The Makers of Sport Policy: A (Task)Force To Be Reckoned With

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The Makers of Sport Policy: A (Task)Force to Be Reckoned with

Article in Sociology of Sport Journal · March 2005

DOI: 10.1123/ssj.22.1.78

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Sociology of Sport Journal, 2005, 21, 78-99

The Makers of Sport Policy:

A (Task)Force To Be Reckoned With

Michael P. Sam

Taskforces, commissions of inquiry, and advisory committees are significant institutional features in the development of government sport policy. This study analyzes New Zealand’s Ministerial Taskforce on Sport, Fitness, and Leisure (2001) and uses empirical data gath- ered from observations of consultations, interviews with committee members, and available documents. It is argued that procedural, organizational, and political considerations significantly shaped and constrained the Taskforce’s findings and recommendations. Two fundamental contradictions are discussed. The first concerns the expectations for these bodies to develop both innovative and pragmatic recommendations in light of their ad hoc nature, their broad mandates, and short time lines. The second contradiction speaks to the paradoxical nature of taskforces in developing sport policy, noting in particular their dual roles as both advocates for the sport sector and investigators responsible for addressing problems and issues.

Les groupes spéciaux de travail, les commissions d’enquête et les comités consultatifs sont des éléments institutionnels importants dans le développement d’une politique gouvernementale en matière de sport. Cet article porte sur une analyse du Groupe de travail ministériel sur le sport, la condition physique et le loisir de la Nouvelle-Zélande (2001).

L’analyse est fondée sur des données empiriques colligées à partir d’observations, d’entrevues avec des membres du Groupe et de documents disponibles. Il est suggéré que des considérations procédurales, organisationnelles et politiques ont significativement influencé et restreint les résultats et les recommandations du Groupe de travail. Deux contradictions fondamentales sont discutées. La première concerne le fait que l’on s’attende à ce qu’un tel groupe développe des recommandations pragmatiques et innovatrices alors qu’il est de nature ad hoc et qu’il possède un mandat large et peu de temps. La seconde concerne la nature paradoxale des groupes de travail qui développent des politiques en matière de sport et particulièrement leur rôle double en tant que défenseurs du sport et en tant qu’investigateurs responsables d’aborder les problèmes.

Commissions of inquiry, national taskforces, and advisory committees are significant institutional features in the development of government sport policy.

Indeed, it is through these bodies (and their subsequent reports) that sport policy is linked with everything from health and community welfare to cultural identity, national pride and unity, international cooperation, and economic growth. Given this breadth of interests and agendas, the formulation of a coherent “national policy for sport” (the subject of several recent sport inquiries) poses a significant chal- lenge.¹ The task is rendered more difficult because contemporary inquiries into sport also have to consider the effectiveness of bureaucratic structures and scrutinize

The author is with the University of Otago, School of Physical Education, Dunedin, NZ.

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them along public management criteria (Sam & Jackson, 2004). Thus, in countries like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, inquiries no longer address sport in prin- cipally philosophical terms; they increasingly speak of the sport sector’s “fragmentation,” as well as the need for “partnerships” and intersectoral collaboration (cf. Canada. Canadian Heritage, 2001; Ministerial Taskforce, 2001; Sport 2000 Taskforce, 1999). Given the diversity in interests, the multiple organizational arrangements, and widening public scrutiny, sport policy development grows ever more complex and problematic. Thus, it is through taskforces and inquiries that sport (as an area of public policy) is essentially “put on trial”; that is, assessed, evaluated, and otherwise defined.

Canada’s Dubin inquiry exemplified this in 1990 when it was appointed to investigate a perceived “crisis” in Canadian sport, ultimately resulting in that government’s re-evaluation of the national sport system and the commissioning of two other reports (Semotiuk, 1994).² In Australia, taskforces and review committees have been widely used by various ruling governments, with some reports resulting in significant budgetary increases (e.g., Australia Sport and Tourism, 2001).

Even in a presidential system such as the United States, where there is much less traditional use of these instruments, federal committees (such as the Secretary’s Commission on Opportunity in Athletics) are occasionally appointed to make recommendations regarding sporting matters.³ Despite their general misuses (in terms of deviating attention or delaying action), inquiries and taskforces play significant roles in defining issues and shaping policy agendas (Aucoin, 1990; Bradford, 1999;

Prasser, 1994). Given how regularly these bodies are commissioned and the extent to which they demand input from “stakeholders,” scant attention has been paid to how these organizations of policy analysis actually function.

The analysis and study of these institutional mechanisms is significant from a number of different perspectives. For historians, the final reports of taskforces and inquiries represent punctuations in the contemporary histories of sport and politics. Sociologists similarly take note of their importance because the reports of inquiries might institutionalize dominant ideas with respect to issues of gender (McKay, 1997), athletes’ rights (Kidd, 1988), or citizenship (Harvey, 2002). More- over, the processes that underpin taskforce reports provide a window into state–

civil society relations and the way in which interests are organized in (or out) of policy making (Harvey, Thibault, & Rail, 1995). As Aucoin (1990) notes, taskforces are significant to the policy analysis process because they tend to identify policy issues, draw explicit reference to the specific interests in a policy sector, introduce or legitimize new ideas, and point towards particular prescriptions and solutions.

