A CHRISTIAN APPROACH TO LITERARY CRITICISM : A NON- MORALISTIC VIEW
W . G .J. PretorÍU S M. A.-student, Department o f English. PU fo r CHE
T he com m o n question: “ Is a C h ristian a p p ro a c h to literary criticism feasible?”
m ay be m o re p ro fita b ly re fo rm u lated as: “ H ow sh o u ld a C h ristian a p p ro a c h to literary criticism be?” . It is clearly n o t a m atter o f the possibility o f such an a p p ro a c h , b u t a challenge o f form u latin g a new critical theory.
“ W h at co u ld be sim pler a n d easier th a n to say what a w ork o f a rt is, w hether it is go o d o r b a d , a n d why it is so?” (O lso n , 1976, p. 307). T h e p roblem o f value ju d g m e n ts in literary criticism , c o n tra ry to O lso n ’s view, has proved to be the m ost com plex o f all lite ra ry p ro b lem s th ro u g h o u t th e h isto ry o f criticism . It is also thi cen tral issue underlying the distinction betw een different approaches to literatu r T he fo rm alist critic is trad itio n ally reticent a b o u t value jud g m en ts an d con
c en trates u p o n close read in g o f texts an d im plicit ev alu a tio n . C o n tem p o rary form alists, how ever, ten d to move aw ay fro m the ideal o f critical objectivity O n the o th e r h an d , th e m oralist critic is p rim arily concerned w ith th e purpose o f the literary w ork. In N aaldekoker, D . J. O p p erm an seriously d o u b ts the possibility o f a C alvinist a p p ro a c h to a rt, which he regards as a contradictio in terminis (pp. 61-63).
I shall a tte m p t in this essay to show th a t th ere is a valid literary criticism w hich is n eith er exclusively based on aesthetic ju d g m e n t, n o r a n a tte m p t to su b o rd in ate lite ra tu re to religion in a m oralistic way, a n d th a t such criticism originates from a C h ristian vision o f life.
T H E M O D E O F EX ISTEN CE O F T H E LITERARY W ORK The Platonic dilemma
T h e tw o m ain g roups o f answ ers given to the question o f w hat a literary w ork o f art is, o rig in a te fro m P lato a n d A risto tle, a n d are m utually exclusive. P lato m ay be seen as the fa th e r o f m oralism , in his “ em phasis on practicality a n d u tility”
(D aich es, 1956, p. 21): his insistence u p o n tru th in poetry, adv o catin g a m im etic a p p ro a c h to literatu re. O n the o th e r h an d , A risto tle’s Poetics m ay be seen as a treatise on the ontological a p p ro ach to poetry, w hich form s the basis fo r form alist theories o f literature.
A th ird answ er is offered by the C h ristian a p p ro a c h to literary criticism , which com prises elem ents from b o th the P lato n ic an d A ristotelian theories, b u t reaches beyond their lim itations.
O lthuis’ provisional scheme
In a lectu re given a t th e PU fo r C H E d u rin g 1980, O lth u is offered a provisional schem e fo r th e in te rp re ta tio n o f literatu re. In this schem e, the literary text is perceived as a uniq u e arran g em en t o f th e dim ensions o f reality. T he distinctive feature o f a literary w ork o f a rt is the fact th a t it is lingually foun d ed and aesthetically qualified. T h e d o m in a n t dim ension is th e aesthetic.
O lth u is p o in te d o u t th a t focussing th e critical a tte n tio n exclusively u p o n the aesthetic dim ension o f the literry w o rk results in intuitivist criticism , while elevating th e lingual dim ension to an ab so lu te results in positivism . B oth o f these extrem es are p resent in co n te m p o ra ry criticism : itendency tow ards subjectivist, c o m m itted criticism o n the one h a n d , a n d linguistic a n d stylistic criticism , aim ing a t scientific precision, on th e other.
T he P lato n ic dilem m a m ay also be view ed in this perspective: P la to ’s rejection o f p o etry as a n in ferio r im itatio n o f reality is du e to his iso latio n o f the aesthetic d im ension on a rt. A risto tle’s so lu tio n is based on th e isolation o f features belonging to th e lingual dim ension o f lite ra tu re , so th a t th e tw o theories represent tw o extrem es, b u t n eith er offers a com prehensive ch aracterizatio n o f the n atu re o f literatu re.
