Nationalism Ideas of Fidel Castro

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Nationalism Ideas of Fidel Castro

―A Comparative Analysis―

MORIGUCHI Mai

カストロがキューバ革命当初は圧倒的な国民の支持を得た理由のひとつは，ナショナリズムであると言われている。だが，世界中にある無数のナショナリズムの全てがカストロ政権の事例のように支持を得られるわけではなく，むしろそうでないものは数多い。また，カストロのナショナリズムが支持の柱のひとつであることは多くの研究者において一致しているものの，これを思想内在的に分析した研究は現在まであまりなされていない。本稿では，革命前後のフィデル・カストロのイデオロギーを，当初彼と協働したが後に決別した革命政権初代首相ホセ・ミロ・カルドナの思想と，革命前の共和国，政治原則，バティスタ政権，革命後，米国という5つのポイントで思想の比較を行う。この比較の結果を，リーア・グリーンフェルドの理論を援用して分析した結果，両者がルサンチマンという点に注目した際に国民へのアピールで大きく異なることを明らかにし，カストロの思想は国民に対し，劣等感を抱く身近な強国（米国）に対する自らの優越性を見出したという特徴があり，それが強みである可能性を示した。

Keywords

Cuba, nationalism, resentment, Fidel Castro, José Miró Cardona

キューバ，ナショナリズム，フィデル・カストロ，ルサンチマン，ホセ・ミロ・カルドナ

Introduction

　Most Cuban people enthusiastically supported the Revolution of 1959 and its leader, Fidel Castro. Many researchers have studied the reasons for that support, one of which is nationalism. For example, Jorge Dominguez, a Cuban-American scholar, says, “Charisma, political deliverance, distributional performance, and nationalism were four elements in the legitimation of revolutionary rule ［Dominguez 1978: 201］”. Many scholars have shared this idea, such as Dimitrov^（1）, who analyzed the performance of nationalism among five post-communist countries, and Koike^（2）, who said that nationalism is the foundation of socialist systems. Of course, as in other populist regimes in Latin America, distributional performance guaranteed the occurrence of the Revolution; however, researchers agree that nationalism was a significant contribu- tor to the Cuban Revolution. In this study, I adopt Anthony Smithʼs definition of nationalism as “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nationʼ ［Smith 1991: 73］”. This concept is broader than Ernest Gellnerʼs well-known concept, which defines nationalism as “primarily a political principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent ［Gellner 1983: 1］”.

　However, not all types of nationalism can guarantee a regime or revolution, that is, political legitimation.

For example, in Japan, nationalism is regarded as responsible for the fascist regime and participation in World War II. Consequently, this has evoked hostility toward political nationalism among some Japanese

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people.

　Thus, this paper addresses the research question, “What factor sufficiently strengthened nationalism to prompt the Cuban peopleʼs enthusiastic support for Fidel Castro?” For this purpose, I adopt nationalism theorist Liah Greenfeldʼs analysis as the methodology in this study and establish “resentment” as a key word. Resentment is defined as “a psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy, hatred and the impossibility of satisfying these feelings ［Greenfeld 1992: 15］”. Neitzsche, who expanded the use of the word “resentment” in his works, said that resentment can be converted to good virtue by the weak^（3）. Then the following philosophers and scholars of 20^th century such as Max Scheler^（4） interpreted resentment as a motivating power of revolution, forming new religion, communism and other ideologies. The novel point of the Greenfeldʼs interpretation is that the weak can find totally different virtues than the strong to overcome its resentment. In contrast, Neitzsche claimed that the new good virtue converted from the resentment is not new one but rather a reinterpretation of the resentment. Through case studies on five countries, her analyses indicate that for an emerging nation, an existing nationʼs idea of “nation” serves as an ideal. However, in many cases, this process emphasizes the emerging nationʼs inferiority. Further- more, Greenfeld states that resentment has the creative power to cause the “transvaluation of values.” In other words, the emergence of national identity accompanied by resentment can emphasize traditional and indigenous elements. According to her research, Germany and Russia in 19^th century are typical examples of this phenomenon; both countries harbored resentment toward Western Europe, but by enhancing their own features, they instilled self-respect and nationalism in the population^（5）.

　Greenfeldʼs analysis was not comparative but detailed single case studies. Besides, although her analysis of resentment is not applied to all the cases that she studied, she had not demonstrated which kinds of cases can be applicable. That is to say, to show its cause or condition, comparative case study of nationalist ideas in the same nation and period focusing on the conversion of resentment might be a significant contri- bution. Thereupon I compare nationalist ideas of two Cuban revolutionary leaders. Fidel Castroʼs nationalist idea, which is so influential and contains strong anti-American sentiment, could be one of the expres- sions of Cuban resentment, at the same time. Thus Castroʼs idea is one of the most suitable cases to study with Greenfeldʼs methodology.

　I compare them to an alternative concept of Cuban nationalism, the ideology of José Miró Cardona, a Cu- ban lawyer and an exponent of the conservative reformists in the struggle against the military regime in the 1950s^（6）. It is most appropriate to compare Miró Cardonaʼs ideology with Castroʼs not only because it was representative of an alternative reformist nonviolent revolutionary group but also because he participated in the anti-Castro movement after the Revolution. Naturally I cannot compare an individual, Castro, with more than one person. But Miró Cardona is a representative ideologue of the biggest alternative trend of the Cuban nationalist ideas on that period. I mean in spite of studying the biggest alternative trend totally, I choose Miró Cardona as a case to compare^（7）.

　Two leaderʼs speeches and written massages mentioned little about resentment, because those messages were meant for the public and didnʼt contain negative messages or sentiment. This shows just how finally Castro and Miró Cardona thought about or reacted to the resentment. In following sections I examine its process and background focusing five points: the first republic, the Batista military regime, the revolutionary government, the U.S. and political principal. Former three points are the most important periods for the nation on the first 20^th century. Ideas about these three points show clearly how Castro and Miró Car- dona thought about the nation. The forth point shows the U.S. as the archetypical enemy for Castro and as

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a model for Miró Cardona. The last point, their political principal, was the backbone of their ideas and ideal about the nation. These five points are not link directory to resentment but demonstrate the process and background as to how they thought about or reacted to the resentment.

