Public sector governance and accountability - Blog Staff

Editorial

Public sector governance and accountability

1. Introduction

Thecollectionofpapersinthisspecialissuehasprimarilybeendrawnfromthepapersrepresentingthe‘‘Corporate Governanceand accountabilityin thePublic Sector’’stream oftheSeventhInternationalCriticalManagement Studies Conference(CMS7),whichwasheldattheUniversityofNaplesFedericoII,Italy,inJuly2011.Thestreamwasinspiredby internationalreformsfocussedonthemodernizationofgovernments.Thesereformshavebeenimplementedatcentral, regionalandlocallevels,andarebasedontheassumptionthatimprovingthemechanismsofgovernanceandaccountability willenhancetheperformanceresultsinthepublicsector(Aucoin,1990;PollittandBouckaert,2011).Awiderangeofactors havebeeninvolvedinthepublicsectorreforms,suchascorporations,foundations,andotheragenciesincludingbothprivate and intergovernmental actors. They have all played a role in defining the requirements for new governance and accountabilitymechanisms (Christensenand Laegreid, 2007). In this respect, the focushas particularlybeenon how governanceandaccountabilityhavebecomediffusedinthepublicsectorcontextandhowthemultipleactorsinteractinthis newarena(Dubnick,2005;Humphreyetal.,1993;Mulgan,2000).

The remainder of this editorial is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces some views on governance and accountabilityinconnectionwiththepublicsectorreforms.Section3givesasynopsisofthecontributionstothisspecial issuefromtheperspectiveofthebroaderdomainofpublicsectorgovernanceandaccountability.Finally,Section4reflects onthepapersandofferssomeperspectivesforfutureresearch.

2. Viewsonpublicsectorgovernanceandaccountability

Inordertounderstandthechangingrolesofgovernanceandaccountabilityaspartoftherecentpublicsectorreforms,we willfirstlyintroducesomegeneralnotionsregardingpublicsectorgovernanceandaccountability.Subsequently,wewill introducetheconceptsofNewPublicManagement(NPM)andNewPublicGovernance(NPG)asrecentreformpackages,and showtheroleofgovernanceandaccountabilitytherein.

2.1. Governanceandaccountability

‘‘Governance’’hasbecomeoneofthebuzz-wordsinmodernsocialsciences.Inthemostgeneralsensegovernancedeals withthesteeringandcoordinationofvariousactors,ofteninnetwork-typepatternsofcollaboration(seeclassicalworkson governance,e.g.Rhodes, 1997orKooiman,2003). Althoughtherearealsocasesof‘‘governancewithoutgovernment’’, usually agovernancestructure containsat leastonegovernmentalinstitution.Governanceis anumbrellatermwhich includes different meanings and perceptions and is widely used in political sciences as well as in economics and management.Althoughgovernancealsocovershierarchicalformsofsteering(‘‘government’’),itisusuallyassociatedwith othergovernancemodes,primarilymarketsornetworks(Bevir,2009).

Toindicatecontrolissuesinthecontextofcorporationstheterm‘‘corporategovernance’’wasestablished.Corporate governance canbedefined asa conceptof structures,rules, proceduresand mechanismsfor theproper steeringand controllingofcorporations(Colleyetal.,2005;OECD,2004).Intheprivatesectorcorporategovernanceistheumbrellaterm for allaspectsof thepowersand competencesintherelations amongdifferentorganizationalunits andbetween the organizationanditsvariousstakeholders(particularly:shareholders).Inthefrequentcaseofseparationbetweenownership andmanagement,thecorporategovernanceconceptensurestheinfluenceoftheownersofthebusinessonitsmanagement.

Mostaspectsofthecorporategovernanceofcompaniesareregulatedincompanylaw;usuallyaccordingtothelegalstatusof thefirm.Otheraspectsarecoveredbysoftlaw,e.g.corporategovernancecodes.

ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect

Critical Perspectives on Accounting

j o urn a l hom e pa ge : ww w. e l se v i e r. c om / l oca t e / cp a

1045-2354/$–seefrontmatterß2012ElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2012.11.005

Publicsectorgovernanceconcernsaccountabilitytasksinrelationtothespecificgoalsofthissector,whicharenotlimited toservicedelivery(e.g.costandqualityofservices)butalsoincludetheimpactofthepoliciesonthecommunityorthe societyatlarge(e.g.policyoutcomesorvaluefortaxmoney).Governanceincludesvarioustypesofmechanisms,particularly structuresthatclarifytheresponsibilitiesofthevariousstakeholdersasregardstheorganization,approachesthatfosterthe capabilitiesformeetingtheseresponsibilities,andtoolssuchassystemsforinternalcontrolandexternalaccountability.Inhis historicalreviewofthegovernanceconcept,Goddard(2005,p.195)distinguishesatleastthreedimensionsofgovernance:

conformance,performanceandstructure.Theaboveindicatedgovernancemechanismscanalsobeobservedinthecodesof conductforgoodgovernanceinthepublicsector(compare,forexample:TheIndependentCommissiononGoodGovernance inPublicServices,2004).Ifwewanttounderstandaccountabilitymechanisms,wehavetoconsidertheminthecontextof governanceasindicatedhere.Accountabilitycanhavedifferentmeanings.Basically,itreferstothegivinganddemandingfor goodconduct,butsomeauthors(Smyth,2012,pp.231–232)aremorestrictinthesensethattheyemphasizetheneedfor control(sanctionandreward)asaninstrumenttoformalizetheconcept,becauseotherwiseitwouldbemerelyassociated withanswerabilityandtransparency.