In O lth u is’ schem e th e literary w ork m ay be ju d g ed in term s o f aesthetic a n d lingual n o rm s, b u t he p o in ts o u t a th ird dim ension o f th e literary w ork w hich is its leading dimension: the c e rtitu d in a l. L iteratu re is alw ays led by its w orld view. O lthuis represents the th ree dim ensions in the follow ing d iag ram , as a provisional device fo r the in terp re tatio n o f literary w orks:
T R U L Y w orld view n o rm a - aesthetically good lingually good C H R IS T IA N tive
w orld view d isto rte d aesthetically p o o r lingually p o o r N O N - w orld view u n d er- aesthetically fair lingually fair
C H R IS T IA N developed non-aesthetic non-lingual
All co m b in atio n s o f these dim ensions are possible: a literary w ork in w hich the w o rld view is u n d erd ev elo p ed a n d w hich is n o n -C h ristia n in c o n te n t, m ay be aesthetically go o d a n d lingually go o d ; a w ork w hich offers a tru ly C h ristian belief a n d a n o rm ativ e w o rld view m ay be aesthetically a n d lingually p o o r. O lthuis suggests th a t tru ly C h ristia n lite ra tu re sh o u ld aim a t th e to p layer in th e d iag ram in every dim ension. C h ristian criticism sh o u ld o p erate fro m b o th directions: from the lingual to w ard s th e ce rtitu d in a l a n d fro m the p o in t o f view o f belief to w ard s the lingual dim ension.
T h is is clearly a co m p reh en siv e schem e fo r literary criticism . A gainst it, the follow ing sta te m e n t fro m a c o n te m p o ra ry fo rm alist tic seem s very frail: “ T h ere is o f course, a difference betw een the aesthetic v alu atio n in th e a rts a n d ou tsid e o f art.
In the a rts , aesth etic v alu atio n necessarily sta n d s highest in th e hierarchy o f the
values c o n tain ed in th e w o rk , w hereas o u tsid e o f a rt its po sitio n vacillates an d is usually su b o rd in a te ” (M ukarovsky, 1964, p. 49). T his statem en t show s the c o n te m p o ra ry m ovem ent in criticism to w ard s a m im etic a p p ro a c h to literature, d u e to the iso latio n o f th e aesthetic dim ension o f literature.
REALISM AS A CRITERION FOR LITERARY VALUE
T h e m im etic fallacy h as been p o in ted o u t by th e New C ritics. T .S. E liot fo rm u la te s it as follow s: “ It is sim ply n o t tru e th a t w orks o f fictio n , prose o r verse, th a t is -o say w orks d ep ictin g the actio n s, th o u g h ts a n d w ords a n 'i passions o f im aginary h u m an beings, directly extend o u r know ledge o f life" (1962, p. 49).
R o o k m a k e r also deals w ith the q u estio n o f a rtistic tru th : “ In a w ay a rt does the tr u th often m ore th a n it is tru e in th e sense th a t it p o rtra y s reality according to its . co n cep tu al reality. A rt does the tru th in its ow n artistic w ay” (1970, p. 238).
T h e o u tsta n d in g ch aracteristic o f any m oralistic theory o f literatu re is its dependence u p o n a m im etic evalu atio n o f literary w orks. Seerveld (1968) conceives o f a rt as style a n d deals w ith the dangers o f m im etic criticism . H e eventually offers a so lu tio n w hich acknow ledges th e u nique qualities o f the literary w ork o f art.
T he tw o crucial concepts in Seerveld’s a p p ro ach a re th a t a rt is sym bolic an d th a t it is subject to the law o f coherence. C o h eren t sym bolical objectification is his sine qua non fo r th e literary w ork. Seerveld also acknow ledges im ag in atio n as a cen tral concept in literary criticism , peculiar to the kind o f know ledge an d m eaning in the literary w ork, w hich m akes it different from science. H ow ever, he specifies the term fic tio n a lity as a distinctive feature o f literatu re as follows:
“ F ictio n is a m isnom er applied to literatu re unless it be u n d ersto o d as saying: this w ork deals in the w orld o f im agination an d it is as religiously conditioned, as steady a n d responsible a grip o n reality as th e h um an consciousness which yields scientific d a ta o r the o rd in ary b reak fast eating experience” (p. 89).
