While scholars have compared agencies' interpretive practices to those of courts, they have yet to develop a theory of agency statutory interpretation. This article develops a purposive theory of agency statutory interpretation on the grounds that legislative statutes oblige agencies to implement the statutes they so administer.
AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN CONTEXT
Interpretation in the Administrative State
First, in terms of sources of law, the traditional focus on judicial statutory interpretation is overlooked. With these perceived contrasts in place, it is now time to develop a theory of the legal interpretation of agency.
Grounds for an Interpretive Approach
THE A GENCY'S PURPOSIVE DUTY
It argues that regulatory statutes place a duty on agencies to interpret the statutes they administer in a purposive manner. Finally, Article E argues the agency's duty to implement also requires the agency to interpret the statutes it administers in a purposive manner.
The Elements of Statutory Obligation
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall have... licensing and related regulatory authority. .with respect to the following facilities of the Administration... ").The Secretary [of Education] shall have the authority to prescribe such rules and regulations as the Secretary may consider necessary or appropriate for the administration and administration of the functions of the Secretary or the Department.") . 3474, except that "the Secretary [of Education] shall have the authority to prescribe such rules and regulations as the Secretary may deem necessary or appropriate to administer and administer the functions of the Secretary or the Department," 31 U.S.C.
The general design and duties of [the Department of Agriculture] shall be to obtain and disseminate useful information among the people of the United States on subjects relating to agriculture U.S.C. It shall be the province and duty of said Department [of Commerce] to promote, promote and develop the foreign and domestic commerce, the mining, manufacturing and fishing industries of the United States.. ";. 101(b) A Department) of Transportation is necessary in the public interest .. to ensure the coordinated and efficient administration of the transportation programs of the United States Government" in addition to five other general purposes of the agency.").
The Character of the Agency's Purposive Duty
First and most obviously, the agency must develop an understanding of the principle or purposes set forth in the statute. The point here is the more basic and fundamental one: discerning the purposes or principles of the statute and seeking to implement them are necessary elements of the agency's duty to carry out its statute. Our reading of the statute and the RP furthers this goal by requiring all commercials broadcast by stations/[digital distributors] to comply with the RP, regardless of whether they do.
Purposivism in the Executive Branch than 95% of broadcast commercials are embedded in programming when sent to stations/[digital distributors]. This passage shows that the agency formulates an understanding of the purpose of the statutory provision and evaluates alternatives in light of that purpose. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION FOR EMPLOYEES OF PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES.-No corporation with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Reinforcement in Administrative Law
As noted above, the priority of the agency's purpose is independent of how the agency distinguishes the purpose. The agency had rescinded its passive restraint requirement without devoting any analysis to maintaining the airbag-only requirement, despite its own prior conclusions that airbags were effective in promoting the safety of vehicle occupants.”20 The Supreme Court reasoned. 34; Given the effectiveness attributed to airbag technology by the agency, the [Safety] Act's mandate to achieve road safety would suggest that the logical response to the deficiencies of detachable seat belts would be to require the installation of airbags." 1 The law's purpose of promoting occupant safety was critical to the agency's finding that it failed in its duties of reasoned elaboration; it did not explain how the chosen course of action, in light of its prior findings, furthered the 'mandate' of the law.
The agency's duty to "persuasively explain why it has exercised its discretion in a particular manner"'2 thus includes a duty to relate the agency's chosen course of action to the purposes set forth by the act.' To fulfill this duty, the agency must specify the ends of the statute. As a result, arbitrary and capricious review can be viewed as a check on the agency's duty to apply the statute in a deliberate manner.'24.
From Implementation to Interpretation
AGENCY PURPoSIvISM AND RESPONSE TO CRITICS
While this represents a crucial step forward in identifying the grounds and general orientation of agencies' statutory interpretation, it does not defend its workability in practice or suggest how the approach might be specified. This is done by examining the ability of agencies to apply the classic technique of purposive interpretation set out by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks in The Legal Process.42 There are several reasons for specifying the approach with reference to Hart's theory and Sacks, even though the courts were their primary focus. Congressional staffers “did not distinguish, as some scholars have, between the agency's statutory 'implementation' and the agency's statutory 'interpretation'.” Id.