Bovensprovidesaratherconcisedefinitionofaccountability:‘‘Asocialrelationshipinwhichanactorfeelsanobligation toexplainandtojustifyhisorherconducttosomesignificantother’’(2009,p.184).Theaccountabilityconceptisprimarily associatedwithpowerdelegationfromshareholders(principal)tomanagers(agents)andthewaytoensuretherelationship betweentheagentsandtheprincipals(Broadbentetal.,1996;GrayandJenkins,1993;Sinclair,1995).Inordertodefinewho theprincipalisandwhotheagentis,thequestionsofwhoisresponsibletowhomandforwhatneedstobeanswered (Bovens,2009).Thisissuehasresultedinthediscussionofaccountabilitytowardsstakeholdersoutsidetheorganizationas wellasamongthedifferentlevelsof theorganization, i.e.external andinternal relations(Deleon,1998; Romzekand Dubnick,1987).Thus,adistinctioncanbemadebetweeninternalandexternalaccountability(GrossiandThomasson,2011).

Accountabilityis context-specific.Ithastobeadjusted toboththetype oforganization andtheobjectfor whichthe organizationisaccountable(RobertsandScapens,1985;RomzekandDubnick,1987).

2.2. Furtherthoughtsonpublicsectoraccountability

Publicsectoraccountabilitytraditionallyconcernstherelationshipbetweenpoliticiansandcitizens,aswellastothat betweenpoliticiansandpublicmanagers(Barberis,1998;Mulgan,2000).Bovensnotesthattheconceptofpublicsector accountabilityhasbecome‘‘arhetoricaldeviceservingasasynonymformanylooselydefinedpoliticaldesiderata,suchas transparency,equity,democracy,efficiencyandintegrity’’(2009,p.183).Sincetheconcepthasrecentlybeenexpandedit can now also be appliedto more complex relationships. Greiling and Spraul(2010) point out that the provision of informationwithintheaccountabilityrelationshipcanbesupplyordemand-driven.Accountability isnotlimited toa principal–agentrelationship,and viceversa,actorscanbeaccountabletoanumberof partiesinsideandoutside their organizations.Tothisend,differenttypesofaccountabilityhavebeenidentifieddependingon thetypeofrelationship concerned,whichmeansthatitcannowinvolveabroaderspectrumofstakeholders(Andre´,2010;Barberis,1998;Sinclair, 1995).Giventheheterogeneityandcomplexityoftheinterestsatstakeinthepublicsector,publicorganizationsmaytendto optforambiguousstrategiesandgoalswhicharelesslikelytoberejectedbytheelectoratethanclear-cutpolicies,andwill allowthepoliticianstomaintainorincreasetheirpoliticalconsensus.

Public sectoraccountabilityhas several forms: authorsdistinguish between internal and external (Romzek,2000;

RomzekandDubnick,1987);directandindirect(Polidano,1998);andverticalandhorizontalaccountability(Barberis,1998;

Bovens,2009;Mulgan,2000;Hodges,2012).Accountabilityinthepublicsectorisdescribedasaheterogeneous,complex, chameleon-likeandmultifacedconceptencompassingseveraldimensions(Barberis,1998;Mulgan,2000;Sinclair,1995).

According to Shaoulet al. (2102, p. 221), thepublic sectorcontext with its multiple stakeholdersrequires a multi- dimensionalexternalreportinginstrumentwhichcoversmultipleareas,suchastheuseandstewardshipofresources,the costandqualityofservices,financialprobityandfinancialcontroloverpublicresources.Sinclair(1995)evendefinesamuch broadersetofaccountabilityformsforthepublicsector,whichgoesbeyondthescopeoffinancialdimensions,byalso includingpolitical(ordemocratic),public,managerial,bureaucratic,professional,andpersonalaccountability.Moreover, thisauthorseesaccountabilityasmultipleandfragmented:‘‘beingaccountableinoneformoftenrequirescompromisesof othersortsofaccountability’’andmoreovershesuggeststhat‘‘accountabilityiscontinuallybeingconstructed’’(Sinclair, 1995,p.231).

Thepublicsectoraccountabilitydimensionbecomesevenmoreinterestingandsignificantwhenconsideringthe‘‘big paradigmshifts’’thathavetakenplaceovertheyearsinpublicmanagementandaccounting.Inthenextsectionwewillfocus onthecurrentshiftinpublicmanagementandaccountabilityasdiscussedbytherecentresearchliteratureonthistopic, namelythatfromNewPublicManagementtoNewPublicGovernance.

2.3. FromNewPublicManagement(NPM)toNewPublicGovernance(NPG)

Duringthepastthreedecadesthemanagementofpublicsectororganizationshasbeensubjecttomajorchanges.The umbrellatermusedtocharacterizethesechangesisNewPublicManagement(NPM).IngeneralNPMhasbeenaresponseto accusationsdirectedatthepublicsectorofbeingbureaucratic,inefficientandineffective.AsaneoliberaldoctrineNPM supports,amongothergoals,theintegrationofprivatesectormanagementconceptsandmarketmechanismsintothepublic

sector(Reichard,2010).Hood(1995)claimsthatchangesinpublicsectoraccountinghavebeencentralintheriseofNPM.He furthersuggeststhatthedevelopmentofNPMhasbeentheresultofabroadershiftinviewsregardingpublicaccountability andpublicadministration.

