In a 2008 report, Amnesty International described 'widespread and systematic violations'1 of human rights in the country, while Human Rights Watch noted 'the fundamental and pervasive nature of repression in Turkmenistan' and 'the government's abysmal human rights record'2. Unfortunately, as this report states, the EU is not even on first base when it comes to approaching Turkmenistan's biggest problem – the misappropriation of hydrocarbon revenues by an unelected ruling elite. The EU is not even on first base when it comes to approaching Turkmenistan's biggest problem - misappropriation of.
Why is Nabucco being proposed?
The European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank have all expressed interest in offering loans to the Nabucco consortium, and NGPI has formally approached the EIB for such a loan. The EU is committed to diversifying its gas suppliers and reducing its dependence on Russia. Nabucco would bypass Russia entirely and open up a direct and significant supply route to the gas reserves of Central Asia and the Middle East.
Which countries could supply gas to Nabucco?
23 Baker Schaffer, Marvin, 'The great gas pipeline game: monopolistic expansion of Russian's Gazprom into European markets', Foresight, Vol. 30 EU Press Release, "The EU and Turkmenistan strengthen their energy relations with a Memorandum of Understanding", 26 May 2008 [online], accessed 30 May 2009, available at. Turkmenistan's education system has also deteriorated significantly since the end of the Soviet era, not least because of the malign influence of President Niyazov's "sacred book" the Ruhnama.
Turkmenistan and the Resource Curse
However, this money accrues directly to the ruling elite, who use it to maintain a state structure based on patronage and repression. In other words, the Turkmen government is able to use oil and gas money to settle competing political interests and invest in a sizeable police and military to suppress any elements that challenge the government and will not be corrupted. This pattern of patronage and repression is common in oil and gas-rich developing countries and can be explained as a symptom of the 'resource curse', an idea that attempts to explain why resource-rich developing countries seem to be more bad in economic terms. , social and political development than resource-poor developing countries.
When the price is low, the government is short of funds and unable to finance public projects and social services. The current dispute between Russia and Turkmenistan over price shows the fragility of reliance on gas revenues, as Russia pushes to significantly lower the amount they pay for Turkmen gas. The longer the dispute continues, the longer the Turkmen government will continue without payment from Russia, and the greater the losses to the Turkmen treasury.
A Global Witness report revealed in 2006 that about $3 billion in Turkmen gas revenue was held in a Deutsche Bank account controlled by President Niyazov. The report also revealed that no money from Turkmen gas goes into the national budget and that 75% of government spending is done outside the budget53. This level of fiscal ambiguity makes it nearly impossible for Turkmen citizens to know with any degree of accuracy how state funds are being spent.
Repression of Civil Society Activists and Political Opposition
A purge of so-called "traitors" took place in late 2002 after an apparent assassination attempt on President Niyazov. The International Committee of the Red Cross was denied access to the prisoners, in continuation of the Turkmen government's policy of blocking access to all international human rights organizations. The repression of civil society is just one of the many ways in which the Turkmen government seeks to exert control over the population.
President Berdymukhamedov was a close colleague of Niyazov and oversaw many of the former dictator's most disastrous policies. 59 Human Rights Watch, 'Turkmenistan Country Summary', January 2009 [online], accessed 22 June 2009, available at http://www.hrw.org/europecentral-asia/turkmenistan. The repressive apparatus of the Turkmen state remains firmly in place, and evidence of ongoing human rights violations continues to be collected67.
Berdymukhamedov also amended the constitution to increase the power of the president and introduced a new crackdown on freedom of artistic expression69. Freedom House noted in their 2009 Nations in Transit report that Berdymukhamedov "ended the second year of his presidency having done little to reform the structure of government" and that Turkmenistan "retained many of the distinctive features of the Niyazov era, including frequent purges of senior officials, a one-party system, tight control of the state-run mass media, and severe restrictions on civil liberties'70. Although the Turkmen government staged “democratic” presidential elections with much fanfare in December 2008, the reality was that the vast majority of candidates represented Turkmenistan’s only state-sanctioned political party, with only limited international observation allowed71.
A recent announcement by the Turkmen government also confirms that the study of Ruhname will remain compulsory in higher education73.
