Indonesia has experienced more than 20 terrorist attacks since 2000.5 The first attack claimed by the police by a terrorist group in Indonesia occurred on August 1, 2000. Why the actions or activities of terrorist groups in Indonesia could not be completely stopped .
Writings Systematic
The third main objective was to give operators the tools necessary to implement a preventive approach, particularly the role of intelligence. The fourth objective was to provide guidance on how to identify information of interest and how to apply it to the new operational objectives of a war on terrorism.
Chronological of Terrorist actions in Indonesia
Another cluster bomb exploded in front of the police headquarters complex, exactly in the lobby of Wisma Bhayangkari, on 3 February 2003 and at Soekarno-Hatta Airport, Cengkareng, on 27 April 2003. A bomb exploded in the public area of Terminal 2F, where 2 people was seriously injured and 8 others slightly injured. A bomb exploded in a house of a member of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) M Iqbal alias Abu Jibril in West Pamulang.
In the same year, Bali again suffered from bomb that exploded at Raja Bar Kuta and Jimbaran Café on October 12. A compound bomb exploded in the building causing half of the building to be damaged and killed 3 people as well. A compound bomb exploded in Atrium Plaza, Jakarta, near Pizza Hut Restaurant, wounding 6 people.
At the same time, a compound bomb exploded in the Philippine Consulate General's office in Manado, North Sulawesi.
The Evolution of Terrorism in Indonesia
The Method
Some of these bombs covered with plastic bags and placed in the buildings intended to be bombed by the terrorist like what happened in several bombed churches in Jakarta, Bekasi, Sukabumi, Bandung, Mojokerto, Medan, Batam and Pekanbaru on Christmas Eve 2000 .The terrorist also planted a bomb in a car as happened in front of the Australian Embassy in September 2004. However, the terrorist also used another method using bombs to carry out terror.
This method used by terrorists when a minibus exploded in front of the Sari Club restaurant, in Bali, October 2002 and at the JW Marriot Hotel in Jakarta, August 2003. From the raid of the terrorist group in Pamulang, Aceh and North Sumatera, Indonesian police have found several long range bomb triggers, air rifles, pistols,. Sofyan was once a police officer who was fired in 2009 because he chose to join jihad.
Yet many of them never realize that this fund will be used for terrorist activities, said Wawan Purwanto, the intelligent observer.25 The terrorist simply used the strategy of raising money for social or religious charity, but then corrupted it.
The Target
The house of Abu Jibril (member of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) in Tangerang, Tentena market, a bank in Medan delivered some book packages of bombs to the house of Ulil Abshar Abdala, Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) activist and musician Ahmad Dhani. More recently, terrorists have also directed their attack against the government, which they believe supports the interests of the West and infidels, such as the police, the military and their property. In September 2010, a terrorist cell attacked the sector police office in Medan, North Sumatra, and shot dead several police officers who were on duty at the time.
And since the police found some bombs and ammunition in Jatiasih, Bekasi in August 2010, they predict that the next target of the terrorist group in Indonesia will be the president, according to Gen.
The Motives
The Indonesian National Agency for Counter-Terrorism (BNPT) and Densus 88 in 2003, Indonesia has still experienced several times of terrorist acts until now. Second, there is a lack of coordination within security officers and with other agencies as well as with the public in their counter-terrorism strategy. Therefore, this argues that the problem with counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia is not in the intelligence itself, but primarily in the preventive program.
Although counter-terrorism agencies in Indonesia have developed the ability to prevent further attacks by predicting and gathering information about the potential bombings, such as in Bali last March, they still lack monitoring of the spread of the ideology. In addition to Densus 88, the government has also formed a national agency, BNPT, which is arguably taking a softer approach in the fight against terrorism. Regarding “soft” approaches, BNPT could look at the counter-terrorism strategy implemented by the Saudi government.
Christopher Boucek in his paper explains the three programs of a soft counter-terrorism strategy that is aimed at prevention, rehabilitation and aftercare program.32.
Background
Therefore, this article will answer the question why the counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia has not been able to completely eradicate terrorism in this country. This paper argues that the counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia is ineffective mainly because it is partially implemented and inadequately coordinated. At least three factors have contributed to the lack of a counter-terrorism strategy in this country.
Therefore, this article suggests that the Indonesian government should look at the soft counter-terrorism strategy implemented by the Saudi Arabian government. Essentially, the Indonesian government must combine both hard and soft approaches in its counter-terrorism strategy. The third section examines the achievements of Indonesia's counter-terrorism strategy, linked to its weaknesses.