Incomparisonwiththetraditionalconceptsofpublicadministration,NPMhasbeenbasedonadifferentconceptionof publicaccountability,entailingadifferentapproachtotrustanddistrustinsocialandeconomictransactionsresultingina differentstyleof‘‘accountingization’’(PowerandLaughlin,1992)andpoliticallanguage(WatkinsandArrington,2007).Also previousstudieshavesuggestedthatthisnewlanguage,forexampleintermsofperformanceinformation,wasfirstofall used in external accountability relationships, rather than in the internal management communication. In this new conceptionofaccountabilityaccountingwasthekeyelement,reflectingahightrustinthemarketandprivatebusiness methodsandalowconfidenceinthepublicservantsandthetraditionalprofessionals,whoseactivitieshadtobeclosely evaluatedthroughsophisticatedaccountingandmanagementtechniques.Therewasanincreasingtendencytowardsthe adoptionofprivate-sectormanagerialandaccountingtechniquesinorder‘‘tomakethepublicsectormorebusiness-like’’

(Lapsley,1999;Olsonetal.,1998).However,theprivatesectormethods,practicesandaccountingtoolsweremostlyadopted withoutathoroughanalysisofthepublicsector’sspecificobjectivesandcharacteristics.

NewPublicGovernance(NPG)hasitsoriginsintheradicalchangesintroducedinthepublicpolicyinthe1980sand 1990s,andcanbepartlyregardedasaresponsetotheNPM-orienteddevelopmentsinthepublicsector,especiallywith respectto‘marketization’and‘accountingization’(Osborne,2010).AccordingtoAntiroikkoetal.,NPGreferstothe‘‘steering, coordinationanduseoftheinstitutionalarrangementsformulatedinpolicy-makingandimplementationprocessesaimedat thecollectiveinterestinapolycentricmulti-sectoralstakeholdercontexttopursuethecollectiveinterest’’(2011,p.3).So, NPGcontrastswithNPMinatleasttworespects:(1)NPGisprimarilyfocussedonpublicsectorvalues(asopposedtoprivate sectorvalues)and (2) NPGstartsfromtheperspectiveofnetworksof organizations(asopposed tothatof individual organizationsandtheirrelationswithclients).Theterm‘‘governancenetworks’’isusedtolabelthemoreorlessstable patternsofsocietalrelationships(interactions,cognitions,andrules)betweenmutuallydependent(public,semi-public, and/orprivate)actorsincomplexpolicyissuesorpolicyprogrammes(KoppenjanandKlijn,2004,pp.69–70).

Intheserelationshipspublicsectororganizationsareconfrontedwithsomestrategicchoices.Threestrategicchoicescan bedistinguishedwithregardtopublicsectorreformssuchasNPMorNPG:

Definingtheorganizationalboundaries.

Thestructureofthecontractualrelationshipsandthedevelopmentofresourcemanagement.

Theorganization’sinternalcontrolandcommunicationsystems,i.e.theorganizationalstructures.

Regardingthefirstchoice,NPMhaspromotedtheoutsourcingofbothcore,oftenstandardized,services(e.g.,issuingof permits,education)andnon-coreservices,suchassupporttasks(e.g.,IT,financialadministration).However,researchhas shownthatthisapproachcanleadtoanincreaseinthetransactioncosts,becausepublicserviceproviderstendtobehave opportunisticallytoservetheirowninterests(Hoffmanetal.,2010;LeGrand,1999).Competitionamongproviderswiththe samegoalsanddistrustbetweentheseprovidersandthepurchasersoftenleadtohighertransactioncostsandanineffective useofcommonresources(Barretta,2008).Moreover,otherstudieshavepointedtothepoorevidenceofbenefitsotherthan costsdecrease(Almqvist,2004;LeGrand,1999)andreportedthatprovidersaremorefocussedonquantitythanonquality (Lapsley,2009).Partlyasa responsetothesefindings,policychangeswereenactedinfavourofcooperation,involving organizational boundary-spanning effortsfor sharingknowledgeand evenresources(Kurunma¨ki and Miller,2011)to enhancenetworkingandcollaborationamongorganizationalentities.AccordingtoNPG,themake-or-buydecisionformerly associatedwiththeNPMparadigmhasbecomeameansbywhichresources,knowledge,anddifferentcompetenciesare sharedtopromotecooperationintheprovisionofservices.Thisdevelopmenthascalledfornewideasabouthowthese resourcesshouldbeusedandsharedandhownewaccountabilityrelationshipsbetweenactorsshouldbemanaged.

