Toward clearer skies: Challenges in regulating transboundary haze in Southeast Asia
Janice Ser Huay Lee
a,1,*, Zeehan Jaafar
b,c,1,**, Alan Khee Jin Tan
d, Luis R. Carrasco
b, J. Jackson Ewing
e, David P. Bickford
b, Edward L. Webb
b, Lian Pin Koh
faWoodrowWilsonSchoolandDepartmentofEcologyandEvolutionaryBiology,PrincetonUniversity,Princeton,NJ,USA
bDepartmentofBiologicalSciences,NationalUniversityofSingapore,Singapore
cDepartmentofVertebrateZoology,NationalMuseumofNaturalHistory,SmithsonianInstitution,Washington,DC,USA
dFacultyofLaw,NationalUniversityofSingapore,Singapore
eCentreforNon-TraditionalSecurityStudies,S.RajaratnamSchoolofInternationalStudies,NanyangTechnologicalUniversity,Singapore
fEnvironmentInstitute,andSchoolofEarthandEnvironmentalSciences,UniversityofAdelaide,Australia
1. Transboundaryenvironmentalpollution
Environmental pollution transcends political and economic boundaries,especiallyinlightofglobalization(YeandWei,2012).
Pollution may originate in one countrybut cause problems in another,reflectingthehighconnectivityofatmospheric,aquatic and terrestrial environments (Jayakumar et al., 2015). Trans- boundaryenvironmental pollution originates fromvarious eco- nomically driven anthropogenic activities (Naito, 2010). These include industrialdischarge ordammingof riversthat traverse multiple countries at a location upstream, and consequently affecting downstream countries (Dudgeon, 2000; McCaffrey, 2015), leakage of radioactive material from a nuclear plant in one country may raise serious environmental concerns for an entireregion(VanNoorden,2007),andsmokegeneratedfromland
burningactivitiesinonecountrymayaffecttheregionalairquality (Tay, 1998). Transboundary environmental pollution has had significantnegativeimpactstothebiodiversity(Campagnaetal., 2011;Dudgeon,2000),economy(Quah,2002;Selinetal.,2009), andhealthofinhabitants(ChiuandLok,2011;Marlieretal.,2015;
VaradyandMack,1995)ofaffectedcountries.
International negotiations on transboundary environmental issues are becoming increasingly difficult due to disparate interests of participating nations (Seo 2013). Yet,international andregionalsystemsofenvironmentalmanagementandgover- nance are essential to mitigate transboundary environmental pollution (Adger et al., 2005; Kimball, 1999). Environmental governanceoftransboundaryenvironmentalpollutioniscomplex duetothedifferentspatial,socio-political,andtemporalscalesin whichtheseoccur(Dietzetal.,2003;LemosandAgrawal,2006).As aresultofspatialdecouplingofthecausesandconsequencesof environmentalpollution,transboundarypollutionactivitiessuch as the release of industrial waste effluents upstream of an internationalriverorpollutionoftheregionalatmospherefrom theuseoffiretoclearlandforagriculture,resultsinanunequal distribution of costsand benefitsfor differentcountries. While ARTICLE INFO
Articlehistory:
Received20April2015
Receivedinrevisedform15September2015 Accepted18September2015
Keywords:
Environmentallaw Deforestation Fires Governance Industrialplantations Indonesia
ABSTRACT
Addressingtransboundaryenvironmentalproblems,suchaspollution,andclimatechange,hingeon strategiesthatoftenrequirebothmandatoryandvoluntaryparticipationofaffectednations.Usingan unprecedentedapproach,theSingaporegovernmentrecentlypassedaTransboundaryHazePollution Act(THPA)thatfinanciallypenalizescompaniesforsmoke-hazeaffectingthecity-statebutoriginating fromactivitiesoutsideherpoliticalboundaries.ThisActmaysetaprecedentforfutureactionsagainst proximate actors of environmental degradation but is fraught with substantial challenges in implementation.Inattemptingtoholdagri-businesscompaniesaccountable,theTHPAmustpresent indisputableevidenceoffireburningactivitiesandpositivelyidentifytheinitiatorofthesefires.We furtherarguethatsmallamendmentstotheTHPA,andothersimilarlaws,mayresultinenvironmental co-benefitsrelatedtocarbonemissions,ecosystemservicesandbiodiversitypreservation.
ß2015ElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved.
* Correspondingauthor.
** Correspondingauthorat:DepartmentofVertebrateZoology,NationalMuseum ofNaturalHistory,SmithsonianInstitution,Washington,DC,USA.
E-mailaddresses:[email protected](J.S.H.Lee),[email protected](Z.Jaafar).
1Jointfirstauthorship,bothauthorscontributedequallytothework.
ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect
Environmental Science & Policy
j our na l h ome p a ge : w ww . e l se v i e r. co m/ l oc a te / e nv sci
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2015.09.008 1462-9011/ß2015ElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved.
Principle21oftheStockholmDeclarationstressesthatcountries have‘‘thesovereignrighttoexploittheirownresourcespursuant totheirownenvironmentalpolicies’’,italsostatesthatcountries have the ‘‘responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdictionorcontroldonotcausedamagetotheenvironmentof otherstatesorofareasbeyondthelimitsofnationaljurisdiction’’
(UnitedNations,1972).Cross-scalegovernancemechanismssuch asregional(e.g.,theConventionontheProtectionoftheRhine) (European Union, 1999) and international (e.g., the Montreal Protocolonozoneemissions)(UnitedNations,1987)treatieshave beensetuptooutlinemandatoryand/orvoluntarymeasuresto ensurepollutingcountriesareaccountableinthearenaofregional andglobalenvironmentalhealth.Internationalenvironmentallaw, especially in the past five decades, has evolved to address transboundary environmental pollution by seeking toestablish legalprinciplesthatmakestatesresponsibleforactivitieswithin theirjurisdiction,especiallyensuringsuchactivitiesdonotcause harmtotheenvironmentofotherstates(Redgewell,2015).Inthis paper,we discussonesuchexampleofenvironmental lawthat addressestheissue of transboundary air pollution (orhaze) in SoutheastAsia.