Ultimately, how a taskforce does all these things is dependent on both the ideological context in which it is situated, as well as on the prescribed operational rules it inherits (such as its terms of reference, reporting procedures, etc.). Thus, this second view suggests that the rationality (and objectivity) of these bodies might be paradoxically limited by the very structures that make them an appealing instrument to develop public policy. For example, if a commission of inquiry’s mandate is to establish the feasibility of a particular strategy (as was the case before the establishment of the Australian Institute of Sport), the terms of reference often suggest a priori that a solution has been found and that information should be sought to justify and rationalize that solution.⁴ Similarly, the institutionally recognized role of taskforces as agents of policy change means that they are unlikely to recommend keeping the status quo, particularly when they are appointed by a newly

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elected government party. Thus, whereas taskforces are institutional policy making structures, they are themselves influenced by numerous other structural elements including, for example, the amount of financial resources provided/allo- cated or the timeframe within which the inquiry must be completed. It is with such constraints in mind that the findings of taskforces and inquires need to be understood.

Purpose

Conventional scholarly analyses of commissions of inquiry in sport range between two polar ends. The first is distinguished by an uncritical examination of their findings, recommendations, and effects on subsequent policy (cf. Houlihan, 1997; Macintosh, Bedecki, & Franks, 1987; Olafson & Brown-John, 1986). Stud- ies of this nature are usually intended to make direct comparisons among countries and, thus, remain largely descriptive. The second approach provides a more critical view of the functions that these inquiries fulfill, presenting them as either devices through which governments legitimate their activities (Chalip, 1996) or as purveyors of dominant discourses (McKay, 1991; Sam, 2003). The preference for one approach over the other likely has more to do with the limitations of space (as well as the intended audience) rather than any intentional neglect. What appears to be missing in either case, however, is an examination of the institutional mechanisms underpinning these policy-making processes. Taskforces and commissions of inquiry are inarguably distinctive forms of policy formulation compared with other locales: political parties, interest groups, or the bureaucracy (Bradford, 1999).

Therefore, how do the structures and dynamics of an inquiry impact the final outcomes of policy? How does the very nature of a taskforce shape or constrain its capacity to produce “good” policy? More significantly, how do their characteristics shape what is even considered to be good policy? This article analyzes the use of inquiries in sport-policy making and seeks to explain how their particular features contribute to shaping policy.

Through an understanding of the institutional constraints these organizations are confronted with, it might be possible to either add to existing critical views of their recommendations or, at least, put such criticisms into perspective.

For though the tendency might be to either dismiss taskforce findings as a reflection of broad political ideology (such as nationalism or neoliberalism) or as re- sponses to economic imperatives (e.g., promoting capital accumulation), showing how inquiries produce their reports and under what circumstances can add detail to the role of taskforces in the policy process.

This article addresses two related topics. First, it examines the nature of taskforces and inquiries as instruments to formulate sport policy. More specifically, it describes their functions, including both their intended and unintended roles (as sources of policy advice, as means to ensure compliance, and as vehicles to legitimate future action). A second aim of this article is to illustrate two fundamental contradictions arising from the use of these policy instruments. The first contradiction concerns the expectations for these bodies to develop both innovative and pragmatic recommendations in light of their ad hoc nature, their broad mandates, and short time lines. The second contradiction speaks to the paradoxical nature of taskforces in developing sport policy, noting in particular their dual roles as both advocates for the sport sector and investigators responsible for addressing problems and issues.

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New Zealand’s recent Ministerial Taskforce on Sport, Fitness, and Leisure serves as the case study to illustrate how government institutions (such as the Minister’s Office and Treasury Department) enabled or constrained the formulation of policy issues, findings, and recommendations. Although it is acknowledged from the outset that state institutions differ across national contexts, the present case will hopefully allow for reflection on how the governmental machinery surrounding these bodies contributes to organizing politics.

This article is divided into four parts. The first introduces the broader theoretical framework used to investigate policy institutions like taskforces and inquiries. The second addresses the nature of taskforces and inquiries, their forms and structures, and their role in policy development. Particular features of New Zealand’s Taskforce are then described, focusing specifically on four institutional considerations: its terms of reference, resources, timelines, and links with other state departments. The fourth section discusses the implications of these institutional arrangements on the making of national sport policy.

Theoretical Approach

The study of institutions is of central importance to explaining political phenomena (Rhodes, 1995). An institutional approach is adopted here for essentially three reasons. In the first instance, it allows for an examination of a taskforce as an institutional form of government policy analysis. It provides a means to describe and analyze a distinctive mechanism through which government policy agendas and alternatives are formulated. The approach thus places commissions of inquiry and taskforces within the wider institutional contexts that ultimately contribute to appointing them, legitimizing them, providing them with resources, determining their timelines, and so forth. The taskforce as institution is thus an important form of collective action in general and a significant part of the sport policy process in particular.

The second reason for using institutional analysis is that it allows for an examination of how rules in these contexts enable and/or constrain the formulation of policy. For instance, in the case of a taskforce, certain rules are designed to limit bureaucratic and political discretion, providing a reason why, in many instances, committee appointees come from outside the civil service (Kernaghan &

Siegel, 1995). If we are interested in why some policy issues gain prominence while others do not or why some strategies are pursued and not others, we must pay attention to how the policy process itself is organized.

Third, and in a more critical vein, institutional analysis helps to reveal the inherent biases in politics (March & Olsen, 1989). For example, what might appear as a relatively benign mechanism for decision making, such as the use of referenda in U.S. state decisions to subsidize sport stadia construction, not only reflects the value placed on direct democracy but also illustrates wider societal pressures to simplify complex political issues into narrow economic arguments.

