International Journal of Social Science Research (IJSSR) eISSN: 2710-6276 | Vol. 5 No. 1 [March 2023]
Journal website: http://myjms.mohe.gov.my/index.php/ijssr
THE DILEMMA OF RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY: EVIDENCE FROM AN
EXPERIMENTAL VIGNETTE STUDY
Yang Yu1 and Nur Ajrun Khalid2*
1 2 School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, MALAYSIA
*Corresponding author: [email protected]
Article Information:
Article history:
Received date : 27 February 2023 Revised date : 17 March 2023 Accepted date : 23 March 2023 Published date : 30 March 2023 To cite this document:
Yu, Y., & Khalid, N. A. (2023).THE DILEMMA OF RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT AND
ACCOUNTABILITY: EVIDENCE FROM AN EXPERIMENTAL VIGNETTE STUDY.International Journal of Social Science Research, 5(1), 216-230.
Abstract: Even though results-based management (RBM) of the New Public Management (NPM) is not widely regarded as the ideal area to be implemented in China, in actuality, the leadership of the reform era introduced cadre management ideas infused with RBM, commensurate with the deployment of various market mechanisms in the economy. However, with the intensification of China's market-oriented reform, the actual implementation of this strategy appears to be ineffective, even though it could make officials more accountable in the short term but harm the efficiency of government organizations in the long term. Grassroots officials, for example, are subjected to different accountability pressures that result in diverse or even more conflicting objectives that are likely to inhibit an increase in government productivity. Through the association between RBM and the literature on cadre management in China, specifically the "hold-to- account" system of cadre accountability, as well as the connection between RBM and accountability, this article explores the surprising results and managerial dilemma that the Chinese government faces when implementing the RBM framework. Based on an experimental vignette study conducted in China, this research also examines how bureaucrats respond to the different accountability targets of upper-level officials and local citizens and how the intensity of such responsibility influences their responses.
Keywords: Results-Based Management, New Public Management, China, Experimental Vignette Study.
1. Introduction
Researchers have noted problems with RBM that are specific to NPM countries (the UK, Australia, and New Zealand), such as the tension between bureaucrats' autonomy and ministerial control (Maor, 1999), a lack of objectivity in performance evaluations, and account attribution (Nielsen & Moynihan, 2016) (Olsen, 2015) (Pollitt, 2006), and overall skepticism about whether RBM as a corporate management philosophy could, even with supplements, function well in the public management sector (Hood, 1991). Remarkably, as several experts have pointed out, it is not the supremacy of the old public management, which was defined by rule-following and tight management discipline, but rather the absence of these traits that contributes to the overall poor performance of NPM reforms in developing countries (Sarker, 2006) (Manning, 2001). In contrast, China's system exemplifies how a long-standing authoritarian structure can facilitate the adoption of NPM reforms within a developmental goal. China's RBM works well and has successfully produced enormous economic growth and infrastructure construction. However, the results-based personnel management reforms have yet to eliminate implementation problems. In other words, is that evidence that the success of RBM can be attributed to some hidden traits of China's authoritarian institutions?
Moreover, the other question focuses on whether it is generally appropriate for local China to implement RBM performance evaluation in all situations.
2. Literature Review
In the 1990s, the term "results-based management" first appeared. It derives from concepts such as management by results and management by objectives, which have been prevalent in various policy sectors since the 1960s. RBM was widely implemented in many aid organizations as a "management strategy aiming at accomplishing significant changes in the way government agencies work, with enhancing performance (getting better results) as the major focus" (Binnedjikt, 2000). The central idea was that collecting performance data would allow for external stakeholder accountability reporting and internal management learning and decision-making, including delegation and participative management. The idea implies that RBM would allow employees and teams to devise methods for achieving outcomes. Literature abounds that, with RBM as a management philosophy, approach, and set of tools designed to improve both management effectiveness and accountability, an agency should (Batliner, Felber, & Günther, 2011) Bester, 2012) (Binnendijk, 2000) (Ika, 2009) (Meier, 2003) (Vahamaki, 2011):
⚫ Specify desired outcomes regarding SMART (specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound) objectives.