I．The Republic and Political Principle

　The first point of comparison addresses Miró Cardonaʼs and Castroʼs contradictory ideas regarding the independent Republic of Cuba^（8） founded in 1902, following four years of US occupation^（9）, during which the United States strongly influenced and pressured Cuba culturally, politically, and economically. For instance, it imposed the Platt Amendment on the Republicʼs constitution, partially restricting Cuban sovereignty. However, due to economic prosperity, many of the intellectuals were pro-American during the de- cline of powerful nationalism.

　Born in the year that Cuba gained independence, partially through his fatherʼs efforts as a general, Miró Cardona saw the Republic as the fruit of heroesʼ struggle for independence. Because he greatly respected his father as a founder of the Republic, he did not consider the Republic in a negative light, unlike Castro, who saw it in an era of neocolonialism. During Miró Cardonaʼs formative years, Cuba enjoyed economic prosperity due to the United States. Moreover, the Republic had a democratic system of elections and laws.

Later, Miró Cardona noted that that period of time was not exceedingly unpleasant.

　Because he married young, Miró Cardona began working before completing high school. Thus, when he became a lawyer, he was 38 years old. In addition, during his time at Havana University, it closed three times because of student political movements. In fact, from after World War I to approximately the time of the Great Depression, the economic crisis and the Machado administration caused nationalist and nationwide anti-government movements, primarily aimed at replacing President Machado, who amended the constitution to prolong his presidential term and suppressed the opposition and journalists. Furthermore, the depression rekindled nationalism among Cuban people. For two decades, due to economic prosperity, the Cuban people had nearly forgotten nationalism^（10）, but the depression diminished positive feelings toward the United States.

　Although many statesmen in the following decades participated in this movement, Miró Cardona paid no attention to it not only because he needed to study and work to support his family^（11） but also because he believed that maintaining order, liberty, and justice is not the duty a student: Only the law is responsible for it. In a 1958 speech, he asserted that a person replacing the law results in dictatorship or totalitarianism: The law is the only measure that protects human rights and liberty. Because the United States fol- lowed the rule of law, Miró Cardona deemed it a democratic country, although he was not completely satis- fied with it. His criticism was directed toward the United States providing help to non-democratic Latin American governments, for example, by supplying arms. He said,

　The concept of Liberty…is a kind of “conformed volunteer with the law.”

　For the due protection of liberty, the constitutional systems of the liberal democratic regimes build a perfect guaranteed system under the title “fundamental rights of individuals” without regard to political, social, or religious criteria.

　The only climate in which human liberty can survive is the climate of Democracy.…Only in a democratic regime is liberty possible, and it is the sole system in which people realize a life of liberty, peace,

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and creativity ［Miró Cardona 1958: 9］.

　To conclude, Miró Cardona believed that only the law has the right to rule people. The Republic had democratic elections and a legal system, although they were not effectively implemented. According to Miró Cardona, although this era was not ideal, it was not unacceptable because it functioned within the legal framework. Miró Cardona did recognize the problems, such as corruption, gangsters, extreme poverty, but stated that “everything was going to become better.” He wished to protect the Republic that his father and other independence heroes fought for.

　In contrast, Castro considered the Republic to be a symbol of US imperialism. The son of a ranch owner, Castro was born in 1926 and raised during the nationalism revival and the Great Depression. His family was wealthy, but his parents were not well educated, and his father participated in the War of Indepen- dence on the Spanish side. He grew up on a ranch with many poor peasant families and observed their poor conditions, although it is said that the living standards of the peasants on his fatherʼs ranch were rela- tively better than othersʼ. A big part of the population lived in and this poverty was a serious Cuban problem at the time, especially in rural areas^（12）.

　Castro thought that Cuba had not been independent entirely from the U.S., in other word the Republic was neocolonial. Imperfect sovereignty due to the Platt Amendment led social problems like poverty, gangsters, corruption^（13）. Castroʼs ideas were thus shaped by anxiety due to the lack of Cubaʼs independence and anger toward social problems. Both Castroʼs anxiety and anger were inspired by the experiences of his schooldays as well as by José Martíʼs ideas.

　José Martí is regarded as Cubaʼs greatest national hero by the majority of the Cuban people. Not as a soldier, but as a journalist, poet, philosopher, and Cuban revolutionary activist, Martí set ideals for the independence movement and the war. Until his emergence, many Latin American intellectuals considered the United States an advanced model of democracy that their countries should emulate^（14）, that is, they considered their own countries inferior. However, Martí changed this attitude, insisting on the marvelousness of Latin America to the extent that he and his ideas continue to symbolize Cuban nationalism.

　From childhood, Castro was influenced by Martíʼs ideas and believed in the potential of Cuba and Latin America and its necessity to be truly independent more than in any political principle. At the same time, he slighted elections and the legal system. Later, Castro narrated his experiences from his schooldays―expe- ditions to Dominican Republic and Bogotazo―as lessons on revolution. Castro participated in the expedition from Cuba to Dominican Republic to overthrow the Trujillo administration, which was considered an

“autocracy.” However, the expedition could not land on Dominican Republic and, in terrible conditions, waited on a desert island for some weeks. Castro swam home. Despite the failure of this expedition, he closely observed political conflict. Castroʼs second early experience was a well-known riot in Colombia, during which the most popular presidential candidate was assassinated because of party conflicts. Coinci- dentally, Castro was present there along with certain Cuban students. These experiences, Castro said, caused him to realize that in Latin America, the politics of the ballot box could not resolve problems. Miró Cardona emphasized the political principles of the Republic, free elections, and the legal system. On the other hand, Fidel Castro saw the Republic as not truly independent and as practically a colony of the Unit- ed States.

　The second point of comparison between Miró Cardona and Fidel Castro is their political philosophy. As previously noted, Miró Cardonaʼs political principles included democratic elections and a legal system, that

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is, liberal democracy. However, before the Revolution, Castro had no coherent political philosophy, having committed neither to communism or socialism. Sometimes, he declared that he was not a communist, for example, on a television program in April 1959^（15）. Of course, his ideas were close to communism or socialism, but as Castro later said, he was not proficient in these ideologies at the time^（16）. Moreover, he did not commit to liberal democracy either. He declared support for elections and the law; however, these were not primary principles for him^（17）. What took precedence was nationalism―to save the people―regardless of any principle. This is also indicated in the following point of comparison.

