Many such errors are categorized as cognitive biases, which arise from mental shortcuts that allow the brain to misjudge information. This article begins to investigate the question: do cognitive biases make the United States vulnerable to the use of reflexive surveillance in Russia. To answer this question, it is necessary to determine whether there is a relationship between cognitive biases and vulnerability to reflexive control.
Although foreign policy decisions are dependent on policymakers, this paper looks at how analysts, specifically intelligence analysts, can better understand the relationship between cognitive biases and reflexive control to better inform policymakers. This article's research is relevant because reflexive control targets errors in the opponent's decision-making process, and cognitive biases are fundamental errors in the decision-making process. Providing an answer to the research question will determine whether there is a relationship between cognitive biases and vulnerability to reflexive control.
Although foreign policy decisions such as those observed in Part III depend on policymakers, this article explores how analysts, and intelligence analysts in particular, can better understand the relationship between cognitive biases and reflexive control in order to better inform policymakers .
RUSSIAN REFLEXIVE CONTROL
The Soviet Union used reflexive control at the operational, tactical, and strategic levels of internal and external policy.5 Russia has modified many aspects of reflexive control to fit today's world, but most of their techniques fundamentally mimic those of the Soviets.6 The key element , that remains is Soviet disinformation. Reflexive control is the practice and theory of controlling one's opponent by making them act as a "reflex" for disinformation or deception. Some ways in which Russian reflexive control mimics that of the Soviet Union include the establishment of foreign-language news media and Russian-sympathizing think tanks in the West.
To carry out offensive disinformation for reflexive control, Russia uses what contemporary analysts call “the 4D approach” – dismiss, distort, distract and dismay.24 When. Turko, a lecturer at the Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, proposed in 1996 that the use of reflexive control by attacking a state's information resources could cause destabilizing damage to the geopolitical balance of power.38 Currently, Russia appears to be destroying and destabilization. Because reflexive control can affect a state, from its military and government systems to the opinions of its population, the lack of sufficiently strengthened information security can cause a state to lose its sovereignty, economic and global power status.39 Information security includes information resources.
Disinformation is produced according to Russia's understanding of the enemy's intelligence, concepts, knowledge, ideas and experience.41 This combination of qualities is considered the foundation of the decision maker's information filter.42 The information filter is the cognitive tool the brain uses to make decisions. which information is useful and which is not.43 Reflexive control's primary use is to find and exploit the information filter's weakest link – cognitive error.44.
COGNITIVE BIASES AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS
Because the brain uses both System 1 and System 2 thinking, intelligence analysts must be aware of their brain's information processing as they work to process information as well. Information is only data until it is processed in the brain of an analyst; therefore, understanding how this process can be flawed by heuristics and biases is important to the work of the analyst.70 Each of these parallels between brain and analyst is subject to its own cognitive biases. In the case of information storage, this limit is three terabytes worth of information72.73 However, the brain's ability to store only reaches one millionth of the daily production of information, which means that.
To avoid information overload, intelligence analysts must quickly filter through this overwhelming amount and select the important information.84 Because the mind is programmed to find and respond to patterns without much hesitation, cognitive biases are inherent to mental processes. 85 An overload of information brings with it several problems. situations in which prejudices are more likely to develop. When viewing a large amount of information, the brain is likely to make unconscious shortcuts to narrow the scope. Here, new details within the information become more important than the general information (even if the general information is more relevant).88 An additional bias involved is called the vividness criterion, where directly perceived information is given a greater value than second-hand or statistical information. .89 An example of these biases is canceling a flight after hearing news of two recent plane crashes, even though the probability of a plane crash has not changed.
But once the brain finds these changes, it attaches meaning to the information based on the direction of the change instead of weighing the information's new value.90 Two of these biases are the anchor effect and the frame effect. The anchor effect refers to the tendency to rely too much on the first piece of information that is provided and to adjust insufficiently when additional information is provided.91 This also explains the persistence of false impressions. Once all the information is reduced, the subconscious and analysts must both "connect the dots" and fill in the space between information with assumptions.