⚫ Establish causal relationships between the intervention's primary goals (results or impact), sub-goals (strategic goals or outcomes), further sub-goals (intermediate results or outputs), and actions (inputs or resources).
⚫ Allocate resources and organize daily operations by the activities and objectives.
⚫ Create metrics for each level of objectives and actions. Specify "means of verification"
and "sources/methods of data collection" for measuring performance against the indicators.
⚫ Periodically conduct evaluation studies and routinely collect data for assessing the performance of interventions and staff. The evaluation examines the performance and impact of interventions in a broader context than monitoring. The purpose of the review is also to draw lessons for future planning.
The Chinese bureaucracy has been constructed to assure the effective implementation of top- down policies to a significant extent: the authority structure is based on upward accountability, with personnel and career development decisions firmly in the hands of higher authorities. To ensure successful policy implementation, reviews, inspections, and performance evaluations of subnational leaders and organizations are frequent and thorough.
The central government has tightened its bureaucratic grip on local officials in a series of recent administrative reforms by implementing new regulations, civil service procedures, and incentive schemes; local officials' performance is evaluating using criteria established by higher authorities; unsurprisingly, the most urgent and primary objective for chief officials is to satisfactorily complete the tasks and accomplish the objectives established by the supervising agencies. Those who do not reach their goals are viewed as incompetent and may face responsibility, stagnant career advancement, or even relegation (Zhou, 2013). Under these conditions, we anticipate local officials to be exceptionally responsive to goals and orders imposed by higher authorities. According to substantial organizational research, this starkly contrasts the classic Weberian bureaucracy characterized by rules and procedures and the logic of appropriateness (March 1994). According to (Pierre & Peters, 2017), public service motivation (PSM) in the public sector enables public institutions to foster and maintain prosocial and altruistic values. Experiments conducted in Indonesia (Banuri & Keefer, 2013) reveal that civil officials with prosocial preferences tend to devote more effort to prosocial duties. Thus, it is acceptable to hypothesize, based on the literature:
⚫ H1: Everything else being equal, grassroots officials are more likely to put forth maximum effort when a task is consistent with citizens' interests.
⚫ H2: Grassroots officials with a higher PSM are more inclined to devote effort to a task that is in the citizens' best interests.
On the other hand, accountability has frequently been employed to regulate, correct, and control public agents by compelling them to explain and defend their behaviour to accountability holders. Ex ante and ex post accountability help maximize bureaucrats’ efforts.
(Bovens, 2007) (Schillemans, 2016). Nonetheless, does this compel bureaucrats to work harder? Where numerous accountability mechanisms exist, they do not necessarily complement one another and may place diverse or contradictory expectations on cadres, particularly at lower levels (Flinders, 2011). Ideally, top-down and bottom-up accountability expectations should be aligned so that lower-level officials can implement policies efficiently.
In reality, however, this is not always the case. Since top officials and politicians may lack familiarity with local realities and a complete understanding of public preferences, the policy priorities determined by upper-level officials may not always be in the best interests of local inhabitants (Hawkins, 2006). As bureaucratic agents, grassroots officials are answerable to their superiors in the organisational hierarchy; nevertheless, public servants are liable for what occurs to local inhabitants (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). In order to manage the many expectations of various stakeholders while still upholding professional norms, grassroots officials may find themselves caught in an increasingly dense "web" of multiple accountabilities demand (Romzek & Ingraham, 2000), which means officials are frequently stuck between top-down and bottom-up accountability.