II．The Batista Military Regime

　Third, I compare Miró Cardonaʼs nonviolent approach and Castroʼs violent approach to the Batista military regime against which the revolutionary movement struggled. Fulgencio Batista staged a military coup dʼétat in March 1952, a few months before the scheduled presidential election. A presidential candidate with the least support and little chance of victory, Batista violently seized power, ostensibly citing the corruption of former president Carlos Prío Socarras: “The military junta have acted to avoid the regime of blood and corruption which has destroyed institutions, created disorder and mockery in the State,…pre- paring a military golpe before the election ［Thomas 1971: 784］”.

　In fact, Prío lost the peopleʼs support because of corruption. For example, members of his family occupied various important posts, and during his presidential term, he acquired a huge amount of property^（18）. Thus, a part of the nation welcomed Batista even though he had illegally obtained power. However, others, including Miró Cardona and Castro, protested his regime. Moreover, two days after the coup, the United States approved Batistaʼs government.

　For years, Miró Cardona continued nonviolent negotiations to replace Batista. Because what he desired most was to make Cuba a complete legal democracy. At the time, Miró Cardona was not only a lawyer but also the technical adviser of the National Committee of Economy and the Dean of the Havana University Law School. Moreover by the 1950s, Miró Cardona was representative of Havanaʼs legal circle, participat- ing in various international conferences of the Inter-American Bar Association. As he mentioned in a speech during the anti-Batista movement, he considered himself as Cubaʼs guardian of the law^（19）. Even under the illegal regime, he had strained to resolve the problem within the current legal system.

　But the purpose of Castro was not the same. Castro had participated in political activities since his schooldays, focusing on poverty, gangsterism, corruption, and Cubaʼs imperfect sovereignty. Immediately after the coup, he criticized Batistaʼs military regime, making it appear as if previous regimes were more democratic and that reforms would improve the Republic:

　Misgovernment was being endured, but then it had been so for years, with the people awaiting the constitutional opportunity to right the wrongs. And you, Batista, who basely escaped for four years and, for three, engaged in useless politicking, appear now with your tardy, unsettling, and poisonous remedy, making shreds of the Constitution, when in only two months we would have reached the goal through appropriate means ［Bonachea and Valdés 1972: 147-149］.

　Originally, however, Castro wished to reform the Republic, not recover a pre-Batista state. Although Cas- troʼs revolutionary movement was anti-Batista, it included much more.

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　At first Miró Cardona negotiated as secretary general of the Sociedad Amigos de la República （Society of Friends of the Republic） SAR, an anti-government conservative reformist group^（20） out of the existing political parties. There were some anti-Batista political parties but SAR was not a political party. It tried to be neutral without having any particular policy. SAR was a nonpolitical, conservative, and reformist group of intellectual elites founded in 1948 by the famous philosopher Jorge Mañach^（21）. Because of its nonpolitical character, the membersʼ ideas were diverse, although of a reformist conservative tendency. It cam- paigned to morally and civilly enlighten the people.

　In November 1952, SAR reorganized for the anti-Batista movement. Cosme de la Torriente^（22） and Miró Cardona, as new secretary general, tried convincing young people eager for armed revolution that violent measures were outdated and that power had to be regained through elections. Thus, until April 1956, SAR was a main anti-government actor. In particular SAR requested to the opposition cooperation based on the guarantees of the 1940 Constitution, the most regarded and supported constitution in Cuba and Latin America at the time. It had progressive clauses, such as land reform, protection of labor, and clauses for- bidding all the discriminations as gender and racial.

　Some, Castro included, lost hope of successfully negotiating with Batista because the government didnʼt practice elections fairly. However, for a few years, many still considered it possible to peacefully resolve the issue and thus supported SAR. SAR representatives persevered with their attempts to convince the people, especially the youth, to struggle not with arms but with intelligence. In addition, they tried convincing Ba- tista to fulfill his promises, cautioning that the people could neither accept nor obey him. Batista never refused demands outright, but feigned intent to cooperate, ensuring that his regime is regarded as democratic and relations with the United States are maintained. Miró Cardona and de la Torriente seemed deluded by Batistaʼs excuses or token compromises. After Batistaʼs refusal, Miró Cardona justified SARʼs actions as

“the clean ambition of public service ［Ibarra 2003: 42］”.

　In March 1956 direct dialog between SAR and the government took place and the opposition again asked for a general election （possibly enabling a regime change） and guarantees of the 1940 Constitution. Be- cause it didnʼt succeed, finally, Miró Cardona abandoned negotiations but not nonviolent and legal measures. Attempting to corner Batista, Miró Cardona organized diverse civil groups nationwide （e.g., institutions of higher education, churches, local autonomous bodies, and service organizations）, and as their co- ordinator, demanded Batistaʼs resignation.

　The civic institutionsʼ demand damaged Batistaʼs position. Furthermore, the business community had prospered because of the relations between Batista and the United States and did not officially oppose him after the military coup. Now, however, Batista feared that the business community would join the opposition. Miró Cardona had planned a two-stage strategy: first, to declare a unified organization of civic and armed groups and second, to call a general strike if Batista refused to resign. Miró Cardonaʼs efforts bore fruit in the form of the Pact of Caracas^（23）, in which almost all the opposition forces agreed. The pact defined the processes and rules of regime change and establishment of the provincial government, but it didnʼt contain any specific policies to be implemented after the Batista government. This is because all Miró Cardona wanted to do was to reestablish a democratic system in Cuba.

　The chasm between Miró Cardona and Castroʼs attitudes toward Batista comprised the issue of violence.

The former held to the possibility of nonviolent change for some years after the coup, but the latter abandoned the possibility almost immediately. Two weeks after the 1952 coup, Castro brought its illegality to the courtʼs attention―his only nonviolent ploy. The court ignored his suit, and Castro began insisting that

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there was no possibility of peaceful change; only armed struggle could reclaim power from Batista^（24）. Im- mediately, Castro began organizing an underground movement, and in July 1953, attacked the Moncada barrack with only ill-armed 140 civilians^（25）.