Given the luxury of a specific context, the present approach allows for an examination into some of the rules that confine power in policy making.

Institutional Policy Analysis

An institutional approach is one in which the formulation and development of policy is understood to take place within a particular organizational context.

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Thus, to adequately explain how or why certain policy problems (and their associated solutions) emerged requires taking into account the institutional setting that shaped them, including parameters such as decision rules, procedures, and administrative or political arrangements (Parsons, 1995). Generally speaking, institutions are the relatively stable systems of rules that guide political behavior. Although electoral systems, constitutions, and legislative configurations are commonly understood to bring order to politics, other structures such as organizational links, informational networks, and think tanks are also conceptualized as institutions (Considine, 1994; March & Olsen, 1989).

Given the breadth of this perspective, it is not surprising that the use of institutions as an analytical tool does not represent a coherent body of research (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Peters, 1996; Reich, 2000; Rhodes, 1995). Two schools of thought on institutions are relevant to the present analysis. First, historical–

institutional (or formal–legal) approaches are commonly used to explain the gen- esis of sport policy because they offer descriptions of constitutional, legislative, or bureaucratic structures (Chalip, 1990; Henry, 1990). Important to the analysis of sport in comparative terms, these works see the organization of the polity or political economy as the principal factor structuring collective behavior.

Adopting a more cultural perspective, sociological institutional approaches consist of theories derived from the field of organizational sociology (Parsons, 1995; Peters & Pierre, 1998) and are used to explain how institutional practices originate and change. Applied to policy making, such explanations suggest that institutions (e.g., existing organizational structures or programs) not only confine the range of possible actions but also construct actors’ preferences and identities with respect to instances of policy development. This approach is reflected in the works of Newell and Swan (1995) and Kikulis (2000), who observe that National Sport Organizations (NSOs) do not necessarily adopt new designs to advance mean- ends efficiency, but rather because these new forms have their own “logic of social appropriateness” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; March & Olsen, 1989).

Reconciling an Institutional Approach

Common to these two approaches is a focus on how layers of structure affect policy outcomes. The idea that policy processes take place within a nested institutional context is best captured by Rein and Schön (1993) who note, “policy issues tend to arise in connection with governmental programs, which exist in some policy environment, which is part of some broader political and economic setting, which is located, in turn, within a historical era” (p. 154). Thus, how policy makers think about issues and, indeed, which issues are allowed to surface is contextualized by a number of contingent factors including what policies and programs already exist, the organization of international systems, the organization of the state (e.g., Westminster vs. presidential system), and the organization of society. At the broadest of levels, international parameters such as trade agreements or labor laws structure national sport policy processes. Houlihan (2000) notes, for instance, that many issues in sport (such as doping or the citizenship of athletes) are now addressed in a globalized policy arena (see also Jackson, 1998). At the next level, past policies and inherited institutional arrangements inevitably structure both the nature of problems and the range of possible solutions. Thus, the various government departments that oversee sport (such as the Department of Culture, Media, and Sports in

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the United Kingdom or the Department of Canadian Heritage) set boundaries on the preferences and goals sport is intended to fulfill. At a “meso” level, policies are also influenced by the interactions within particular policy communities or networks. In this perspective, specific interests (such as those drawn across gender, racial, or professional lines) are more explicitly described as influencing policy development, yet their influence is ultimately constrained by their status, capital resources, and their access to the process. It is at this meso level that the present case study is necessarily situated.

Taskforces and inquiries are significant structures where the macro- and micro-policy contexts meet. By virtue of their designs, they are expressly intended to link the demands of the state with those of civil society. So while they are shaped inevitably by the exigencies of government, taskforces and inquiries are also a unique institution through which (some) small groups and individuals are able to directly access the policy process. Therefore, an institutional approach is relevant because taskforces inevitably have their own sets of rules regarding who should participate, how information is processed, and what counts as a good outcome. If we accept that public policy making is about resolving particular problems or issues, institutions are the mechanisms or bundles of rules that establish “what limits (if any) are to be placed on the range of possible outcomes” (Atkinson, 1993, p.

6). This is not meant to downplay the importance of existing political structures (such as the authority of the state) in shaping policy. Rather, it is to acknowledge that other tensions (such as the political disjunctures between social democracy and neoliberalism) represent a separate level of institutional analysis that is beyond the scope of this article. Here it is the organizational qualities of taskforces (as policy-making institutions) that are being emphasized.

Taskforces as Institutions

It is generally accepted that inquiries are more similar than different in their various forms, which might include taskforces, royal commissions, or special committees (Bulmer, 1980; Kernaghan & Siegel, 1995; Prasser, 1994). They all share many of the same characteristics: they are ad hoc bodies established by government and commissioned to investigate, inform, report, and recommend. They are also characterized by their membership, usually drawn from outside the public service, and their requirement to seek public input through hearings, forums, and submissions.⁵

Roles (Government and State Perspectives)

A number of reasons have been offered to explain why governments appoint taskforces, inquiries, and other investigative bodies. Two broad categories of ra- tionales are offered here. First, commissions of inquiry represent governmental attempts to separate particular policy issues from political partisanship. Although this might be a dubious assurance in the sense that commissioners are appointed by the party in power, the perception of neutrality and objectivity is an important one because they are said to be most useful to governments when a “public perception of independence and objectivity is deemed to be of the highest priority” (Aucoin, 1990, p. 203). Second, commissions of inquiry are appointed to escape the biases of the existing bureaucracy. This can be a key rationale given some of the mandates

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of government agencies that sometimes include the growth and expansion of their own policy sectors.⁶ Moreover, inquiries become necessary when an elected government is seeking reform in the organization and design of the existing bureaucratic structures.

