The Russian-Korean gas pipeline has raised many expectations, but so far has not shown much progress. Therefore, conventional research on the Russian-Korean gas pipeline has focused on the expected economic and political effects of the pipeline's completion.1) Numerous. That's because other Northeast Asian states have floated related alternative proposals as the Russian-Korean pipeline project stalled.
Furthermore, certain players in Russia have recently begun to express skepticism towards the Russian-Korean pipeline.
The Geopolitics of Competition and Conflict since the halt of the Russo-Korean Pipeline
An observation of the current situation raises expectations that improvements in inter-Korean relations will allow an easy restart for the Russian-Korean pipeline project. The Russian-Korean pipeline may have been a win-win strategy through mutual cooperation between South Korea, Russia and North Korea, but North Korea's foreign policy and political decisions put the possibility of such cooperation at risk of unraveling .
Chinese proposal for Russo-Sino-Korean gas pipeline cooperation
China’s gas strategy and Russia’s natural gas
China produced 94.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 2010, but consumed 110 billion cubic meters resulting in a deficit of 15.5 billion cubic meters.5) China is expected to produce 300-400 billion cubic meters of natural gas by 2020 consumption. , China continues multiple investments in Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan), Russia and Myanmar in order to safely meet its domestic demand for natural gas.6) At the same time, China has routed domestic natural gas pipelines through its "West to East" Gas Transport” project aimed at building infrastructure for its domestic natural gas. Recently, domestic and Central Asian pipelines running through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have been connected, partially achieving China's energy strategy goals in the natural gas sector. 7) Connections with Russian pipelines have yet to be completed.
Natural gas cooperation projects between the two states are said to be influenced by Russia's tradition of antagonizing China. Chinese natural gas projects include the 3,000 km long Altai gas pipeline, which connects western Xinjiang Uighur province and gas fields in western Siberia, which was agreed in 1996, and the Irkutsk Kovykta gas field project, which was stranded in 2003.9) The Altai gas pipeline has been idle over a longer period, while the Kovykta project, in which South Korea also participated, was scrapped by Russia and replaced by projects to connect the Sakhalin gas fields with South Korea and Japan. This shift was the result of Russia's Eastern Gas Program strategies, but can also be considered a result of Russian and Japanese anti-Chinese controls aimed at avoiding losing Siberian and Far Eastern natural gas to China.
66~67; On natural gas cooperation and conflict between Russia and China, see Chen, Jingquan and Yun, Shuming,. At the same time, Russia decided to supply natural gas to China from 2015 by ratifying the Agreement on the Construction of a Gas Pipeline and the Supply of Natural Gas to China. In addition, Russia's Gazprom and China's CNPC have agreed on the main working conditions for the supply of natural gas.
China’s new proposal: Russo-Sino-Korean pipeline cooperation without North Korea
The connection of the Russian-Korean pipeline could have complicated the acquisition of sufficient quantities of Russian gas. Harboring ambitions to gain a competitive advantage over Russian gas beyond the existing gas cooperation agreed with Russia, China feared that the activation of the Russian-Korean pipeline would cause damage. Such intentions came to light shortly after the Russian-Korean pipeline stalled.
China proposed a Russian-Sino (Shandong Peninsula) ˀGYellow Sea route as an alternative to the Russian-Korean pipeline project. The distance to Seoul is 380 km, which makes it shorter than the 700 km North Korean section of the Russian-Korean pipeline.11). This proposal was made during a meeting between China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) Chairman Jiang Jiemin and Korea National Oil Corporation CEO Kang Young-Won in August 2011.
Chairman Jiang, despite his position as a corporate executive, was one of the top 200 members of the Chinese Communist Party and an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, as well as the head of Petro China, the major energy firm. in China at that time. 11) "China makes a radical proposal by excluding North Korea from the Russian-Korean Gas Pipeline". lt; Figure 3> The Russian-Sino-Korean Pipeline proposed by China14). ministerial level) tasked with overseeing large state-owned enterprises under the Xi Jinping regime, has recently reaffirmed the Yellow Sea route.13) Furthermore, the Chinese proposal's high link with. Such examples show that Chinese interests are not favorable to the advancement of the Russian-Korean gas pipeline.
Likelihood of changes in Russia’s position
28. brought out the Russian-Korean pipeline to Korea and the Vladivostok LNG project in Japan to boost competition between the two states. In this regard, the Russian-Korean gas pipeline project may be nothing more than one of many options for Russia. Second, it is debatable whether the Russian-Korean pipeline still provides benefits to Russia today.
As North Korean risk and suspicions towards Korean capital escalate, the likelihood that Russia will choose a negative response to the Russian-Korean PNG project increases. If the construction of a natural gas liquefaction plant is confirmed on the assumption that a quick restart of the Russian-Korean PNG project was unrealistic due to North Korean risk, Russia will lose the incentive to restart the PNG project. 18). As the political nature of the Russian-Korean pipeline is strong while North Korean risk remains high, negative evaluations of major energy companies such as Gazprom are inevitable.
