with the surrounding populations is examined.
Case Study
The first category of answers ignores that the Druze are a minority community and are not part of the Jewish majority, which Arab-Israelis generally oppose. In the same article, a different language is used to describe the death of the Druze soldiers. Both Al-Quds and Al-Hadath use the Arabic word maqtal al-Druzeen, or "killing of the two Druze." The Arab-Israelis were martyred and the Druze were just killed.
However, if you dig deeper, one notices that the reporting of many of the news articles is solely focused on the broader political dispute between Arab-Israelis and Jews and is not concerned with the Druze identity of the deceased. This same article along with many others fails to mention that the fallen soldiers belong to the Druze. It also shows that Arab Israelis group the Druze together with other Israelis, ignoring that they have a distinct identity.
A major theme found in the Arab media is that Israel is taking advantage of the Druze to serve a larger political purpose. This implies that they see the Druze policemen as any other Israeli policemen, which suggests that the Druze - like the Jews - are the enemy of the Arab-Israelis. The sacrifice that the Druze offer to the state is clear; however, the benefits Israel offers them in return are less direct.
The Druze have been used by the Jews since before the state of Israel was founded. In the 1930s, however, the relationship between the Druze and the Jews was more favorable. That the Jews abuse the Druze only became clear after a tragedy such as the Al-Aqsa shooting in July 2017.
The use of the word "martyr" by Arab media articles to describe only the three Arab-Israeli attackers and not the fallen Druze policemen demonstrates Arab-Israeli sentiments towards the Arab-Israeli population and the Druze population. However, within the IDF and Israeli society, there is a distinct difference between the Jewish population and the Druze. The Druze look like Arab-Israelites and are treated the same by Jews when they meet casually.