Moreover, the Chinese bureaucracy has been constructed to assure the effective implementation of top-down policies to a significant extent: the authority structure is based on upward accountability, with personnel and career development decisions firmly in the hands of higher authorities. To ensure successful policy implementation, reviews, inspections,
and performance evaluations of subnational leaders and organizations are frequent and thorough. The central government has tightened its bureaucratic grip on local officials in a series of recent administrative reforms by implementing new regulations, civil service procedures, and incentive schemes; local officials' performance is evaluated using criteria established by higher authorities (11); unsurprisingly, the most urgent and primary objective for chief officials is to satisfactorily complete the tasks and accomplish the objectives established by the supervising agencies. Those who fail to meet their objectives are considered incompetent and may face increased responsibility and stagnant career advancement. Scholars contend that overly stringent accountability may send a negative signal to bureaucrats and are likely to crowd out their intrinsic motivation, and this has been referred to as the "crowding- out effect" (Frey & Jegen, 2001) (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Scholars argue that public sector officials are generally prosocial and are motivated to serve the public more by intrinsic reward than extrinsic control (Perry, 2000) (Banuri & Keefer, 2013). The bureaucrats are subjected to accountability pressure. The crowing-out effect may influence their performance more than the disciplining effect. That is, it is possible that if a task is in the interest of citizens, the intensification of accountability may not necessarily increase bureaucratic effort because the crowding-out effect is more significant than the disciplining effect:
⚫ H3: When a task is aligned with citizens’ interests, intensified accountability may be counterproductive and lead to the reduced bureaucratic effort.
⚫ H4: When a task is matched with citizen interests, increased accountability tends to crowd out grassroots officials with higher PSM.
Problem Statement
The extensive literature has concentrated chiefly on accountability per se, including its controversial definitions, typologies, and debatable repercussions (Yang, 2012). Although some studies have noted the incongruence between different accountability expectations (Romzek & Ingraham, 2000) and the resulting problems, such as bureaucratic dysfunction and mismanagement (Koppell, 2005), bureaucrats are typically viewed as passive in response to accountability demands. Little consideration has been given to how local officials may react to such demands. The significance of personal preferences, motivations, and value judgements in molding grassroots officials' responses to varied expectations and accountability intensity has yet to be thoroughly examined. This research aims to address and try to cover these gaps by analyzing officials' responses to top-down pressures in order to gain a more profound knowledge of policy execution at the local level.
3. Method
Survey Experiment: An Experimental Vignette Study
This study conducts a survey experiment to investigate how local officials in China respond to contradictory expectations from their superiors and the local citizens. Utilizing an experimental design in opinion polls presents the following advantages (Hvidman &
Andersen, 2016) (Bullock, Imai, and Shapiro 2011) (Schillemans, 2016):
⚫ Identifying more precise causal effects by isolating the influence of confounding variables.
⚫ When direct questions are likely to elicit response biases (i.e., when respondents are inclined to lie), these survey experiments provide alternatives to asking direct questions.
⚫ They are cost-effective, can be implemented rapidly and iteratively, and may be incorporated into large-scale online surveys because they do not require in-person contact to implement. Thus, a researcher can rapidly arrange a series of online survey trials to learn about the mechanisms underlying the treatment effect.
In an experiment, participants are randomly assigned to at least two experimental conditions, and the researcher subsequently treats each condition differently. To determine the causal effects of explanatory variables on dependent variables, the researcher can assume that the only difference across conditions is the change in treatment due to random assignment (Hvidman & Andersen, 2016). As a result, this study employs a between-subjects randomized survey experiment in which each respondent is assigned to only one treatment or vignette (Charness, 2012). This design was chosen due to two factors. First, social psychology, personality, and decision-making studies may consider using a between-subjects design (Keren & Lewis, 2014). Second, exposing respondents to a single treatment diminishes the likelihood that they will comprehend the purpose of the experiment and choose the most desirable answer, which leads to biased results.
Experimental Vignette Design
Vignettes incorporate explanatory factors into describing scenarios that should be realistic to respondents. It is a "brief, well-prepared description of a person, item, or circumstance representing a systematic collection of attributes" (Atzmüller & Steiner, 2010). Experimental vignette methodology is especially beneficial when researchers must exercise control over independent factors to acquire evidence of causality (Christopher, 1999). Table 1 displays the experimental design of this investigation. The design manipulates the setting for the two explanatory factors: target and accountability. The vignettes vary regarding whether supervisors' and locals' targets for a given work are convergent or divergent, as well as the level of hierarchical accountability. The experiment has a 2 (target: convergent, divergent) by 3 (accountability: low, moderate, high) factorial design and hence specifies six (vignette) experimental conditions.
