2 For the complete list of political parties in the Kyrgyz Republic, see http://minjust.gov.kg/?page_id=6551. Consequently, parliamentarism in the Kyrgyz Republic is also based on patronage networks6, where business interests and "regional identity" are intertwined.
Political Representation of Women in Kyrgyzstan in the 2007 and 2010 convocations
I compare the professional background of female MPs in the 2007 and 2010 parliaments and their legislative activity. As can be seen from the analysis of women's legislative positions in the 2007 and 2010 elections, the number of opportunities to translate women's policy preferences into a legislative agenda has officially increased.
Speaker Vice-speaker Chair of
The successful implementation of a gender quota depends on the initial success of the quota design. The lack of a mechanism to replace a resigning candidate with a candidate of the same gender results in parties failing to fill 30% of parliamentary seats with women.
Commi6ee Vice-chair of Commi6ee
Furthermore, the distribution of women in committees has become more balanced, with more women represented in traditionally male-dominated committees. The involvement of women MPs in the legislative process varies greatly and depends on various factors such as education and.
Judiciary reform in Kyrgyzstan started after the 2010 coup, but has not yet been completed. Some community policing practices aimed at counter-terrorism in the United States seem applicable to policing in Kyrgyzstan.
Ensuring Freedom from State Violence in the Kyrgyz Republic
Allocate sufficient funds in the state budget for the recently established National Center for the Prevention of Torture of the Kyrgyz Republic. There is little credible information about specific political affiliations and loyalties.
Nationalism in Kyrgyzstan
Production is expected to last until 2026, when most reserves are expected to be exhausted. The Kyrgyz government owns 33% of the shares in Centerra (not Kumtor) through the state-owned mining company Kyrgyzaltyn JSC. The agreement governing ownership and operation of the mine has changed several times over the years.
While the core of the dispute revolves around the ownership, structure and distribution of. Simply put, the controversy revolves primarily around the ownership of the mine and the profits that accrue from it. There is a clear economic component to the dispute, as is evident from the terms of the various agreements outlined in Table 1.
Controversy over the ownership and future of Kumtor re-ignited with Parliament's decision in February 2013 to renegotiate the terms of the 2009 agreement. In December of the same year, a version of the Memorandum of Understanding was approved without such a clause.
The Art of Survival
Kyrgyz labor migration, human capital, and Social Networks
As of September 30, 2014, the banking system of Kyrgyzstan consisted of the National Bank of Kyrgyzstan (NBKR) and 24 commercial banks.2 The. In 1992, the laws "On the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic" and "On banks and banking activity in the Kyrgyz Republic" were adopted. 2 “Banking System Development Trends,” National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic, September 30, 2014, http://www.nbkr.kg/index1.
Abdybaly tegin, ed., "Report on the stability of the financial sector in the country", National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2012, http://www.nbkr. In 2010, the situation worsened even more due to political instability, which also caused a contraction in the size of the banking system's assets and deposits. 11 "Strategy for the development of the banking sector for the period before the end of 2014", National Bank of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, 2011, http://.
This crisis revealed how susceptible the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic was to external pressure. 18 "Strategy for the development of the banking sector for the period before the end of the year 2014," National Bank of Kyrgyz Republic.
6 Sebastien Peyrouse, “The multiple paradoxes of the agricultural issue in Central Asia”, EUCAM Working Paper No. This is one of the main challenges for social justice in rangeland management practices in Tajikistan. Access to pastures in Kyrgyzstan is easier and seems to contribute to the commercialization of the livestock sub-sector.
In August 2015, the State Committee for Land Management and Geodesy of Tajikistan was designated as the authorized state body responsible for grassland management, and the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Tajikistan was designated as the authorized state body responsible for grassland use. Grassland User Unions (PUUs) are made up of all members of the community by law. NJPB collects pasture use fees to go towards the implementation of pasture management plans.
To highlight the slow progress of grazing reform in Tajikistan, according to Article 9 of the Grazing Law, the Government of Tajikistan established an "authorized state body" responsible for grassland management. In contrast, the collection of grazing fees has increased in Kyrgyzstan, and according to the community grassland management plans, grazing fees are used for the construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of grazing infrastructure, as well as for improving grazing conditions and preventing degradation.