2. TheSoutheastAsianhazeproblem
Clearingoftropicalforestsforlarge-scalecommercialagricul- ture and medium- to small-scale farming has resulted in significant carbon emissions that contribute to global climate change(Gibbsetal.,2010;vanderWerfetal.,2009;Vermeulen etal.,2012).Burning,practicedinmanypartsofthetropics,isthe cheapestandmostconvenientmethodoflandclearancepreferred bysmallholderagriculturistsandagro-industrialcompaniesalike (AndersonandBowen,2000;Ketteringsetal.,1999;Siegertetal., 2001).Unregulatedlandburningforagricultureresultsinreduced airqualityduetoemissionofhazardousgasesandaerosols,forest degradationandhabitatlossthatnegativelyimpacttheprovision of ecosystem goods and services (Cochrane, 2003; Heil and Goldammer,2001;Langmannetal.,2009;Reddingtonetal.,2014).
AnnualburningeventsinIndonesiareleasemassiveamountsof carbon,averaging0.049gigatonnesofcarbonperyear(GtCyr 1) in Sumatra and 0.074GtCyr 1 in Borneo(vander Werfet al., 2008)which areexacerbated not onlyduringEl Nin˜ o-Southern Oscillation(ENSO)events,butalsointeractionsbetweenENSOand otherweathersystemssuchastheIndianOceanDipoleandthe Madden-JulianOscillation(vanderWerfetal.,2008).Prevailing northerly winds during the burning season (June–October) transportgaseousemissionsandparticulatematter,termed‘haze’, throughoutIndonesia,Brunei,Malaysia,SingaporeandThailand andinflicthighsocialandeconomiccosts(Othmanetal.,2014).
ThetransboundaryhazeepisodesintheseSoutheastAsiannations fullyemergedontheregionalagendaandgainedglobalattention in 1997/1998,when massive forestand peat fires in Indonesia released an estimated 0.95Gt of carbon into the atmosphere (equivalentto15%ofmeanannualglobalcarbonemissionsfrom fossilfuels)(Pageetal.,2002;Turetskyetal.,2015;vanderWerf etal.,2010)producingsmokepollutionthatblanketedtheregion andseverelyimpactedpublichealthandtourism(Pageetal.,2002;
Quah,2002;Tacconi,2003).Affectedcountriesestimatedlossesat USD383millionasadirectresultofthisepisodealone(Gloverand Jessup,1999).InJune2013,theregionwasagainenvelopedbya severehazeeventforthreeweeks.Unprecedentedlevelsofsmoke andatmosphericparticlesduringthisepisodecausedairqualityto reachhazardouslevelsinMalaysiawithAirPollutionIndexvalues of750(valuesabove300aredeemedhazardous)andSingapore withPollutionStandardIndexvaluesof400(valuesabove300are deemedhazardous).Atthepeakofthisepisode,manyflightswere canceled, affected areas in Malaysia were declared states of
emergency,and hundreds ofschools inMalaysiaand Indonesia were closed (Ramasamy et al., 2013). Remote sensing analysis indicatedthat52%ofthetotalburnedarea(84,717ha)inRiaufell withinconcession boundaries ofmajor oil palm and pulpwood companies(Gaveauetal.,2014).Manyofthesecompaniesarenot headquartered in Indonesia but instead have administrative, financial and operational centers in nearby countries such as SingaporeandMalaysia.
Attemptshavebeenmadetodealwiththehazeproblematthe regionallevel.The10membersoftheAssociationofSouthEast AsianNations(ASEAN)signedtheAgreementonTransboundary HazePollutionin2002.However,Indonesia’sdelayinratifyingthe agreement until September2014, making it the last signatory, signaleditsunwillingnesstodepartfromthe‘businessasusual’
scenario (Putri, 2014). Moreover, despite improved monitoring technologies(e.g.,theAssociationofSoutheastAsianNationsSub- RegionalHazeMonitoringSystem)andassurancesoncessationof burningactivitiesfromtheIndonesiangovernment,effortstocurb the haze remained limited (Nurhidayah et al., 2014). Previous exhortationsfromneighboringcountriestostopforestfireshave been met with rebukes from Indonesia to respect its national sovereignty (Soeriaatmadja, 2014), demonstrating the complex natureoftheprobleminvolvingpolitics,economicinterests,and the environment. For example, while ‘zero burning’ legislation does exist in Indonesia, explicit allowances are made for local communitiestousefiretoclearland(Tan,2015b).Additionally, there exist nationwide prohibitions against starting fires in or developingpeatareasthataremorethan3mindepth.Anentity foundguiltyofsettinganillegalforestfirecouldbeimprisonedfor 5–15yearsandfinedupto5billionRupiah(aboutUS$420,000).
Thesearenotinconsequentialpenalties.However,complexitiesof politicalgovernanceinIndonesiaresultinineffectiveenforcement of,andcompliancewith,theselaws.Ultimatelythesuccessofthe ASEAN’sAgreementonTransboundaryHazePollutiondependson Indonesia’senforcement willand capacity. Untilrecently,apart from applyingdiplomatic pressure and providing financial and technicalaidtoextinguishfires,neighboringcountrieshavebeen limited in thewaystheyare ableto addressthesourceof the problem(Lohmanetal.,2007;YongandPeh,2014).