Table 1: Six Vignettes for the Experimental Design Explanatory
Factor Accountability
Target
Level Situation
High (1) Moderate (2) Low (3)
Clear / Convergent
(1)
Clear target + high accountability (V1)
Clear target + moderate accountability (V3)
Clear target + low accountability (V5) Conflicting /
Divergent (2)
Conflicting target + high accountability
(V2)
Conflicting target + moderate accountability
(V4)
Conflicting target + low accountability
(V6)
Because participants come from different government positions and have unique experiences, they possess administrative competence in various fields. Consequently, these vignettes were made universal and applicable to any respondent. The entire scenario was based on the supposition that "your superiors have requested you take control of a specific task." After reading the scenario, respondents are asked how much work they are willing to invest in completing the task. A 5-point Likert scale is used to assess because it provides respondents with a manageable set of options: two positives, two negatives, and one neutral.
⚫ In vignette 1, the task benefits citizens and is aligned with the target. The accountability intensity is high in this section, your upper-level supervisors conduct intense monitoring and frequent inspections of the work, you will be punished severely if you make a mistake.
⚫ In vignette 2, a scenario in which the task does not benefit citizens and might even have some adverse effects on them, as well as with a high level of responsibility, stringent supervision, and frequent inspections, if you make a mistake, you will be punished severely.
⚫ In vignette 3, activity is helpful to citizens and aligned with the target. But, the intensity of accountability is moderate, meaning that your superiors apply moderate monitoring and offer moderate rewards or punishments based on the task's success or failure.
⚫ In vignette 4, a circumstance in which the task does not benefit citizens and even negatively influences them. However, it has moderate accountability and offers modest rewards or punishments based on its success or failure.
⚫ In vignette 5, this task benefits citizens and aligns with the target, but your supervisors impose little inspection and few checks on the task's process and outcomes. There are also few rewards or punishments for performance.
⚫ In vignette 6, the intensity of hierarchical accountability is low, but it portrays a situation in which the work does not benefit citizens and even has adverse effects on them.
3.1 Materials
Although bureaucratic deviations from the logic of appropriateness are widely observed in other market societies, these fundamental characteristics differ significantly in the Chinese bureaucracy, which is organized along hierarchical lines to facilitate the implementation of policies and directives established by higher authorities. This bureaucracy is distinguished primarily by its emphasis on RBM. This does not imply, however, that behaviours prompted by the logic of obtaining RBM goals are necessarily coherent with the intentions of the original policy. Consequently, the comprehensive comprehension of the accountability indicator system assists in the identification of critical analytical variables and is essential for the design of the following experiments.
The signing of target pledges of responsibility between responsible subjects at various levels is a crucial component of the "responsibility system of RBM" in China, which implies that each responsible subject must first break down and refine the overall objective defined by the central level government or the governments at higher levels, create an index system as the foundation for evaluating and awarding local governments or departments, and then form a documented "responsibility pledge letter." Even though the objective local accountability system might take on various forms, the underlying framework and index remain similar.
