François Godement, Director of the Asia Program and Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). He then became Head of the Asia-Pacific Desk of the Delegation for Strategic Affairs and Adviser on International Affairs for the French Ministry of Defense. Valérie Niquet is head of the Asia department at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS).
Summary
Welcoming Remarks
Keynote Speech: Asia-Pacific’s Strategic Environment and France
The San Francisco System and Maritime Security Challenges in Asia Challenges in Asia
Because of the two main players, there are three choices for the countries in the region. The first point was to contain the possible revival of the Japanese military in the region. However, there is a slight nuance by the Trump administration in the application of the US-Japan treaty to the Senkakus.
Europe’s Roles in Maritime Security in Asia
Both the US and China in the SCS are trying to prevent each other from pursuing their core interests. Therefore, it is in the interests of the US and European countries to tell China that we are willing to go to great lengths to protect it. Therefore, we should be concerned about the growing risk of an unintended escalation of the situation, especially in the ECS.
Closing Remarks
Asia Pacific Regional Order and Maritime Security
Paracels and Spratlys: Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores; Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands (Art.2). Northern Territories (Hokkaido)/ Southern Kurile Islands: "Japan renounced all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands" (Art.2). All the islands in the Pacific Ocean which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories which Japan stole from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, will be restored to the Republic become from China.
The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushsu, Shikoku and such smaller islands as we determine (Para: 8). Joint Communiqué between China and Japan 1972 The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this position of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it maintains its position under Article 8 of the Postsdam Proclamation.
Japan will agree to any proposal by the United States to the United Nations to place it under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole managing authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29deg. Japan relinquishes claim to Sakhalin in exchange for ownership of the Kuriles north of Urup. The leaders of the...USSR, USA and Great Britain have agreed that...the USSR will go to war against Japan on the side of the Allies on the condition that:.
The main obstacle to the conclusion of this treaty is the question of the delimitation of the borders between Russia and Japan.
SCAPIN 677
S. Position (1953-present)
Japan acquired ownership of Takeshima by virtue of its continued peaceful possession and administration of the islands. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereof, the United States shall have the right to exercise any and all forms of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters. Several of the Allied Powers urged that the treaty require Japan to relinquish its sovereignty over these islands in favor of the sovereignty of the United States.
In the face of this divided opinion among the Allies, the United States believed that the best formula would be to allow Japan to retain residual sovereignty while allowing these islands to be incorporated into the United Nations. The Prime Minister "stressed the strong desire of the Japanese people to return administrative control of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands to Japan." In response, President Eisenhower reaffirmed the US Kennedy Signing Order Regarding the Ryukyus (1962) – “I recognize that the Ryukyus are part of the Japanese homeland and see.
Residual sovereignty” was defined in 1969 as that “the United States would not transfer its powers of sovereignty [administrative, legislative, and judicial] over the Ryukyu Islands to any country other than Japan.” The United States cannot add to the legal rights which Japan possessed before it transferred the administration of the islands to us, nor can the United States, by returning what it has received, diminish the rights of other claimants. The United States believes that any conflicting claims to the islands are a matter to be resolved by the parties involved.
The United States takes no position on the issue of the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands.
Cooperation and Security states that the treaty applies to the territories under the
Reconcile Taiwan for losing its seat at the UN and break the stalemate in the ongoing textile negotiations with Taiwan – Influenced by the US.
Each Contracting Party recognizes that an armed attack against any Contracting Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and security, and declares that it will act in accordance with its own constitutional provisions and procedures to meet the common danger. Any such armed attack and any measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall cease to apply when the Security Council takes measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
Both leaders asserted that Article V of the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation covers the Senkaku Islands.