T h is statem en t o riginates from Seerveld’s con cep tio n o f the sym bolical as a prim e m ode o f reality, w hich is present in everything, n o t exclusively in a rt. T he tru th o f th is o b serv atio n can n o t be denied, b u t it sh ould be n o ted th a t, a lth o u g h he effectively dism isses the realistic a p p ro a c h to literatu re, Seerveld fails to p o in t ou t th a t a rt differs from reality ip a fu rth er im p o rta n t respect: the poet deliberately exploits this sym bolic m ode o f reality; he fo reg ro u n d s a n d actualizes any an d every p o ten tial th a t th e raw m aterials o f reality may have.
Pseudo-Christian art
S eerveld p o in ts o u t tw o fallacies in a m oralist ap p ro ach to literature: if the artist is a C h ristia n , it does n o t im ply th a t the w ork is so; if the subject m atter is biblical, the literary w ork is n o t au to m atically C h ristian . (Cf. p. 47). “ Indeed, m uch so-called
‘C h ristian lite ra tu re ’ is n eith er lite ra tu re n o r C h ristian , because o f its cliché-ridden style, vagueness an d m uddle o f th o u g h t, unctuousness o f tone o r piety o f sen tim en t, all o f w hich deny the vitality, vigour an d p u rity w hich is im plicit in the C h ristian u n d erstan d in g o f a r t” (E tchells, 1969, p. 15).
R oper (1979) also states th a t ju s t as the desp airin g realism in 20th century literature m ay be called u n C h ristian , the shallow sentim entality th a t seeks to cou n teract it is u n accep tab le to the C h ristian , a n d th a t “ C h ristian a rt should steer clear o f depicting virtue a n d vice in m oralistic term s” (p. 21).
A n o th e r aspect o f the concept o f C h ristian a rt is th a t o f q uality. T.S. Eliot p oints o u t th a t religious p o etry is usually synonym ous w ith m inor poetry (1962, p. 45).
R o o k m a k e r’s a rg u m en t on artistic quality also applies to literatu re, an d deserves to be q u o ted in full:
“ C h ristian a rt is n o th in g special. It is so u n d , healthy, good a rt. It is a rt th a t is in line w ith the G od-given stru ctu res o f a rt, one w hich has a loving a n d free view o f reality, one w hch is good an d true. In a w ay there is no specifically C hristian a rt. O ne can distin g u ish only g o o d a n d b ad a rt, a rt w hich is so u n d a n d go o d from a rt w hich is false o r w eird in its insight in to reality. T h is is so w h eth er it is pain tin g o r d ram a o r m usic. C h ristian s, how ever full o f faith they may be, can still m ake b ad a rt. They may be sinful a n d w eak, o r they m ight n o t have m uch talent. O n the o th er h an d a n o n -C h ristian can m ake a thing o f b eau ty , a jo y fo r ever — provided th a t he rem ains w ithin the scope o f th e norm s fo r a rt, provided th a t he w orks out o f the fullness o f his h u m an ity , an d does not glory in the depraved o r in iniquity o r glorify the devil. So a w ork o f a rt is n ot go o d w hen we know th a t the artist was a C hristian:
it is good when we perceive it to be g o o d ” (1970, p. 228).
M arxist literatu re and criticism
M arxist criticism m ay be defined as an a tte m p t to analyse literatu re in term s o f the historical c o n d itio n s in w hich it has been p ro d u ced (cf. E agleton, 1976, p vi). The o u tsta n d in g ch aracteristic o f M arxist criticism is th a t it is prescriptive: it calls on th e literary artist to com m it his a rt to th e M arxist cause. M arxist prescriptivism in criticism is the direct result o f its “ reflectionism ” (E agleton, p. 48).
T he English b ran ch o f M arxist criticism is ch aracterized by E agleton as follows:
“ M uch English M arxist criticism seem s to subscribe sim ultaneously to a m echanis
tic view o f a rt as the passive ‘reflex’ o f the econom ic base, an d to a R om antic belief in a rt as p rojecting an ideal w orld a n d stirring m en to new values” (p. 54).