Regardingthesecondchoice,theNPMviewoncontractualrelationshipsisconsiderablyinfluencedbythetraditional neoclassicalperspectiveoncontracts.AccordingtoWalshetal.(1997),inthisviewthecontractisanimpersonalprocessin whichthepartiesinvolvedcometoanagreementabouttheirformalcommitmentstoeachother.Theyareheldtothese commitmentsandshouldtheyfailtorespectthem,sanctionswillfollow.Thelawstandsbehindtheseagreementsasan instrumentforresolvingpossibleconflicts.Inthistraditionalview,thecontractcarefullyallocatestherisks,responsibilities andrewardsbetweenthecontractparties.Therelationshipbetweentheclientandthecontractorislimitedtomatters specificallyconcernedwiththeexchangeoftheservicesorgoods.Thecontractstrictlyandcomprehensivelydefinesits termsandlimits.Thisviewoncontractsisbasedonthenotionofconflictinginterestsbetweentheclientandthecontractor, wherebythecontractorwillnotactintheinterestoftheclientwithoutthethreatofsanctions.Inasimilarvein,theclientwill exploitthecontractor,ifpossible.Ifthecontractorfailstodeliver,hewillbepunished(e.g.,throughdelaysorreduced payments).

However,aquitedifferentperspectiveoncontractsandaccountabilityistheonebasedontheideathatinenteringintoa contract,thepurchaserandtheproviderhaveagreedtoaclosecooperation(Walsh,1995).Thisviewhasbeendominantin therecentNPGdebate(Osborne,2006).Thecooperativecontractstartsfromtheassumptionthattherehastobeacertain degreeoftrustbetweentheclientandthecontractor,andthatpunishmentisnotanappropriatemeansofdealingwith failure.Itisarguedthatincaseofinsufficientperformancedeliverythebestresponsetofailureforboththeclientandthe contractoristobewillingtocooperateinsolvingtheproblem.Insituationswheretheserviceprovisionissocomplexthat

ultimatecontrolisdifficultandcontractsareinsufficient,thepartiesinvolvedmayoptforasystemof‘relationalcontracting’.

Inthiscontexttheemphasisshiftsfromadetailedspecificationofthecontractcomponentstoanumberofmoregeneral statementswhichcanbeadjustedovertime(Ferlieetal.,1996;Walshetal.,1997;Watt,1998).

NPG-typerelationshipsbuiltonnetworksofdifferentcompetencies,emphasizingcommoninterestsandblurringthe purchaser/providersplit,haveseemedtoreceiveincreasingsupportthesedays.However,atthesametime,thereisstill a large focusonthe logicunderlying the marketmechanism andcompetition principles, whichmakes the current situationmultifacetedinthesensethatmanyoftheNPM-basedmanagementstylesremaintobewidelyused(Lapsley, 2009).Intoday’sharshfinancialclimatetheintroductionofnewinnovativewaysofmanagingpublicorganizationsare difficulttolegitimizeandmaintain(Almqvistetal.,2011).Hence,notonlyhavetheorganizationalboundariesandthe accountabilityrelationshipschanged,alsothethirdstrategicissue,organizations’internalmanagementandcontrol,has alteredovertheyears.

Withrespecttothislastissue,theoveralltrend–asindicatedabove–regardingthemanagementcontrolduringthelast decadeshas been a call by both researchers and practitioners for broadening themanagement routines beyond the traditionalfinancialcontroloforganizations.Thisdevelopmenthaspromotedatechnology-driventrendtowardsincreasing thediversity of performanceindicators, aimedat extending theamountof controllableaspects withinorganizations.

However,alsothistrendhasbeencriticized.Someclaimthatitmayleadtoadisproportionatefocusonmeasurabilityatthe expenseofthesustainableprovisionofpublicvalue.PowerandLaughlin(1992)callthisdevelopment‘‘accountingization’’, Power(1997)describesitastheriseoftheauditsociety,whileLapsley(2009)labelsitthe‘‘tickboxmentality’’.Moreover, theambitiontomeasureanincreasingamountofcontrollableaspectshascreatedaparadoxintermsofthequalitylogics,in thesensethatwhatisdifficulttomeasure(especiallytheoutcome)hasatendencytobeignored(Almqvist,2001).

More recent reforms, however,include a wider range of parties (such as corporations, foundations, and agencies employingbothprivateandintergovernmentalactors),whichhasincreasedtheneedfornewgovernanceandaccountability mechanismsrelatedtothespecificcharacteristicsof publicnetworks.‘‘Theeffecthasbeentodeprive particularlythe political but also administrativeleadership of levers ofcontrol and of influence and information, raising questionof accountabilityand capacity’’ (Christensenand Laegreid, 2007, p. 12). Organizational interdependence has becomean ubiquitousconceptandthesteeringofcomplexsetsofinterdependentorganizationsisbecomingincreasinglydifficultfor governments.Rhodespredictedthat‘‘hollowstateerodesaccountability’’and‘‘institutionalcomplexityobscureswhois accountabletowhomandforwhat’’(Rhodes,1997,p.147).MoreoverBovens’(2009,p.201)pointsoutthat‘‘themost importantconsequenceisadecreaseinintensityandscopeofpublicaccountability’’.Othershavearguedthatthesereforms arenotsomuchathreattoaccountabilityinthepublicsector,butdorequirenewsolutions(Deleon,1998).

2.4. NPMandNPGimplicationsforperformancemeasurementandaccountability

Klijn (2012) makes a clear distinction between NPM and NPG. NPM is more hierarchical and typically based on contractualrelationships,whereasNPGrecognizestheimportanceofinterdependenthorizontalrelationships.Thelatter does not mean, however,that governance networksare completely horizontal.As Klijn (2012, p. 207) indicates: ‘‘In governancenetworkstherearealsoverticalelementsbecauseactorshavedifferentresourcesandthesecauseinequalitiesin therelationsthroughasymmetricalresourcedependencies,whileformalcontractsbetweenvariouslayersofgovernment levels,forinstance,createsomeverticalrelationships’’.