Nevertheless, if the early implementation of the Russian-Korean gas pipeline project fails and sufficient gas reserves are not obtained, Russia may favor the Japanese project as a realistic alternative. -Joong Yoon, “Energy Cooperation and Conflict in Northeast Asia: New Circumstances for Russian Gas Supply and the Russian-Korean PNG Project” (Korea Institute for the Advisory Council on National Unification, May 2013). From one perspective, Russia has sought cooperation on the Russian-Korean gas pipeline to increase its geopolitical and geoeconomic influence in gas negotiations against China.
Expansion of the Japanese factor
34 . by cooperating with Russia as part of a supply diversification policy.24) Japan has a complex attitude towards the Russian-Korean gas pipeline project. On the other hand, the pipeline is preferred over the Russian-Sino-Korean pipeline if it is considered as a countermeasure against China and a means for diversification of natural gas supply route. In this regard, the Russian-Korean gas pipeline project, seen from a practical Japanese perspective, can be treated as a secondary issue.
Nevertheless, it may still be better than the Russia-China-Korea pipeline project, taking into account the diversification of energy supply routes and anti-Chinese countermeasures. It is worth noting that the Russian-Korean gas pipeline project is important for Japan as a supply route for Russian natural gas. In this respect, the Russian-Korean gas pipeline can be seen as beneficial for Japan as a means of diversifying supply routes.
In order to gain energy by opposing China, it can be understood that the Russian-Korean pipeline is preferred over the Russian-Chinese-Korean pipeline project. Japanese enthusiasm for energy development with Russia, which has become particularly evident since the Fukushima accident, is alarming for the "time is on our side" view of the Russian-Korean pipeline. 39. disputes are resolved to some extent and pipeline links between Japan and Sakhalin materialize, South Korea may lose its leadership position to Japan as the Russian-Korean pipeline faces significant delays.
Internal conflicts in South Korea and the U.S. negative viewpoint
The Meaning and Role of the Russo-Korean Pipeline
Possibilities for New Cooperation
Catalyst for Northeast Asian energy cooperation
Under such circumstances, the Russian-Korean gas pipeline can become a catalyst for energy cooperation in Northeast Asia instead of another means of competing for energy security. Therefore, the construction of the Russian-Korean gas pipeline will be another favorable condition for the energy cooperation of Northeast Asia. On the other hand, if all countries in the region gain a stable supply route through the construction of the Russian-Korean gas pipeline, multilateral energy cooperation such as the following will become more likely.
Therefore, if multilateral energy cooperation were achieved through the construction of the Russian-Korean gas pipeline, the bargaining power against Russia, which maximizes economic profit, would increase. In the long term, it will be possible to envisage a project of a gas pipeline connection of Northeast Asia, similar to the form of ASEAN energy cooperation. The Russian-Korean gas pipeline can also become a means for South Korea to lead energy cooperation in Northeast Asia.
Thus, if South Korea builds the Russian-Korean gas pipeline and complements it by obtaining a long-term supply contract with Russia, it can play a positive role in creating a regional energy cooperation mechanism. Therefore, if the Russian-Korean gas pipeline is built, energy cooperation with Japan can only be pushed forward. Beyond Energy Cooperation: Catalyst for Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative and the Trust Building Process on the.
Beyond energy cooperation: Catalyst for Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative and the Trust-building Process on the
In this situation, President Park Geun-hye's Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative aims to soften Northeast Asia's bilateral conflict structure into a structure of multilateral mutual cooperation and interweave it with Eurasian cooperation to build trust and to promote economic cooperation on the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast. Asia. The country then seeks to organize a "senior-level conference for peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia" and promote the institutionalization of peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia.47). This is mainly because the Russian-Korean pipeline project involves North Korea, the key factor of tensions in Northeast Asia.
Guidelines for the Park Administration's North Korea Policy," (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2013), p. While still a presidential candidate, President Park pointed out through an article in the Wall Street Journal that a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula achieved through the resolution of inter-Korean mistrust and confrontation is important to ease the tensions in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, the energy cooperation between South Korea and Russia will be the driving force behind the realization of the Northeast Asia peace and cooperation initiative through middle power diplomacy. North-South (longitudinal) cooperation with Russia through the Russo-Korean pipeline will thus be a force to resist east-west (latitudinal) pressure between the US and China, while North Korea will be included in Northeast Asia's regional integration to relieve regional security risk.53).
If North Korea abandons its current policy of economic subordination to China and politico-economic conflict with the United States to attempt geopolitical cooperation with Korea and Russia, the structure of the conflict in Northeast Asia cannot be eased. If this opportunity for energy cooperation is lost, while political and military conflicts between regional countries remain unresolved, peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia will become distant goals. As a non-conventional security issue and a medium for multilateral economic cooperation, the pipeline is a catalyst for a peace and cooperation initiative in Northeast Asia and for confidence building.
