133
Reinstatement of National Guidelines of State Policy Within Indonesian Presidential System: The Possibility
Muhtadi1, Zulkarnain Ridlwan2
1Universitas Lampung, Indonesia, E-mail: [email protected]
2Universitas Lampung, Indonesia, E-mail: [email protected]
Submitted: February 06, 2023; Reviewed: March 27, 2023; Accepted: April 03, 2023
Article Info Abstract
Keywords:
GBHN/ PPHN, Indonesia, Presidential System, Reinstatement.
DOI:
10.25041/fiatjustisia.v17no2.2909
Placing the National Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN or PPHN) made by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) as a guideline for the President can potentially reposition MPR above the President. Such an idea of a state has been implemented in Indonesia for no less than 54 years (1945-1999). This paper aims to analyze the basic characteristics of the presidential system and assess the compatibility of PPHN with the presidential system, with the novelty which then offers a model for pouring PPHN into laws and regulations that align with Indonesia's presidential system. Based on the conceptual and theoretical approaches, it can be concluded: First, the basic character of a presidential system is to separate the legislature from the executive, so no accountability mechanism puts the President down as subordinate to the legislature. PPHN implementation can shift this separation towards an accountability model, a feature of a parliamentary system. Second, PPHN can be re- enforced in a presidential system, with the prerequisite that no accountability mechanism puts the President under MPR. Third, pouring PPHN into the form of a Law replacing the RPJPN Law will be more relevant to avoid a government system shifting. However, providing a checks and balances mechanism for the President through the House of Representatives' budgetary rights is still necessary.
ISSN: 1978-5186 | e-ISSN: 2477-6238.
http://jurnal.fh.unila.ac.id/index.php/fiat
134
A. Introduction
A system of constitutional government that was confirmed in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (1945 Constitution) after its four amendments. The discourse on reinstating the National Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN) or in a new term, State Policy Principles (PPHN), often includes an alleged contradiction with the Indonesian presidential system.
Meanwhile, PPHN has the potential to shift the Indonesian government system towards a parliamentary by placing the President as subordinate to the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR).
Indeed, the relationship model of these two institutions will determine what government system is implemented in Indonesia. Conceptually, the system of government only includes two branches of state power; executive and legislative. This construction aligns with Matthew Shugart's opinion that functionally the system of government (presidential or parliamentary) is the legal framework that forms the basis for setting the pattern of relations between the legislature and the executive.1
In line with that, Jimly Asshiddiqie defines a government system linked to the term regeringsdaad, a government administration by the executive in conjunction with the legislature.2 Stepan and Skach put forward the same conclusion that if there is interdependence between the government and parliament, then that is a parliamentary system. At the same time, presidential is interpreted if the government and parliament stand alone.3
So, running a presidential system means putting a distance between the executive and legislative power. Conversely, adhering to a parliamentary system means designing a close authoritative relationship from the legislature to the executive branch. This authoritative relationship emerges in the discussion of the stipulation of PPHN.
Although the latest progress stated that the PPHN proposal to be included through the 1945 Constitution amendments was canceled,4
1Matthew S. Shugart, “Comparative Executive Legislative Relations”, in RAW Rhodes et.al., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p.344.
2Jimly Asshiddiqie, Pokok-Pokok Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia Pasca Reformasi (Principles Constitutional Law of Indonesia Post-Reform), (Jakarta: Buana Popular Science, 2007), p. 311.
3 Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach. “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation”, World Politics, 46 (1): 1–22, 1993. In a parliamentary system, the power to form and dismiss a government is vested in the parliament. See: Michael Laver, “Legislatures and Parliaments in Comparative Context”, in Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 121–140.
4The Chairman of MPR Review Board declared the cancellation of PPHN proposal to be included in the 1945 Constitution upon the agreement of all factions in MPR. PPHN will only be contained in the Law, considering that the RPJPN Law will end its validity soon.
Look:https://news.detik.com/berita/d-6026276/badan-pengkajian-mpr-skekat-batal-
amendemen-konstitute-terkait-pphn also,
135
conceptual and theoretical studies of the PPHN idea remain interesting, bearing in mind the perceived incompatibility of the PPHN concept in a presidential system. Once again, a system of government that has become a strong consensus in the range of amendments to the 1945 Constitution (1999-2002) as a reformation mandate.