3. Thinkingoutofthetinderbox
The Singapore Parliament passed the Transboundary Haze PollutionAct(THPA)inAugust2014,whichallowsforimposingof finesoncompaniesthatcauseorcontributetotransboundaryhaze pollutioninSingapore(Box1describestheTHPA)(Chua,2014).
TheTHPA’scenterpieceisaregimeofmultiplelegalpresumptions (SingaporeanMinistryfortheEnvironmentandWaterResources, 2014).First,itprovidesthatiftherearemapswhichshowthatany landisownedoroccupiedbyacompany,itshallbepresumedthat that company owns or occupies that land. The maps can be procuredfromavarietyofsources:anyforeigngovernment,any department or instrumentality of the government of a foreign state,and,anyperson,company,orentityoperatingtheconcession inquestion,whocanbelegallycompelledtofurnishitsownmaps.
Second,ifthereisserioushazepollutioninSingaporeandsatellite and othermeteorologicalevidenceshows that ator aboutthat time,thereisalandorforestfireonanylandcausingsmokethatis movingin thedirectionof Singapore,it shallbepresumedthat thereishazepollutioninSingaporeinvolvingsmokeresultingfrom thatlandorforestfire.Thisissoeveniftheremaybeotherfiresin adjacentareasatthesametime.Third,itshallbepresumedthat the company that owns or occupies the land in question has engaged in conduct, or engagedin conduct that condones any conduct by another, which caused or contributed to that haze pollutioninSingapore.
The entity or company concerned can deny each of these presumptionsbutineachcase,itwillbeartheburdenofproving thecontrary.Further,theTHPAextendsliabilitytoanyentitythat participatesinthemanagementoroperationalaffairsofanother (second)entity,exercisesdecision-makingcontroloverthelatter’s business decision pertainingto land thatit (the second entity) ownsoroccupiesoutsideSingapore,orexercisescontroloverthe secondentityatalevelcomparabletothatexercisedbyamanager of that entity. This is designed to target parent or holding companies that have subsidiaries or related entities that are owners or occupiers of land and that engage in an offending conductontheground.
4. Challengesoftheapproach
Singapore therefore utilizes its judicial system to hold the businesssector,inthisparticularinstance,pulpwoodandoilpalm
companies (Sizer et al., 2013), accountable for transboundary pollution originating outside of, but affecting, Singapore. In targeting fires within company concession boundaries, the Singaporegovernmentis selectiveinflexingits pressurepoints bybasinglegalactiononwell-definedandmeasureableindicators (e.g.,airqualityinSingapore,winddirectionintheregion,fireson the ground) that can be remotely monitored by Singaporean governmentagencies.ThegreatestadvantageoftheTHPA,thus, maybethattheSingaporegovernmentengagesdirectlywithlocal and foreign entities that contribute to transboundary haze pollution,and appliesliabilitywhenthere issufficientevidence todeducecausality.However,substantialchallengesexisttoward successfulimplementationoftheTHPA:(i)obtainingindisputable evidenceoffireburningactivities,(ii)resistancefromentrenched economic interestsin plantationdevelopment and (iii)political hurdlesinimplementingtransboundarylaws.
4.1. Indisputableevidenceonfireburningactivities
SuccessfulimplementationoftheTHPAisreliantonaccurate spatial information on thelocation of fire and theperpetrator responsibleforstartingthefire.Whilecurrenttechnologyallows forthelocationoffireeventstobeidentifiedwithinconcession maps(Gaveau etal.,2014; vanderWerfet al.,2010),it isstill inadequatein addressingactorsresponsibleforstarting thefire (WorldResourcesInstitute,2014).Thelevelofaccuracyofthese concession maps is contentious due to a lack of coordination among district, provincial and central government authorities (Wollenberg et al., 2008). Approximately 5.8Mha or 10.2% of industrialconcessionsfromoilpalm,logging,pulpwood,andcoal mining industries in Indonesia overlap, making it difficult to attributefireeventstorespectiveindustriesorspecificcompanies (Aboodetal., 2014).The situationis compoundedbyfailure of Indonesiatodevelopasingle,consistentmapoflandconcessions throughout the country (Ewing and McRae, 2012). Different ministries(e.g.,theMinistryofForests,MinistryofEnvironment, Ministry of Agriculture, and Ministry of National Development Planning)havehistoricallydevelopeddifferentmaps,highlighting alackofinter-ministerialcoordination.Thefactthatthesemaps arestillpresentlyusedinsuchamannermaypointtocompeting interests and competition for resourcesand influencebetween different government agencies. Mapping has become more complexoverthepasttwo decadesaspolitical decentralization hasdriven greaterconcession-granting power tolocallevels of government (Barr et al., 2006). Consequently, there would be uncertainty if Singapore enters into evidence, maps that are contested during prosecution. Uncertainty can be avoided by compellingthesecompaniestofurnishmapsthattheythemselves use.Prosecutorsmaypresumethatanyareastatedtobewithina company’s map boundaries to be owned or occupied by that company.Thisscenariointurn,couldcompelsuchcompaniesto furtherobfuscatetheirownmapsbyqualifyingvastareasasbeing
‘contested’,especiallyifthesecompaniesareoperatingalongside localcommunitieswhodisputetheboundariesandencroachon thecompanies’land.