Therefore, the following performance targets on responsibility have been chosen as examples of the critical elements of the goal responsibility system, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Performance Targets of Results-Based Management in Jingbian County Items Performance Targets Points Responsible Supervision
Organization(s)
Comprehensive Targets
（20%）
Party building 3 Party Organization Department
Anti-corruption and building a clean
government* 3 Office of Discipline Inspection
Commission Propaganda and civilization work 3 Propaganda Department Maintaining comprehensive social
security* 3 Commission of Political and Legal
Affairs
Safety production* 3 Bureau of Supervision on Safety
Production
Handling mass complaints 3 Bureau of Complaints
Family planning* 4 Bureau of Family Planning
Economic Targets
（60%）
Construction of cultivated lands and
water resources 6 Bureau of Water Resources
Agricultural production 6 Agricultural Bureau
Technical training for young peasants 3 Bureau of Rural Work Forest construction and forbidding
grazing on hillsides* 6 Forestry Bureau
Grass planting, livestock raising and
animal quarantine 6 Bureau of Raising Domestic
Livestock
Non-public economic development 3 Bureau of Managing Township Enterprises
Labor export 2 Labor Bureau
Healthcare 3 Healthcare Bureau
Education 2 Education Bureau
Management on asset liabilities 3 Financial Bureau
Key projects funded by higher-level
governments 10 Bureau of Economic Development
Key projects invested by the county 5 Bureau of Economic Development Key projects funded by townships 5 Financial Bureau
Others
（18%）
Normal performance and periodical
assessment 5 _
Democratic assessment by supervisors 5 _
Democratic assessment by
subordinates 3 _
Comprehensive assessment by the
County Party Committee 5 _
*These targets have veto power, which means that one vote cancels out all other positive votes.
Source: Jingbian County Party Committee and County Government. Internal Document
3.1.1 Samples
The sample size for this study was determined based on the statistical power analysis, which estimates the number of participants required to detect a significant effect to ensure that it is sufficient to detect the hypothesized effects. The power analysis was conducted using G*Power software. Six hundred respondents were invited to participate in the study, and 472 completed the survey. The sample size was sufficient to achieve a 95% confidence level with a margin of error of ± 4.5%.
The respondents were all selected students currently enrolled as part-time MPA or MBA students in Chinese universities while serving as full-time government officials. The advantage of this approach is that it could provide access to an extensive number of civil servants with diverse backgrounds working in various government positions. The Chinese government has a strict hierarchical structure with a heavy workload transmitted downward to county and township officials, intended to serve as a liaison between the upper administrative levels and the public (Heberer, 2019). Even though the majority of these survey
respondents hold relatively low administrative positions, they nonetheless retain discretionary power in local affairs.
3.1.2 Procedures
This experimental vignette design data collection procedure consists of the following steps:
Formulate the research question, design the vignettes, pilot-test the vignettes, select the participants, administer the vignettes, collect the data, and interpret the results. The sample size for each group is determined using R and a power analysis based on Cohen's (1988) criterion. We utilized the G*Power software tool in R with a minimum detectable effect size of 0.25, a significance level of 0.01, and a statistical power of 0.9. This study accounted for potential non-response and attrition rates when calculating the sample size. The result implies that the minimum sample size for each vignette should be 60. Based on this calculation and the premise that respondents were randomly allocated a questionnaire embedded with one of the six vignettes, this study contacted around 598 public officials and collected 475 valid questionnaires, of which 79 included Vignette 1, 72 included Vignette 2, 84 included Vignette 3, 73 included Vignette 4, 77 included Vignette 5, and 90 included Vignette 6, all of which met the minimal sample size requirement. The samples were drawn from nine cities in Guangdong Province, including Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Foshan, Huizhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Jiangmen, and Zhaoqing, with 44% male and 56% female respondents.
This study evaluated a priori hypotheses, and comparisons were made between subjects.
Respondents will be randomly assigned to one of six scenarios (HA + CT, HA + DT, MA + CT, MA + DT, LA + CT, LA + DT) using a structured (self-report) questionnaire. After reading the scenario, they will be asked to decide based on the information provided, and their choice will be recorded. The data will be analyzed statistically to assess the relationship between accountability intensity and bureaucrats' responses to conflicting targets (expectations) among China's government officials. Unavoidably, a prevalent problem with self-report questionnaires is social desirability bias. Respondents may overstate "positive"
behavior and intentions while understating "negative" ones. It is, therefore, essential to make respondents feel at ease about sharing their views. In this survey, respondents were reassured that the questionnaire was anonymous so that they could express potentially sensitive attitudes without being identified as holding those attitudes, that their responses would not be classified as correct or incorrect, and that the information collected would be kept strictly confidential and used solely for academic purposes. It was also stressed in the questionnaire that the vignettes were hypothetical general scenarios and did not target any organizations or individuals. Overall, the experimental vignette methodology is an innovative approach that enables researchers to manipulate critical factors in a controlled setting, providing a rigorous and systematic way to explore complex research questions and better comprehend the complex interplay between policy, behavior, and outcomes in the context of results-based management and accountability in China. By methodically designing and performing the study, we may acquire valuable insights into the obstacles and opportunities presented by these policies and develop more efficient methods for achieving their goals.