Finally, this paper examines the challenges faced by counter-terrorism agencies in Indonesia by looking at the Saudi Arabian government's countermeasures.
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia
40 Mark Stout, “In Search of Salafi Jihadist Strategic Thought: Mining the Words of the Terrorist,” in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, (vol. Although Indonesia has experienced a number of public terrorist acts perpetrated by JII since 2000, 45 was the first bombing in Bali in October 2002 that forced the Indonesian government to include the strategy of eradicating terrorism in their national political and security agenda 1/2002 regarding the criminal act of terrorism in accordance with Government Regulation instead of Law No.
2/2002 on the procedures for the protection of victims and witnesses in the violent human rights violence. Both laws essentially define terrorism as a criminal offense related to domestic security.46 Consequently, the Indonesian police are the agency that has the ultimate authority to deal with and subsequently conduct a criminal justice process before arresting the alleged perpetrators. . President Megawati Soekarnoputri further instructed the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security to formulate a set of integrated and comprehensive policies to eradicate the crime of terrorism as well as establish a non-structural task force unit to support his duty.47 Therefore, the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security has that time, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, formed a coordination desk in his ministry to coordinate the eradication of terrorism, known as Desk Kordinasi Pemberantasan.
One of the bombs exploded in the GKPI church, the other two bombs in other churches did not explode.
The Hard Approaches of Densus 88
One of the characteristics of the Densus 88 is the secrecy of their operations, so that only the commander knows all the plans and strategy. Moreover, due to secrecy, security apparatuses in other districts and other authorities refrain from fully supporting the operations of Densus 88, as misunderstandings may arise. Nevertheless, in some campaigns they became victims due to lack of information and coordination.
This happened, for example, in 2009, when Densus 88 asked the regional police in East Java to support them in carrying out its action to arrest Azhari in Batu, East Java. At the time of their action, some members of the regional police did not yet know that they were about to arrest Azhari. The terrorists attacked the police station as they wanted to take revenge on Densus 88, who had previously arrested and shot several terrorists during silent raids in Tanjung Balai, Deli Serdang and Lampung, near Hamparan Perak.
The lack of information and coordination left police officers ignorant and unprepared for terrorist attacks in their office.52 Essentially, the lack of coordination caused local authorities and other security agencies, which understand the local situation and geography , as well as ways to conduct a silent raid better, can not include effectively and optimally.
The Achievement of Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia
The perpetrators were allegedly members of the group Abu Tholut, the leader of the JII military camp in Aceh. These are testimony to the weaknesses of intelligence capabilities in counter-terrorism, as mentioned by former head of Densus 88, Suryadarma Salim.54 This is in addition to the weaknesses of law enforcement regarding intelligence, as acknowledged by Ansyad Mbaai.55. Therefore, this paper suggests that the problem of counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia is not in the intelligence itself, but mainly in the preventive program.
The police still lack surveillance, although the counter-terrorism agencies in Indonesia have developed the ability to prevent further attacks by predicting as well as gathering information about the potential. 54 “Kemampuan Intelijen Indonesia Memprihatinkan” (The capability of Indonesian intelligence is a concern”) retrieved from http://us.nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/76874-. Their failure lies in preventing the spread of the Jihadist ideology, which justifies the use of violence to achieve their goals.
Sungkar and Baasyir together with their cadres had spread the ideology of Salafi jihadism in Indonesia through dakwah (preaching) either in mosques or in their cell group meetings.
The Future Challenges of Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Indonesia
This is not to say that the deradicalization program run by the government is failing. Therefore, this paper suggests the Indonesian government to look at the "soft" strategy against terrorism carried out by the Saudi government. Christopher Boucek, in his paper, explains the three interconnected programs of counter-terrorism strategy which are aimed at prevention, rehabilitation and aftercare.65.
Essentially, in this reform era, the Indonesian government must carry out a holistic and comprehensive strategy against terrorism and it is in such a way to respect the law and human rights of Indonesia. This is to suggest that, in the first place, although Indonesia is about to initiate counterterrorism legislation to justify its preventive measures, it has a weak preventive strategy. The government must provide employment opportunities so that they can be productive to support themselves and their family, and be accepted by society.
Third, to effectively measure the fight against terrorism, the Indonesian government must implement comprehensive and interrelated measures against terrorist groups at all levels, from pre.
