The "fall" of the casusha has here been limited to the descent of circumscribed objects on the game table. With the "randomness" of the lottery decision-making process, we have reached the final word in our etymological investigation.
The Ancient Atomists
The author of the atomic theory, Democritus, preferred to accept the view that all events are caused by necessity, rather than to deprive the atoms of their natural motions (Cicero 1941, On Fate, 23). How convincing is Lucretius's statement - which, incidentally, confirms Cicero's analysis of the raison d'être of fluctuation - that "what prevents the mind itself from having necessity in itself in all actions (...) is the minute interruption of the first beginning at no fixed place and at an unspecified time?” (Lucretius. According to Furley's interpretation, the point of the twist is simply to allow a discontinuity in a.
If we look back at Cicero's analysis of Epicurus, we will find that he opposes Epicurus' worldview not only to that of the elder atomist Democritus, but also to that of the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus, according to whom "all things happen by the fate and spring from eternal causes which govern future events” (Cicero 1941, On Fate, 21). It is clear that such a view “leaves no room for alternative developments of the world. In the context of the etymological connection between the words "chance" and "danger" and the throwing of dice, to which we drew attention in our previous section, it is interesting to find that Chrysippus insists that dice and scales "do not now can't fall or tip over. one way and now another without the appearance of some cause” (Plutarch 1976, On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1045).
On Divination and Providence
Indeed, it would appear that the Greek Stoics held that there is a rational organizing principle found in all things in the world that determines the course of all events. At a certain point in his De divinatione, Cicero specifically criticizes the view that "divination is the foreknowledge and prediction of events which are considered fortuitous [res fortuitae]", that is, of things which, "for though they happen frequently, it does not always happen" (Cicero 1923, On Divination 2.5.13–14). For if He knows, then the event is certain to happen; but if it is certain to happen, chance exists [fortuna ] not.
Is all "providence," in the sense of "providence," also "providence" in the sense of "benevolent guidance?" God must have foreseen the fall of Adam and Eve; but this was presumably not an intended part of his plan. However one chooses to resolve this difficult issue, for Saint Augustine, the most influential of the Latin Church Fathers, it was clear that there existed a personal type of divine providence, implying that whatever happened, at least for God, the source of all providence — a rational event. For most Christian writers these two ideas were indeed connected, and necessarily so because of the divine predicates.
Boethius
On the other hand, there was the omnipotence of God, which implied that whatever happened had to happen, and since God was benevolent, whatever happened also had a positively providential aspect—an idea which Augustine attributes to the Platonists. For Boethius, then, the concept of casusis is compatible not only with providence, but also with the causal structure of the world. Realcasus would not only be inexplicable, it would be without a cause or, in Boethius's words, ex nihilo.
This identification of casus with events ex nihilo is not taken from Aristotle, but could indicate Boethius' indebtedness to Stoic determinism.
Late Medieval Views on Chance
Referring to the views we encountered earlier in our chapter, Thomas refers to Aristotle's conception of chance, quotes Augustine's view that there is neither chance nor luck in the world, since all events are foreseen, and quotes Boethius, for whom the word "destiny" referred to the inherent arrangement of things by which divine providence achieves its desired effects. Thomas Christianizes the Aristotelian distinction between the regularity found in the supralunar world and the disorder found in the sublunar world, explaining that “whatever happens by chance on earth, whether in nature or in human affairs, proceeds from a predetermined cause, namely the divine. Providence" (Thomas Aquinas vol. Only when things are explained from the point of view of their immediate causes, things happen by chance or chance, but not when they are explained from the point of view of divine providence, whereby "nothing happens in the world by chance" ( ibid.).
In the second book of the Summa contra gentiles, which deals with the creation of the world, Thomas devotes a chapter to the question whether the "distinction of things," that is, their division into genera and species, is the result of chance. . Given that "chance is found only in things that are otherwise possible," Thomas argues that "the distinction of things in terms of species cannot be the result of chance," since forms (which define species) are by definition immutable. In the third book of the Summa contra gentiles, Thomas cites Aristotle's example of the chance meeting between a man and his debtor to show that providence does not exclude the case: "It would be contrary to the essential character of divine providence if all things would happen out of necessity.