3.1.3 Variables
This study includes PSM as a moderating variable to examine the interconnections among PSM, accountability intensity and targets in affecting the motivations and preferences of grassroots officials. In addition to shedding insight into treatment effects, experiments can also analyze the interaction between treatment variables and relevant individual-difference factors (Iyengar, 2011). Moreover, control variables include personal demographic factors such as gender, age, and administrative rank. Table 3 describes the key variables:
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Pertinent Variables.
No. Variables Respondents Minimum Maximum Means
1 Target/ expectation 475 1 2 1.60
2 Accountability 475 1 3 2.43
3 PSM 475 1 5 3.92
4 Gender 475 0 1 0.56
5 Age 475 1 5 1.83
6 Administrative rank 475 1 5 1.89
Code: Target (Clear / Convergent = 1, Conflicting / Divergent = 2). Accountability intensity (low = 1, moderate
=2, high =3). PSM (strongly disagree =1, disagree =2, neither agree nor disagree =3, agree =4, strongly agree
= 5). Gender (male = 0, female = 1). Age (≤30 = 1, 31–35 = 2, 36–40 = 3, 41–45 = 4, 46–50 = 5). Administrative rank (section staff = 1, deputy section grade = 2, section grade = 3, deputy division grade = 4, division grade = 5).
3.2 Data Analysis
The corresponding means for the six vignettes are displayed in Figure 1. When a task aligns with citizens' interests, the average scores for respondents' efforts are 4.09 for high accountability intensity, 4.47 for moderate accountability intensity, and 4.21 for low accountability intensity. When a task deviates from citizens' interests, the effort scores for high, moderate, and low accountability intensity are 3.97, 3.30, and 3.28, respectively. The implication is that respondents who confront a clear target from citizens and superiors are more motivated to exert effort than those who face conflicting targets. Considering the level of accountability intensity, respondents exert the most effort (4.47 scores) on a task when it matches the targets of supervisors and citizens, and the level of accountability intensity is moderate. They exert the least effort (3.28 points) when the work does not fit citizens' demands, and the accountability intensity is minimal.
Figure 1: Description of the Six Vignettes' Individual Means
The descriptive results of the statistical tests conducted on the six vignettes based on the variation of the two factors are presented in Table 4. The results of the t-test indicate that respondents are willing to put forth more effort if the task is aligned with the citizens' targets (t = 11.08, p < 0.01). No matter whether the level of accountability intensity is present—high, moderate, or low—respondents are more inclined (p < 0.01) to exert effort to complete a task when it is for the best benefit of residents than when it is not.
Table 4: Distinctions Between Clear and Divergent Targets
This study used OLS regression methods to examine the impact of a target, accountability intensity, and their interaction on grassroots officials' efforts. Table 5 presents the results. Target is a dummy variable showing whether the work aligns with or conflicts with citizens' interests. In contrast, accountability intensity is a ranking variable reflecting the level of accountability imposed by superiors. Model 1 contains the independent variables. Model 2 includes both independent and control variables. Model 3 covers the interaction terms between the explanatory variables. Models 4 and 5 represented the effort under "clear target"
and "divergent target," respectively. The results of the regression reveal that along with the interaction variables, the coefficients of the target and their corresponding interactions with accountability intensity and PSM have significant effects.