This kin d o f m oralism , the su b o rd in a tio n o f literatu re to a pragm atic cause, as an in stru m e n t o f p ro p a g a n d a , spells critical suicide. W atson states th a t ’’subjectivism is trivialising as well as philosophically in co h eren t” (1978, p. 51).
T H E P U R P O S E O F PO ETRY
W ellek a p d W arren (1942) sum m arize th e d ich o to m y in th e conception o f the p u rp o se o f lite ra tu re th ro u g h o u t literary history in th e w ords o f H orace: dulce et utile: a rt has a n aesth etic fu n ctio n , it is a n en d in itself, b u t it also has a pragm atic fu n ctio n , a n in stru m en tal value (cf. C h a p te r 18).
A C h ris tia n a p p ro a c h to lite ra tu re does n o t iso late a single fu n ctio n o f literatu re, b u t com prises a n d also extends H orace.
L ite n .ta re as propaganda
T h e fu tility o f th e M arxist a p p ro a c h to lite ra tu re , th a t th e literary w ork sh ould be utilized as p ro p a g a n d a , serves as a w arn in g to th e C h ristian critic. R oper (1979) uses ex p ressio n s w hich resem ble th is a p p ro a c h , like: “ a rev italizatio n o f th e a rts in th e p ow er o f th e G o sp el” (p. 1). A lthough th e “ terrib ly influential pow er o f especially lite ra tu re ” (Seerveld, 1968, p. 120) does exist, it is n o t th e first concern o f th e critic to discover o r estim ate this pow er. J u s t as the literary critic is n o t a politician, as the M arxist w ould have him , so the critic is n o t a m issionary.
The theory o f C hristian organization in all areas o f Iranian activity
T h e p revious p a ra g ra p h is n o t m ean t as a denial o f the fact th a t m an as a w hole, as a religious being, is involved in literature.
“ T h o u g h we m ay read literatu re merely fo r pleasure, o f en tertain m en t, o r o f aesth etic en jo y m en t, th is read in g never affects sim ply a so rt o f special sense: it affects u s as en tire h u m an beings; it affects o u r m o ral an d religious existence”
(E lio t, 1962, p. 51).
A C h ristia n a p p ro a c h to lite ra tu re will accept th a t th e W ord o f the L o rd is ab so lu te, th a t “ G o d ’s W ord is th e law th a t o rd ers an d stru ctu res th e w hole creation ...[a n d th a t] n o sp h ere o f life can be d iv o rced fro m th e service o f G o d ” (R oper, 1979, pp. 5 a n d 6), b u t in stead o f leading to prescriptivism , a truly C h ristian a p p ro a c h will, by v irtu e o f th e accep tan ce o f th e to ta lita ria n c h aracter o f th e W ord o f G o d , lead to u n b iased pro d u ctiv ity in th e field o f criticism , because no single critical co n cep t will th re a te n to tu rn in to a n ab so lu te w hich m ay d is to rt the critical ap p ro ach .
The autonom y o f the literary work
T h ere is a su b tle b u t crucial difference betw een the view o f th e literary w ork as an a u to n o m o u s stru c tu re a n d the C h ristian a p p ro ach . It is tru e th a t “ m en o u g h t to value lite ra tu re fo r being w h at it is; they ou g h t to evaluate it in term s an d in degrees o f its literary value” (W ellek an d W arren. 1942, p. 238).
T h e C h ristian critic is pre-em inently in th e p o sition to account fo r the unique
qualities o f the literary w ork, because he is able to consider the literary w ork from th e perspective o f real freedom o f th o u g h t.
A C h ristian a p p ro a c h to literatu re does n o t im ply the opposite o f an intrinsic a p p ro a c h . R o o k m ak er says th a t “ A rt needs no ju stificatio n ” (1970, p. 229). It is not th e p rim ary fu n ctio n o f a rt o r literatu re to p ro m o te C hristianity; it has its own validity. R o o k m ak er explains th e validity o f a rt in term s o f all created things, like m o u n tain s, b ird s o r flowers: “ T h e ir m eaning is th a t they have been created by G od a n d are su stain ed by H im . S o a rt has a m eaning as a rt because G o d th o u g h t it good to give a rt a n d beau ty to h u m an ity ” (p. 230).