Humans are biologically inclined to assume that more favorable information is more valuable than unfavorable information.108 If the quality of the presented information is uncertain, the brain creates certainty based on how favorable it is. Similar to the anchoring effect, the halo effect increases the weight of the first impression and applies that impression to everything related to the perceived information.111 From here on, the opinion about the information affects how valuable the information is to the current situation and other cases, even if the information has no nothing to do with other cases.112 The analyst may receive information that fits well with their intended narrative even though it does not really relate to the evidence; or the analyst might reject the accurate information but disregard it and everything associated with it because it makes less sense for their narrative. Since the brain cannot directly communicate with others, the subconscious mind often assumes that another brain (or set of brains) is doing exactly what it is doing.
In IC, intelligence is a product analyst tailored to meet the decision maker's needs and timelines.123 Decision makers expect analysts to alert them to changes and developments and always want to know more about what to expect going forward.124 As new developments and changes emerge, analysts attempt to examine available relevant factors and interpret the meaning of the information within real-world US decision-making timelines. Some details of the information may be distorted and replaced with other already stored details. Second, information specifications can become generalities.143 Third, information about entire events or lists is reduced to a few points that represent the whole.144 Finally, information can be stored based on the circumstances under which the information was received, even if it had little or no to do with the information.145 Each of these storage methods serves as a basis for later bias.
Understanding how the brain stores information and the biases that are at risk can later help recognize biases at play and guard against them when they are noticed.
REFLEXIVE CONTROL AND THE UNITED STATES
Another way biases shape the United States' reflexive control perspective is by assuming that Russia's actions that are similar in execution have the same purpose. While Russian reflexive control originated in the Soviet Union, Russia's military thinking has continuously evolved since the end of the Cold War.180 Therefore Russian. 180 Keir Giles, "Russia's 'New' Tools for Confronting the West," (Research Paper, The . Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2016).
Western analysts have written assessments of reflexive control based on Russia's involvement in Eastern Europe, specifically Ukraine and Crimea. 181 Keir Giles, "Russia's 'New' Tools for Confronting the West," (Research Paper, The . Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2016). Russia's Hybrid Warfare," (Russia Report 1, Institute for the Study of War, September 2015), http://understandingwar.org/report/putins-information-warfare-ukraine-soviet-origins-russias-hybrid-warfare; Keir Giles, "Russia's 'New' Tools to Confront the West," (Research Paper, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2016).
Russia’s Hybrid Warfare”, (Russia Report 1, Institute for the Study of War, September 2015), http://understandingwar.org/report/putins-information-warfare-ukraine-soviet-origins-russias-hybrid-warfare. While these cases are excellent examples of Russian reflexive control and illustrate much of Russia's hybrid warfare doctrine,191 too much focus on these specific cases may lead analysts and policymakers to compare them to current and future cases. Russia is likely trying to create unstable conditions in the United States and the West that mimic Russian social problems.
An example of Russia's attempt to disrupt this triad is through the term "fake news." 218 Maria Snegovaya, “Putin's Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia's Hybrid Warfare,” (Russia Report 1, Institute for the Study of War, September 2015), http://understandingwar.org/report/putins-information-warfare -Ukraine-Soviet-origins-Russia-hybrid-warfare. This article sought to answer the question: Do cognitive biases make the United States vulnerable to Russia's use of reflexive control.
Cognitive biases are recognizable when observing the reactions of the West and the United States to Russia's use of reflexive control. Keir Giles, “Russia's 'New' Tools to Confront the West,” (Research Paper, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2016). Can Kasapoglu, “Russia's Renewed Military Thinking: Non-Linear Warfare and Reflexive Control,” NATO Defense College, no.
Maria Snegovaya, “Putin's Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russian Hybrid Warfare,” (Russia Report 1, Institute for the Study of War, 2015), http://understandingwar.org/report/putins-information-warfare-ukraine -soviet-origins-russia-hybrid-warfare.
