Foreign Activities in Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): Malaysia’s Response
Noraini Zulkifli1*, Mohd Faudzi Zahari1
1 Department of Strategic Studies, Faculty of Management and Defense Studies, National Defense University of Malaysia
*Corresponding Author: [email protected]
Accepted: 15 May 2021 | Published: 1 June 2021
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Abstract: As a maritime nation, Malaysia has developed its own maritime capabilities in order to safeguard its national interest over the sea especially in Exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
Any activity that could threaten the strength of the economy can be regarded as betray national interests and actions must be taken to prevent it vociferously. South China Sea (SCS) is increasingly important not only in terms of defence strategy even in economic development of the country. It is used by the warships and merchant ships. This SCS is rich with natural resources such as oil and fishery. These natural resources will invite many foreign countries to come and do illegal activity in Malaysia’s EEZ. Zone (EEZ) together with its impact towards Malaysian maritime security. This research was conducted to analyze the foreign activities in Malaysia’s Economy Exclusive Zone (EEZ) together with its impact towards Malaysian maritime security. Where there are many foreign activities occurs in the waters of our country which indirectly affect the economy and national security. Therefore, the Security Forces should work together with the relevant agencies to safeguard the security of our country's waters from activities that could be harmful to our country's waters. Utilizing the qualitative approach, this research sought the foreign activities in Malaysia’s EEZ and how Malaysia response on this issue. The findings of this research are 1) Non – traditional security issues occur in Malaysia EEZ recently, 2) Malaysia has cooperation with several agencies to protect EEZ’s sovereignty and 3) Malaysia increasing the cooperation with other countries to enhance the maritime security in the EEZ boundaries.
Keywords: Exclusive economic zone (EEZ), Malaysia, South China Sea (SCS), Maritime Security, Maritime safety
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1. Background
Article 55 of United Nations Conventions on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the special legal regime established in this part, under which the right and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the right and freedom of other state are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention (UNCLOS Article 55). In Article 57, the EEZ coverage is clearly limited and shall not extent beyond 200 nautical miles from which the breadth of the baselines of the territorial sea is measured (UNCLOS Article 57). However the sea in our region are so problematic that many countries have overlapping EEZs, which caused in some instances by the use of excessive territorial sea straight baseline. Some EEZs are relatively confined but countries continue contending for authorities over broader area of waters. As a result, more conflicts have emerged over the undefined EEZs.
Maritime Security is one of the new catchwords of international relations environments.
Nowadays, most major actors have started to include maritime security in their authority to ensure their sovereignty are kept in order. These buzzwords have draws attention to new challenges and rallies support for tackling these. Malaysia’s security considerations continue to be dominated by developments of maritime affairs being perceived merely as an extension of these activities. Although there were notable exceptions such as the intrusion of the nuclear armed aircraft carrier led task force into the South China Sea (SCS). Maritime security issues are of both a military and a policies nature. It is, therefore, necessary to take both these components into account for a proper understanding of their collective impact on national security. However, Malaysian territorial waters have expanded after the formation of the Federation of Malaysia by incorporation of Sabah and Sarawak in 1963. This event has also made Malaysia become a country of two separated landmasses, divided by the South China Sea. The establishment of new maritime regimes, the UNCLOS in 1982, has allowed Malaysia to extend more territorial waters and claim sovereign rights outside contiguous zone to 200- nautical-mile EEZ (Valencia 1991). The EEZ in the east coast covers an area of 121,491sq km off a 532km coastline spanning across Kelantan, Terengganu and Pahang.
2. Literature Review
i. Maritime Security
Referring the article from Vrey (2010), African Maritime Security: A Time for Good Order at Sea, had discuss that maritime security frequently to do by pointing to ‘threats’ that prevail in the maritime domain Its refer to threats such as maritime inter-state disputes, maritime terrorism, piracy, trafficking of narcotics, people and illicit goods, arms proliferation, illegal fishing, environmental crimes, or maritime accidents and disasters. The majority of international actors defines maritime security by identifying a number of threats that the concept includes. In 2008 UN Secretary General’s Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea provides an outline of the threats commonly included (UN 2008). The report differentiates between seven. (1) Piracy and armed robbery, (2) terrorist acts, (3) the illicit trafficking in arms and weapons of mass destruction, (4) the illicit trafficking in narcotics, (5) smuggling and trafficking of persons by sea, (6) illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and (7) intentional and unlawful damage to the marine environment.