Insuchsituations,companiescouldstillbeheldresponsible undertheTHPAunlesstheyprovethatinstigatorsofoffending conductactedwithouttheirknowledgeorconsent,orcontrary totheirwishesorinstructions.TheTHPAfurtherstipulatesthat thisdefenseisunavailableif:(a)theinstigatorisanemployeeor agentofthecompanies,orisengaged,directlyorindirectly,by thecompaniestocarryoutanyworkonlandthattheyownor occupy,or(b)theinstigatorhascustomaryrightstothelandand who has an agreement or arrangement with the companies relating tofarmingor forestryoperationswith respect tothe land.
Box1. Key features of the Singapore Transboundary Haze PollutionAct(2014).
Liability:Therearecriminalandcivilliabilitiesforanentitythat engagesin conduct orcondones another’s conduct, which causesorcontributestohazepollutioninSingapore.Inaddi- tion,there isliability foranentitywhichparticipatesinthe managementofasecondentity(e.g.,asubsidiaryoralinked concern)ifthelatterengagesinconductorcondonesanother’s conduct which causes or contributes to haze pollution in Singapore.
Burdenofproofandrebuttablepresumptions:Aseriesof rebuttablepresumptionsaimtoovercometheburdenofproof fortheprosecution.First,companieswillbepresumedtoown oroccupylandsiftherearemapsshowingthattheyownor occupythelandsinquestion.Second,ifthereishazepollution inSingaporeandthereis,atoraboutthesametime,alandor forestfireonanylandsituatedoutsideSingapore,itwillbe presumedthatthehazeinvolvessmokefromthatlandorforest fireif satellite, wind and other meteorological information showthatthesmokeismovinginthedirectionofSingapore.
Thisissoeveniftheremaybeotherfiresonotherlandsator aboutthesametime.Third,wherethefirstandsecondpre- sumptionsaresatisfied,itwillbefurtherpresumedthatthe owneror occupierof the landinquestion has engaged in conduct,orengagedinconductthatcondonesanyconductby another,whichcausedorcontributedtothathazepollutionin Singapore.Theburdenisontheentitytodisproveanyofthese presumptions.
Extraterritoriality:TheActclaimstoapplytoanyentityany- where in the worldwhose conduct affects Singapore’s air quality.Itisbasedonextraterritorialenvironmentallegislation foundinothercountriessuchastheUnitedStates.Inpractice, though,itislikelyto beusedagainstentitieswithalinkto Singapore,e.g.aSingaporesubsidiaryofanIndonesianplan- tationcompany(thesubsidiarybeingincorporatedandhaving apresenceinSingapore,butowningoroperatingthelandin question)
Fines:UptoSGD100,000(USD79,900)foreachdaythereis haze pollutionin Singapore, capped at SGD 2 million. An additionalfineofuptoSGD50,000perdayiftheSingapore Director-GeneralofEnvironmentalProtectionsuppliesawrit- tenrequestforfire-preventionactivities(e.g.,deployingfire- fightingpersonnel,discontinueburning,orsubmissionofan actionplan)andthisrequestisnotactedupon.Entitiescanbe liableforcivilpenalties,withnostatedmaximumpenalty,ifa plaintiffsustainspersonalinjuryordeathattributabletothe conductoftheentitythatcontributestohazepollution.
TheActwaspassedon5August2014andisavailableonthis website: http://www.parliament.gov.sg/sites/default/files/
Transboundary%20Haze%20Pollution%20Bill%2018-2014.pdf
Furthermore,despitefiresoccurringwithintheboundariesofa company’sconcession,thecausesmaybeexternal.Spatialanalysis ofburntareasinRiauduringtheJune2013hazeeventshowed60%
ofburntareaswithincompanyconcessions(50,248haor31%of total burned area) were being illegally occupied by local communities (Gaveau et al., 2014). Community encroachment intotheseareasmaybetheresultofunresolvedlanddisputesor socialconflicts(Ekadinataetal.,2013;Suyantoetal.,2004).Bylaw, lands within concessions are leased to companies for agro- industrialdevelopment,butinreality,theseareasmayfallunder customarylandownershipforlocalcommunitiesorcontestedfor livelihood activities. As a result of unclear land tenure and overlappinglandrights,ownershipwithinconcessionboundaries is questionable and attribution of fire events on these lands becomeschallenging.
Inordertoprosecute,theTHPAmustidentifylandownersand provebeyond doubttheperpetratorofthefire. Ownershipand occupationare not straightforwardlegal concepts in Indonesia.
Rights to the land may include the right to farm or operate plantations,to extract minerals foundunder the surface,or to harvest produce. Such rights may co-exist alongside the local communities’customaryrightstotheland.Totakeintoaccount such realities, the THPA extends the definition of ‘‘owner’’ to includenotjustapersonwhoholdsavalidlease,license,permit, concessionorothersimilarauthorization,butalsoonewhohasan agreement or arrangement with another person who has a customaryrightunder local lawwith regardsto theland, and theagreementorarrangementrelatestoanyfarmingorforestry operationstobecarriedoutbyanypersoninrespectofthatland.
Consequently,acompanythatoperatesoncustomarylandsinsuch fashionwillstillfallwithintheTHPA’sambit,eveniftheactual farmingorforestryoperationsarecarriedoutbyotherparties.This will cover the common situation where a concession holder typicallybuys theharvest fromadjoiningcustomarylandsthat havebeensetasideforlocalcommunitiestoconductfarming.
DuetothedepthofpeatdepositsinIndonesia,firesthatoccur on peatlands can burn below the surface and may originate elsewherefromwherethefire emergesaboveground(Ballhorn etal.,2009;Sargeant,2001).Accuratelyattributingcauseoffiresto actorsinthis landscaperequiressignificantforensicefforts,and willprove highly challenging for successful implementation of Singapore’sTHPA.Presentremotesensingcapabilitiesarelimited onthisfront,anddatamisinterpretationsmaymisleadadjudica- tionefforts.