Table 5: Results of Regression for Effort Effort
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Target/ expectation -0.53***
(0.06)
-0.53***
(0.06)
Accountability 0.10**
(0.04) -0.08 (0.05) -0.11**
(0.05)
0.27 (0.06) PSM 0.10***
(0.04)
0.13***
(0.04)
0.23***
(0.05)
0.23***
(0.05)
-0.02 (0.05) Gender -0.06
(0.06)
-0.04 (0.06)
-0.01 (0.06)
-0.13 (0.08)
0.07 (0.09) Age -0.03
(0.04)
-0.01 (0.03)
0.00 (0.03)
0.04 (0.06)
0.01 (0.04) Administrative rank -0.08*
(0.05)
-0.06 (0.05)
-0.05 (0.05)
-0.07 (0.06)
-0.06 (0.07) Interaction Effects (Combine)
Target*
Accountability
0.38***
(0.08)
Target** PSM -0.22***
(0.07) Accountability*
PSM
0.01 (0.04)
0.05 (0.06)
-0.03 (0.07) Adj R-squared 0.050 0.151 0.164 0.066 0.080 Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed test)
HA MA LA Overall CT 4.09 4.47 4.21 4.26 DT 3.97 3.30 3.28 3.52 D-value 0.15 0.84 0.72 0.65
t-test 2.26 10.90 7.48 11.08 p-value 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
To further investigate the specific effect of the three levels of accountability intensity on the effort of grassroots officials, Table 6 within that study treats the former as a categorical variable. In Models 6 and 7, the targets of citizens and superiors are clear. In the two models, moderate and high accountability intensities, respectively, serve as the reference group.
Model 6 demonstrates that respondents with low (β= 0.27, p < 0.01) or high (β= 0.52, p <
0.01) accountability intensity are more likely to exert less effort on a task than those with moderate accountability intensity.
Table 6: The Outcomes of Regression at Three Effort Levels Under Both Clear and Divergent Targets Effort Under CT Effort Under DT
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Gender -0.12
(0.08)
-0.12 (0.08)
0.06 (0.09)
0.06 (0.09) Age 0.01
(0.05)
0.01 (0.05)
0.01 (0.04)
0.01 (0.04) Administrative rank -0.05
(0.06)
-0.05 (0.06)
-0.09 (0.06)
-0.09 (0.06)
PSM 0.33***
(0.07)
0.20***
(0.08)
-0.06 (0.09)
-0.01 (0.10) High Accountability -0.52***
(0.10)
0.38***
(0.12)
Moderate Accountability 0.52***
(0.10)
-0.38***
(0.12) Low Accountability -0.27***
(0.10)
0.29***
(0.11)
-0.20*
(0.12)
-0.58***
(0.12) High Accountability * PSM -0.15*
(0.08)
0.04 (0.14)
Moderate Accountability * PSM 0.15*
(0.08)
-0.04 (0.14) Low Accountability * PSM -0.23**
(0.10)
-0.10 (0.11)
0.13 (0.13)
0.08 (0.13) Adj R-squared 0.153 0.153 0.058 0.058 Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
4. Results and Discussion
4.1 The Impact of Conflicting or Divergent Targets
Model 3 indicates that when all other variables are held constant, there is a negative relationship between grassroots officials' targets and the effort expended on a given task (β=
0.53, p < 0.01). In other words, if the task meets the citizens' targets, officials' effort will increase by 0.53 points (on a 5-point scale) compared to if it does not. Hence, Hypothesis 1 is supported. Moreover, the interaction between the target and PSM is significantly associated with effort (β= 0.22, p < 0.01), demonstrating that the effect of a target on effort is amplified when respondents have a high PSM, as revealed by Model 3. In particular, when a task aligns with citizens' targets, respondents with a high PSM are likely to exert more effort than those with a low PSM. Thus, hypothesis 2 is verified. A possible reason is that respondents with a higher PSM are more concerned with the target of citizens than those with a lower PSM.
4.2 The Impact of Accountability Intensity Levels
In Model 3, accountability intensity's impact on effort is not statistically significant (β= - 0.08, p > 0.1) when evaluated as a ranked variable. However, its interaction with the target is strongly associated with effort (β= 0.38, p < 0.01), indicating that the influence of accountability intensity on effort depends on whether the task is aligned with citizens' targets.