Legal process theorists strive to match decision-making authority with competence in defining the procedures necessary for resolving particular questions.”43 Purposivism in the classic explanation of executive branch theory. and subsequently of textualists and public choice theorists—is primarily focused on Hart and Sacks' view.1' A defense of purposivism, even for agencies, must confront these criticisms. So while the fundamental task of agency could be specified in a way that does not follow the contours of Hart and Sacks' approach, their theory provides an appropriate starting point and counterpoint.
Agencies and Purposivist Interpretation
In the first case, Congress has been relatively specific about the purpose of the statute. In contrast, it is an uncontroversial directive to give the agency a duty to choose a course of action that “best achieves” the purposes of the statute. Purposivism in the executive branch is better positioned to take note of the state of the industry, the extent of its dependence on advertisers, and the economic impact of this new rule.
Because agencies are part of the Executive Branch, they must obey binding executive orders that instruct how. 187 For a useful exploration of agencies' challenges and capacity to engage in constitutional implementation, see Gillian E., reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010), providing an overview and defense of the Office of Legal Counsel's capacity for independent legal advice, including on constitutional issues).
Purposivism v. Textualism Beyond the Courts
MPLICATIONS OF AGENCY PURPOSIVISM
Understanding that regulatory statutes obligate agencies to be purposeful and that agencies have the capacity to meet that obligation has implications for central issues of administrative law and statutory interpretation. For the judiciary, this understanding indicates a reorientation of the framework for judicial review of agency operations. For the executive branch, this understanding has implications for the allocation and balance of authority between the president and those agencies or agency officials authorized by law.
Judicial Review of the Purposive Agency
Purposivism in the Executive Branch technocratic judgment.2"5 Scholars have traced these and other conceptions of the agency in current doctrines of judicial review of agency actions.216 In particular, it suggests that judicial review should be structured around an understanding of the agency's statutory duties. Does the agency's action highlight the statute's purpose(s) using means permitted by law and other legislation.
Neither Chevron nor State Farm take the nature of the agency's statutory duty as their order inquiry. Similarly, asking whether the agency's action is permitted by the statute appears to be required by the directive in § 706(2)(C) that a reviewing court review any agency action "that more than exceeds statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations declared illegal C. In short, the purposive understanding of the agency's obligations suggests that reviewing courts are also obligated to review agency actions within a purposive framework (unless there is some constitutional reason not to do so).
The President and the Purposive Agency
What counts as legitimate or unlawful influence depends fundamentally on the nature of the authority's legal task. At a basic level, purposeful accountability requires that the agency's actions be sustained and rationalized in terms of the objectives of the statute. Purposivism in the Executive Branch It is important to note that simply specifying what type of influence is legitimate does not mean that the organization is legally obligated to follow the president's directives.
The question of what content is legitimate is distinct from the question of whether the president has authority to direct agency actions. The content of the president's directive could be legitimate, but the agency could have no obligation to follow the president's view; likewise, the content may be illegitimate, even though the agency has an obligation to follow (legitimate) presidential directions. By clarifying that the rationale for the agency's interpretive duties is statutory, the purpose statement highlights the limits of the president's authority to override this approach.
The Law-Politics Distinction in the Administrative State
The question of the scope of the President's power to direct agency action is one for which there is robust debate on both constitutional and statutory dimensions.233 The point here is that the purpose accounting identifies the duties that legislative statutes impose and thus what counts . as a legitimate influence without answering the separate question of allocation of powers between the agency and the President. This view of the distinction between law and politics is also reflected in the reformist impulse to design discretion out of administrative government. As suggested above, the purposive account of agency statutory interpretation conceives the relationship between law and policy differently.
To be sure, one function of law and legal considerations is to identify the scope of the agency's powers. This shows that regulatory statutes place distinct obligations on administrative agencies to transfer the powers granted in light of the purposes or principles that the statutes establish. By providing an account of the agency's legal duties of implementation, this theory also informs the debate about the extent of presidential and other political influence over agencies.