　As explained above, many Cubans maintained hope of nonviolence way for the first few years. But gradually support for Castro increased, especially after the progression of guerrilla war in the mountains. One reason could be due to peopleʼs disappointment at the current liberal democratic system. Although the Cu- ban republic had characteristics of a democratic system like a constitution, law and elections, these were not practiced sufficiently. Castroʼs comment that “a ballot box cannot resolve the problems of Cuba” could be closer to the peopleʼs sentiment than Miró Cardonaʼs fundamentalist logic of liberal democracy.

　By ousting Batista, Miró Cardona expected to recover what was lost or changed during and after the coup: the 1940 Constitution; the legal system; and free, open elections. As previously noted the Pact of Ca- racas, which unified the opposition, defined only the political process of post-Batista. Castro had different expectations, with much of his platform being more detailed and specific. His speech “History Will Absolve Me,” written in prison and later published, contained specific plans for legal revisions, for example, land reform that even defined how much land a person could own, workerʼs profit-sharing rates, rent reductions, apartment construction, and nationwide electrification. These social problems, existent for decades, had not been caused by Batista.

　To summarize, Miró Cardona did all what he could within the framework of the current legal system to regain the rule of law and order that Batista had damaged. Conversely, Castro slighted the framework of the law, almost immediately initiating an armed struggle. Moreover, as he always had, he wanted to resolve deep-rooted social problems. Miró Cardonaʼs principles could gradually and indirectly resolve social problems through the democratic process, or perhaps, his principles could not resolve certain problems such as poverty, which existed long before law and order fell to Batistaʼs coup. Conversely, Castro blamed not the lack of respect for the law and order for Cubaʼs situation, but those who exploited the people, that is, the autocrats and huge companies.

III．The Revolutionary Government

　On January 1, 1959 the Revolution ousted Batista. The next point of comparison between Miró Cardona and Castro is their actions after the Revolution. From the outset, Castro was practically the leader of the Revolution. Under his direction, many people, including Miró Cardona, left Cuba. This reflects the differ- ence between Miró Cardonaʼs and Castroʼs thoughts about the nation.

　After Batistaʼs downfall, however, they cooperated. Miró Cardona assumed the office of prime minister.

Instead of Castroʼs guerrilla group members, the other ministers included civilians from reformist conservative groups, such as Miró Cardona. The upper- and middle-class populations were considered to have separated from the Revolution because of economic policies, including condemnation, but Miró Cardona did not deem these important. His primary reasons included policies implemented without respect for the legal system and approaches to communism and the Soviet Union. As Miró Cardona asserted during his exile in the United States: “Even if the Castro government had done some good for the people of Cuba, I still would reject it because he had robbed them of their liberty ［New York Times, January 21, 1961］”. Miró Cardona did not oppose many policies of the Revolutionary government, such as land reform. The land reform realized in May 1959 was regarded as radical for its restrictions on large-scale landowning, its

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organization of the farmers, and the distribution of land to farmers. Although many rich Cubans emigrated because of the land reform, Miró Cardona favored the enforced land reform law.

　His suggestion about Castroʼs post clearly reflected this. In the first few weeks of the Revolution, Castro did not hold a post in the government. However, he was practically the chief of the state. At the time, Miró Cardona said, “it was chaos. There was a dual government: ［Manuel］ Urrutia ［the president］ in the palace and Fidel Castro in the Hotel Havana Hilton ［Miró Cardona （n. d.）: 4-5］［;］ policies were constantly being changed on broadcast television ［Sarasota Journal, July 6, 1960］”. For example, before the Revolution, gambling was a mafia business, and Castro promised to eradicate it. On June 16, Miró Cardona declared opposition to all gambling; on the following day, Castro announced gamblingʼs continuation, ostensibly to preserve employment^（26）. Miró Cardona complained, but did not attempt to stop Castro. He suggested changing Castroʼs post by nominating him as a cabinet member （defense minister） or prime minister, or by creating a ministry to coordinate matters between Urrutia and Castro^（27）. Thus, Miró Cardona attempt- ed to place Castro within the legal framework. The most important thing for him was not the policy itself but the process that led to make policy and law.

　First, extremely disappointing to Miró Cardona was el paredon, or the wall. The Revolutionary government executed many “criminals” from the Batista government without official trials^（28）. There were too few judges and too many suspects. Castro asked the masses thronging the plaza, “Guilty or innocent?” The masses cried “Guilty!” And as if it was a legally valid verdict, the suspects were shot. The majority of the people favored what amounted to “mob rule” because Batistaʼs soldiers had assassinated innocent people in the street. However, for Miró Cardona, “the man of the law ［Miami News, January 30, 1959.］”, execution without due legal process was intolerable.

　Other countries, especially the United States, and the media strongly criticized this lack of legal process.

But Castro could not understand why. The following episode illustrates this gap in perception. To convince those outside Cuba, Castro invited foreign media to “the popular trial.” In front of his people and the foreign media, he said, “Did you see? A million Cubans agreed with it ［Cortman 2003: 145-149］”. In other words, Castro believed that if the legal process is inadequate or time consuming, justice may be “practiced”

outside the legal framework. Similar to Miró Cardona, the foreign media did not agree.

　Second, Miró Cardona left Cuba because of approaches to the Soviet Union. The Revolutionary government and the United States had gradually become estranged, primarily because of economic policies such as condemnation. Therefore, the Revolutionary government approached the Soviet Union; consequently, the Soviets began supplying oil to Cuba. Miró Cardona equated communism with a totalitarianism that steals liberty. He did not logically explain why a communist regime and the law could not coexist, but re- peatedly insisted that it was so, for instance, in his speech in 1958. Of course, the ideological conflict during the Cold War might have influenced him.

　After Miró Cardona resigned from his post as Cubaʼs prime minister, he served as Cubaʼs ambassador to Spain for some months. Upon returning to Havana, he found Cuban political situation profoundly changed^（29） According to his report, some students asked him to purge his University colleagues because they were not sufficiently revolutionary^（30）. According to the biography written by his daughter, he said,

“The ideological dissention between the governmentʼs object and my consciousness are insuperable

［López Mesa 2008］”, and left his homeland.