This paper uses normative law research methods by reviewing a conceptual study that examines the comparative theory of presidential systems in relation to PPHN: First, how does presidential system theory guide a pattern of relations between the legislature and the executive?
Second, is PPHN following that theory? Third, how is PPHN reinstatement compatible with the Indonesian presidential system?
Based on this theoretical approach, this research's novelty is analyzing the legislative's authoritative limits on the executive in a presidential system, which is different from other government systems. For PPHN initiators, this knowledge will guide the extent to which PPHN arrangements can be adapted within the framework of Indonesia's presidential system.
B. Discussion
1. Legislative Authority Limits on Executive in Presidential System As stated in the Introduction, the relationship between the executive and legislative power is central to studying the system of government. At the same time, the judiciary lies outside it with its independence and independence. The variants of the government system that will be elaborated in this paper are limited to parliamentary and presidential systems. Although there are variants other than the parliamentary and presidential systems, the two systems represent more substantive differences.
Identifying the most distinctive characteristics of a presidential system, one can start by exploring its origins, the United States5. According to Bagir Manan, the presidential system model in America has several general characteristics, one of which is that the President is not responsible to the people's representative body (Congress) and therefore cannot be subject to a
in:https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/04/11/06005391/badan-pengkajian-mpr-disebut- stakes-tak-doing-amendement-for-pphn-tapi?page=all [last accessed December 2, 2022]
5According to Ball and Peters, the United States is the most prominent reference for presidential systems.Other countries, especially in Central America and South America, are considered to be imitating the American presidency. See: Alan R. Ball and Brainard Guy Peters, Modern Politics and Government, 4th Edition, (Hampshire and London: Macmillan Education, 1988), p. 49. In line with Ktotoszynski who stated that the United States is a reference for studies related to the presidential system in order to see that the implementation of the concept of separation of power can be carried out responsibly between the legislature and the executive. See: Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., “The Separation of Legislative and Executive Powers”, in Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon, Comparative Constitutional Law, (Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar, 2011), p. 237.
136
vote of no-confidence by Congress.6Jimly Asshiddiqie mentioned a similar character that in a presidential system, the President is not responsible and is not subject to parliament.7 More concisely, Shugart and Carey stated that the relationship between the two institutions did not depend on mutual trust.8
For this reason, according to Alan R. Ball, the President can only be removed from office by the impeachment mechanism of the legislature.9 In line with CF Strong's opinion that the presidential system is a non- parliamentary executive, the legislative power cannot influence executive power.10Although, according to Arend Lijphart, this condition risks causing a deadlock in policymaking because the executive and legislature both have a legitimacy basis.11
In contrast, the parliamentary system as the antithesis of the presidential system has opposite characteristics. Sri Soemantri stated that executive accountability to the legislature is among the characteristics of a parliamentary system.12 According to Ball and Peters, this characteristic is the basis for the executive's obligation to resign if the parliament does not support post-accountability.13
Such an accountability mechanism is intertwined with the opinion of Jimly Asshiddiqie who mentions that parliamentary characteristics require the government to be accountable to the parliament.14 Because according to
6Bagir Manan, Presidential Institution, (Yogyakarta: FH UII, 2003), p. 48-49.
Compare: Ridlwan, Zulkarnain, and Zainal Arifin Mochtar. 2019. “Regulate the DPR's Committees: Making the Indonesian Presidential System More Representative”. Fiat Justisia:
Jurnal Ilmu Hukum, 13 (2):129-50.https://doi.org/10.25041/fiatjustisia.v13no2.1566. See also, in: Zulkarnain Ridlwan, "Structuring the Oversight Function of the House of Representatives for the Government in the Indonesian Presidential System", Dissertation, Gadjah Mada University, 2019 http://etd.repository.ugm.ac.id/penelitian/detail/175063
7 Jimly Asshiddiqie, Konstitusi dan Konstitusionalisme Indonesia (Constitution and Indonesia Constitutionalism, (Jakarta: Secretariat General and Registrar of the Constitutional Court, 2006), p. 204-206
8 Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies:
Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 19. Compare: Cyril Benoît and Ana-Maria Szilagyi (2021) “Legislative direction of regulatory bureaucracies: evidence from a semi-presidential system”, The Journal of Legislative Studies, DOI:10.1080/13572334.2021.1986281