According to the article Bueger (2015) mentioned that maritime security can be analysed in similar ways by recognizing the relations to other terms. It’s can cover four broad concept of maritime security that cover marine environment, economic development, national security and human security. This article will provide a basic understanding what is maritime security and it may differ from other state interpretations of threats. Each of these concepts points us to the different dimensions of maritime security. The dimensions of sea power and marine safety are century old understandings of danger at sea meanwhile blue economy and resilience are two dimensions that have rise at roughly the same time as maritime security. The debate has hardly been influenced by more recent theoretical developments such as constructivist thinking or critical safety studies. The seas are the plain where superpower or regional power rivalry takes place in the realistic interpretation. These included so-called ' new ' security issues such as terrorism, transnational organized crime or environmental degradation, affecting a variety of actors including but not limited to the state, and were characterized by multisector responses such as the growing tendency to link security to development.
ii. Malaysian approach to the SCS in term of Maritime Security
The article from Parameswaran, P. (2015), Playing it Safe: Malaysia’s Approach to the South China Sea and Implication for the United States mentioned that Malaysia's point of view on the SCS issue regarding maritime security will be concentrating on the concepts or to adopt a
“playing it safe” approach by pursuing a combination of diplomatic, legal, economic, and security initiatives that can secure its interests as a claimant state while being careful not to disrupt its vital bilateral relationship with China. Malaysia has four interest in SCS. The first and narrowest one is preserving Malaysia’s claims. Within the South China Sea, Malaysia claims 11 maritime features in the Spratly Islands and occupies eight of them, with the other three being occupied by Vietnam or the Philippines. Safeguarding those claims is essential for Malaysia’s prosperity and security. Second, Malaysia has an interest in maintaining a strong bilateral relationship with China beyond the South China Sea issue. A third interest for Malaysia in the South China Sea is ensuring broader regional peace and stability and some open commons. The fourth interest in the South China Sea is the preservation of global norms and international law.
The South China Sea is a highway for trade, shipping and telecommunications through which a third of world trade passes. These include general principles such as the peaceful settlement of disputes as well as specific agreements that apply to the South China Sea issue, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In Malaysia’s view, laws and norms in the South China Sea help it and other claimants seek clarity in the face of conflicting claims from a common basis of understanding without resorting to “might makes right”
approaches and destabilizing acts involving military force.
Rustandi (2016), The South China Sea Dispute: Opportunities for ASEAN to Enhance its Policies in order to Achieve Resolution has mentioned that the longstanding disputes in SCS which involving numerous coastal states is creating a stressful situation which is far from conducive to achieving peaceful settlement. The continuous debate in the SCS with the limitation of how ASEAN way of making decisions. ASEAN’s decision‐making mechanism is through consultation and consensus, as stated in Chapter VII, ‘Decision Making’, Article 20, of the ASEAN Charter, which has been identified as the ‘ASEAN way’. As consultation and consensus are fundamental to ASEAN’s culture and tradition, so this code of conduct should have several levels or phases, ranging from purely implementing a unanimous decision, through to implementing a majority‐rule voting decision. In between, there should be several levels that involve a mixture of these processes. The code of conduct should also specify the types of occasions when the organisation should implement a consensus/unanimity‐based decision (such as when a situation exists that has a direct impact on a certain member) and the types of occasions where there is no direct impact to a certain member and the organisation may implement a majority‐rule voting system in making a decision.
Sovereignty in ASEAN and The Problem of Maritime Cooperation in the South China Sea has mention that the maritime realm so different from the earthly realm is that the question of sovereignty remains highly challenged. ASEAN members are also involved in a ' conflict process ' involving militarizing conflicting claims in the SCS, hand in hand with the contestation. This process includes open deployment of military units, confrontation between navies in disputed areas and the implicit use of threats. Constructivists will argue that the failure to break this ' conflict process ' into open warfare shows the ASEAN way. The fact remains, however, that there are still military confrontations at sea, as opposed to attempts to resolve issues on land in a cooperative and peaceful manner.