　Miró Cardona felt betrayed. But as American journalist Herbert Matthews^（31） said, Castro fulfilled some of his promises and broke others^（32）. The broken promises included the following: lack of elections, trials

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and lawmaking without a legal process, and policies beyond the legal framework. The platform of Castro and his anti-Batista government movement, the 26th of July movement （M-26-7）, comprised the exercise of the election and the respect for legal processes^（33）. However, in contrast with the Caracas Pact, Castroʼs platform included much more than legal process, such as land reform, education reform, and rent reduction. These promises were fulfilled―though of course, some of these parts were changed when Castro practiced. His platform provided for the distribution of farmland, but farmers organized into an agricultural cooperative to improve efficiency. His other policies, too, were as radical as those written in the platform.

Castro emphasized problems such as poverty over addressing issues such as el paredon, and he professed that the theory of democracy cannot save the hungry or cure the sick^（34）.

　López Fresquet, a cabinet member, observed, “The foreigner, especially the North American, put his emphasis on the legal aspects of the revolutionary trials.…The Cuban was interested in moral justice”^（35）. According to Castro and his associates, the principle behind the Revolutionary governmentʼs actions was moral and depended on the peopleʼs will. Moreover, Castro asked the peopleʼs will through “direct democracy,” as in the following:

　Do you approve of our having converted the headquarters of the old political police into a childrenʼs playground and of our having changed the old Army headquarters into a scholastic center that the children of Cuba so needed? （Exclamation of approval）

　…Do you approve of our having put the price of medicine within the reach of the people? （Exclama- tion of approval）［Castro 1959b］.

　That was Castroʼs definition of direct democracy, and he insisted on its legitimacy in the initial weeks of the Revolution: “One million Cubans have voted.…Democracy means respecting peopleʼs will.…We revo- lutionaries are strong now, not because we have all the English tanks, the Sherman, English planes…and thousands of arms. We are strong because we rely on public opinion, which is stronger than anything

［Castro 1983: 386-388］”. In this, “the people” Castro referred to included

　the six hundred thousand Cubans without work, who want to earn their daily bread honestly without having to emigrate from their homeland in search of a livelihood; the five hundred thousand farm laborers who live in miserable shacks, who work four months of the year and starve the rest, sharing their misery with their children, who donʼt have an inch of land to till and whose existence would move any heart not made of stone; the four hundred thousand industrial workers and laborers whose retirement funds have been embezzled, whose benefits are being taken away, whose homes are wretched quarters, whose salaries pass from the hands of the boss to those of the moneylender, whose future is a pay reduction and dismissal, whose life is endless work and whose only rest is the tomb ［Castro 1959b］.

　The Revolutionary government could benefit the national majority, namely, the poor, as Castro insisted, but it was the Cubansʼ idealization of José Martí that legitimized Castro. Martí and Castroʼs political ideas were not exactly the same. Martíʼs large amount of works could be cited and interpreted by any standpoint of Cuban patriots because his ideas were principally based on Latin-Americanism, equality, human rights and liberty, and it was only possible to focus on just some of them strongly. For example, Miró Cardona ad-

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mired Martíʼs ideas and interpreted them to accommodate his version of liberal democracy. Martí was rec- ognized as a national hero by the Cuban majority, but the interpretation of his ideas were very different.

　In his 1953 “History Will Absolve Me” speech, Castro cited Martíʼs message: “The man who abides by unjust laws and permits any man to trample and mistreat the country in which he was born is not an honor- able man.” In other words, Martíʼs stance that resisting an unjust law justifies policies and actions that are beyond the law legitimized Castroʼs violence and warfare against Batistaʼs illegitimate regime. This logic was also applied after the Revolution: The people have the right to resist interference with the Revolution.

Miró Cardona adhered to principle, even though it might not have immediately benefitted the people, because not respecting the legal system could lead to autocracy and then totalitarianism.

　Castro and Miró Cardona had the same goals for Cuba, such as land reform as planned in the 1940 Con- stitution. They differed in their methods for achieving these goals, and Cuban exiles in the United States regarded Miró Cardona as more liberal than did many upper- and middle-class Cubans.

IV．The United States

　The United States shared Miró Cardonaʼs principles of open elections and a legal system. However, he sometimes criticized the United States during the anti-Batista movement, such as for supplying arms to the Batista government until 1958. Miró Cardona believed that a democratic country must be faithful to its principles by not supporting an undemocratic country and instead aiding that countryʼs democratic forces.

　The Bay of Pigs Invasion was a typical example. Miró Cardona went into exile to Miami in October 1960.

By then, many anti-Castro Cuban exile groups had formed in Miami, including small groups as well as large armed groups. Upon his arrival in Miami, Miró Cardona was elected to formulate the platform and become the general leader of these groups. Naturally, diverse exile groups did not share these （Miroʼs）

ideas; some conservative groups opposed Cubaʼs land reform; others, although as liberal as Castro, had clashed with him. Miró Cardona was probably elected as leader because of his connections in Washington, his authority as a representative of the Cuban legal circle, and his relative neutrality.

　In Miami, Miró Cardona and the Cuban exiles prepared a unified anti-Castro organization, which included plans for a provisional government^（36）. In March 1961, the Cuban Revolutionary Council was founded, and soon, with CIA support, Cuban exile brigades invaded Cuba. Miró Cardona inspired the Cuban exiles to restore “liberty” to the island. He believed that the people would rise up against Castro if the brigade ar- rived in Cuba, commenting before the invasion that 85 percent of the Cuban people would support them^（37）. They were not soldiers hired by the United States as Castro claimed, but Cuban people who expected to return home, including Miró Cardonaʼs son.

　At the same time, he asked the United States to do all they could for them because the US is their alli- ance sharing the principle. Immediately before resigning as president of the council, he requested 50 million US dollars from the US government, asserting that the struggle against Castro was not only a Cuban affair but also an issue affecting the entire western hemisphere. He insisted that the Soviet Union contrib- uted a greater amount to Castro, and therefore the exiled Cuban Revolutionary Council should receive the amount mentioned above. After the failure of the invasion, he issued a long letter in which he complained that the United States did not provide sufficient help, even though President Kennedy stated that they would not abandon Cuba^（38）. However, Kennedy had never intended to provide support that included military action, although he and the US government sympathized with the Cuban exiles^（39）.

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　To summarize, Miró Cardona intended to make Cuba a desirable member of the western hemisphere, that is, a liberal democratic country with open elections and a legal system. At the same time, he imagined a Cuba that would be equal to or even better than the United States in that sense. Through such measures, Cubaʼs historical resentment toward the United States could be overcome.