9 Alan R. Ball and Brainard Guy Peters, Modern...Op.Cit.
10 CF Strong, Modern Political Constitutions: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Their History and Existing Form, (London: The English Book Society and Sidgwick
& Jackson Limited, 1966), p. 356.
11 Arendt Lipjhart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 70.
12 Sri Soemantri, “Sistem Pemerintahan Republik Indonesia (Government System of the Republic of Indonesia)”, Mimbar Hukum, no. 44, vol. vi, 2003, p. 189.
13Alan R. Ball and Brainard Guy Peters, Modern...Op.Cit., h. 259-260; See also:
Ni'matul Huda, Ilmu Negara (General Theory of State), (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 2011), p.
259-260.
14 Jimly Asshiddiqie, Pengantar Ilmu Hukum Tata Negara (Introduction to Constitutional Law), p. 323.
137
Saldi Isra, in a parliamentary system, the parliament is the epicenter of political power.15
So, it needs to be underlined that the basic character of a presidential system is to separate the legislature from the executive, that each does not supervise the other but only checks and balances the other. This shift towards accountability will only blur the hallmark of a presidential system towards a parliamentary system. It is within these limits that the relationship generated by PPHN in Indonesia's presidential system should arise.
2. Compatibility of GBHN/PPHN with the Presidential System
In the Indonesian state system, GBHN was an important document that outlined the government's long-term development plans and national priorities. It guides policymakers and lawmakers to ensure their decisions align with the country's vision and objectives. Therefore, for pros, the main argument in defending GBHN is that the direction and purpose of the government wheel journey will be easier to understand so that it is quite easy to correct the level of success and achievement that is inscribed by a government in power.16
Normatively, the 1945 Constitution before the amendments positioned GBHN in a superior status because it was attached to MPR's position as the highest state institution, with the substance of the norms as follows:17
a. Article 3 "The People's Consultative Assembly establishes the Constitution and the outlines of the state policy."
b. Explanation of the State Government System III point 3 "People's Sovereignty is held by a body, called the People's Consultative Assembly, as the embodiment of all Indonesian people (Vertretungsorgan des Willens des Staatsvolkes). This assembly establishes the Constitution and determines the outlines of state policy. This assembly appoints the Head of State (President) and Deputy Head of State (Vice President). This assembly holds the highest state power, while the President must carry
15 Saldi Isra, Sistem Pemerintahan Indonesia: Pergulatan Ketatanegaraan Menuju Sistem Pemerintahan Presidensial (Indonesian Government System: State Administration Struggle Towards a Presidential Government System), (Depok: Rajawali Pers, 2019), p. 19- 21.
16 See: Abbas Raga Sugara, “The Relation Between Direct Presidential Election System With The National Development Plan”, International Journal of Law, Environment, and Natural Resources, 1(2), 89–96. https://doi.org/10.51749/injurlens.v1i2.12. See more at:
Bambang Sadono and Lintang Ratri Rahmiaji, “Reformulasi Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN) dan Amandemen Ulang Undang-Undang Dasar”, Masalah-Masalah Hukum, Jilid 49 No.2, April 2020, p. 213-221; and also: Efriza, E. (2020). Polemik: Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN) dan Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang (RPJP), dan Eksistensi MPR. Parapolitika : Journal of Politics and Democracy Studies, 1(1).