According to Cronau, TA. (2012), Maritime Security: Malaysia’s Persistent Problem. As one of the three economically dependent coastal states on maritime trade, one of Malaysia's most critical challenges is to maintain effective maritime safety in this region. Malaysia seems to have neutralized the maritime threats in this region by unilateral and multilateral security measures taken in recent years. However, due to geographical challenges, sovereignty concerns and territorial disputes, vulnerabilities remain. In order to effectively counter this threat and protect its economic interests and sovereignty in the future, Malaysia will need to take proactive measures to increase domestic and partnership capacity with the other coastal states.
iii. The Concept of a Malaysian National Maritime Security Policy
As mentioned before, Malaysia faces numerous security threats including sea robbery, intrusion of foreign fishing vessels, intrusion of foreign marine scientific research vessels, smuggling, illegal sand mining, illegal immigration, taking of archaeological treasures, overlapping claims and intrusions by foreign warships. The article of Iskandar S (2006), The Concept of a Malaysian National Maritime Security Policy mentioned that with the complexity and uncertainty of today’s security environment, including non-military, trans-national and asymmetric threats, deterrence must be comprehensive (Iskandar 2006). Unlike the traditional military/state actor threats, non- traditional maritime threats often demand more than a purely military response.
These issues must be address in a critical and organized manner in order to formulate the National Maritime Security Policy which provide a framework for five considerations. (1) Assisting all relevant agencies/departments and ministries regarding the objectives and goals of maritime security when carrying out their duties and responsibilities, (2) assisting the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) when enforcing maritime laws, (3) examining existing policies that require adjustment to the latest development while also filling gaps in the policy, (4) developing a sense of community responsibility to protect the national maritime interest and (5) developing the National Security Policy and the National Ocean Policy. Lyndsey (2006) mentioned that the Strategic Environment is the Crucial Determinant of the Information that is available to an actor and the structure within which actors operate.
The environment determines what the actors think they know for sure and what they have to infer, if possible, from the behaviour of others. But the precondition for managing marine resources is a secure maritime environment.
The article from Daniel, T. (2018), Issues Impacting Malaysia’s Maritime Security Policies and Postures. The MMEA formation in 2005 marked the beginning of the transformation and consolidation of the maritime security framework and approach to Malaysia. There were seven agencies dealing with maritime safety in Malaysia at one point in time, each with different responsibilities. Fortunately, there is a more streamlined approach, although questions remain as to whether it can be improved. The issue of silos operation is an ever-present issue. The lead agencies are now the MMEA, the leading maritime law enforcement agency, the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) as the lead maritime defence agency, closely supported by the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF), which operates its own maritime air patrols, the Fisheries Department and the Marine Police of the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP), formally known as the Marine Operations Force (MOF). These agencies will need to address Malaysian maritime security's three main thrusts.
Iskandar, S. (2006), the Concept of a Malaysian National Maritime Security Policy. This article mentioned about the maritime space of Malaysia contains resources that contribute
significantly to the economic and social well-being of the country. These include fishing, oil and gas, and beauty of the scenery. This maritime space is also critical to the security and defense of Malaysia. Malaysia faces numerous security threats including marine robbery, intrusion of foreign fishing vessels, intrusion of foreign marine science vessels, overlapping claims, intrusion by foreign warships and much more. With today's security environment complexity and uncertainty, including non-military, transnational, and asymmetric threats, deterrence must be comprehensive. Unlike traditional threats from the military / state actor.
Often, non-traditional maritime threats require more than a purely military response.
3. Research Methodology
For this research, a qualitative approach is used by gathering all secondary data at various libraries i.e. the Ministry of Defence Library, Malaysia Staff College Library that provides a lot of books peculiar to the research and National Defence University of Malaysia (NDUM), which has the largest number of references material pertaining to social science studies.
Besides that, the resources also can be collected from Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA), Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relation (IDFR), Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), International Fusion Centre (IFC), Command and Control Centre of Singapore as well as Naval Intelligence Division, Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) Headquarters. In addition to secondary data, will be collected from books by credible authors, as well as from articles published in journals, magazines, newspapers and published theses in order to support this research and also from internet was used via web sites, databases and through documentation where possible. The data collected from web sites normally can be in term of annual report especially from Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA).
Conceptual Framework
This study is guided based on the maritime security theory. Harry Y. (2006) mentioned that this theory is widely used and acknowledges as a tool to assist in the crucial decision making.
One of his best statement regarding this theory is “Strategic theory opens the mind to all the possibilities and forces at play, prompting us to consider the costs and risks of our decisions and weigh the consequences of those of our adversaries, allies and others”. This theory also will integral to the endeavour to understand the actor’s values and preferences is an appreciation of the wider strategic environment in which it functions. He also mentioned that strategic theory will ensure all states that have interests in their boundaries or sovereignty will enhance their abilities to ensure that their survival, economic well-being, favorable world order and persevering national values.
Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework
INDEPENDE NT
INTERVENIN G VARIABLE
DEPENDENT VARIABLE Foreign
Activity
Piracy
Malaysia Maritime Security in
SCS Smuggling
Illegal Fishing
Figure 1.1 above show the conceptual framework of the study. The conceptual framework has been developed base on the independent variable, intervening variable and dependent variable.
This study will have one independent variable which is foreign activity. Three intervening variables which includes piracy, smuggling, illegal fishing and one dependent variable which is Malaysia Maritime Security.
4. Discussion
Based on the present trends and reports, these foreign activities may increase and continue in the near future. It is understood that the importance of maritime security is something that needs to be preserved in order for Malaysia to safeguard its economy and the security of the nations.
Besides that, Malaysian government also should look back the Malaysia Foreign Policy towards the few incidents happened and involved to ensure the security and safety of our maritime territory are protected from any threats. The non-traditional security issues in the Malaysia EEZ can become more serious. More attention need to be placed on maritime terrorism as no matter how remote the chances are, due to its nature, it can occur at any time.
The possibility of illegal activities in our EEZ to increase is always present due to economic reason such as recession, poor governance, and poverty or under development. Despite current stability in our EEZ, littoral state need to be always prepared due to the surprise nature of the maritime terrorism. Piracy and other illegal activities will be on the rise depending on the economic situation of the littoral states. The occurrence of economic backwardness in the region particularly to the littoral states will be a catalyst to the rise in maritime illegal activities.
Mutual interests and respect for the sovereignty of the Malaysia Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as well as the responsibility of the user states under article 43 of UNCLOS it is expected that there will be cooperation to promote maritime security in the strait based on International Law. If this cooperation can be developed positively, it will benefit for both the coastal and the user states, especially in economic and security aspects. Under business philosophy of vessel operators is right time at the right place, within Malaysia EEZ should be well protected by all means in mitigates issues raised up. Pollution, Piracy, Smuggling and Illegal Immigration and Safe Navigation are among of issues were highlighted. The pillars of strength and capabilities need to be strengthen further in projecting better operation environment. Safe navigation does not stop at all physical condition but it continues at the cleanliness of our EEZ. Certain environment policies should be adopted from the advance country such as allowable contaminated waste in river and sea, safe navigation speed that has lesser effect to banks, and safe engine speed for lesser environment – air pollution as well as educates all parties involves in straits usage.
The phenomenon of foreign activity in Malaysia EEZ is considered a serious threat especially to its economy, political and security. Malaysia is very consistent to the Treaty where it has absolute sovereign jurisdiction in its territorial sea and EEZ. It is crucial to safeguards its interest over the EEZ in order for the economy to prospers. Malaysia has primary responsibility and obligation to keep order at sea within its territorial jurisdiction. Unauthorized or unlawful military activities goes against the very grain of this primary obligation and undermines the rights of coastal states’ jurisdiction in UNCLOS with regard to military activities in the EEZ.
Malaysia government approach to handle with these foreign activities are by deterrence and diplomacy. Diplomacy requires international cooperation because those threats are primarily transnational. As mentioned, transnational maritime crime provides terrorist and guerrilla groups the means to move weapons and personnel, raise funds, and recruit new members.
The problem of overlapping maritime boundaries is generated from the UNCLOS 1982 and the limitation of Malaysia’s military maritime capability to back up the negotiation, particularly with the regional power like China. Malaysia needs to strengthen its military maritime capability at least to deter any further conflict and, if it is possible, to negotiate from the strength in the future. The problem of protection of maritime sovereignty is also generated from the limitation of Malaysia’s military maritime capability. Malaysia requires more capital ships and submarines to defend its maritime sovereignty without considerable risk in the EEZ and overlapping maritime boundaries.
The whole responsibly now lies on the front liner team. Recognition and rewards system could be established for the third parties who involves in securing, controlling and updating information. However, smart partnership could be one of way out in organizing the straits.
Mutual interests and respect for our maritime waters and the sovereignty of the Malaysia EEZ, as well as the responsibility of the user states under article 43 of UNCLOS it is expected that there will be cooperation to promote maritime security in the strait based on International Law.
If this cooperation can be developed positively, it will benefit both the coastal and the user states, especially in economic and security aspects. Under business philosophy of vessel operators is right time at the right place, within Malaysia Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) should be well protected by all means in mitigates issues raised up. Pollution, piracy, smuggling and Illegal immigration and safe navigation are among of issues were highlighted. The pillars of strength and capabilities need to be strengthen further in projecting better operation environment.