PoliciES
Rethinking the moderate-Extremist duality
Much of the literature on Islam in Central Asia gives disproportionate attention to one. In fact, one of the few characteristics held in common among the various extremist groups in Central Asia is a perspective on Islam that can be referred to as. Similarly, the case of Tablighi Jama'at clearly illustrates the difficulties in using the broad, overarching terminology of "extremism" to refer to textualist Islamic movements.
Furthermore, the fact that the Tablighi Jama'at is an apolitical movement means that participation in its activities, especially the daavat,19 the act of inviting other Muslims to pray in the mosque, provides a risk-free opportunity to explore and express a self-conscious Islamic identity rooted in the basic texts of the religion.20. The Hanafi madhhab is one of the four major schools of Islamic jurisprudence, and the one most prevalent in Central Asia. Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev himself used the symposium as an occasion to remind people of the nature of traditional Kyrgyz Islam.
According to a report published by the State Commission on Religious Affairs, "Islam, "to become an integral part of our culture and history ... exists in harmony with the customs and traditions that spread in Kyrgyzstan in the course of centuries."37 From the perspective of the state and the Muftiat, "tradition" refers to moderate, tolerant Hanafism. But since traditionalists do not constitute an organized group or movement, they have not attracted the attention of the state.
Public and State Responses to iSiS messaging: Kyrgyzstan
2 In the past, Kyrgyz security services have often made unverified claims that attempt to link political opposition figures or domestic unrest to international Islamist militant groups, including unsubstantiated claims that ethnic violence in 2010, which also featured a major role by organized crime figures, who control the country's powerful drug-trafficking networks, were planned by the Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in collaboration with ousted members of the Baki regime. In January 2015, the Kyrgyz press and social media exploded with debate when Malikov said his "sources" had informed him that ISIS had earmarked $70 million specifically to "destabilize the situation in southern Kyrgyzstan" and the rest of the Fergana Valley. Several of the country's more popular Kyrgyz-language media harshly criticized the interior minister for not "admitting" that the attack was a "terrorist act" before any evidence from the investigation was available.
3 Scott Radnitz's recent work on the instrumentalization of conspiracy theories by Kyrgyz politicians is an excellent study of the role these myths play in the Kyrgyz information environment and the way they are often perpetuated by actors within the state itself. In what was likely an attempt to counter these rumours, the police released their own video, which successfully attracted attention on social media, showing the aftermath of the raid, including graphic footage of the dead bodies of the slain suspects and the ISIS flag and the weapons , which has allegedly been found. in the home. In response to the July 2015 release of the first ISIS message targeting Kyrgyzstan, social media users and Kyrgyz commentators on Kloop – the.
On their coverage of the first message from ISIS targeting Kyrgyzstan: "It's actually really scary." Other Facebook users claimed that the video was created by the Russian Federal Security Service to justify the deployment of additional troops to Kyrgyzstan or the opening of a new military base in the country, or that the video and “Facebook trolls” sharing the news were evidence of “3, 7 million dollars', which the US is expected to invest in information operations in Kyrgyzstan.
People Accused of Being Part of Jm, iSiS or Both by the Kyrgyz Authorities, 2010-16
The Central Asia Program (CAP) at George Washington University promotes high-quality academic research in contemporary Central Asia and serves as an interface for the political, academic, diplomatic, and business communities. The Central Asia program focuses on the wider Central Asian space, which includes the five post-Soviet Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Xinjiang, Mongolia and the Volga-Ural region, Kashmir and Balochistan. It provides a platform for different, and even sometimes conflicting, views on contemporary Central Asia.
Research on Central Asia is all too often conducted by geographically divided groups. The Central Asia Program seeks to bring together partners from the United States, Europe, Russia, Asia, and Central Asia by promoting various forms of interaction and initiating joint projects. The Central Asia Program recognizes the growing importance of Central Asia in the 21st century and is a dynamic initiative that strives to be at the forefront of the debate on the region.
Kyrgyzstan has been the most studied country in Central Asia due to its openness to Western observers and the significant presence of foreign institutions in its higher education system. In the last few years, the Kyrgyz authorities have begun to follow the path of Uzbekistan, placing excessive emphasis on the theme of Islamic radicalization to justify the status quo and the role of law enforcement authorities.
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