17The text of the 1945 Constitution before the amendment is quoted from the
website of the Constitutional Court, see:
https://www.mkri.id/public/content/infoumum/regulation/pdf/UUD45%20ASLI.pdf
138
out state policy according to the outlines set by the assembly. The President appointed by the assembly is subject to and responsible to the assembly. He is the "mandatarist" of the assembly. He is obliged to carry out the decisions of the council. The President is not "neben" but
"untergeordnet" to the assembly.18
c. Explanation of State Administration System VI.I “The position of the House of Representatives is strong. This council cannot be dissolved by the President (unlike the parliamentary system). Apart from that all the members of the People's Legislative Assembly also serve as members of the People's Consultative Assembly. Therefore, the House of Representatives (DPR) can always monitor the actions of the President.
Suppose the DPR considers that the President has violated the state policy established by the Constitution or the People's Consultative Assembly. In that case, the assembly can be invited to a special session to ask for accountability to the President.”
d. Explanation of Article 3 "Because the People's Consultative Assembly holds state sovereignty, its power is unlimited, given the dynamics of society, once in 5 years the Assembly pays attention to everything that is happening and all currents at that time and determines what directions should be used for at a later time."
The provisions of the norms above are quoted in full to conclude several things related to the original intent19 of the GBHN position: First, MPR has the right to determine GBHN as the highest state institution. Second, the President is a subordinate of MPR and is subject to and responsible to MPR for carrying out GBHN. Third, the DPR can invite MPR to have a special session if there is a violation of GBHN by the President. Fourth, GBHN is reviewed for five years.
That four main provisions at the same time illustrate that there is a very authoritative relationship between MPR and DPR for the President. If the President controls the power of the MPR, then MPR will only become a rubber-stamp parliament.20 On the other hand, it can cause an unstable government to easily replace the President if the President's accountability to
18Untergeordnet, meaning 'subordinate'.
19 Original intent interpreted as desire of the framers of the constitution or law. The need to know the original intent is meant because a constitution must be interpreted strictly according to the intentions of its founders, not with modern values and interpretations, as according to Wild. See: Susan Ellis Wild, Webster's New World Law Dictionary, (New Jersey: Wiley Publishing, Inc., 2006), p. 159.
20Historically, both conditions have occurred in Indonesia. In Ben Noble's definition, a rubber-stamp parliament is a parliament that is completely submissive and obedient to the wishes of the head of government. See: Ben Noble and Ekaterina Schulmann,
“Not Just a Rubber Stamp:Parliament and Lawmaking” in Daniel Treisman (ed.), The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin's Russia. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, p. 49. See also: Ben Noble, 2016. “Rethinking 'Rubber Stamps': Legislative Subservience, Executive Factionalism, and Policy-Making in the Russian State Duma.” D.
Phil. dissertation, University of Oxford.
139
MPR is rejected.21 Relations in this latter form usually work in a parliamentary system of government. Thus the 1945 Constitution before the Amendment still adhered to impure presidential.
This relationship structure with parliamentary characteristics has been corrected by amendments to the 1945 Constitution, which strengthened the presidential system. Consequently, GBHN no longer has a position in the government system, mainly due to MPR's equality among other state institutions.22 Instead, Law Number 25 of 2004 concerning the National Development Planning System (SPPN) was stipulated as the basis for national development planning after the amendments to the 1945 Constitution, coupled with Law Number 17 of 2007 concerning the National Long Term Development Plan for 2005-2025 (RPJPN Law).
In terms of its substance, according to Anggraini et al., the basic documents for national development planning after the amendments to the 1945 Constitution are not much different from GBHN documents issued through an MPR Decree.23 Furthermore, Anggraini et al. concluded that the material contained in the SPPN and GBHN have similarities in terms of the principles and goals of development and their scope because they are guided by the same state goals in the 1945 Constitution.24
Then the biggest difference between the SPPN and GBHN arrangements is only in the form of the legal product. If previously it was regulated in an MPR Decree, now it is regulated through Law. Commenting on this condition, it can be stated that the State Policy is not regulated in the form of an MPR Decree because MPR's status is horizontally equivalent to other state institutions. Subkhan also described the same condition.25 Forcing the implementation of PPHN with the GBHN model and the authority to make
21According to Ali Syafa'at, GBHN as a product of MPR will provide two choices that have been proven historically. First, it becomes an institution that perpetuates power because the president is able to regulate and control the majority of MPR members, as happened during the New Order era. Second, it makes the government unstable because the president can be dismissed at any time when his accountability is rejected by MPR, which is actually more because the president cannot regulate and control the majority of MPR members, as was the case with Gus Dur's government. See: Muchamad Ali Safa'at, GBHN = Majority Democracy, 2016 accessed from http://safaat.lecture.ub.ac.id/files/2016/02/GBHN- Demokrasi-Mayoritas.pdf.