The danger is that every incident is vulnerable to misinterpretation and has the potential to produce a far wider conflict. It is therefore particularly important that mechanisms be instituted to address particularly troubling maritime issues. This is especially so for military and intelligence gathering activities. Malaysia, which has signed the UNCLOS treaty, maintains that military operations, hydrographic surveying and intelligence collection by foreign ships or planes can be carried out in an EEZ only with permission from the coastal state. Coastal countries of the South China Sea, especially those with extensive coastlines bordering the sea such as China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, have a major stake in protecting their EEZ, fisheries, energy supplies, and natural resources from outsiders.
Malaysia required a holistic approach to address these issued because of its involved numerous actors across sectors and boundaries. Malaysia has shown positive efforts in ensuring its border and sovereignty is upholding. More prominent actions at the national and international levels to be seriously engaged with the maritime security especially in EEZ. In many countries the naval forces are responsible for a whole range of maritime security operations including the exercise of sovereignty, law enforcement, safety, environmental protection, resource management, in addition to the traditional practice related to military defence. Therefore, any foreign activity within a State’s maritime jurisdictional zones is of interest to the naval forces.
We should ask about, what activity is allowed? Where is it allowed? By whom is it allowed?
Under what conditions is it allowed? The issue of military research or civilian MSR on a military vessel falls in all of the above areas.
Since it is the military that often must deal with situations arising from foreign activities, the law of the sea is of direct importance to them. If nothing else, military forces prefer some form of rules of engagement. If they discover a foreign vessel in their waters engaged in diverse activities, how do they decide which are legitimate? Should they take action or not? In
international law, doing nothing might be perceived as tacit recognition of an activity’s lawfulness, which may set a precedent. This in retrospect, might not be in a State’s interest to allow and must certainly be a high priority on the national security agenda.
However, on other issues such as military activity in EEZ, anti-piracy or anti-terrorist enforcement measures, and territorial claims, they have had conflicting views. As a maritime nation, Malaysia must possess civil and military capabilities to explore the sea on the basis of sustainable development. Without the capabilities of exploitation, whether for resources or other expansions, a nation cannot be called a maritime nation. This is crucial in the aspect of security and defence of the nation. In this connection, the maritime law enforcement is construed as the taking of any reasonable measures to ensure or prevent any form of violations of any Acts or applicable written law. It its broad sense, law enforcement encompasses show of presence to provide deterrence, the discovery of violation, conducting an investigation, court proceeding and the enforcement of court decisions. However, the RMN still requires more capital surface combatant ships like frigates to get rid out of the weakness.
To protect the SLOC, the MMEA and RMN is capable to conduct local engagement or escort Malaysian merchant ships when passing through the vulnerable waters because it can set up a task force for this mission in the required waters. There are many weaknesses such as duplication of responsibilities, lack of coordination among enforcement agencies, lack of central coordinating and macro planning, lack of focus on the economic use of assets, misuse of military assets and use of non-standardized equipment. This will lead to cost ineffectiveness and inefficient management of maritime law enforcement.
Politically, a nation must have a clear national policy to make comprehensive use of the sea and to tackle the issues and challenges in this process. As so far as Malaysia’s maritime development is concerned, the study and recommendation by EEZ committee has begun since early 1979. This has led to the recommendation for formation of MECC in October 1983 and then the official formation of National Maritime Coordinating Committee (NMCC) and MECC in December 1985. National Maritime Council was formed in October 1987. The latest development was the establishment of Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) in 2007. However, to this date, there still no clear national policy exists with regards to the maritime law enforcement. The need for comprehensive policies on coastal zone and ocean management, the sustained development of sea resources, the protection of the marine environment and the security are issues facing administrators and governments of all political persuasions.
Increased threat on security or sovereign right and maritime space has spawned jurisdictional and management problems in seas between national governments and their subordinate political units and among management agencies within governments. It is also defined as the ways in which conflicts of interest over scarce resources are resolved. When combined, it gives the meaning of having to manage people that belong to certain groups in a situation where there will be conflicts of interests. In simpler terms, it is the means for governing a country. In a domestic society, those means are defined by a series of procedures that are based in domestic sovereignty. There is no identical definition of security among states, states would normally define its core values as the important aspects that needs to be protected in order to ensure the security of the state. This is the essence in the process of maintaining and promoting the security of the country.