O bjectivity in criticism
Seerveld (1968) show s th a t th e extrem e o f the gustibus non disputandem est is an u n ten ab le attitu d e in criticism , b u t also rejects ab so lu te critical objectivity, w hich is trad itio n ally seen as the alternative to a personal an d subjectivist attitu d e. H e states th a t th e “ p o stu la tio n o f specifically C h ristian (n o t universally A bsolute!) canons fo r a rt a n d fo r literary criticism are u rg en t” (p. 101). Such canons fo r criticism sh o u ld be objective in a m odified sense: in focussing a tte n tio n u p o n literatu re as literatu re.
T he C h ristian critic w ould d o well to tak e T.S. E lio t’s im personal theory o f poetry as his p o in t o f d e p a rtu re (cf. E lio t, 197S, p p . SO ff), w hich acknow ledges the sep araten ess o f th e literary w o rk as a valid a n d independent p a rt o f h u m an life. In E lio t’s critical th e o ry , th e literary w o rk m ay be ev alu a ted by its degree o f com plexity: the diversity o f its m aterials an d th e extent to w hich coherence has been achieved a m o n g them , b u t ju d g m e n t m ay n o t be based u p o n extra-literary in fo rm atio n .
C H R ISTIA N C R IT IC IS M
So fa r I have discussed vario u s p o in ts th a t sh o u ld oe tak en in to co n sid eratio n in a C h ristia n a p p ro a c h to lite ra tu re . I shall p roceed to give a critical acco u n t o f a few a tte m p ts to p ro d u c e a th eo ry o f C h ristia n criticism , as well as a b rie f co m p ariso n w ith a representative onto lo g ical th eo ry o f literatu re.
T.S E liot in Religion and L iterature
In T .S . E lio t’s essay, The Function o f Criticism , he places th e follow ing em phasis u p o n critical objectivity:
“ T h e critic, one w o u ld su p p o se, if he is to ju stify his existence, sh o u ld en d eav o u r to discipline his pe rso n a l p reju d ices a n d cra n k s — ta re s to w hich we are all subject — a n d co m pose his differences w ith as m any o f his fellow s as possible, in th e co m m o n p u rsu it o f tru e ju d g m e n t” (1975, p. 69).
290
In Religion and Literature, he is concerned w ith “ the ap p licatio n o f o u r religion to the criticism o f an y lite ra tu re ” (1962, p. 44). T his is a com plem entary statem ent to th a t m ad e in The Function o f Criticism , alth o u g h it superficially a p p ears to be a c o n tra d ic tio n . T h is becom es evident in th e light o f E lio t’s qualification o f his c o n cern w ith th e re la tio n o f religion an d literatu re: “ W h at I w ant is a literatu re w hich sh o u ld be unconsciously, ra th e r th a n deliberately an d defiantly, C h ristian ” (1962, p. 46).
A C h ristian a p p ro a c h to literatu re is necessary, according to Eliot, because n e u tra lity in criticism does n o t exist, a n d also because “ the a u th o r o f a w ork o f im ag in atio n is try in g to affect us w holly, as h u m an beings, w hether he know s it or n o t; a n d we are affected by it, as h um an beings, w hether we intend to be o r n o t”
(1962, p. 48).
■Unfortunately, E lio t’s argum ent is m arred by an untenable dichotom y. H e suggests th a t literary criticism sh o u ld be co n d u cte d by m eans o f purely literary criteria, but com pleted by extra-literary criteria:
“ W hat I believe to be incum bent up o n all C h ristian s is the duty o f m aintaining consciously certain sta n d a rd s an d criteria o f criticism over an d above those applied by th e rest o f th e w orld; a n d th a t by these criteria an d sta n d a rd s everything th a t we read m ust be tested ” (1962, p. 53).