Viewed through sociopolitical lenses, commissions of inquiry serve a number of other functions. They are frequently described as a form of symbolic action (Elder & Cobb, 1983; Prasser, 1994). To use a sporting example, Australia’s “Go- ing for Gold” report symbolized the federal government’s concern with the plight of Australian athletes on their return from the Seoul Olympics (McKay, 1991).⁷ Canada’s Dubin inquiry was similarly symbolic, demonstrating the government’s initiative in addressing the perceived “crisis” in Canadian sport (Jackson, 1998).

Beyond their symbolic representations as “government taking action,” however, commissions of inquiry also embody democratic decision making at its most basic (Salter, 1990). Ultimately, they symbolize the state’s willingness to seek public input on future policy. The extent to which public input actually shapes an inquiry’s thinking is somewhat debatable because many allude to their tendency to seek compliance for policies already decided upon (Checkoway, 1981; Doern & Phidd, 1992; Young, 1981). Either way, the preference for developing sport policy using inquiries likely stems from governments’ limited capacities to implement policy without such collaboration.

Thus, another related function of inquiries concerns their role in legitimating government discourse, where ideas might become transmitted into political action via public participation and consultation (Ashforth, 1990; Bulmer, 1980;

Sheriff, 1983). This functional view of inquiries is not always clearly articulated.

For instance, it is unclear if governments can, with any certainty at least, predict the outcomes of these processes, and thus, how could they be sure that the “right”

ideas get transmitted? Such uncertainty notwithstanding, historians often provide strong evidence illustrating that government discourses permeate the findings and recommendations of inquiry reports (e.g., Zakus, 1996). Moreover, an inquiry’s use as a legitimating tool remains a distinct possibility given certain governmental controls such as the careful selection of committee members, a narrow mandate, and a short timeline to complete its report.

Method

The nuances of policy formulation are best captured through contextually specific empirical case studies (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995). Thus, in addition to the institutional approach used here, the wider case analysis of New Zealand’s Minis- terial Taskforce also included an examination of discursive and ideological elements of the process (see: Sam, 2003; Sam & Jackson, 2004).

Given the subjectivist, interpretive, and critical approach of this wider project, it was necessarily associated with a particular methodological orientation (Stoker, 1995). Thus, elements of the policy process were not treated as “hard, real and external” phenomena lending themselves to surveys or specific types of experi- mental designs (Cohen & Manion, 1989, p. 8). Rather, a range of interpretive tools and techniques were favored including accounts, participant observations, and read- ings of available documents or texts. Because of limitations of space, only two of these sources (observations and interviews) are described here.⁸

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As part of its consultation process, the Taskforce held 12 workshops across New Zealand during September and October 2000. After initial contact, I was invited to observe these meetings by the project manager and the Taskforce Chair- person. Permission to observe the Taskforce was gained by submitting a written research proposal indicating the project’s wider aims, proposed methods, and as- surances of confidentiality (e.g., a promise not to speak to news media during the Taskforce’s tenure). In all, 10 of these meetings were observed, producing a mass of field notes that were informed and organized according to the project’s theoretical frameworks. Ultimately, the aim of observing these meetings was to investigate how both ideas (i.e., recurring issues, shared understandings of policy problems) and institutional elements (i.e., how interests were organized and debates structured) influenced the Taskforce’s policy. Observations thus served to document the political transactions between interests (Dingwall, 1997), while also re- vealing the role of organizational structures in shaping the policy process.

With respect to this analysis (focusing on the institutional constraints of the Taskforce), the main source of data was the commissioners themselves. Here, the purpose of conducting interviews was to gain some insight into the Taskforce’s worldviews and to see things as they do (Fielding, 1993). For instance, how did they make sense of the various opinions and information sources? Did they per- ceive their investigations to be constrained by resources (e.g., time) or other imperatives (e.g., procedural or political)? Interviews were, therefore, expressly designed to take stock of those activities (such as Taskforce meetings with the Minister) that were difficult to observe (Levin, 1997).

Ten formal semistructured interviews were conducted with members of the Taskforce between June and December 2000. Following an emergent design (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994), interview guides were continually revised and con- structed for each taped interview. Given that the study also involved observations, however, there were numerous other unstructured discussions at meeting breaks that ultimately found their way into field notes. Moreover, there were informal venues in which exchanges took place, including taxi rides, hotels, and airport terminals. Support for such unstructured forms of interviewing comes from the integral connection between fieldwork and the desire to understand (as well as explain) observed phenomena (Fontana & Frey, 1994).

As a final note, it is worth explaining how institutional constraints from the Taskforce’s process came to be identified and interpreted from the sources men- tioned. As the procedures above suggest, no single source of data was taken by itself as evidence of a particular pattern of institutional constraint. The wider analysis for this study thus drew from Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) constant comparative method.⁹ Accordingly, evidence was not drawn from a content analysis of any one source of data but rather from a process of induction from all available texts:

observations of consultations (i.e., field notes), interview transcripts, as well as follow-up emails and phone calls. The appropriateness of such an approach stems from its capacity to combine inductive category reasoning with a simultaneous comparison of all social incidents observed (Goetz & LeCompte, 1981).