To defend against the external threat, the RMN’s capability in controlling the sea varies between sea control in dispute and working sea control. It means that the RMN has maximum capability to operate with high degree of freedom while the enemy can only operate with high risk in some Malaysian maritime waters where concentration of naval force can be done conveniently. It also means that the RMN has minimum capability to operate with considerable risk in some Malaysian maritime waters where concentration of naval force is hardly done, particularly in the EEZ and overlapping maritime boundaries in the SCS, because the RMN possesses very limited capital ships. Contributions of Research to Practical Implementation.
Conclusion
Malaysia’s EEZ boundary between neighbour countries and part of main international sea water route for trade especially at South China Sea became quite difficult for maritime agencies to make any enforcement. Besides that, the rich of sources and strategic area also became be a main factor for illegal maritime activities occur at our EEZ area. Malaysia government should become more seriously and aggressive in handle these issues due to protect our maritime sovereignty. Second, the different interpretations of the EEZ regime exist, especially on the issues of coastal state jurisdiction over military activities, MSR and hydrographic surveys, navigation and overflight freedoms became another issues this day. It’s should be settled by negotiation and political relationship among the countries involves. Rules were needed only to prevent direct conflict through poor planning or misunderstanding but in recent times, rules, regulations and laws are needed not only to rationalize planning and management of activities but also to command and impose sustainability of specific activities. As some countries have ratified the conventions and have introduced their own domestic laws to regulate the activities of foreign vessels and aircrafts over their EEZ, these efforts will be better appreciated if their transparency is enhanced. This could be done by widely disseminating the related information.
Secondly, dialogue and mutually acceptable resolutions or agreements are necessary. These can be achieved at the bilateral level and perhaps be expanded into the regional level if conditions are favorable. This can represent the best effort to forge a common interpretation of all the key principles, concepts and conventions. However, one of the key points is the criterion for the definition of legal terms such as due regard, peaceful purpose, and especially the definitions of MSR, military activities, hydrographic surveys and other contentious terms.
These terms should be clearly defined by all countries. This is the premise for any further negotiation. However, it is essentially important to promote them to a governmental level, to discuss them in a broader sense and eventually to reach a regional consensus. Finally, referring to the quarrels within disputed EEZ waters in our nation, the best solution definitely lies on the settlement of the disputes. However, in the near future, the delimitation of all the unresolved boundaries, such as the straight-line maritime boundaries in the South China Sea, is highly unlikely. This is partly because the nature of maritime boundary making in this region is quite problematic. The geographic conditions in this region are complex with many littoral and adjacent countries around the same body of waters and the delimitation of even a single boundary usually involves more than two countries. Furthermore, take the situation of bilateral boundaries in Southeast Asia as an example that of the approximately 60 maritime boundaries required in the region, less than twenty per cent have so far been frilly resolved. What is even more complicated is that some multilateral maritime boundary disputes involve more contenders and each country uses various reasons to defend their own arguments. This can be exemplified by the South China Sea dispute, which is very tricky and countries seem to have no specific expectation on it concerning the settlement of boundary issues in the short term.
Thus, perhaps one of the most effective ways for contentious countries to deal with their disorders and quarrels at sea under the current situation is to establish interim agreements between themselves pending their final resolution of the boundaries issues. However, in order
to grant the interim agreements enough binding effect, all details should be discussed and clarified, such as the location of the disputed areas, the procedures to implement the agreement, the penalty for any contravention of the agreement, etc. Another approach could be the functional approach a cooperative mechanism requires claimants to shelve the territorial disputes first and to start with joint development and some other non-traditional security cooperation projects, which definitely can be applied to joint military exercises, MSR and hydrographic survey in disputed areas as well. Therefore, it is imperative for regional countries to lay down more concrete measures for existing proposals as well as any new initiatives in the future. The government must have a strong political will to address and push on any move, plans, law enforcement and vision on securing Malaysia sovereign right. Ministries involves in the enforcement of law of the seas must work together, avoiding any duplication of responsibility and execution of development plan. The Ministry of Finance also should give some priority in the annual allocation of the operating and development budget in line with the national maritime policy of nation. The execution and planning must be treated as a nation’s strategic importance. The government should be very serious in developing the nation to be a maritime nation but not to emerge as superpower. Maritime nation in Malaysia’s context is more on economic perspective and the security aspect of the nation. In this connection the government has to develop adequate capability in term of defence equipment, maritime based industry infrastructure and maritime security related system capability to cater for this effort.
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