22 See: Sudi Fahmi and Adrian Faridhi, “Limited Amendment of 1945 Basic Constitution and The Return of Main State Guidelines”, Mimbar, Vol. 36 No. 1st (2020).
23Yessi Anggraini, Armen Yasir, and Zulkarnain Ridlwan, "Comparison of Development Planning Before and After the Amendments to the 1945 Constitution"Fiat Justisia: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum. Volume 9 No. 1, January-March 2015, p. 78-79.
DOIs:10.25041/fiatjustisia.v9no1.589
24Ibid.
25According to Subkhan, the horizontal equality of state institutions means that no one is able to fully control development planning from the center to the regions, as was the case during the New Order era. See: Imam Subkhan, “GBHN and Changes in Development Planning in Indonesia (GBHN and The Change of Indonesia Development Planning)”, Aspirations, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2014.
140
and be accountable to MPR will only bring impure presidentialism back into the Indonesian government system.
If this is concluded, it is necessary to discuss a model for the reappearance of PPHN which is in line with the development of Indonesia's presidential system as a reform mandate, especially regarding the appropriate types of its regulations.
3. PPHN Regulatory Model that is Aligned with the Indonesian Government System
A review of the conformity of PPHN with a presidential system unravels that PPHN can only apply in Indonesia in an impure presidential system. The placement of PPHN in the MPR Decree is also no longer relevant if it is intended to demand compliance from all state institutions, considering that MPR is no longer the highest state institution.
For this reason, it is necessary to present an ideal PPHN regulation model. On the one hand, it corresponds to the Indonesian presidential system which has been strengthened in the amendments to the 1945 Constitution, also on the other hand, it can effectively act as a reference and guideline for development in this Republic. Following are some of the setting models:
a. PPHN is stated in the 1945 Constitution;
b. PPHN is stated in the MPR Decree; or c. PPHN is stated in the Law.
As is known, since the last Amendment was in 2002, until now quite some themes have been campaigned by several state institutions to be carried out in the 5th Amendment to the 1945 Constitution. If the first model is chosen, pouring PPHN into the 1945 Constitution requires the 5th Amendment. This choice requires a lot of energy because it is commonly known that the 5th Amendment proposal has been echoed for quite a long time but always fails to reach a consensus. Apart from being unclear about the substance of PPHN to be formulated, there are also concerns about
"stowaway" taking advantage of the opening of the amendment door.
This first regulatory model also has the potential to put MPR back in the status of the highest state institution. Choosing equality between state institutions with the principle of checks and balances was a conscious choice in the spirit of the Reformation. Because PPHN requires the compliance of all state institutions, if no state institution ensures this, PPHN will only be a guide on paper.26
26 See: Hilaire Tegnan, et.al, “Indonesian National Development Planning System Based on State Policy Guidelines (GBHN) : A Return to the Future?”, International Journal of Law Reconstruction, Volume II, Issue 1, March 2018, p. 33-34. Also: Yusdiyanto,
“Reviving the Broad Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN) as the Product of People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in the Presidential Government System in Indonesia”, Fiat Justisia: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum, 12 (4), (2018), p. 313. See more: Yuzuru Shimada, 2022.
“Authoritarianism and Constitutional Politics in Post-Authoritarian Indonesian Society:
141
Meanwhile, if the chosen model is the second arrangement by pouring it into an MPR Decree, it is no less problematic. This is because the MPR Decrees referred to in the types and hierarchy of statutory regulations in Article 7 of Law Number 12 of 2011 only refer to MPR Decrees that are still valid, not new ones.