Consequently, this study further investigates the impacts of accountability intensity on officials' efforts in Models 4 and 5 under clear and diverging targets. In Model 4, the link between responsibility intensity and effort has negative statistical significance (β= -0.11, p <
0.05) when the task is aligned with citizens' targets but a positive and statistically significant association (β= 0.27, p < 0.01) when it is not. This indicates that when the task is matched with the targets of the citizens, a higher level of accountability intensity results in less effort by officials, demonstrating a crowding-out effect. When a task benefits citizen, and responsibility intensity grows from low to moderate, respondents with high PSM are likely to put in more effort than those with low PSM, as shown in Figure 4. The interaction in Model 6 is significant (β = 0.23, p < 0.05), indicating that modest accountability has a crowding-in effect. However, when accountability intensity increases from moderate to high, those with a high PSM are likely to make less effort than those with a low PSM. This significant interaction (β = −0.15, p < 0.1) in Models 6 and 7 confirms that high accountability intensity has a crowding-out impact, which is why hypotheses 3 and 4 are somewhat supported. Models 6 and 7 show an intriguing discovery regarding PSM that respondents with higher PSM are more inclined to work hard on a task when it aligns with citizens' targets. This association is statistically insignificant when the task conflicts with citizens' targets, as shown in Models 8 and 9. This may be the result of bureaucrats feeling unsure of their position when confronted with contradictory expectations from citizens and superiors.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we explored how local public officials respond to different levels of accountability intensity when facing clear and divergent targets from supervisors and citizens.
We identify four significant findings.
⚫ First, when a task is aligned with citizens' targets, officials with high PSM are more concerned about whether their tasks match the public target and less inclined to accept top-down instructions passively. Under higher accountability pressure, however, grassroots officials might become less focused on whether a task is the apparent target of citizens and more likely to obey their superiors to avoid punishment blindly.
⚫ Second, when a task's targets are matched with those of the citizens, moderate accountability intensity is the most effective strategy to motivate officials and increase their prosocial value. However, excessive responsibility may stifle their inherent desire.
⚫ Third, the officials at the local level tend to devote less effort to tasks that do not serve the targets of citizens, and increased accountability may drive them to comply with top- down directives that do not suit local circumstances.
⚫ Fourth, while officials have some influence over the policymaking process, many are able and ready to use their discretion to fix policy flaws and enhance the daily lives of the wider populace. The results illustrate the positive role played by grassroots officials in China who work for the benefit of citizens.
In short, these results demonstrate that accountability is not a panacea for regulating bureaucratic behavior, despite its frequent usage as a control mechanism to motivate officials to behave as intended. As Halachmi explained, the purpose of RBM performance measurement is accountability (Halachmi, 2002). Performance evaluation can be advantageous for enhanced responsibility and increased productivity, but this does not imply that the same measuring methodologies can simultaneously or equally fulfil both purposes (Halachmi, 2002). This is prevalent in many nations, including the United States and New Zealand (Radin, 2003). (Schillemans, 2016). If officials were required to follow their supervisors' instructions regardless of the consequences, they might pay less attention to whether their efforts harmed the public interest. Hence, public managers must identify their objectives prior to developing a complete measurement program.
In general, the RBM performance evaluation approach in China has its advantages.
Establishing a results-based responsibility structure in China's local governments ensures that lower-level officials will adhere to a substantial number of the primary policy goals of higher- level authorities. If these policy preferences were in line with public interests, performance evaluation might have created the impression of boosting the legitimacy of the governing regime. On the other side, the problem with using a results-based responsibility system is that it risks increasing the short-term accountability of public employees at the expense of the long-term productivity of government institutions. As a result, the practical approach is to first recognize and make choices between competing aims and then find a mechanism to balance the actors' respective interests. In other words, they are ensuring that the anticipated outcomes are innovative.
6. Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank supervisor Nur Ajrun Khalid and colleagues, as well as everyone else who has assisted us. Thanks to the Universiti Sains Malaysia School of Social Sciences for assistance and support in preparing the study.
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