US EIA (2013)
QUESTIONS/COMMENTS
Public Seminary on “Asia’s Regional Order and Maritime Security” 2 nd Floor, Room 269, Maison
Professor Aaron Friedberg’s 1994
East Asia is made up of several
Westphalian states that are
Westphalian states are
Brunei in the South China Sea;
Straits ;
These disputes are
The adoption of these tactics represents an attempt by both regional powers to pursue their near-term geostrategic interests without provoking a large-scale military response from the United States and its allies. As China joins the ranks of the great powers, China's leaders increasingly believe that their country has the preponderance of military and economic power to overhaul the rules, norms and institutions that govern the world order to serve their interests.
On its part, the United States designed the rules,
This, in turn, creates the possibility of a systemic conflict or a clash of great powers in the second decade of the 21st century.
A major systemic war would not only cost
Southeast Asian states
China poses the biggest challenge in both efforts to either resolve/manage or escalate the maritime and territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
China believes that the South China Sea
China has been Deterring
Philippines and
Vietnam in enhancing their maritime
The South China Sea is now one of the four geo-Strategic flashpoints
South China Sea is now the future of
China has also been very active in effecting its
Since June 2013, China has unilaterally and rapidly built several new oil and natural gas platforms near the midpoint between China and Japan. As a result, Japan has repeatedly raised its objections to China's continued unilateral development of oil and natural gas in the East China Sea.
From Japan’s point of view, China’s build-up of
Chinese Maritime Law Enforcement Agency (CMLEA) vessels also intensified their activities around the Senkaku Islands for several days in August 2016. This was the strongest and most massive operation of the CMLEA in the waters around Senkaku. To effect a unilateral change in the territorial status quo in the East China Sea, China increased its air and maritime activities in the East China Sea when it deployed PLAAF aircraft over the Tsushima Strait, between Okinawa and Miyakojima- islands, sent.
PLAN ships also began operating in the southern waters of the Senkaku/Diayo Islands. Prime Minister Shintaro Abe's policy of continuing his predecessor's position of not recognizing the existence of the Senkaku dispute. Prime Minister Abe announced an increase in the defense budget and a review of the 2010 national defense program guidelines.
The year 2015 was seen as the year when both Chinese and Taiwanese leaders made great efforts for a gradual normalization of China-ROC relations. In January 2016, Miss Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidency. This has led to a renewed tension in the Taiwan Strait as China is very suspicious of her motives regarding Taiwanese independence.
Suspicious of possible secession of Taiwan
Administration, China is currently developing the
Taiwan but also against the U.S. Seventh Fleet
The existence of these maritime tensions
The standoff in East Asia is caused by the fact that these maritime tensions could lead to three possible strategic scenarios.
A U.S.- China
Asia- Pacific
China's recent escalating actions and assertive behavior in both the South and East China Seas are causing more actors to directly engage in East Asian maritime security issues both diplomatically and strategically.
Despite their geographic, political, diplomatic, and
China's naval build-up and consequent maritime expansion are generating bilateral, transatlantic and global issues that will affect the EU's nascent common foreign and security policy and the EU's role as the leading global civilian power. Since 2016, Russia has taken a more active role in East Asia as it began to criticize the position and role of the United States. The most sensitive element of China-Russia relations, security, has become increasingly important as the two countries have grown.
With its growing wealth, China has applied a sophisticated form of economic statecraft to influence the views of regional states on the maritime disputes. Most East Asian states now weigh their geo-strategic interests and political decisions in the context of their alliance and security partnership with the US. This causes claimants and non-claimant actors to adopt a delicate balancing act regarding their respective positions on the maritime issues. in East Asia.
China's naval build-up, growing security, and development of its extensive anti-access/area denial capabilities in the First Island chain are designed to challenge the U.S. These geo-strategic issues related to maritime disputes in East Asia should make Europe think about its limited security role in the region. Europe may consider expanding its current policy instruments of annual declarations, a ban on commercial arms sales to China and nascent freedom of navigation operations (from France) with new initiatives such as enhanced strategic dialogue with the US- in.
While it is true that Europe does not have a
Europe’s Past be
How to defuse Sino-US tensions in th e South China
Sea?
S.: forward military presence used to manifest that international waters cannot be treated as within the