Hodges(2012,p.30)madeadistinctionbetweenverticalandhorizontalaccountability.Verticalaccountabilityrefersto

‘‘thelegalstructuresunderlyingpublicsectororganisationsandwhichconformtotheprocessesofauthorisationanddefined mandates.Itislinkedtoliberalpoliticaltheoryinwhichbureaucratsdeliveroutputswhilepoliticiansshouldberesponsible foroutcomes’’.Horizontalaccountabilityconcernsthemoralandsocialobligationsasperceivedbyorganizationstoreportto stakeholdersorthemutualarrangementbetweenbodiesofequalstandingtoprovidepublicservices(Bovens,2007).

Since the 1980s the public sector’s boundaries as well as its financing and management methods, governance structures,responsibilities,controls andaccountingconcepts havesignificantlychanged(Chan,2003;Guthrie,1998;

Lu¨derandJones,2003).Theaccountingsystemshavebeenadaptedtothechangingdemandsofpublicgovernance,which hasclearlyinfluencedthesesystems’useandcontent(BroadbentandGuthrie,2008).Thegrowingneedforbothfinancial andpoliticalaccountabilitydemandsabroaderandmorecompletesetofmanagementandaccountingsystemstoprovide feedbackfordecision-makingandforimprovingaccountability(Broadbentetal.,1996;Chan,2003;Chowetal.,2007;

Humphreyetal.,1993).

Table1summarizesourdiscussionofthechangingfocusofaccountabilityunderNPMandNPG.

Asindicatedabove,NPMisprimarilybasedonaverticalandhierarchicalview,whereasNPGemphasizesahorizontal focus.Inaddition,theapproachesdifferintermsoftheirscope,i.e.,NPMisparticularlyconcentratedontheoutputsof individualorganizations(result-orientation)whileNPGisaimedatresults,especiallytheoutcomesofcollaborativeefforts.

ThedifferencebetweenNPMandNPGisinfactthreefold:thetypesofperformanceindicatorsdiffer,thedesignofthe performanceinformationsystemsdiffers,andtheuseofthesesystemsdiffer(vanHeldenetal.,2012).NPMrepresentsa

‘commandandcontrol’mannerofusingperformanceinformation,whilethefunctionofperformanceinformationwithin networksismainlytosupportprocessesofdebateanddialogueamongthepartnerswithdifferentcompetencies,whoare dependentoneachotherbutnotinahierarchicalsense.Thiscontextpromotesclearandaccessibleperformanceinformation (AhrensandChapman,2004;deBruijnandvanHelden,2006;Wouters,2009).Behn(2003)arguesthatdifferentobjectives

requiredifferenttypesofperformanceindicators.Thisviewcouldimplythatperformanceinformationforaccountability purposesdifferstosomeextentfromperformanceinformationforcontrolpurposes.Twoaspectsmaystandout.First, the information in accountability reports is generally more comprehensive than that in control reports, which are particularlyfocussedonthespecifictasksandresponsibilitiesofthemanagers.Second,incontrolreportstheperformance indicatorsselectedarerelatedtotheconceptofcontrollability,whileaccountabilityreportsalsocontaininformationon elementswhichareparticularlyrelevanttoexternalstakeholdersbutoutsidethescopeofthemanagersandpoliticiansin question.

Differencesalsoexistintermsofaccountingandfinancialreporting.WhileNPMislinkedtoindividualorganizations usingcomprehensiveconcepts offinancialreporting(accrualaccounting),NPGhasamulti-organizationalfocuswitha particularinterestin‘‘Whole-of-GovernmentAccounting’’(WGA)andconsolidationissues(GrossiandNewberry,2009).The consolidatedreportinthepublicsectorprovidesanoverviewofthefinancialperformanceandpositionnotonlyofthesingle organizationbutofthewholegroupoforganizationswhichareunderitscontrolandprovidepublicservices(Broadbent etal.,1996;Chan,2003;Chowetal.,2007).

3. Summaryofthepapersinthisspecialissue

Thissectionsummarizesthefivepapersinthisspecialissue.Apartfromdescribingthepapers’researchaimandmain findings,wewillalsotrytopositionthepapersinthebroaderdomainofthethemeofthisspecialissue:publicsector governanceandaccountability.Thefirsttwopublicationsdiscussissuesofperformancemeasurementforaccountability purposesfromdistinctviewpointsandtheoreticalperspectives.Thethirdpapercriticallypointsoutthenon-neutralityof accountabilityrelationships,andthefinaltwopapersdealwithmorespecificissuesofpublicsectorgovernance,particularly thewayinwhichinternalauditorscopewithroleconflictsandthefinancialexpertiseofoversightbodymembersinapublic sectorcontext.

3.1. Performancemeasurementsystemsforaccountabilityandinternalcontrol

The ultimate goal of a governance system is to help achieve the organization’s targeted performance. Therefore, performancemeasurement instrumentshave toprovideinternalstakeholderswithinformationforinternalcontrol.In addition,theyhavetoinformexternalstakeholdersabouttheorganization’sachievements.ThepaperbyIrisSalitererand SonjaKoracdealswithantecedentsofperformanceinformation(PI)usewithrespecttointernalcontrolandaccountability purposesinAustriansmallandmid-sizedlocalgovernments.Theseantecedentsaredefinedatfourdifferentlevels,the contextual,theinter-organizational,theintra-organizationalandtheindividuallevel.