It w ould be m ore p ro fitab le fo r the C h ristian critic to look into literature itself for sta n d a rd s o f ju d g m en t concerning literary greatness. T he C hristian is no super
critic, b u t like o th e r critics engaged in the p ursuit o f true ju d g m en t. A lthough he believes the W ord o f G o d to be the illum inating pow er in all spheres o f existence, he can only arrive a t true insight into literatu re by way o f critical hum ility.
It sh o u ld be p o in ted o u t at this stage th a t the co n cep t o f the co m m o n grace o f G o d has significance fo r literary criticism . It has been m entioned earlier in the essay th a t th e fact o f th e literary a rtis t’s being a C h ristia n o r a n unbeliever does n o t yield any in fo rm atio n a b o u t the literary q uality o f his art. T his is also tru e o f the literary critic, w hich is n o t observed by Eliot. T he C h ristian critic is not au to m atically a b e tte r critic th a n any o th e r, b u t the critical objectivity is uniquely possible w ithin the fram ew ork o f a C hristian approach.
Calvin Seerveld
In A Christian C ritique o f A rt and L iterature (1968) Seerveld asks: “ A re there any specifically C hristian canons o f criticism ?” (p. 62).
His C hristian guidelines fo r literary criticism are based on a C hristian philosophy.
T w o prelim inary o p eratio n s are: the process o f establishing w hether a given text is literatu re an d h istoriographic exegesis o r contextual illum ination. C riticism itself consists o f “ scientific analysis defined aesthetically” (p. 105) in term s o f three m ain questions.
Seerveld proceeds to m ake a practical analysis o f th e w ork o f Tennessee W illiams along the lines o f his philosophical schem e, w hich leads to th e classification o f W illiam s’ w ork as p a rt o f “ secularly spirited c o n tem p o rary literatu re” (p. 117).
I am n o t in the p o sitio n to com m ent u p o n Seerveld's philosophical com petence, alth o u g h I m ight ven tu re to p o in t o u t th a t he does n o t provide fo r literary criticism in term s o f the lingual dim ension o f th e literary w ork (cf. O lth u is’ provisional schem e). H ow ever, fro m the p o in t o f view o f the discipline o f literary criticism , Seerveld’s p ractical analysis is in ad eq u ate. It does n o t deal w ith the literary w ork as literatu re, b u t as a collection o f th o u g h ts an d ideas.
O lth u is’ provisional schem e has n o t yet been ap p lied in practice, b u t seem s to prom ise b e tte r results th a n this exercise in w h at m ay hesitan tly be called m oralist criticism . T he cru cial difference in th e tw o views o f criticism lies in O lth u is’
co n cep tio n o f th e m ovem ent in critical o p e ra tio n . Seerveld’s criticism is directed fro m th e certitu d in al d im ension to w ard s th e aesthetic, b u t n o t in the o pposite d irectio n , w hich causes his criticism to becom e a n exclusively extrinsic a p p ro a c h to literatu re.
'H.R. Rookmaker
A m ore satisfacto ry a p p ro a c h in term s o f p ractical app licab ility is th a t o f R o o k m a k e r in M o d em A r t an d the D eath o f a C ulture (1970). H is p rinciples o f a rt criticism are general artistic tru th s w hich also ap p ly to literary w orks.
H is an sw er to E lio t’s im passe resu ltin g fro m the a p p licatio n o f tw o sets o f norm s:
th e purely literary a n d the ex tra-literary criteria, is as follows:
“ T he q u estio n poses a false p ro b lem . A w ork o f a rt is m uch m ore th a n c a n be analysed by these tw o co n cep ts o f th e aesth etic an d th e m oral: if it is a g reat w ork o f a rt, it is a un ity in w hich very m any elem ents can be discovered” (1970, p. 232).
H e perceives a n u m b e r o f n o rm s an d stru c tu re s in a rt. T h e first o f these is the co n cep t of artistic truth. T his raises th e tra d itio n a l d ich o to m y o f the relatio n o f b e a u ty an d tru th , to w hich R oo k m ak er answ ers th a t C h rist is th e tru th , an d also p o in ts o u t th a t tru th in a r t does n o t m ean rep resen tatio n al tr u th , b u t in terp re tativ e tru th .