The difficult question of sovereignty persists, since such monitoringandenforcementeffortsonIndonesianterritorycannot be carried out by foreign countries, but by Indonesia alone.
Ultimately,Indonesianenforcementandprosecutionactiononthe ground will matter most in resolving the problem at its core, together with cooperative mechanisms among regional states (includingprovisionoffinancialandtechnicalassistance).Thetrue valueofSingapore’sunilateral actionviatheTHPAliesmorein exertingpressureonIndonesiatotakegreateractionofitsown.It willanswertheIndonesian argumentthat victim statesshould lookattheirowncompaniesfirst,whichisexactlywhatSingapore is proposing to do with its THPA. In this manner, the THPA complements and reinforces the ASEAN Agreement on Trans- boundary Haze Pollution, which lays down obligations on individualstates totacklethefiresandtocooperatewithother states.
4.2. Entrenchedeconomicinterestsinplantationdevelopment Indonesia’s complex land-use regulations and overlapping central,provincialanddistrictlevelgovernancemaycomplicate anddelayprosecutionofforeignentitiesbasedthere(Indonesian
Center for Environmental Law, 2008). The prevalence of local benefitcapturebylocalauthoritiesandelitesfromagribusiness developmentmayresultinreluctanceoflocalauthoritiestohelp prosecuteindividualsandcompaniescontributingtowardtrans- boundary haze pollution (Varkkey, 2012). Moreover, perverse incentives are institutionalized in local legislation favoring the conversionof forests forplantation development(Butler,2014;
Irawan et al., 2013). Often, districtauthorities rule in favor of plantation companies and plantation developers despite fire events or other forms of environmental transgressions within their concessionsdue topatronagepoliticsbetweenthem (Bell, 2014; McCarthyetal.,2012; Varkkey,2012). Infact, patronage networksamongsomeMalaysianandSingaporeanoilpalmfirms withIndonesianprovincialanddistrictofficialshavebeensingled outasoneofthedriversoftransboundaryhazepollution(Varkkey, 2012).Toacertainextent,theSingaporeTHPAisanappropriate measure since it recognizes foreign investors as a driver of transboundaryhazeandpenalizestheseentitiesforanyfireevents occurring within their concession boundaries. In light of entrenchedeconomicinterestsbylocalauthoritiesforplantation development,theTHPAmayfaceresistancefromlocalauthorities to betransparent about plantation companyoperations within theirprovinces,especiallycompaniesthathavenodirectfinancial links with Singapore. This is made still more complicated by emergence of medium-sized operators and small-scale land- holders that have contracts with large international firms but whoseactivitiesaremoredifficulttoassessandpenalize(Ewing, 2013).
4.3. Politicalhurdlesinimplementingtransboundarylaws
Tan(1999)madethecaseofholdingtheIndonesiangovern- mentaccountableforfailingtocontrolthefiresthatprecipitated thetransboundaryhazein1997–98.Thegeo-politicalconstraints ofbringinganactionagainstIndonesiaunderinternationallaw, however,are immense.Itis highlyunlikely that Indonesiawill submittothejurisdictionoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeor anyotherdisputeresolutionmechanism.Itisequallyunlikelythat statesintheregionwillriskpoliticalandeconomictieswiththe regional economic giant that is Indonesia, to pursue an action beforeaninternationaltribunal(Tan,1999,2015b).Resultantly, such a case did not materialize, but in 2002 the ASEAN Haze Agreementwas craftedtopresent a frameworkfor cooperative mechanisms among ASEAN nations to effectively deal with transboundaryhazeincidences(Tan,2015a).Overthenextdecade, theAgreementwasfoundtoexertlittleauthorityinreducingthe occurrences of regional haze events (Tan, 2005). Significant pathologieswithintheAgreementworkedtowardcompromising itseffectiveness,includingweakobligationsrelatingtorequesting and receiving assistance, monitoring, reporting, exchanging informationandconductingresearchtothecompleteabsenceof enforcement and liability provisions and compulsory dispute resolutionmechanisms(Tan,2005,2015b).Thus,thedistastewith which ASEAN Member States perceive to be ‘confrontational’
methods of dispute resolution, and their prevailing instinct to upholdtheprincipleofnon-interferenceornon-interventioninthe internalaffairsofMemberStatesledtoineffectivesanctionsand non-enforceability(Tan,2005).
The enactment of the THPA by Singapore demonstrates a unilateral measure from the Singaporean government in an attempt to hold industrial stakeholders accountable for land burning activities in Indonesia(Tan, 2015b). Implementing the THPAandpenalizingtheplantationindustriesresponsiblemaybe politically sensitive sincethesame industries contributetothe economic development and revenue of both Singapore and Indonesia(Varkkey,2012). Properimplementation of theTHPA
wouldrequireaccuratespatialconcessionmaps,whichhavebeen inthepast,withheldbytheIndonesiangovernment.Inmeetings described as ‘tense’, the Indonesian government resisted and raised legal obstacles to the sharing of map information. The Indonesian Environment Minister argued that the freedom of informationlawofIndonesiaprohibitedthepublicdisclosureof suchinformation.Itwasfurtherclaimedthatdatathatcouldreveal the country’snatural resources wealth, such as forested areas, couldnotbemadepublicunderIndonesianlaw(Tan,2015a).