　Despite his resignation as council president and his disappointment in the Cuban peopleʼs lack of support for the invasion, Miró Cardona continued the anti-Castro movement throughout his life. Although he noted that Castro “had done some good for the people,” admitting that Cubans accepted some of Castroʼs policies, the ideal of elections and a legal system always remained as supreme values for him.

　On the other hand, since his schooldays, Castro had considered the United States an enemy of his nation, an imperialist dominating Cuba. Such a perspective was not uncommon at the time, especially among the youth, while there were also those who longed for and respected the United States. Historically, Cu- bans harbored ambivalent feelings toward the United States^（40）. But after the Revolution, Castroʼs hostile remarks continually increased as the United States criticized the Revolutionary governmentʼs radical policies.

　For example, the United States condemned el paredon, executions without legal process, but Castro could not understand why they did it because the country had overlooked many of Batistaʼs illegal actions, especially the assassinations of citizens. Castro invited foreigners to his popular trial to obtain their trust;

he believed that they would understand if they witnessed the people agreeing with this form of justice.

　In addition, there were other issues that worsened relations between the two countries, particularly economic problems. Castro intended to improve poor peopleʼs standard of living; inevitably, this conflicted with the interests of US capitalism, since at the time, much US capital was invested in the Cuban economy.

Of course, the foreign investments were made legally, with rights of possession, and the United States protested violations of their property rights. Castro said to his people:

　If we plant rice, we interfere with foreign interests; if we produce lard, we interfere with foreign interests; if we produce cotton, we interfere with foreign interests, if we cut down the electric tariffs, we interfere with foreign interests; if we make a Petroleum Law, like the one which is about to be de- creed, we interfere with foreign interests［…］. They accuse us, trying to find some pretext to justify aggression against our country ［Castro 1959b］.

　Similar to how he justified measures beyond the law on the basis of Martíʼs message regarding the right to resist unjust laws, Castro justified the right to resist obstacles presented by foreign countries, especially the United States. The foreign capitalists criticized the lack of legal process in the Revolutionary govern- mentʼs policies and lawmaking. On the other hand, Castro criticized the capitalists for interfering with im- provements to lives of the poor and with reforms to address social problems. Gradually, Castroʼs accusa- tions intensified, and he accused them as “the imperialists” of causing the revolution. Moreover, he called the Bay of Pigs Invasion a US military invasion, even though President Kennedy opposed it. Nevertheless, the brigade of Cuban exiles was supported by the CIA. Thus, the two sides talked at cross-purposes.

　Castroʼs logic not only benefitted the people but also instilled in them self-confidence as Cubans. In 1960, the Declaration of San Jose was adopted in a foreign ministersʼ meeting of the Organization of American States, led by the United States. It criticized the Soviet Union and Chinaʼs intervention on the American continent, referring to Cuba. In response to the Declaration of San Jose, the First Declaration of Havana

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was adopted later that same year. I cite Castroʼs speech in April 1961, a comment on the Declaration of San Jose, to show how Castro described Cuba.

　Economic aggression was banned expressly, and yet our country was brutally attacked economically. Representatives of Latin American countries met at Costa Rica, and did not condemn the aggressor;

but there was a declaration against the victim. The powerful country had violated the law against economic aggression; but when the time came to condemn the shark, the sardines met and condemned the other sardine. But this sardine was no longer a sardine ［Castro 1961; Castro 1965: 108］.

　Cubaʼs hostile relationship with the United States helped form its national identity: small, but brave and resistant.

Conclusion

　By focusing on five points of comparison between Miró Cardonaʼs and Castroʼs ideas, this paper illustrates their relation with resentment. In conclusion, Castroʼs appeal to the Cuban people enabled the small, underdeveloped country to overcome its resentment toward the United States. Compared with Miró Car- donaʼs alternative ideas about Cubaʼs nationalism, the endurance of the Castro regime becomes more un- derstandable.

　The points of comparison included Miró Cardonaʼs and Castroʼs ideas regarding the following: 1） the Republic; 2） political philosophy and principles, including violence and nonviolence; 3） the Batista military regime; 4） the post-Revolution period; and 5） the United States. These points illustrate the relationship between leadersʼ political philosophy/nationalism, in this case Cuba, and the peopleʼs resentment of “better”

countries, in this case the United States.

　Miró Cardona embraced the concepts of liberal democracy. Accordingly, he opposed Batistaʼs illegal regime; however, he also opposed strategies of the anti-Batista movement that were outside the legal framework. After the Revolution, he remained opposed to policies that were not based on a legal system, although he said that Castro “had done some good for the people ［New York Times, January 21, 1961］”. As a liberal democratic global power, Miró Cardona requested a commitment from the United States―complete support to the side that respected law and election systems. He wanted Cuba to be an ideal, democratic member of the western hemisphere.

　In contrast, Castro considered the Republic as neocolonial and was oriented toward resolving Cubaʼs social problems, perhaps because of growing up around poor peasant families and because of his strong respect for José Martíʼs Latin Americanism. Castro had previously committed to solving social problems, but not to any political principle. During the anti-Batista struggle, the differences between Miró Cardona and Castro did not surface; they did so after the Revolution, during the process of policy making.

　Castro, eschewing liberal democracy and the United States, not only sought new principles for Cuba that were aligned with socialism but also turned resentment into renewed sense of self-confidence. That is, the people have the universal right to resist if the law or the governor is unjust. Moreover, this right precedes the law. Through this logic, the small island nation of Cuba acquired new nationalistic value.

　Therefore, Cubaʼs history conforms to Greenfeldʼs theory: resentment can be a positive motivator that turns resentment into new values that emphasize traditional and indigenous elements; in this case these elements are the revaluation of Cuba dating to ideas of José Martíʼs Cubanism and Latin-Americanism. And I mean transvaluation of values is the accommodation of these elements to the situation of Cuba at that

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time.

　This comparison, although it illustrates different political philosophies, cannot prove the causality of in- fluence. However, the emotional logic of “small, but brave and resistant” still strongly persists, for example, in the Non-Aligned Movement. As mentioned in the introduction, many researchers have studied why Cas- tro gained the peopleʼs support. This research presents a new possibility by comparing subsistent nationalistic ideas.