Thispapermakesatleastthreecontributionstothebodyofknowledgeonpublicsectorperformancemeasurement research.First,bystudyingthePIuseinpublicsectororganizationsatboththepoliticalandthemanageriallevels,second,by examiningwhethertheantecedentsofPIusedifferbetweeninternalcontrolandaccountabilitypurposes,andthirdby investigatingtheimpactofthevariousinter-organizationalapproachesonPIuse, particularlyinternalautonomization, outsourcingandcooperation.AstrikingoutcomeofSalitererandKorac’sstudyisthatpoliticiansusePImoreextensively thanmanagers,whichcontradictsthefindingsofearlierstudies.Moreover,thisstudyindicatesthatarationalcultureand management styleareconsistentantecedentsof PIuse,both forinternal controlandaccountabilitypurposes,andfor politiciansandmanagers.Theinter-organizationalantecedentsofinternalautonomization,outsourcingandcooperation, however,differintheirimpactonPIuse,whileneithercontextualantecedents(financialhealthandorganizationalsize)nor theindividualantecedentofapro-NPMattitudehaveasignificantinfluenceonPIuse.Futureresearchneedstofurther examinetheimpactofinter-organizationalregimesonPIuse,notonlybecauseoftheinconsistentfindingsofthisstudybut alsotoaddressthesecomplexissuesinamoreadvancedway.

Table1

AcomparisonofpublicsectoraccountabilitybetweenNPMandNPG.

NewPublicManagement(NPM) NewPublicGovernance(NPG)

Focus Intra-organizationalfocus Inter-organizationalfocus

Objectives Improvingtheefficiencyandeffectivenessofthe singleorganizations’publicservicedelivery

Improvingtheinter-organizationalcoordinationand outcomesofanetworkoforganizationswithdifferent competencies

Accountabilitydimensions Verticalperformanceofsingleorganizations Accountabilityintermsofresults(outputs)

Horizontalperformanceofthenetworkoforganizations Accountabilityintermsoftheoutcomeofthenetwork Managementcontrol Hierarchicalcontroloftheresultsofsingle

organizationsthroughperformanceindicators onefficiencyandeffectiveness

Managingtheoutputsbyassessingtheobjectives

Enablingcontrolthroughdialogue-drivensystemsof performanceindicators,strengtheningthecontributionof individualorganizationstothenetworkperformance Governingtheoutcomebyanalysis/evaluationofthenetwork Accounting Financialreportingofsinglepublicorganizations Whole-of-GovernmentAccountingandconsolidatedreporting Source:AdaptedversionofKlijn’smodel(2012:p.209).

3.2. Intelligentandvalue-ladenaccountabilityinanetworkcontext

LindaEnglish’spaperpresentssomeresultsofaprisonreforminWesternAustralia,particularlytheprivatizationofone ofthisstate’sprisonsanditsgovernancebytheDepartmentofJustice.Theauthordescribesthecontractualarrangements withtheprivateprovideranddiscussesthekindsofcontrolandoversightandtheirresults.Generally,thiscasestudyshows aninterestingpictureofgovernancereforminaquiteproblematicenvironment(theprisonasaclosedinstitution).Acore featureofthegovernanceconceptherehasbeentheestablishmentofanindependentregulatorybody,the‘‘inspectorof custodialservices’’.Indescribingandanalyzingthestructuresandproceduresoftheperformanceevaluationoftheprison servicesinWesternAustralia,Englishspecificallyemphasizestheprivatelyoperatedprison.Shequalifiestheaccountability regime,whichisbasedonregularinspectionsanddetailedperformancemeasurement,as‘‘intelligentaccountability’’.The systemconsiderablyimprovedtheprisons’performancebutalsoresultedinavisiblevalueshiftasregardstherelevant stakeholders.Itdiffersfromtherathertraditionalandhierarchicalgovernanceconceptusedbythisgovernmentdepartment, whichisbasicallyconsideredasquiteweakbutalsoregardedasslowlyimprovingovertime.However,thecasestudydoes illustratetheinabilityofthisdepartmenttochangeitshierarchicalgovernance,e.g.bydevolvingresponsibilitiestothelocal actorsintheprisons.Theresearchprovidesinsightsintotheprerequisitesforandelementsofanintelligentaccountability regime,e.g.a sophisticatedsurveillanceconceptanda highlytransparentaccountoftheresults.Furthermore,English introducesvariousvalueconceptsanddemonstratesthatthevaluesofbothprisonsandgovernmentbodieshavechanged overtimefromasecurityorientationtowardsamoreharmony-basedvaluesfocusedoncare.

Generally,thispaperprovidesvaluableinsightsintothedistributionofresponsibilitiesandaccountabilitiesinanetwork- typestructure consistingof variouspublicandprivate actors.Furthermore, it shedslight on thecontractualrelations betweenagovernmentaldepartmentandaprivateproviderinthedelicatecontextofcustodialservices.Itshowsthepositive impactofanindependentinspectionregimeonorganizations’performanceandaccountability.Finally,thepaperprovides evidenceforasuccessfulprivate-orientedgovernanceofprisonorganizations,withasbasiccriteriacontrolandoversight.