The analysis that follows illustrates the influence of institutional arrangements on the Taskforce’s findings and recommendations. After that, the significance of the Taskforce as an institution is critically discussed, with particular reference to certain recurring tensions, paradoxes, and conundrums. Before analyzing and

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discussing the specific features of this Taskforce, however, it is necessary to briefly describe its wider context, including sport’s place in New Zealand politics and government policy.

New Zealand’s Institutional Context

Historically, sport evolved into New Zealand’s government portfolio in much the same way as in other Commonwealth countries such as Canada or Australia.

Aside from rudimentary programs initiated in the 1930s, New Zealand’s acceptance of sport and recreation as a legitimate policy concern coincided with the development of the welfare state (Collins & Stuart, 1994; Macdonald, 1999).

By the mid 1980s, however, New Zealand was entering a recession. Public overseas debt was $8.2 billion and the budgetary deficit was $3.1 billion (Sinclair, 1990). In the midst of hard economic times and New Zealand’s slip among member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), a dramatic shift took place. A newly elected Labour government dis- mantled controls regulating the New Zealand economy and instituted an agenda for change unprecedented in the western world (Cheyne, Belgrave, & O’Brien, 2000; Russell, 1996). It reorganized government departments to follow corporate models leading to smaller core executive agencies, more Crown entities, and the sale of public utilities (Christenson, 2001).

It was in this neoliberal environment that New Zealand sport first became the subject of a ministerial review. The Sports Development Inquiry Committee’s (1985) recommendations led to the abolishment of departmental structures and the formation of a quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organization named after Sir Edmund Hillary, the first (along with Sherpa Tenzing Norgay) to reach Everest’s summit. Although the Hillary Commission (HC) maintained a small budget and contributed relatively little in financial terms, it was the HC’s centrality in a bur- geoning sector that allowed it to become such an influential presence in New Zealand sport. The Commission’s links with local governments and national sport organizations, along with its establishment of Regional Sports Trusts, has meant that it has been able to set policy direction for sport (Collins & Downey, 2000).

The state’s corporate ideals and managerialist agenda thus filtered down into sport. The HC touted business models to its constituents (cf. Hall, 1991; Hillary Commission for Recreation and Sport, 1989) and became largely consumed with the new language of the public sector, including accountability, outputs (Scott, Bushnell, & Sallee, 1990), and empowerment (Shirley, 1990). Just as the effects of these ideas have not been clear-cut in areas like health and education (Brook Cowen, 1997), there have been tensions in the New Zealand sport sector, particularly in relation to a perceived fragmentation brought about by government devolution (see Office of Tourism Sport and Sport, 1999, p. 2). By the mid 1990s, the prolif- eration of organizations, combined with the contractual nature of the system, stimu- lated many national sport organizations to demand structures that were more coherent (Romanos, 1995). The High Performance Sport Review Committee, established in 1995, attempted to streamline central agencies, and though it suc- ceeded in raising more government funds for elite sport, it failed to achieve the

“one-stop-shop” it had envisioned.

In June 2000, three months before the Sydney Olympics, New Zealand’s newly elected Labour Party fulfilled its promise to provide leadership to the sport

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sector (New Zealand Labour Party, 1999) and established the Ministerial Taskforce on Sport, Fitness, and Leisure. The Taskforce’s terms of reference were made public in June along with a list of committee members. The six appointees came from a variety of backgrounds: a university lecturer (and elite athlete), a doctor, a law- yer, an ex-cricket star (and former sports administrator), a national sport’s CEO, and an ex-elite squash player. John Graham, a former secondary school headmaster and ex-All Black rugby player, chaired the Taskforce. The Taskforce also engaged the services of a full-time project manager and report writer. Together, they were given 6 months to

define the vision for sport, fitness and leisure in New Zealand for the next 25 years, identify the necessary strategies to encourage and sustain interest, participation and achievement . . . and complete a review of long-term structural arrangements for the . . . sector. (Mallard, 2000)

After initial meetings and discussions, the Taskforce undertook the process of public consultation that characterizes these bodies.

Ultimately, the Taskforce’s significance as an agent of change became manifest through its final report, released in January of 2001. As both constituent and constitutor of contemporary political discourse, the Taskforce supported a number of dominant ideas including notions of efficiency, leadership, and competitiveness (Sam, 2003). Its subsequent recommendations for mergers and a more integrated sport system marked a paradigm shift away from decentralization and deregula- tion toward greater central governmental control. In this light, the changes reflected the inherent paradoxes between neoliberal tenets of empowerment and the more recent reformist goals of gaining policy coherence, coordination, and inte- gration (Sam & Jackson, 2004). Although such contradictions are not addressed here, the following analysis of the Taskforce must necessarily be located within these wider political tensions.

Analysis

This section outlines the institutional factors that gave shape to the Ministe- rial Taskforce’s policy formulation process. Because there is insufficient space here to provide detail on all of the institutional considerations and constraints, this analysis focuses on those originating from within government.¹⁰ These are related to the Taskforce’s terms of reference, timelines, resources, and its links with departments of government (e.g., Minister’s Office and Treasury Department). The nature of these institutional arrangements are described and analyzed, illustrating their propensity to enable and/or constrain the Taskforce’s process of policy formulation.