The third regulatory model will be more relevant to the Indonesian presidential system. The pouring of PPHN into the Law on Principles of State Policy (PPHN Law) has no implications for changes in the presidential system. No state institution is replaced in a higher position than other state institutions, so no accountability forum positions one state institution to be subordinate to another. PPHN Law, formulated jointly between DPR and President, can also involve other constitutional state organs to preserve this idea.
For the writer, the moral support in the form of the basis of the state and the goals of the state as described in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution is sufficient as a basis for values that characterize all development movements in Indonesia. Meanwhile, PPHN, as its substance derivative, is sufficiently regulated in the form of a law. Moreover, the RPJP Law will end soon. It can be replaced with PPHN Law. Such a placement will be the middle way for the aspirations of reinstating GBHN content while maintaining the substance of the RPJP.
However, it needs to regulate the oversight mechanism for the substance of the RPJMN (National Medium Term Development Plan) which the President-elect determines for a five-year term. A monitoring mechanism by DPR with begrooting rights (budget rights). For example, if the President does not comply with PPHN Law, DPR will not approve the Bill on the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBN) for the coming year. This mechanism will legally control the RPJMN to comply with PPHN, not politically. By this mechanism, the DPR carries out checks and balances to the President through oversight function and budgetary rights.
C. Conclusion
Based on the discussion above, it can be concluded. First, the basic character of a presidential system is to separate the legislature from the executive, so no accountability mechanism puts the President under Legislature. PPHN implementation can shift this separation towards an accountability model, a feature of a parliamentary system. Second, PPHN can be reinstated in a presidential system, with the prerequisite that no accountability mechanism places the President under the MPR. Third, pouring PPHN into the form of a Law replacing the RPJPN Law is most relevant to avoid government system shifting. However, it is still necessary
Reemergence or Legacy?”. Brawijaya Law Journal 9 (1):90-106, p. 91.
https://doi.org/10.21776/ub.blj.2022.009.01.07
142
to provide an oversight mechanism for the substance of the RPJMN with the DPR's budget rights.
References
Ali Safa'at, Muchamad GBHN = Majority Democracy, 2016 accessed fromhttp://safaat.lecture.ub.ac.id/files/2016/02/GBHN-Demokrasi- Mayoritas.pdf.
Anggraini, Yessi., Armen Yasir, and Zulkarnain Ridlwan, 2015.
"Comparison of Development Planning Before and After Amendments to the 1945 Constitution". Fiat Justisia: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum. Volume 9 No. 1. DOI:10.25041/fiatjustisia.v9no1.589
Asshiddiqie, Jimly. Konstitusi dan Konstitusionalisme Indonesia (Constitution and Indonesian Constitutionalism), Jakarta: Secretariat General and Registrar of the Constitutional Court, 2006.
---. Pengantar Ilmu Hukum Tata Negara (Introduction to Constitutional Law), Volume I, Jakarta: Secretariat General and MKRI Committee, 2006.
---. Pokok-Pokok Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia Pasca Reformasi (Principles of Post-Reform Indonesian Constitutional Law), Jakarta: Buana Popular Science, 2007.
Ball, Alan R. and Brainard Guy Peters, Modern Politics and Government, 4th Edition, Hampshire and London: Macmillan Education, 1988.
Benoît, Cyril and Ana-Maria Szilagyi. 2021. “Legislative direction of regulatory bureaucracies: evidence from a semi-presidential system,”
The Journal of Legislative Studies,
DOI:10.1080/13572334.2021.1986281
Chairman of MPR Review Board: the cancellation of PPHN proposal to be included in the 1945 Constitution. See:https://news.detik.com/berita/d- 6026276/badan-pengkajian-mpr-skekat-batal-amendemen-konstitute- terkait-pphn
---:https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/04/11/06005391/badan- pengkajian-mpr-disebut-stakes-tak-doing-amendement-for-pphn- tapi?page=all
Efriza, E. (2020). Polemik: Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN) dan Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang (RPJP), dan Eksistensi MPR. Parapolitika: Journal of Politics and Democracy Studies, 1(1).
Huda, Ni'matul. Ilmu Negara (General Theory of State),, Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 2011.
Isra, Saldi. Sistem Pemerintahan Indonesia (Indonesian Government System), Depok: Rajawali Press, 2019.
