19 The Political Economy of Peace in the Middle East The Impact of Competing Trade Agendas Edited by J.W. Essays in Honor of Geoff Harcourt, Volume Three Edited by Peter Kriesler and Claudio Sardoni 23 The Dynamics of Technological Knowledge.
Contributors
Mansoob Murshed, Institute for Social Studies (ISS), The Hague, Netherlands
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. PKM purchasing power parity PGE political general equilibrium R&D research and development REER real effective exchange rates.
1 Introduction
Mansoob Murshed
It is very much in the tradition of the trade-off between market failure and policy failure. For countries in the EU periphery, the empirical results in the chapter show that the presence of US FDI boosts US IPT.
2 A proposal for a new dynamic federalism in
Wagner (1978) 'The Institutional Framework for Municipal Incorporation', Journal of Law and Economics The Effect of Government Structure on Special District Expenditures', Public Choice. 1994) 'The Political Economy of Centralization and the European Community', Public Choice The Impact of Interstate Conflict on Revolutionary Change and Individual Freedom', Kyklos The Effects of Jurisdiction Types and Numbers on Local Public Finance' in Harvey S.
3 On the economic causes of contemporary civil wars
We need to assess why some 'post-conflict' countries have returned to war (Angola) while others have managed to maintain peace (Mozambique). 2 Measuring conflict and its occurrence is not simple (see Ayres, 2000, Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2000).
4 Russia
More specifically, the second section examines the impact of the resource interest on the speed of reform. The fourth section analyzes the impact of the natural resource rent on rent-seeking behavior and corruption.
5 Electoral uncertainty, economic policy and
Note that ct,kt+1 only represents the functions of the predetermined share capital,kt, and the current tax rate,θt. The selected party chooses the current tax rate, θt, to maximize the utility of the representative household. That is, θt will only be a function of the current value of the economy-wide state variables.
It is important to note that the main result of the literature (i.e. the lower the probability of re-election, the stronger the incentive for policymakers to choose short-sighted distortionary fiscal policies, and hence the lower the growth economic and intertemporal welfare) the crucial assumption that political parties care about economic outcomes more when in power than out of power (see Bellman equations (5.11a)–(5.11b) above). Also, since the early 1960s in most OECD countries, there is evidence that: i) the size of the public sector (measured by total government expenditure as a share of GDP) has increased significantly; and (ii) government consumption (for example, government transfers and wages) as a share of GDP shows a marked upward movement relative to government investment (see Alesina, 1999 and Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000). See also Persson and Tabellini (1999a) for a survey of the literature on political uncertainty, economic policy and economic growth.
This means that the value functions in (5.11a)–(5.11b) are expected to be of the log-linear form VP(kt) =uP0+uP1logkt and VN(kt) =u0N+uN1logkt, where P0,uP1,uN0,uN1 undetermined coefficients.
6 The importance of being unimportant
This point forms the basis for the analysis of the growth implications for small states in the context of their economic suboptimality. Endogenous growth models therefore offer a potential means of examining the determinants of growth in small states. Small states are also highly susceptible to import shocks due to their high degree of import dependence.
Economic vulnerability arises primarily from the great structural openness and dependence on trade of small states. Islandness is often seen in the literature as a critical factor in the growth of small states. Economic integration requires giving up trade policy autonomy, a crucial variable in economic policy in small states.
This chapter examines the international political economy of small states in the context of the structural and political consequences of their important economic characteristics.
7 Some observations on small state choice of exchange
The second section examines recent data on real exchange rate volatility and stable prices for these small states. In this section we will examine the choice of exchange rate regime in terms of the trade-off between reliability and flexibility. Incidentally, this finding would seem to support the sticky picture of world prices with real exchange rate volatility closely related to nominal exchange rate volatility.
But since it is the countries with the fixed exchange rate that have the real real exchange rate and the relative volatility of inflation, something else may be going on here. And in comparing floating versus fixed, we find that any increase in the variance of real exchange rates in floating regimes is associated with greater variability in nominal effective exchange rates and relative inflation rates—so it does not appear to be the result of selection. of the nominal exchange rate. Finally, neither the nominal exchange rate nor the relative inflation rates change their spectral pattern with respect to each other or to regime choice.
Likewise, the choice of exchange rate regime has no influence on the variability of the real exchange rate.
