He publishes on the theory of international relations and the expansion of the European Union. It is therefore in the interest of the security community to expand in order to reduce the number of potentially hostile relations with the outside world. Continually ensure that the values and identity of the security community remain shared and adhered to by all.
Conceptual and Theoretical Considerations
Adoption and adoption of a new norm established at the domestic level can generally be done through the actions and interests of state and social actors and/or through the inclusion of the new norm established in national laws (Cortell and Davis. However be the norm that the agency and/or epistemic community with expertise of the new set of norms promotes, must succeed in getting decision makers to accept established norms and act accordingly either through legislation or changed behavior and procedures within the political system. -level determination is not possible, then the norm will not be successfully adopted, despite perhaps eager acceptance in the epistemic community.
It is therefore essential that the promoted norms are aimed at individuals who are able to reach into the decision-making process or strategically important segments of the political elite. The more foreign the norm to the relevant state culture, the more difficult it will be to establish support for it. However, easy access to decision-makers in the political system is not necessarily an advantage to getting the norm set accepted within the decision-making political elite, since other competing norm sets will also have easy access and therefore competition at the decision-making level.
Therefore, for the successful adoption and institutionalization of the given norm it is essential that those promoting the norms set by the international level have a thorough understanding of the specific internal political structures and processes in the country in question. For example, the processes of culture and identification with external actors and their norms can in some cases be very different depending on whether one is talking to elite members from a foreign ministry or a defense ministry, from a party left or from a right-wing party, from a nationalist/patriotic newspaper editor or a critical/independent newspaper editor, etc. Moreover, where some of them may be important for the spread of the established norm within the political elite, other members may be. of the elite that are important for the spread of the established norm at the nation/people level.
In other words, what emerges is a process that is extremely complex and requires a thorough understanding of the prevailing domestic conditions.
This is not the case at the level of the nation/people – here the most important factor is the interest in the subject or the salience of the norm being promoted. But in the case of the spread of a democratic system of norms, the institutionalization and internalization of the norm established at the level of the nation/people is important, but still brings difficulties and pitfalls that require much more attention than is possible within the scope of the system. of this chapter. Successful diffusion of norms to the level of the state and the elite may say little about the ability of the elites to influence in turn the level of the nation and the people.
Therefore, what is being investigated can be conceptualized as a process of social group change from out-groups with varying distance from the in-group, to members of the in-group, which in the case of democratic norm socialization in the New Europe can be seen as as the Euro-Atlantic community. In the case of the socialization of democratic norms in the New Europe, it is possible to conceptualize four different out-groups, based on the specific in-group orientation at the two domestic levels: state/elite and nation/people. There is indeed room within the model for a significant degree of variation between members of the same outgroup (as illustrated by the significant difference between, for example, Hungary and Romania, both of which were, until recently, members of outgroup 112). .
The two-level constellation is not a country-specific constant, but will change according to the established rate. In a bottom-up version of the model, outgroups 2 and 3 would have reversed priority, as the nation/people level would weigh more heavily than the state/elite level. The fact that only those socialized who fit into outgroup 1 are likely to exhibit successful socialization is clearly a cause for concern in the case of the current attempt to transfer democratic norms to Iraq.
On the same occasion, they announced the dire consequences of Vladimir Meˇciar's inclusion in the next government at every opportunity.
Promoting Ideas through International Organizations
Most European countries now agreed on the norm of the right of states to self-determination. The same applies to the tasks of the organization in the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the implementation of peace in Kosovo. It is equally interesting to see the evolution of the national core documents developed at PfP & Co.
The MAP Alliance's socialization strategies also change with regard to those socialized in the various out-groups. According to Karen Smith, only 1 percent of the EU's total aid budget was dedicated to direct support for democratization in the Central and Eastern European countries. First of all, the focus on material, financial rewards has to do with the EU's specific capacities.
We argue that the vast majority of norms disseminated by the OSCE are aimed at promoting human security. From these terms of scope, we conclude that the strategy plays a secondary role in the socialization activities of the OSCE. The explanation of the OSCE's special training philosophy lies in its organizational features.
However, in the case of the OSCE, the composition of a country-based system of categorical differences is an informal process. The task of the OSCE is not made easier by the fact that the available resources are very limited. For the standard history of the negotiations that led to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, see Maresca (1987).
Receiving and Internalizing Ideas in Transforming
Societies
After the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Federation, the two successor states formally enjoyed equal status in international relations. Only after early elections in 1994 did EU representatives officially and critically comment on the state of democracy in Slovakia. After a night parliamentary session in November 1994, the EU Presidency issued a demarche to the Slovak authorities, expressing concern about the conditions accompanying the transfer of power to the new Meiar government.
The EU presidency even issued a second demarche to the Slovak government in October 1995, followed by a similar document from the US administration. All three documents emphasized the need to respect the plurality of political opinions, in accordance with the constitution and respecting its international obligations (Meseznikov, 1996). In November 1995, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling on the Slovak government to respect basic democratic principles and human rights.
Informally, EU representatives were even more candid: Reuters Press quoted a senior EU diplomat as saying that Slovakia had no chance of being invited to the EU in the first round of enlargement, as EU priorities did not include care for democracy. processes of its member states (Sme, December 20, 1996). EU representatives, however, insisted that Slovakia had to embark on major political reforms before being accepted as an EU member. The clearest evidence that the Slovak government failed in its major foreign policy goal – the start of NATO and EU membership talks – came with the decision of the NATO Summit in Madrid in July 1997 and the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997. .
Similarly, the EU Council fully accepted the Commission's previous assessment of Slovakia and refused to start direct membership negotiations due to serious internal problems in respecting democratic norms.
On the other hand, the Association Parliamentary Committee attracted more attention in Slovakia and thus contributed to the awareness of the wider public about the different views of the Slovak government and the EU. The main reason for this was that opposition MPs in the APC could convey EU views through media representatives covering APC meetings. Similarly, during a visit to Slovakia in June 1998, European Commissioner Hans van den Broek assured Slovak citizens of the "unconditional support of the EU" in their efforts to join the EU (Sme, 18 June 1998).
It should be clear from this brief overview that the EU's overall strategy towards Slovakia changed during the Meiar government in 1994-1998. In their strategy for influencing Slovakia's democratic situation, EU representatives stated their main concerns and repeatedly emphasized that the Slovak government does not meet the requirements. This was evident from the statements of EU representatives in the Association Council and also from the conclusions of the sessions of the Association Parliamentary Committee.
The EU Presidency issued two demarches to the Slovak authorities on the same issue, and individual representatives of the Commission as well as EU member states also reiterated the need to improve the state of democracy in Slovakia. The EU did not impose formal diplomatic sanctions against Slovakia and did not suspend the Association Agreement, although it was one of the options considered. Second, the EU representatives did not openly support the anti-Meeiar opposition parties, although their preference was quite evident (Lombardini, 1999).
Moreover, the transnational contacts of the opposition parties with their partners in the EU countries have certainly contributed to the tactics of the EU representatives (Pridham, 1999b).