Terms of Reference

Before making any committee appointments, the Minister’s office, in con- junction with the Office of Tourism and Sport and the project’s manager, produced the Taskforce’s terms of reference. Strikingly broad, they included both philosophical and organizational mandates, effectively encompassing all of the standard elements of a strategic planning exercise: vision; identification; and evaluation of present issues and structures, recommendations and strategies. In addition,

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the Taskforce was asked to comment on a wide range of other issues relating, for example, to the outdoor environment and the impact of globalization, trade, and commercialism on sport.

Such breadth produced a number of implications and considerations for the Taskforce.

First, from the perspective of those wishing to influence policy outcomes, the terms of reference became the only document available for public comment.

Thus, although the terms of reference allowed a broad range of interests to respond (including government agencies, health advocacy groups, and secondary schools), the resulting submissions lacked any specific demands because the brief was simply too wide in scope. This also became apparent throughout the public consultation process where, in the absence of any specific issues to address, discussions could range from very broad philosophical issues to the most minute of program- matic detail.

The broad terms of reference created similar problems for the Taskforce committee. The uncertainty of scope eventuated into a number of epistemological issues for the Taskforce, particularly when it came to engaging the various sporting interests in consultations. Faced with organizations linked with areas as di- verse as tourism, education, health, the environment, and Maori, the Taskforce was initially overwhelmed with the varying roles, functions, and relationships of these bodies with respect to their sport/recreation brief. It was a steep learning curve for members of the Taskforce, who had no previous experience with sport as a sector. One committee member commented, “I imagined that these [taskforces]

would be conducted by people starting off with a great deal of knowledge about the area. In fact, most of it for me has been 6 months learning about it.”

Resources

One of the more obvious constraints put on this inquiry was the amount of resources directed towards its investigations. In light of the Taskforce’s mandate to consult nationally and the geographical distance between committee members, its $300,000 budget (Treasury, 2000) meant significant restraints on travel. Thus, only two or three Taskforce members attended each of the 12 regional consultations, resulting in significant informational disparities within the committee. Mem- bers’ limited involvement in the regions, combined with the absence of any formal reporting mechanism at the committee level, meant that regional issues and demands were (at best) overlooked or (at worst) ignored. Remuneration to committee members for 1 day per week, though managing to ensure their regular involvement in Taskforce work, was insufficient to even out informational disparities.

As a matter of common concern to all ad hoc policy bodies, issues of time influenced this Taskforce in a number of ways. Because it had only 6 months to complete a report (and a limited budget), it did not conduct any additional research beyond its consultation and submission processes. Consequently, it relied on sta- tistical information and reports commissioned by the very organizations it criti- cized for decisions not having “been marked by a high level of research and analysis” (Ministerial Taskforce, 2001, p. 51). Time constraints might also have contributed to the Taskforce failing to release an interim report. Perceptions of a looming timeline, however, were not universally shared, and the pressures of time

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appeared to have simply reinforced the idea that the Taskforce should act as cata- lyst rather than analyst. The project manager observed:

I don’t personally believe that if this group had 12 months [instead of 6], it would come up with anything different. . . . At the end of the day, we could continue talking about these things for the next 2 or 3 years. It’s actually time for action. People have been talking too long.

Institutional Links

Beyond the Taskforce’s mandated 6-month deadline, its requirement to produce a timely report had other caveats as well. Equally significant was its requirement to meet deadlines set for the government’s annual budget. In July the Sport, Fitness, and Leisure Minister (Trevor Mallard) told the Taskforce that for any additional financing to be considered in the budget, supporting evidence from the report would have to be available by late January or February at the latest. As the project manager noted, “Before we even know what we’re going to be saying we have to start to take into account the practical realities, that budgeting for next year is under way already.” A Taskforce committee member reported more specifically that:

Treasury came into our group reasonably early on and gave us some timelines. . . . And at that time there was something like 4 or 6 hundred million that they thought were going to be some lollies [candies] in the next budget and, obviously, the various ministers wanted their hand in that till. So we had to let them know pretty quick what we wanted. . . . So that sounded promising.

Besides dispelling the myth that policy formulation takes place sequentially (problem followed by solution, rather than the reverse), these comments speak to the role of the Taskforce in the eyes of its responsible Minister. And they would later reflect the contradictory role of the Taskforce as both investigator (and problem solver) and advocate (or supporter).

Treasury’s requirement to fulfill policy implementation issues produced other, more onerous recommendations. In the end, the final report’s list of alternate sources of revenue (including levies on cars and international travelers) to finance the proposed initiatives were unconnected with committee discussions. Similarly, budget figures for high performance sport had little to do with the preferences of committee members. Rather, these figures were included in the report as a means to illustrate the sport sector’s need for more funds.

The Taskforce engaged in other forms of government consultation. For example, throughout early stages of the Taskforce’s tenure, one committee member discussed Crown entity models with the Prime Minister’s Office and State Ser- vices Commission in order to explore the possibility of other departments (e.g., Health or Education) purchasing services from a new sport/recreation agency. Both the Chair and project manager were very cognizant of these departments and, thus, sought to keep them abreast of their progress. A distinct focus on the education sector emanated not only from the Chair’s background (as a former headmaster) but also because the Sport Minister’s wider portfolio included Education. His po- sition in the cabinet, as well as his role as associate Minister of Finance, allowed

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for some forecasting on behalf of the Taskforce. Describing one of these exchanges, the project manager recounted, “Mallard assures him [the Chairman] that there is some money in the education budget that they will push towards that area [sport]

and he said I don’t know how much it is and I don’t know to what extent.” The final report’s focus on the Ministry of Education, thus, came as no surprise.