8 Trade in fragmented products
The second section discusses how fragmentation can be measured and presents some descriptive data relating to the volume of US-EU inward processing trade. In the case of the first, plants belonging to the same company specialize in the production of different components. Therefore, it is necessary to control the presence of American foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country.
The results show that the presence of US foreign direct investment in the EU member country has a positive impact on the US IPT in that country. The results also show that, for peripheral countries, the presence of US FDI has a positive impact on the location of US IPT in the country. Our empirical analysis of US active processing trade in EU countries as a measure of the degree of fragmentation occurring in the EU lends support to the comparative advantage explanation.
Kierzkowski (reds) Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the World Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9 Technological innovation
The invention of the steam railway engine led to a dramatic improvement in European trade within the country. The third fact is that the history of the industrial revolution is essentially the history of technological innovation. It is fair to say that none of the classical economists placed technological innovation at the center of economic growth and/or international trade.
Malthus (1836) was struck by the invention of textile machinery in Britain and took machine inventions ('the result of human ingenuity') as substitutes. By plotting the multiple factors against each country, he finds that "rich countries tend to be short on most factors and poor countries tend to be abundant on all factors." The era of modern trade theories began with the advent of the hypothesis of neo-technology and neo-factor proportions – caused by the Leontief paradox (1953).
1970) "The influence of national characteristics and technology on the commodity composition of trade in industrial products", in R.
10 NAFTA, environmental regulations and firm
This strategy was followed by US brewers in the case of Ontario beer (see Rugman and Soloway, 1998). A fourth strategy was to change the product or even the production standard to meet the foreign regulation of the moment. This was an attractive option where adaptation costs were low (perhaps limited to a single low-value input), where firms were installing new capacity in a product line dedicated to the export market and segmented from the rest of the the firm’s production capacity, and when the foreign market offered a high capability, a high percentage of the firm’s sales, and the certainty that the existing regulation would last for a long time (during which additional regulation costs could to be amortized).
Conversely, Alcan (as a Canadian supplier to US companies that exported their beer in aluminum cans to the Ontario market) was mobilized against Ontario's environmental regulations in the Ontario Beer case (Vogel and Rugman, 1997). Such a strategy is reinforced by the finding that in the Canada-US relationship, Canada tends to gain the upper hand on issues dealt with at the top level and related to the overall state of the relationship (Nye, 1974). Initially, domestic companies can benefit from the new NAFTA institutional network in several ways.
A significant number of the environment-related trade disputes in the region (affecting domestic firms, home-based exporters, and home-based multinational corporations), particularly prior to NAFTA, arose from state and provincial regulations (Vogel and Rugman, 1997).
11 Green and producer lobbies
We find that, in the presence of emissions leakages and transboundary spillovers, the relationship between green and producer interests over trade and environmental policy is ambiguous. It shows that, in the presence of trade and environmental distortions, inefficient trade policies can lead to higher environmental quality than more efficient domestic policies. In this case, the environmental impact of the increase in the domestic pollution tax from the point of view of local residents is.
In the first phase, the green lobbies and the producer lobbies simultaneously present incumbent policymakers with contribution schemes, namely functions that map each combination of trade and environmental policies into a level of political contribution. Statement 11.3 The nature of the relationship between green lobbies and producer lobbies depends largely on what policy instruments are available, whether the government acts unilaterally or cooperatively, and the size of emission leakages and associated cross-border spillovers. In this chapter, we used a joint agency model to examine the role of green and producer lobbies in the joint formulation of trade and environmental policies.
Whinston (1986) 'Menu auctions, resource allocation and economic influence', Quarterly Journal of Economics Green and producer lobbies: competition or alliance?', Warwick University CSGR Working Paper no. 2002) 'Green lobbies and transboundary pollution in large open economies', Journal of International Economics, forthcoming. 1997) 'The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.
12 Income tax enforcement with a self-interested
Contradictions between the auditor's report and the taxpayer's report lead to legal proceedings in which the case is closed. This clearly shows that the incentives of the auditor and the taxpayer are linked. The idea is, of course, that this interest will be the auditor's. prevent the taxpayer from lying in the balance.
Thus, game analysis clearly conveys the interdependence of auditor and taxpayer incentives. In the second case described in Proposition 12.2, the auditor is simply indifferent between performing a proper investigation or not. Proposition 12.2 shows that the auditor's and the taxpayer's incentives are related in a rather complicated way.
We can therefore concentrate on the part of the game tree where the accountant is confronted with a report on low incomes.
Index