In addition to the above political challenges, the extra- territorial clause of the THPA may present another hurdle for Singapore in the successfulimplementation of this law.Extra- territoriallegislationagainstindividualsorcompaniesengagedin transboundarypollutionisrare(Tan,2015b).Wheretheyexist,the reachofthelegislationisnotparticularlycontentious,sincethey typicallytargetcompaniesofthelegislatingstate.Totheextent thattheTHPAtargetscompaniesincorporatedinSingaporewith operationsinIndonesia, therewould belittlecontroversysince theseareSingaporeentitiesorcitizens.Whatisunusualisthatthe THPAalsoclaimsjurisdictionovernon-Singaporeentitiesoperat- ingoutsideSingapore,i.e.,companiesorindividualswithlittleor nolinktoSingaporesuchasIndonesianorMalaysiancompanies operatinginIndonesia. Thisextra-territorialclauseoftheTHPA appearstoderivesomeinspirationfromComprehensiveEnviron- mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), a pieceof legislation in place in theUnited States ofAmerica; a federal law that authorizes federal natural resource agencies, states, and private individuals, to recover natural resource damagescaused by releases of hazardous substances. In 2006, CERCLAwasusedinthecaseofPakootasv.TeckComincoMetalsLtd (Tan,2015b)in whicha Canadianlead–zincsmelterdischarged hazardousuntreated effluents intotheCanadian portion of the ColumbiaRiver,whichsubsequentlycarriedtheeffluentssouth- wardintotheU.S.stateofWashington.Whiletheextra-territorial clauseofCERCLAwasdiscussedduringthedeliberationsof the Pakootas case, it was found that the release of hazardous substances occurred within the U.S. and therefore involved a domestic,asopposedtoextra-territorial,applicationofCERCLA.In thisinstance,thecourtwasconcernedthattheapplicationofthe extra-territorialclausewouldbeproblematicasitinterferedwith theprinciple of comityof nations. The concern also relates to problems that might arise if other countries sought reciprocal extra-territorialjurisdictionoverpollutingactivitiesofAmerican companies.In a similar way,the extra-territorial clause of the THPA will raise problems of comity between Singapore and Indonesia,a political decision Singaporehastoacceptwiththe implementationofthislaw.
5. Potentialresolutions
ThechallengesfacedbytheTHPArevealthecontextoflanduse development history and entrenched economic and political interestsunderwhich theSoutheastAsian hazephenomenonis embedded in. Resolution of this phenomenon goes beyond implementingtheTHPAandencompasses advancementsinfire detectiontechnology,Indonesia’spoliticalwillandaction,aswell asaligningsustainablepoliciesforlong-termplantationdevelop- ment;wediscussthemfurtherbelow.
(1)Resolutionofdynamicsresponsibleforrecurrentandworsen- ing peatland fires cannot rely on concession maps and fire hotspotdataalone.Thereisaneedtorefinethespatialdataon twofronts:byimprovinglandusemapstodistinguishareas occupiedbythecompanyandsmallfarmerswithinconcession boundaries;andtoascertaintheoriginoffireeventsthrough
monitoringofdailyhotspotdataandchartingoffireprogres- sionmaps(Fletcheretal.,2014).TheTHPAwillbenefitgreatly ifinvestmentsweremadetoembarkon robustmodelsthat consider haze trajectory dispersal and plume movements.
Mapping technologies can be concentrated in districts and provinces(e.g.,Riau,Jambi,SouthSumatra)alreadyidentified ashighriskfireoccurrenceareas(Reddingtonetal.,2014).Such effortswouldhelptoprovidereliableinformationneededfor theTHPA tobecomeaneffectiveprosecutingtool.However, greater on-the-ground presence, as well as coordination between governments and differentstakeholders,is needed toaccomplishthis.
(2)Recentprosecutions in Indonesia of corrupted officials who receivedbribesfromplantationcompaniesindicateIndonesia’s toughened stance toward those who breachenvironmental laws(Siswo,2014).ThemergeroftheMinistryofForestryand theMinistryofEnvironmentandthesubsequentappointment of a new minister further indicates political reorganization whichcouldalteroldpatronagenetworksbetweenagribusiness firmsandgovernmentofficials(Murdiyarso,2014).Indonesia’s president plans to step up efforts to protect Indonesia’s peatlandsthroughtheimplementationofstrongerregulations and a thorough review of licenses previously granted to companiesthatsubsequentlyconvertedpeatlandsintomono- cultureplantations(Manibo,2014).EffortsbyIndonesiatocurb corruptionconsequentlycreatelessconvolutedlandconcession strategiesandenforceprotectionofpeatlands.Mostimportant- ly,these arethe veryfactorsin whichSingaporehaslimited abilitytoimpact,yetarevitaltothesuccessoftheTHPA.These efforts may signal a strategic shift in regional plantation investmentanddevelopment. Ifimplementedsuccessfully, it maysignifyanewmethodintacklingotherregionalenviron- mentalproblemssuchastheexpansionofrubberplantationsin Indo-China(Warren-Thomasetal.,2015).
(3)Onamorepro-activefront,bothIndonesianandSingaporean governmentscouldconsidergreaterregulationofnewoilpalm and pulpwood investments. Given therisk of fire and haze eventsarehighlycorrelatedwiththedevelopmentofpeatlands foroilpalmandpulpwoodplantations(Sizeretal.,2013),and that peat fires are expected to occur even in non-drought conditions due to degradation of peatlands (Gaveau et al., 2014),thereisarealsenseofurgencytoprotectpeatlandsasa pre-emptivemeasuretostopthehaze.Proposalstodevelop peatlandsshouldbescrutinizedthroughmandatorysocialand environmental impactassessmentsprior toland acquisition anddevelopment.InIndonesia,animpactassessmentprocess or AMDAL is mandatory at the planning stage of each plantation development project (McCarthy and Zen, 2010).