3.3. Aboutthenon-neutralityofaccountabilityrelationships

Accountabilityisnotapurelytechnicalorneutralconcept.Itisgenerallyinfluencedbytwooppositewaysofthinkingon both sides of the accountabilityrelationship, namelyby the views of the accountor and the accountee. Jean Claude Mutiganda’spapercontributestoourunderstandingofthisnon-neutralaccountabilityrelationship.Itanalyzestheimpactof the institutionalization of governance and budgetary policies on the organizational actors’ accountability from an institutionalandcriticalrealismperspective.Bymakinguseofcriticalrealismthepaper’saimistoextendtheBurnsand Scapens(2000)frameworkbyinvestigatinghowinstitutionalizedgovernanceandbudgetarypoliciesaffectthewaysof thinkingandthebehaviouroftheinstitutionalactorsinaccountabilityrelationships.Theempiricsarebasedontwofield studiesconductedintwohospitaldistrictsinFinlandfrom2009to2012.DuringthelasttwodecadestheFinishhospital sectorhasgonethroughNPM-likereformswithasbasicelementsthedecentralizationofthegoverningpowerstothe municipallevel,competitionamongthehospitals,andtheuseofresult-orientedmanagementsystems.

Mutiganda’sstudyshowsthattheformalaccountabilityrelationshipbetweenthesupervisoryboard(representingthe municipalinterests)andthehospitalmanagement,i.e.betweentheaccountorandtheaccountee,istakenforgrantedby both parties. However, their institutionalized waysof thinking about accountabilitycan substantially differ.Hospital managersarguethatoversightbodymembersaremainlyinterestedinmeetingthebudgetarylimitsandrealizingcost savingswithouthavinganyrealknowledgeabouthowhospitalcareactuallyworks.Atthelowerlevels,theaccountability relationshipsbetweenthemedicaltopmanagersandthemedicalprofessionals(doctorsandnurseswithmanagerialtasks) maydiffer.Efficiency-orientedwaysofthinkingamongmedicalmanagersmayresultinarelationalandinstrumentalform ofbudgetaryaccountability.However,ifefficiency-orientedapproachesusedbytopmanagementaredecoupledfromthe care-basedviewsofmedicalmanagers,theaccountabilityrelationshipsmaybecomeprimarilyceremonial.

3.4. Howinternalauditorsarecopingwithroleconflictsintheirwork

Accountabilityrequires theassurancethat financialand non-financial datausedin reportsaboutan organization’s performancearetrustworthy.Auditing procedurescancontributetothis trustworthinessbyassessingthevalidity and reliabilityofaccountingreports.Oftenorganizationshavebothexternalandinternalauditorsforthesetypesofassessments.

Internalauditorshavethefunctionofawatchdogvis-a`-visoversightbodiesingeneralandauditingcommittees,whichare partoftheseoversightbodies,inparticular.ThemaincontributionofthepaperbyMe´lanieRoussyisthatitchallengesthe watchdogroleoftheinternalauditorsinapublicsectorcontext.Thestudyisbasedoninterviewswithexperiencedauditors inpublicsectororganizationsintheStateofQuebec,Canada.

Byusingroletheorytomapoutthevariousrolesplayedbyinternalauditors,thepapershowsthattheseactorsare primarilytheadvisorsandprotectorsoftopmanagementattheexpenseoftheirwatchdogfunctiononbehalfoftheauditing committees.Internalauditorstrytocopewiththistensionbetweenformalindependencyandastronglyfeltloyaltytowards thetopmanagement.Roussyintroducestheterm‘greyindependency’,whichreferstotheinternalauditorwhoseeksto solvehis/herroleconflictsbytryingtobeindependentbutbyforgivinghim/herselfforfallingshortofthisindependencein thestrictestsense.Roussywarnsagainstusingsimplesolutionstofailingtocomplywiththeformalwatchdogrole,for

examplebyre-emphasizingthisfunctionattheexpenseofthesupportingrole.Withrespecttofindingsolutionstoissuesof control,internaladviceandauditing,shepleasforconsideringthewholegovernancemechanism,includingtherolesofthe topmanagement,theinternalauditors,thecontrollers,theexternalauditorsandtheauditingcommittees.

3.5. Financialandtechnicalexpertiseofoversightbodymembers

Apublicsectororganizationneedspeopleinmanagementandcontrolpositionswhohavetherightskillsandsufficient experience.Governorsmayholdeitherexecutiveornon-executivepositions.Whenthesepositionsareclearlyseparated, non-executivestakepartinanoversightbodyoftheorganization,whichhasasupervisoryroletowards(executive)top management.ThepaperbyEjiaVinnariandSalmeNa¨siexaminesthefinancialandtechnicalcompetencesofthemembersof theoversightbodyoftheFinishwaterutilities.