143
Lever, Michael. “Legislatures and Parliaments in Comparative Context,” in Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Lijphart, Arendt. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984.
Manan, Bagir. Lembaga Kepresidenan (Presidential Institution), Yogyakarta: FH UII, 2003.
Manuscripts of the 1945 Constitution before the Amendment:
https://www.mkri.id/public/content/infoumum/regulation/pdf/UUD45
%20ASLI.pdf
Nggilu, Novendri M., Dian Ekawaty Ismail, Suwitno Y. Imran, Lisnawaty W. Badu, 2022. “The Indonesian State Policy: History and the Future,” American Journal of Multidisciplinary Research &
Development (AJMRD), Vol. 04, Issue 05.
Noble, Ben and Ekaterina Schulmann, “Not Just a Rubber Stamp: Parliament and Lawmaking” in Daniel Treisman (ed.), The New Autocracy:
Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin's Russia. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press.
Noble, Ben. 2016. “Rethinking 'Rubber Stamps': Legislative Subservience, Executive Factionalism, and Policymaking in the Russian State Duma.” D. Phil. dissertation, University of Oxford.
Ridlwan, Zulkarnain, and Zainal Arifin Mochtar. 2019. “Regulate the DPR's Committees: Making the Indonesian Presidential System More Representative.” Fiat Justisia: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum, 13 (2):129-50.
https://doi.org/10.25041/fiatjustisia.v13no2.1566.
Ridwan, Zulkarnain. 2019. "Structuring the Oversight Function of the House of Representatives for the Government in the Indonesian Presidential
System," Dissertation,
UGM,http://etd.repository.ugm.ac.id/penelitian/detail/175063
Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., “The Separation of Legislative and Executive Powers,” in Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon, Comparative Constitutional Law, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, USA:
Edward Elgar, 2011.
Sadono, Bambang and Lintang Ratri Rahmiaji, 2020. “Reformulasi Garis- Garis Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN) dan Amandemen Ulang Undang- Undang Dasar”, Masalah-Masalah Hukum, Jilid 49 No.2.
Shimada, Yuzuru. 2022. “Authoritarianism and Constitutional Politics in Post-Authoritarian Indonesian Society: Reemergence or Legacy?”.
Brawijaya Law Journal 9 (1):90-106.
https://doi.org/10.21776/ub.blj.2022.009.01.07.
144
Shugart, Matthew S. “Comparative Executive Legislative Relations,” in RAW Rhodes et al., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
--- and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies:
Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Soemantri, Sri. 2003. “Government System of the Republic of Indonesia”, Mimbar Hukum, No. 44, vol. vi.
Stepan, Alfred and Cindy Skach. 1993. “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation,” World Politics, 46 (1): 1–22.
Strong, CF. Modern Political Constitutions: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Their History and Existing Form, London: The English Book Society and Sidgwick & Jackson Limited, 1966.
Subkhan, Imam. 2014. "GBHN and Changes in Development Planning in Indonesia (GBHN and The Change of Indonesia Development Planning)," Aspirations, Vol. 5, No. 2.
Sugara, Abbas Raga. 2021. “The Relation Between Direct Presidential Election System With The National Development Plan,” International Journal of Law, Environment, and Natural Resources, 1(2), 89–96.
https://doi.org/10.51749/injurlens.v1i2.12
Tegnan, Hilaire., Charles Simabura, and Saldi Isra. 2018. “Indonesian National Development Planning System Based on State Policy Guidelines (GBHN): A Return to the Future?” International Journal of Law Reconstruction, Volume II, Issue 1.
Utami, Tanti Kirana, 2020. “The Existence of State Policy Guidelines in the Perspective of Ordering the Order of Laws and Regulations,”
International Journal of Research -Granthaalayah, Vol 8 (12).
Wild, Susan Ellis. Webster's New World Law Dictionary, New Jersey: Wiley Publishing, Inc., 2006.
Yusdiyanto, 2018. “Reviving the Broad Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN) as the Product of People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in the Presidential Government System in Indonesia”, Fiat Justisia: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum, 12 (4).