Not to be overlooked, the obvious requirement for the Taskforce to submit its report after many hours of meetings, research, and consultation produced its own set of self-interested behaviors. Taskforce members understood that for their findings and recommendations to be taken seriously by politicians, their report would have to adopt a particular perspective. As one Taskforce member noted,

“There have to be some tangibles that ministers and other politicians can latch onto; to say yep, I agree with that. I know if I back that, it will make a difference in my community and my electorate.”

Thus, the report would ultimately be written to gain acceptance. After all, said another Taskforce member, “I don’t want to waste my time on something that’s just going to sit in the corner gathering dust and just going to be a historical document.”

Discussion

An institutional approach to analyzing a taskforce directs our attention to two important features: first, to its place and function within the machinery of government; and second, to the limits (or paradoxes) of this instrument in formulating public policy. Whereas another important feature is concerned with the op- erative rules that guide political interests, the constraining side of public consultations would merit separate attention that cannot be included here.

The case materials presented above highlight two contrasting views on taskforces and their place in government policy making. The first concerns the widely held view (among both bureaucrats and politicians) that these bodies carry out their investigations rationally, that is, with respect to how they sequentially identify problems, develop alternative solutions, and subsequently recommend the best course of action based on careful consideration of costs and/or benefits (Amis

& Burton, 1996). The limits to such rationality notwithstanding (Lindblom, 1959;

Stone, 1997), this technocratic ideal remains a significant perception underpinning the continued use of these bodies (Amis & Burton, 1996). Indeed, in this case the Taskforce felt compelled to portray its inquiry as an “apolitical” exercise, em- phasizing throughout that its findings and recommendations emerged from a “ro- bust” process of “full consultation and in-depth analysis of submissions” (Minis- terial Taskforce, 2001, p. 16). Thus, the Taskforce made certain that its final report at least addressed the expectation of rationality (whether or not meeting many of the standards for it).

If inquiries are seen at times as rational investigative bodies, they are, in contrast, just as often cynically viewed as a means of political manipulation, re- flecting an old adage that inquiries are not so much good for “digging up the truth as for digging it in” (Herbert cited in Bulmer, 1982). The above case lent support to this cynical view, not because it served to obfuscate issues, delay action, and pacify public concern as other scholars have observed (Ashforth, 1990). Rather, it appears that the Taskforce influenced its Minister (and allowed itself to be influenced) so as to ensure that its findings and recommendations would find political

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acceptance. As one member noted, the Taskforce did not want to suffer the same fate as another recent government inquiry report, one that was later rejected by the Minister responsible.¹¹ Another member similarly remarked: “we can minimize political interference, but in saying that, the political will in this process is hugely important.” Thus, the chair and manager met regularly with the Minister, “so that he’s kept abreast of key things and thoughts that we are having . . . making sure they’re not way off the mark . . . and so in the end, there’s no surprises.” Designed in part as sources of objective or neutral policy advice, New Zealand’s Ministerial Taskforce on Sport, Fitness and Leisure sat precariously between having to appear rational while remaining consciously political.

The Contradictions of Public Inquiries

Throughout this article, taskforces and commissions have been referred to as government tools or instruments. This terminology derives from policy research describing the means and devices governments have at their disposal to implement policy, including subsidies, regulatory controls, or the use of media campaigns (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995). Governments similarly have a range of tools for the formulation of public policy, including ad hoc organizations like taskforces and parliamentary committees, as well as more permanent bodies, such as advisory councils or think tanks. The reason this rather functional view is adopted is because, similar to implementation strategies, policy formulation strategies sometimes produce unintended consequences. Just as a regulatory body, such as a sport drug agency, can effect goal displacement (e.g., by evaluating its success on the number of drug tests it performs rather than controlling drug use per se), the use of external reviews to formulate policy can have their own contradictory logics.

From a purely rational–instrumental view, the first contradiction has to do with the capacity of these bodies to investigate the innovative while meeting the inherent demands of recommending the possible. The breadth of their mandates in combination with their requirement to consult widely means that inquiries poten- tially accumulate a considerable amount of information. Yet, they are also concerned with developing useable or practical solutions, which necessitates “an orientation to the very limited and pragmatic policy goals” (Salter, 1990, p. 174). The Taskforce, thus, readily adopted recommendations that could easily be implemented (such as the merging of central agencies) while leaving other strategies for future consideration. This is not to suggest that the Taskforce would have been expected to provide detailed implementation strategies on all of the issues it encountered, but rather, it points to why, in the absence of clearly identifiable solutions for issues such as gender equity in sport administration or Maori self-governance, these were left out of the report altogether. Thus the first contradiction of public inquiries lies with their capacity to incorporate radical debates while remaining oriented to the reformist goal of producing specific recommendations for policy (Salter, 1990).

A second contradiction evolves from the political context in which Taskforces like this one must conduct their work. In this case, the Minister’s signaling of budget surpluses before Taskforce members had begun to understand their brief likely contributed to the Taskforce viewing itself as a vehicle through which greater government spending could be justified. Indeed, as one member expressed, “the case for investment has to be quite a dominant section [in the report] and there

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have to be some tangibles that ministers and other politicians can latch on to.” To seek further evidence of the Taskforce as advocate, one has only to read the report itself. Although it contains detailed descriptions of various agencies and organizations, much of the report poses as a warning if the recommendations are not taken seriously. In the executive summary, the question is posed, “How much does it matter to New Zealanders to save the lives and reduce expenditure by supporting physical activity, recreation and sport?”(p. 9). The second contradiction, thus, speaks to the dual roles of the Taskforce as both advocate for the sport sector and investigator responsible for considering problems and issues. The implications of these contradictions are worth elaborating on.