Thispapercontributesintwowaystoourknowledgeofoversightbody competencesin thepublicsector.Itfirstly develops various measures for estimating financial and technical competence. Financial competence is, for example, estimatedbyassessingthebackgroundofoversightbodymembersintermsoftheireducationandexperienceinfinancial matters andby a self-evaluationoftheir financialexpertise.The paperindicatesthat thefinancialcompetence ofthe oversightbodymembersisgenerallyquitelow,althoughtheself-perceptionoftheirfinancialexpertiseshowsapositive bias.ThesecondcontributionofthepaperisthatVinnariandNa¨sitrytoexplainthedifferencesinthefinancialandtechnical competencesoftheoversightbodymembersbyusingvarioustheoreticallenses.Theyconcludethatstewardshiptheory offersagoodexplanationforthefactthattheoversightbodiesofutilitieswitharelativelyhigherdegreeofautonomization with respect to the local government possess higher levels of financial and technical competences, while resource dependencytheoryindicatesthatthetechnicalcompetencesofmemberswithapoliticalaffiliationarelowerincomparison tothoseofoutsiders.Inapracticalsensethispaperraisesquestionsastowhetheroversightbodiesneedmoreoutsider- professionalsandwhetherthemechanismsforsupervisionandaccountability,forexampleauditingprocedures,areinfact sufficientforcreatinganadequatebalanceintermsofthepoliticalandprofessionalvaluesonwhichoversightbodiesof publicutilitiesshouldbebased.

4. Reflectionsonthepapersanddirectionsforfutureresearch

Thisfinalsectionreflectsonthepaperspresentedinthisspecialissueandsuggestssomedirectionsforfutureresearch.

Threegeneralobservationscanbemadewithrespecttothepapers.

ThepaperbyLindaEnglishinvestigatesaccountabilitychangesinanetworkofstakeholdersinthesensitivecontextof custodialservices.Thisobservationimpliesthatagreatdealofresearchhasstilltobedoneonperformanceaccountabilityin networksinwhichNPGiscentral,assetoutinSection2.Inthisrespectitmightberelevanttorefertothereviewpaperby ProvanandMilward(2001)onnetworkperformance.Accordingtotheseauthors,networkperformanceismorecomplicated inthepublicsectorthanintheprivatesectorbecauseinthefirsttheuserneedsoftheconstituentgroupsarerelativelymore diverse and politicized. Provan and Milward therefore propose a framework for analyzing public-sector network performanceatthreelevels:thecommunity,thenetworkandtheserviceprovider.

Thesecondobservationisthat,irrespectiveoftheimportanceofNPMwithitsemphasisonprivatesectordoctrines, inallofthepapersthepublicsectorcontextplaysapivotalrole.ThepaperbyEjiaVinnariandSalmeNa¨si,forexample, triestoexplainthefinancialcompetencesofoversightbodymembersbyinvestigatingwhethertheirbackgroundsare politicalornon-political.ThepaperbyLindaEnglishaboutaccountabilityincustodialservicesexplicitlydiscussesthe tensions between private andpublic sector values. And JeanClaude Mutiganda discusses twocontrasting waysof thinkinginthehospitalsector,theoneinsupportofNPM(stressingefficiency)andtheotheradvocatingpublicvalues, especiallytheconceptofcare.Thisobservationimpliesthatmostpaperscriticallydiscusstheelementsoftheprivate sectorapproachinapublicsectorcontext,whichiscoretowhatwe,aspublicsectoraccountingresearchers,aremeant todo.

Third,wehighlyappreciatethatmostofthepapersinthisspecialissuehavetriedtocombineatechnicalaccountingfocus withacriticalanalysisoftheuseofaccountinginstruments.Inthisrespect,thepapersbyLindaEnglishandJeanClaude Mutigandaaregoodexamples.

Inaddition,weobservedatensionbetweentheparticularfocusonarelevantproblemissueontheonehandanditsrolein thecomprehensivegovernancecontextontheotherhand.Me´lanieRoussy’spaperisagoodexamplehere.Herresearch criticallyandconvincinglydiscussesthelimitedextenttowhichinternalauditorscanfulfilawatchdogrole.However, becauseherresearchonlyaddressesinternalauditorsaspartofamuchbroadergovernancerepertoire,thisstudydoesnot come up withvery concrete suggestionsfor coping with therole conflicts of internal auditors. In order togain this understanding,theentiregovernancemechanism,consistingoftopmanagement,internalauditors,controllers,external auditorsandauditingcommittees,wouldhavetobeconsidered.Thisbroadergovernancedomainhas,however,notbeenthe subjectofstudyinthepaperspresentedinthisspecialissue.Inbrief,theseobservationssuggestthatmoreattentionhasto bepaidtotherelationshipsbetweenthedifferentelementsofthepublicsectorgovernancedomain,whichcouldbedoneby therealizationofcomprehensiveresearchprogrammesinthisfield.

Finally,wewouldliketostresstheneedformorein-depthresearchontheimpactofparticularorganizationalforms,such asoutsourcingandcollaboration.AlthoughtheseconceptshavebeenaddressedinthestudybyIrisSalitererandSonjaKorac

aboutperformancemeasurementinAustrianmunicipalities,topicsofthiscomplexityshouldbeoperationalizedinmore advancedwaysthandonesofarinthemainstreamaccountingstudiesbasedoncross-sectionalsurveydata.

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RolandAlmquist StockholmUniversity,Sweden GiuseppeGrossi*

KristianstadUniversity,Sweden G.JanvanHelden GroningenUniversity,TheNetherlands ChristophReichard PotsdamUniversity,Germany

*Correspondingauthor.

E-mailaddress:giuseppe.grossi@hkr.se(G.Grossi) Availableonline23November2012