Bibliography

1．Speeches

Castro, Fidel. October 16, 1953.

http://www.marxists.org/history/cuba/archive/castro/1953/10/16.htm 　― February 6, 1959a.

http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1959/esp/f060259e.html.

　― October 26, 1959b.

http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1959/19591026.html.

　― April 23, 1961.

http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1961/19610423.html.

2．Books and articles

Neitzsche, Friedrich. 1983. Neitzsche Zensyu dai 3 kan （Tokyo: Hakusuisya） tanslated by Akiyama, Shigeo.

Aguilar, Luis E. 1972. Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution （Cornell University Press）.

Bonachea, Rolando E. and Valdés, Nelson P. 1972. Cuba in Revolution （New York: Anchor Books）. Castro, Fidel. 1965. Castro enzetsusyu （Tokyo: Shinnihon Syuppan） translated by Takahashi, Katsuyuki.

　― 1983. El pensamiento de Fidel Castro: selección temática （la Habana: Editorial Política）. Coltman, Leycester. 2003. The Real Fidel Castro （Yale University Press）.

CRC（Consejo Revolucionario Cubano）. 1960-1961. Comunicación al Dr. José Miró Cardona y relación de los an- teproyectos de ley, informes, documentos diversos y trabajos de propaganda （Miami: CRC）.

　― 1961a. Disposiciones transitorias a la constitución de 1940 para el gobierno provisional （Miami: CRC）. Cuesta Braniella, José María. 1997. La resistencia cívica en la guerra de liberación de Cuba （La Habana: Editorial de

Ciencias Sociales）.

Dimitrov, Martin. 2005. “Why communism didnʼt collapse: exploring regime resilience in China, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea and Cuba”. http://es.scribd.com/doc/6711499/Why-Comunism-Didnt-Collapse.

Domínguez, Jorge I. 1978. CUBA: Order and Revolution （Cambridge: The Belknap Press）.

Furiati, Claudia. 2003. Fidel Castro: la historia me absolverá （Barcelona: Random House Mondadori, S.A.）. Gellner, Ernest, 1983. Nations and Nationalism （Oxford: Blackwell Publishers）.

Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity （Harvard University Press）.

Guerra, Lillian. 2005. The Myth of José Martí: Conflicting Nationalisms in Early Twentieth-Century Cuba （Univer- sity of North Carolina Press）.

Huberman, Leo, and Sweezy, Paul M. 1960. Cuba Anatomy of a Revolution （New York: Monthly Review Press）. Johnson, Haynes. 1964. The Bay of Pigs: the Leaderʼs Story of Brigade 2506 （New York: Norton）.

Ibarra Guitart, Jorge. 2000. El fracaso de los moderados en Cuba （La Habana: Editora Política）.

　― 2003. Sociedad de Amigos de la República: historia de una mediación （La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias So- ciales）.

Lockwood, Lee. 1967. Castroʼs Cuba, Cubaʼs Fidel （New York: Macmillian）. López Mesa, Yolanda. 2008. Biografía del Dr. José Miró Cardona （unpublished）.

López Avalos, Martín. 2003. La clase política cubana o la historia de una frustración: las elites nacionalistas （Méxi-

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co, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno）.

Martí, José. 1973. Obras completas 1-27 （La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales）.

Matsushita Hirosi, Jo Hiroko （eds）. Latin America seiji to rekishi. Revised edition （Tokyo: Shinhyoron）. Matthews, Herbert L., 1969. Castro: A Political Biography （London: The Penguin Press）.

Miró Cardona, José. （n.d.）. Notas adicionales a mi curriculum vitae （n.p.）

　― 1958. La toga al servicio de la democracia （San Juan: Colegio de abogado de Puerto Rico）. 　― 1959. Dos discursos- día del abogado （Madrid: Embajada de Cuba, Departamento de Prensa）. 　― 1963. El Castrismo: un asesoramiento （San Germán: Universidad de inter Americana）. 　― 1974. Exaltación de José Martí （Santo Domingo: Editora Horizontes de America）.

Ramonet, Ignacio and Castro, Fidel and Hurley, Andrew. 2009. Fidel Castro: My Life: a Spoken Autobiography （New York: Scribner）.

Rice, Donaldo E. 1992. The Rhetorical Uses of the Authorizing Figure: Fidel Castro and José Martí （New York:

Praeger）.

Rojas, Rafael. 1998. Isla sin fin: contribución a la crítica del nacionalismo cubano （Miami: Ediciones Universal）. 　― 2000. José Martí : la invención de Cuba （Madrid: Editorial Colibrí）.

Robert Freeman （eds.）. 1979. Background to Revolution: The Development of Modern Cuba （New York: Robert E.

Krieger Publishing Company, inc.）.

Scheler, Max. 1961. Ressentiment （New York: Free Press of Glencoe） translated by Lewis A. Coser.

Smith, Anthony D. 1991. National Identity （London: Tuttle-Mori Agency Inc）. Sorensen, Theodore. 1965. Kennedy （New York: Harper & Row）.

Szulc, Tad. 1986. Fidel: a Ctirical Portrait （New York: Morrow）.

Thomas, Hugh. 1971. Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom （London: Eyre and Spottiswoode）.

Wright, Ann. 1998. “Intellectual of a Heroic Period of Cuban History, 1913-1923. The ʻCuba Contemporaneaʼ Group,”

Bulletin of Latin American Research, vol. 7, no. 1.

3．Newspapers and magazines New York Times, January 21, 1961.

Montreal Gazette, April 25, 1961.

Miami News, January 30, 1959.

Miró Cardona, José. 1961. “Mensaje del Dr. José Miró Cardona a los cubanos,” Bohemia, no. 58, p. 3.

　― 1963b. “Renuncia de José Miró Cardona ante el Consejo Revolucionario de Cuba,” The Miami News, April 19, 1963.

Acknowledgment

This research was made a presentation at 16th congress of International Federation for Latin American and Caribbe- an Studies, Turkey.

（1）Dimitrov, Martin. 2005. “Why communism didnʼt collapse: exploring regime resilience in China, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea and Cuba”. http://es.scribd.com/doc/6711499/Why-Comunism-Didnt-Collapse

（2）Koike, Yasuhiro. 2004. “Kyuba syakaisyugi no gendankai” in Matsushita Hirosi, Jo Hiroko （eds）. Latin Ameri- ca seiji to rekishi. Revised edition. （Tokyo: Shinhyoron）, p. 270.