First, institutional constraints (such as its terms of reference, deadlines, and government expectations) imposed on the Taskforce affected both its capacity to investigate but, more importantly, its willingness to delve into more complex matters. Some members spoke of developing a “winning formula” rather than ac- knowledging the diversity of interests and issues. In part, the belief that this was possible arose from the Taskforce’s mandate to develop a new vision for sport, where such a vision would represent a clear break from the past and obviate any need to “revisit old issues” (Ministerial Taskforce, 2001). Taskforce members’

perceptions regarding the limits of their influence ironically allowed them to narrow their investigations even further. One member remarked matter-of-factly:

At the end of the day, you have to pitch the report in the right style to actually achieve the recommended outcome. . . . It would be very naïve to say this is what we think should happen, and stuff the politics of the Treasury Department that’s going to be the funder of some of the issues that we recommend. You have to be politically oriented in your thinking.

Thus, to be politically oriented is to make the sport sector appear (ironically) apolitical and devoid of any contentious issues such as the subjugation of physical education to sport, regional differences in service provision, gender gaps in administrative positions, and Maori sovereignty (see Sam, 2003).

Second, the use of inquiries and taskforces to develop policy reflects the contentiousness inherent in contracting out policy advice. With respect to New Zealand sport, the commissioning of reports to private consultants is regular prac- tice (e.g., Business and Economic Research Limited, 2000; CM Research, 2000;

New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, Inc., 1998, 2000). Although to some extent this might reflect the lack of specific research expertise in central agencies, the commissioning of external reports is also intended to appear more objective and far less biased than if these reports were to be produced in-house. And in this same way, the use of a taskforce (or inquiry) to help formulate policy poses a kind of instrumental conundrum. That is, because of its embedded structures, a taskforce rarely does what it is intended to do. Its promise of objectivity is paradoxically limited by its implicit aim as an instrument of change and innovation. Similarly, whatever propensity a taskforce has for innovation is tempered by the need for it to consider both government acceptability and probability.¹² Finally, if the commissioners wish to have some kind of lasting impact, they are required, effectively, to sell their findings, leaving one to wonder if the extent of problems is really as serious as they are made out to be. In this case, commissioners above all might have recognized that a balanced argument would be one that appears uncertain,

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even ambivalent, ultimately threatening the future influence of their findings. Thus, though the rules and practices surrounding the inquiry process did not determine policy outcomes per se, these institutional factors played a fundamental role in establishing the Taskforce’s preferences, its responsibilities, and its relationships to other interests in the process.

Postscript and Conclusion

The Taskforce’s official document, now known as the “Graham Report” after its chairperson, has had considerable impact on sport in New Zealand. Soon after its release, Labour announced that it would substantially increase its alloca- tion to sport by $100 million over 5 years in order to support the Taskforce’s asser- tion that greater government leadership was needed to coordinate the sector (Sam, 2003).¹³ The Taskforce’s recommendations also resulted in the amalgamation of the Hillary Commission with the Sports Foundation (a funding agency for high performance sport) and in the establishment of a new Crown entity. Since its in- ception, Sport and Recreation New Zealand (SPARC) has come under significant public criticism for overestimating its role as leader of the sector, particularly after its decisions to abolish community level grants and name priority sports (Ash, 2002; Brown, 2002; Jones, 2002; Meikle, 2002). Throughout SPARC’s recent publications (e.g., annual report, statement of intent), the Graham report continues to be cited as an open directive for changing the delivery of sport in New Zealand (Sport and Recreation New Zealand, 2002a, 2002b, 2003).

Taskforce committees and commissions of inquiry continue to be a distinctive feature in the development of national sport policies. Whereas these institutions might profess objective rationality, they are by nature profoundly political and are responsible for satisfying several contradictory roles at once: to consult and to co-opt, to explore and to delimit, to report and to persuade. Thus, in order to fully appreciate and evaluate the processes and impacts of inquiries, they must be viewed within their political and procedural contexts (Prasser, 1992).

There are several research gaps yet to cover. The taskforce or inquiry, as a mechanism for developing policy, serves an important institutional role particularly with respect to how it contributes to privileging some groups over others. As Harvey et al. (1995) observe in a Canadian context, the reports of these initiatives manage “the involvement of interest groups in the reforms or changes set to occur in amateur sport” (p. 256). Purposefully or not, the reports of these bodies outline the responsibilities and accountabilities of the various organizational segments and in doing so, limit the number of actors who have a voice (Harvey et al.). How these institutions contribute to the formation of “congealed power relationships”

(Atkinson, 1993) thus merits further attention.

Although much of the analysis and discussion regarding taskforces and other bodies of inquiry occurs at a very macro level and involves considerable abstract or ideological principles, we should not ignore that these are driven by particular interests and they have an impact (albeit indirect) on people’s everyday lives. To this extent, though few are aware of the inner workings and intricacies of government inquiries, it needs to be understood that the task at hand is not a straightfor- ward one. Rather there are several forces to be reckoned with, both originating from within and outside of their institutional structures.

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Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Steve Jackson, Jay Scherer, Nancy Theberge, and the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and feedback.

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