The Central Asia Strategy
The resolution notes "the willingness of President Berdimuhamedov to carry out major reforms" and states that the ITA "would have the potential to contribute to the progress of ongoing democratic reforms in Turkmenistan" and be "a possible springboard to stable and sustainable relations between the European Union and Turkmenistan" and acts as a “possible lever to strengthen the reform process.” Its stated goal is “to contribute to the integration, balanced development and economic and social cohesion of the EU Member States.” Nevertheless, in February 2009 the bank published the EIB Statement on Environmental and Social Principles and Standards91, which they "must be used by EIB staff in all operations.92" The statement clarifies that the Bank will not finance any project that does not meet the standards set out in the statement and is forthright in its assertion that the Bank "will not finance projects resulting in violations of human rights.93".
This may include a social impact assessment if lending takes place outside the EU. The Bank has yet to decide whether a loan to the Nabucco consortium will be external loans, as the Turkish company BOTAS is part of the consortium100. It is therefore reasonable to expect the Bank to involve supplier countries in its environmental and social assessment of the project.
The Bank's founding agreement includes a commitment to 'the fundamental principles of multi-party democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and market economy'. The European Parliament's approval of the ITA, which was subsequently ratified by the Council on 27 July 2009, confirms that the EU has abandoned conditionality in its relations with Turkmenistan. Both have made many of the modest improvements in Turkmenistan since Niyazov's death, while acknowledging that the human rights situation remains unacceptable.
Both urged parliamentarians to agree that the relative openness of Berdymukhamedov's government requires a response from the EU. She noted that both the ITA and the PCA allow for suspension "in the event of an established, continuing and serious breach of the human rights clause". It would be counterproductive at this stage for the EU to publicly harass Turkmenistan on human rights and development concerns.
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
The EU is right to note that more positive cooperation with Turkmenistan is needed if we want to achieve strategic, economic and value goals. Gas relations are the dominant strategic motivation for the EU's engagement with Turkmenistan, and energy is probably the only arena in which the EU could increase its influence vis-à-vis the Turkmen government. However, the human rights and development situation in Turkmenistan remains extremely inadequate and the EU needs to address this issue more decisively in its relations with the country.
The EU significantly lacks ambition in its approach to Turkmenistan, favoring a soft, generational approach to human rights and development issues and moving too closely to a clean energy security approach in the country at the expense of a values-based approach. This gives fuel to criticism that the EU is selling out its values to secure gas. Unfortunately, the human rights dialogue between the EU and Turkmenistan has made very little progress and is widely perceived as a sham by the NGO community.
However, it shows that the EU could be bolder in planning a relationship with some influence with Turkmenistan. This report offers two essential recommendations for the EU regarding the promotion of EITI and the engagement of NGOs. This last point is valid, however, only if the EU makes it clear to Turkmenistan that the implementation of the EITI is important to them.
The EU should seek to mainstream EITI promotion in its dealings with Turkmenistan, including through the EU-Turkmenistan Human Rights Dialogue.
NGO Engagement
AFP, 'Turkmenistan signs landmark gas exploration deal', 17 July 2009 [online], accessed 1 October 2009, available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g_QM3EMFqQKuWdvdt7nVR-IF5Gfw. 5, accessed 1 October 2009, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU_CtrlAsia_EN-RU.pdf. Eurasianet, "Azerbaijan abandons controversial NGO changes", 1 July 2009, accessed 1 October 2009, available at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav070109a.shtml.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Basic Papers of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [online], accessed 1 October 2009, available at http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/insti/basics.pdf p. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Sustainable Energy Initiative: Actions and Results Online], accessed 1 October 2009, available at http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/cs/sei.pdf. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Strategy for Turkmenistan [online], 15 June 2006, accessed 1 October 2009, available at http://www.ebrd.com/about/strategy/country/turk/strategy.pdf.
European Commission, Central Asia Indicative Program [online], accessed 1 October 2009, available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/central_asia/rsp/nip_07_10_en.pdf. European Investment Bank, EIB Support for the Extraction Industry Transparency Initiative [online], 14 July 2009, accessed 1 October 2009, available at http://www.eib.org/about/partners/cso/joint-. European Investment Bank, About the EIB [online], accessed 1 October 2009, available at http://www.eib.org/about/index.htm.
European Investment Bank, Sustainable, Competitive & Secure Energy [online], accessed October 1, 2009, available at http://www.eib.org/projects/topics/energy/index.htm. Human Rights Watch, 'Turkmenistan Country Summary', January 2009, [online], accessed 22 June 2009, available at http://www.hrw.org/europecentral-asia/turkmenistan. World Bank, MDTF Donors and Steering Committee [online], accessed 1 October 2009, available at http://go.worldbank.org/OJYG9QNZW0.
