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(1)

Social Choices Rules

Ram Singh

Microeconomic Theory

Lecture 18

(2)

Is Majority rule a SWF?

Proposition

There exists a SCR that satisfies conditions U, P, I, and ND.

Let

N(xPy)number of individuals who strictly preferx overy N(xRy)number of individuals who weakly preferx overy Definition

A Method of Majority Rule is a SWR such that:

(∀x,y ∈X)[xRy ⇔[N(xPy)≥N(yPx)], or (∀x,y ∈X)[xRy ⇔[N(xRy)≥N(yRx)].

MMR satisfies all conditions butR6∈O.

(3)

Concentrated Power I

Definition

Almost Decisive Set. LetV ⊆Nbe non-empty set, andx,y ∈Xbe an ordered pair. SetV is almost decisive forx againsty if

[(∀i ∈V)(xPiy) & (∀j ∈N−V)(yPix)]⇒[xPy].

In that case, we say: V isD(x,y).

Definition

Decisive Set. LetV ⊆N, andx,y ∈Xbe an ordered pair. SetV is decisive forx againsty if

(∀i ∈V)(xPiy)⇒[xPy].

In that case, we say: V isD(x¯ ,y). Note:

[V isD(x¯ ,y)]⇒[V isD(x,y)].

(4)

Concentrated Power II

Proposition

Suppose a SWF satisfies conditions U, P, I and ND.

[V is D(x,y)for some x,y ∈X]⇒[V isD(u,¯ v)for all u,v ∈ {x,y,z}].

Proof: Suppose,∃x,y ∈Xsuch thatV isD(x,y). Take anyz ∈Xsuch that x 6=z andy 6=z. Consider the following profile:

(∀j ∈V)(xPjy &yPjz) and (∀i ∈N−V)(yPix &yPiz)

So, we get

xPy &yPz ,i.e.,

xPz ,i.e., (Why?)

(5)

Concentrated Power III

[V isD(x,y)]⇒[V isD(x,¯ z)] (1)

Next, let

(∀j ∈V)(zPjx &xPjy) and (∀i ∈N−V)(zPix &yPix). This gives

zPx &xPy ,i.e.,zPy,i.e.,

[V isD(x,y)]⇒[V isD(z,¯ y)] (2)

Interchangingy andz in (2), in view of (1), we get

[V isD(x,z)]⇒[V isD(y¯ ,z)] (3)

(6)

Concentrated Power IV

Consider the following replacements in (1):x →y,y →zandz →x. Now, we get

[V isD(y,z)]⇒[V isD(y¯ ,x)] (4)

To sum up, we have

V is D(x,y) ⇒ V is D(x¯ ,z), from (1)

⇒ V is D(x,z), from the above defn

⇒ V is D(y¯ ,z), from (3)

⇒ V is D(y,z),

⇒ V is D(y¯ ,x), from (4). (5) Interchangingx andy in (1), (2) and (5), we get

[V is D(y,x)]⇒[V is D(y¯ ,z), V is D(z¯ ,x), and V is D(x¯ ,y)] (6)

(7)

Concentrated Power V

From (5) and (6), we get

[V is D(x,y)]⇒[V is D(y¯ ,z), V is D(z¯ ,x), and V is D(x¯ ,y)] (7) (1), (2), (5) and (7) together implies

V isD(u,¯ v)for allu,v ∈ {x,y,z}

Question

How many conditions we have used so far?

What is the size of V ?

Proposition

Suppose a SWF satisfies conditions U, P, and I.

[V is D(x,y)for some x,y ∈X]⇒[V isD(u,¯ v)for all u,v ∈X].

(8)

Impossibility Result I

Question Can]V =1?

Theorem

There is no SWF that satisfies conditions U, P, I and ND simultaneously.

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