（3）Neitzsche, Friedrich. 1983. Neitzsche Zensyu dai 3 kan （Tokyo: Hakusuisya） tanslated by Akiyama, Shigeo.

（4）Scheler, Max. 1961. Ressentiment （New York: Free Press of Glencoe） translated by Lewis A. Coser.

（5）Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity （Harvard University Press）, pp. 15-17.

（6）In this paper, I define nationalism as “political movement for national aims.” Miró Cardonaʼs ideas might seem patriotic rather than nationalistic, but after he became exiled, his movement aimed to “liberate” the nation, a national aim similar to independence or integration of the nation, which is defined by the concept I adopt. Miró Car-

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donaʼs ideas were based on coherent principles before and after the Revolution and his self-imposed exile; what was on the surface differed. Therefore, in this paper, I consider Miró Cardonaʼs concept of nationalism both before and after he became an exile.

（7）Although Miró Cardona represented nationalist ideas, he has not been extensively studied. He was neither a charismatic leader nor a philosopher who wrote significant works, such as Jorge Mañach. Moreover, he lost to Castro, and even though in Miami, he was blamed for the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, he could not main- tain his status as a hero. But to understand the common nationalist ideas of reformist conservative Cubans at the time, one need not focus on someone famous. As a representative of the largest alternative group, Cardonaʼs idea provides the most appropriate comparison with Castroʼs ideas.

（8）In this article, I mean Republic is the first republic from 1902 up to the 1959 revolution.

（9）The Cuban War of Independence escalated into the Spanish-American War. Consequently, Cuba was occupied for four years until 1902.

（10）Aguilar, Luis E. 1972. Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution （Cornell University Press）, p. 30; Wright, Ann. 1998.

“Intellectual of a Heroic Period of Cuban History, 1913-1923. The ʻCuba Contemporaneaʼ Group,” Bulletin of Latin American Research, vol. 7, no. 1.

（11）His father was originally a journalist and did not have the political or economic ambition that other veterans did after the war. He spent the remainder of his life writing books. Thus, Cardonaʼs family was not wealthy.

（12）Huberman, Leo, and Sweezy, Paul M. 1960. Cuba Anatomy of a Revolution （New York: Monthly Review Press）, pp. 3-10.

（13）Bonachea, Rolando E. and Valdés, Nelson P. 1972. Cuba in Revolution （New York: Anchor Books）, p. 132;

Coltman, Leycester. 2003. The Real Fidel Castro （Yale University Press）, p. 36; Szulc, Tad. 1986. Fidel: a Ctirical Portrait （New York: Morrow）, ch. 1-3.

（14）Matsushita, Marta. 2004. “Seiji sisou no ayumi” in Matsushita Hirosi, Jo Hiroko （eds）. Latin America seiji to rekishi. Revised edition. （Tokyo: Shinhyoron）, pp. 57-62; Wright, op. cit.

（15）Matthews, Herbert L. 1969. Castro: A Political Biography （London: The Penguin Press）, p. 145.

（16）He confessed it by himself at the interview with Lee Lockwood （Lockwood, Lee. 1967. Castroʼs Cuba, Cubaʼs Fidel （New York: Macmillian）, pp. 160-165） and the authors of Castroʼs major biographies like as Herbert Mat- thews, Claudia Furiati, Leycester Coltman indicate it, too.

（17）For Castro the more important principal than election was the right to resist unjust laws which was Jose Martiʼ s message. For example he insisted that because Batista got the power with violence, he had had to be ousted with violence （Szulc, op. cit., pp. 157-158）.

（18）Thomas, Hugh. 1971. Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom （London: Eyre and Spottiswoode）, p. 759; Coltman, op. cit., p. 51.

In addition, one of the excuses of Batistaʼs military coup dʼétat was the president and the governmentʼs corruption

（Thomas, op. cit., p. 784）.

（19）Miró Cardona, José. 1958. La toga al servicio de la democracia （San Juan: Colegio de abogado de Puerto Rico）.

（20）I define Reformist conservative group as those who criticized the politics at that time and drove for reform, but reform inside of the current social and law systems. In contrast Castroʼs group drove greater change beyond the current systems.

（21）One of his works is the first José Martí biography, Martí el Apostol.

（22）De la Torriente was a veteran of the War for Independence, who had served as ambassador, Minister of State, Foreign Minister, and senator. He had earlier retired because of his age, but was widely respected by the Cuban people.

（23）Almost all the opposition forces reached an agreement and made this pact in Caracas, Venezuela on July 1958.

Certainly Fidel Castro and Miró Cardona signed it.

（24）Bonachea, op. cit., pp. 147-149.

（25）Another smaller group led by Raul Castro, Fidel Castroʼs brother, attacked Bayamo.

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（26）López Mesa, Yolanda. 2008. Biografía del Dr. José Miró Cardona （unpublished）.

（27）Miró Cardona, José. （n.d.）. Notas adicionales a mi curriculum vitae （n.p.）, p. 5.

（28）Castro, Fidel. February 6, 1959. http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1959/esp/f060259e.html; Coltman, op. cit., pp. 147-148; Thomas, op. cit., p. 1084.

（29）Miró Cardona, （n.d.）, op. cit., p. 6.

（30）Milwaukee Sentinel, July 6, 1960; López Mesa, op. cit.

（31）He was a reporter with the New York Times who interviewed Castro since the guerrilla war and wrote books about Castro and the Cuban Revolution.

（32）Matthews, op. cit., pp. 118-121.

（33）For example, the Sierra Maestra Manifesto.

（34）Castro, Fidel. 1983. El pensamiento de Fidel Castro: selección temática （la Habana: Editorial Política）, p. 400.

（35）Matthews, op. cit., pp. 126-127.

（36）However, US law did not permit this.

（37）Miami News, October 23, 1962.

（38）Miró Cardona, José. 1963. El Castrismo: un asesoramiento （San Germán: Universidad de inter Americana）.

（39）Sorensen, Theodore. 1965. Kennedy （New York: Harper & Row）, p. 298.

（40）Aguilar, op. cit., p. 30; Wright, op. cit.