These assessments must identify social and environmental risks such as potential land tenure conflicts with local communitiesaswellasthefurtherdegradationofpeatlands;
these factors can be included in the overall cost–benefit analysis of investing in plantation development. Such state imposed regulations on oil palm and pulpwood plantation investments could be incorporated into the guidelines of sustainability reports, the latter having just been made mandatory for all companies listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange(Cheam,2014).Inreality,manyofthesesocialand environmental considerations overlap with sustainability guidelinesundermulti-stakeholderorganizationssuchasthe RoundtableofSustainablePalmOilandtheForestStewardship Council,aswellaszero-deforestationcommitmentsvoluntari- lymadebysomemultinationalcompanies(ClimateandLand Use Alliance, 2014; United Nations, 2014). The above state regulations from Singapore can be useful in reining in companies which do not participate in such sustainability
initiatives. However, for middle-level investors and small- holdersdevelopingplantationsoverpeatlands(Ekadinataetal., 2013;Gaveauetal.,2014),bottom-upinitiativesandmarket incentives are needed (Godar et al., 2014). Some possibilities include providing agricultural incentives (e.g., inputs, higher prices)tosmallholderswhopracticezero-burninglandclearance techniques, and cultivating grassroots involvement to develop commitmenttowardsustainabledevelopmentandforestprotec- tionatvillageanddistrictlevels(YongandPeh,2014).
6. EnvironmentalconsiderationsfortheTHPA
ThemainpremiseoftheTHPAistodecreasepollutionlevels fromtransboundaryhazesincetheseepisodesleadtolostincome opportunitiesand impacts to human health in Singapore. As it stands,theTHPAdoesnotfocusonenvironmentalimpactsassuch.
Impactsto the environment fromburning and haze events are staggeringinscale(Tacconi,2003).Burningresultsinlossesand fragmentationofterrestrialhabitats,withsevererepercussionsto terrestrialwildlifeinaffectedareas(Cheyne,2008;Kobayashietal., 2004).Smokepollutantsalteratmosphericbiomes,changeweather patterns,andcauseunintended cascadingimpactsonfreshwater and marine systems (Hammen, 2007; Jaafar and Loh, 2014;
RadojevicandTan,2000)Despitefundamentalshiftsinecosystem functionsasbothdirectandindirectconsequencesofburning(Posa etal.,2011;Yule,2010),environmentalissueshavetakenabackseat tothoseonregionaleconomiesandhumanhealth.
The THPA and future approaches (e.g., memorandum of understanding between Malaysia and Indonesia (Carvalho, 2014))canbenefitfrommoreeffectivelyincorporatingecosystem servicesprinciplesintotheirhazeresponsestrategies.Aspresently constructed,thereareanumberofshortcomingsonthisfrontthat warrantattention.Herewehighlighthowsomeofthepenalties thatcanbeformulatedtoimprovetheenvironmentalapplicability oftheTHPA,andforsupportingfutureinitiativestotacklesimilar transboundary environmental problems caused by the private sectorinothersettings(Table1).
(1)Penaltyproportionaltoextentofenvironmentaldamage–In theTHPA,transgressorsfoundguiltywillbefineduptoSGD 100,000perday(cappedatSGD2million,Box1).Thedaily penalty rate was revised; during the planningstages, the proposedsumwasoriginallysetataone-timefixedpenalty of SGD300,000–450,000.Whena higherpenaltyquantum was suggested, Singapore’s Minister for Environment and Water Resources Vivien Balakrishnan cautioned against oversteppingduringtheinitialeffortsoftheTHPA,asthese businesseswillsufferbothmonetarylossesandreputational damages to the image of the companies involved (Letch- umanan,2015).ThefinalagreedsumofSGD100,000perday (capped at SGD 2 million) is thought to be a sufficient deterrent against transboundary transgressions. However,
we posit that the fixed penalty sum does not take into considerationtheextentofdamageofthefires,justtheevent offireuse,andmaythereforenotadequatelydeterburningof largeexpansesofland.Ahigherminimumbasepenaltyand increasingtheamountproportionaltoburntareawilllikely sendastrongersignaloncontainingtheextentofenviron- mentaldamagecausedbythefires.Asmeasuringtheextent ofburntareainthetropicsissubjectedtomoderatelevelsof uncertainty(Giglioetal.,2010),afirststepapproachcouldbe toincreasefinesbasedonthelowerestimateofburntarea measured.
(2)Penalty based on sensitivity and value of the damaged ecosystem – In the THPA, penalties assume homogeneous habitatandecosystemservicevalues.Werecommendfuture initiativestoadjustpenaltieswiththesefactorsconsidered.For example,thehazeepisodeofJune2013revealedthatburning ofdegradedpeatlands,acarbon-richecosystem,accountedfor morethan80%ofthefires(Gaveauetal.,2014). Burningof peatlandsalsoreleasesahigherlevelofparticulatematterinto the atmosphere (Kim et al., 2014). In addition to the base penalty,addedpenaltiescanconsiderthelevelofparticulate matter recorded in Singapore. These emissions can be calculatedbasedonestablishedglobalsystems(e.g.,Monitor- ing Atmospheric Composition & Climate; https://www.
gmes-atmosphere.eu/)whichcalculatedailybiomassburning emissionsandtransport ofair pollution.Similarly, penalties should be meted out in a decreasing order based on how sensitive these ecosystemsare to fire: peat swampforests, primaryforests,selectivelyloggedforests,secondaryforests, andshruborgrasslands.
(3)Penaltiesreceivedarechanneledtoproblemresolution–We recommendfutureinitiativestoappropriateafixedproportion of penalties received toward ecosystem restoration, fire monitoring,orfundinginitiativesforfirebrigades.Thissystem isfiscallyappropriatesinceitreactstoproblemsastheyarise (generatingfundstoalleviate)orbecomeameliorated(withno furtherfundingneeded).Asmostofthefirehotspotsoccurin remoteareas,considerableeffortandresourcesarerequiredto mobilizepreventionandpreparednessmeasuresinIndonesia.