Chance, Necessity and Design in a Mechanistic Universe
In a letter dated 21 September 1674, Boxel had argued that "it belongs to the beauty and perfection of the universe" to. I therefore say, as I have already said, that the world is a necessary effect of the divine nature, and that it did not come into being by chance” (Spinoza1883, 381). Pierre Gassendi, one of the founders of early modern atomism, explicitly claimed that "chance is not something in itself (...), but the lack of foreknowledge and of the intention of an event" (Gassendi a).
Fate is nothing but God's decree, and luck and chance are expressions of chance in the world, along with human ignorance of the causes of random events (Osler 1994, 92, citing Sarasohn 1985). Leibniz, however, accused Newton and Clarke of reintroducing chance into the world: “Will without reason would be the opportunity of the Epicureans. But Leibniz, who had a different understanding of the relationship between chance, choice, necessity and fate, retorted: "Epicure's chance is not necessity, but something indifferent.
Hume ’ s Critique of the Argument from Design
In his view, "the Epicurean chance is not a choice of will, but a blind necessity of fate" (Clarke, Fourth Letter, §18; ibid., 50). Epicurus introduced it on purpose to avoid necessity. “True, chance is blind; but a will without motive would be no less blind, and no less the result of a real accident” (Leibniz, Fifth Letter, §39; ibid., 79). For Leibniz, the word "coincidence" denotes the absence of a determining cause, and it can therefore be applied to anything that happens without a reason.
The concept of chance also plays an important role in Hume's famous Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Mathematicians have noted that the products of 9 always form either 9 or a smaller product of 9 when you add up all the characters that make up one of the former products. Is it not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of the universe is governed by a similar necessity, though no human algebra can furnish a key to the solution of the problem.
From Natural History to Darwinism
The contrast between the reference to divine providence in the original hymn and Lewis's ironic description of its total absence in an evolutionary process that mows and weeds aimlessly and without purpose or direction is stark. In such a case, every minor change which occurs in the course of age, and which in any way favors the individuals of any species, by better adapting them to their changed conditions, would be preserved; and natural selection would thus have free room for the work of improvement. After all, Mendel, genetics and the discovery of DNA were later episodes in the history of biology.
For example, modern biology talks about the role of mutations in the evolution of species in terms of spontaneous mutations (such as molecular decay) or mutations due to errors that occur in DNA replication. In the eyes of the American philosopher, logician, chemist and mathematician Charles Sanders Peirce, Darwin's theory of evolution actually represented strong evidence against a deterministic view of the world. This erroneous idea has been around since the days of Democritus and the Stoics, but it has existed in the meantime.
Laplace ’ s Determinism, Statistical Regularity and the New Physical Randomness
All it does is to infer, on the basis of a complete set of natural laws and an equally complete set of data for all the bodies in the world, mechanically and with absolute certainty, the present and future behavior of the world and everything located in it. . This erosion happened not only in philosophy and biology, but also in the field of physics. 9. The probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics had been in the air almost from the beginning, and notably, a contre-coeur, in Einstein's own work, but it was first explicitly proposed (and declared fundamental) in a paper by Born in 1926. on collision theory.
What is crucial in the current context is that Born's probabilistic interpretation of quantum physics was interpreted by him and him. In specific situations, such as when we are given a random assignment or trying to calculate our chances of winning in the lottery, the archetypal situation of the falling object will seem rather distant. In the course of our chapter we have discovered that the word "chance" is the opposite of "fate," "purpose," "providence."
1859). On the origin of species by means of natural selection; or the preservation of favored races in the struggle for life.London: John Murray. 1994).Divine Will and Mechanical Philosophy: Gassendi and Descartes on Contingency and Necessity in the Created World.