Hence,pre-emptivemeasuressuchasseasonalforecastingof firesshouldbepartoftheoverallstrategytomanagefiresin Indonesia.Forexampleseverefireeventshavebeenrecently demonstratedtobepredictablemonthsinadvanceusingstate- of-theartseasonalrainfallforecastsforIndonesia(Spessaetal., 2014). Seasonal forecasting of fire risk could be further improvedbyusingstandardfiredangerratingsystems,such astheCanadianFireWeatherIndex(FWI)(Fieldetal.,2014) which have been modified to estimate fire and haze occurrences for Western Indonesia (de Groot et al., 2005;
Fieldetal.,2004).Suchtechniquescanbeincorporatedintothe IndoFireplatformwhichisareal-timeonlinetoolestablished by the Australian government for monitoring hotspots in Indonesia(IndoFire,2015).
Table1
Recommendationsforregulationoftransboundaryenvironmentalproblems.
CharacteristicoftheTHPA Shortcoming Recommendation Otherrelatedsystems
Singleandfixedpenalty Penaltynotassociatedtoextentof damage
Penaltyproportionaltoareadamaged Acidrain,watershedmanagement,fisheries quota,landdevelopment
Homogeneousecosystem value
Penaltynotassociatedtoecosystem value
Penaltyproportionaltohabitatcomplexity andecosystemservicesrendered
Coastalmanagement,watershedmanagement, landdevelopment
Noregulationfornew businesses
Riskofbusinessesnotassessed Imposemandatoryenvironmentalimpact assessments
Coastalmanagement,watershedmanagement, landdevelopment
Penaltiesnotchanneled toresolvesourceof problem
Undermineacceptabilityofthelaw Penaltiesusedforrestorationand monitoringefforts
Acidrain,watershedmanagement,fisheries quota,landdevelopment,coastalmanagement
7. Conclusion
Transboundaryenvironmentalproblemsaredifficulttoresolve duetodisputesoverterritorialsovereigntyandplacingtheonusof environmentalprotectiononeconomicallybeneficialindustriesin theoffendingcountry.Self-interestsandfearofchallengingother nations’righttoeconomicdevelopmentoftenresultinlittleaction toward addressing an international environmental problem. By recognizingitsownagribusinesssector,inparticulartheoilpalm andpulpwoodindustries,aspartoftheproblemandtakinglegal actionagainstpollutingcompaniesinIndonesia,Singapore’sTHPAis makingaregionalenvironmentalproblemtractablebysubjecting thesecompaniestoitsjudicialsystem.AlthoughtheSingaporeTHPA isclearlywrittentoprotectitscitizensfromhazeoriginatingin Indonesia(forexample,legalactioncouldonlybetakenwhenhaze fromIndonesia’sland reachesSingapore), Indonesia wouldreap substantialenvironmentalandhealthco-benefitsascorporations would bemore vigilantin preventing fires.The clause for civil liabilitiesundertheTHPAfurtherprovidesapotentialopportunity forotheraffectedpartiestoholdpollutingcompaniesresponsiblefor anypersonalinjury,physicaldamageoreconomiclossincurred.The THPAtherefore,couldholdbusinessesaccountableforextraterrito- rialenvironmental degradationthat imposessignificantcosts to society.TheTHPAasitstands,however,isfraughtwithlimitations.
Inreality,onthegroundresistancefromeconomicbeneficiariesand supportersofplantationdevelopmentwillposeachallengetothe implementationoftheTHPA.Additionally,prosecutionofperpe- tratorsresponsibleforfireshingesonaccuratelyidentifyingthese entities,achallengeintroducedbylandconflictsinIndonesiaand unreliabilityofland-usemaps.Werecommendthatlocalizedland- usemapsareimprovedandmoreresearchconductedinmonitoring andanalyzingfirehotspottrends.Recentoverhaulinjurisdiction and management of forest resources and forestry within the Indonesian government lends further hope of reducing burning andtransboundaryhaze(YongandPeh,2014).
Inaddition,byincorporatingenvironmentalclausessuchas ensuringthatthepenaltyisproportionaltotheareaburnt,and peggingthepenaltyamounttovalueoftheecosystemdamaged, the THPA designed primarily to reduce haze pollution can coincidentally recognize ecosystem services. We recommend thataportionofpenaltiesobtainedbechanneledintoameliorat- ingandpreemptingtheproblem,suchasinvestinginfirebrigades andfiremonitoringsystems.
Regional momentum observed in attempting to combat transboundaryhazeis evidentfromthepassingof theTHPAin Singapore,andtheclimateinSoutheastAsiaisripefordiscussions on transboundary haze considering positive recent events in Indonesia(e.g.,ratifyingtheagreement,cabinetshake-up)(Yong andPeh,2014).Resultantly,forthefirsttimeintwodecades,there existsapossibilityofaddressingdriversoffireeventsinIndonesia inapracticalmanner.Singaporehastakenonaboldlegalstance towardthetransboundaryhazewiththepassingoftheTHPA.
Acknowledgements
WethanktheNationalEnvironmentAgencyofSingaporeandthe SingaporeInstituteofInternationalAffairsforhostingstakeholder meetingsandworkshopson theSoutheastAsianhaze. J.S.H.L.is fundedbytheSwissNationalScienceFoundation.Z.J.isfundedby the National University of Singapore and the Smithsonian Institute.L.P.K.issupportedbytheAustralianResearchCouncil.
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