R o o k m a k e r h olds an o p tim istic a n d tru ly C h ristian view o f the purp o se o f a r t an d th e p o ssib ility o f estab lish in g a C h ristia n ap p ro a c h to a r t is accep ted as a reality by him:
“ B eauty o f co u rse is so m eth in g given by G o d as a gift to all to create. It is n o t lim ited to C h ristia n s. B u t because C h ristia n s h ave b een m ad e new in C h rist, they a re now in a p o sitio n to ap p reciate G o d ’s tru e in te n tio n fo r m an a n d th e w o rld , a n d create b e a u ty in a r t as a r e s u lt ... O u r a r t, as everything else, m u st be fro m H im , th ro u g h H im a n d to H im ” (p. 244).
292
René Wellelt
W ellck acknow ledges th e fact th a t th e aesth etic a n d th e lingual dim ensions o f the iiterary w o rk are n o t its only dim ensions, a n d th a t these do n o t offer com plete g ro u n d s fo r literary evaluation:
“ W e h ave to becom e literally critics to see the fu n ctio n o f style w ithin a to ta lity w hich inevitably will ap p eal to extralinguistic a n d extrastylistic values, to the h a rm o n y an d co h eren ce o f a w o rk o f a rt, to its relatio n to reality, to its insight in to its m eaning, a n d hence to its social a n d generally h u m an im p o rt” (1970, p. 342).
W ellek’s criterio n fo r the evalu atio n o f th e literary w o rk is inclusiveness. This involves th e ev alu a tio n o f literary w orks in term s o f th e diversity o f m aterial integrated in th e w o rk (m aterial includes b o th the aesth etic a n d the lingual dim ensions): in o th e r w ords, an evalu atio n in term s o f the com plexity o f th e literary w ork. “ T h e value o f the poem rises in direct ra tio to the diversity o f its m aterials”
(W ellek a n d W arren , 1942, p. 243). T he greatness o f a literary w ork m ay be e v alu ted in term s o f the resistance in the raw m aterials to be tran sfo rm ed in to art.
T he sim ilarity betw een W ellek’s fo rm u latio n o f criteria fo r the evalu atio n o f the literary w ork a n d R o o k m a k e r’s co n cep tio n o f a rt as a com plex stru ctu re suggests th a t a C h ristian a p p ro a c h to a rt a n d to literatu re a n d the ontological a p p ro a c h to th e literary w ork d o n o t p a rt com pany.
C O N C L U S IO N
F ro m the co n sid eratio n o f various attem p ts to system atically fo rm u late a C hristian a p p ro a c h to lite ra tu re an d a rt, as well as th e co n sid eratio n o f a n ontological a p p ro a c h to literatu re, it m ay be concluded th a t C h ristian criticism m ay not diverge from a firm ly literary course in dealing w ith literature: it sh ould be based on intensive stu d y o f th e ob ject o f its co ncern by m eans o f rigorously literary principles, in the p u rsu it o f tru e ju d g m en t.
T h e q u e stio n is n o t w hether it is possible to ap p reciate the literary p ro d u cts o f m an ’s creativ ity as a result o f th e grace o f G o d a n d a t th e sam e tim e to co n cen trate u p o n the u n iq u e q u alities o f these p ro d u c ts, b u t how such a C h ristian a p p ro a c h sh o u ld be realized in practical term s. T he final justification fo r C h ristian criticism w ould be to practise it. This is the task n o t o f the ph ilo so p h er, b u t o f the literary critic.
I w ould suggest th a t a p ro fitab le direction fo r C h ristian criticism is along the lines o f a m odification o f O lthuis’ schem e, extended w ith the aid o f insight achieved th ro u g h the ontological a p p ro ach to literature.
T he d istinctive featu re o f the C h ristian a p p ro a c h to literatu re is freedom . R o o k m ak er’s follow ing statem en t sh ould serve as a w arning against prescriptivism an d
critical arrogance:
“ F re e d o m is on ly tru ly p o s s ib le ... w ithin th e norm s a n d stru ctu res a n d laws w hich G o d has m ade us. It is fo r th e C h ristian to distinguish betw een a false legalism a n d a tru e freed o m to be w h at G o d in ten d s us to be, fo r w ith o u t th is freedom a rt will w ith er” (1970, p. 244).
B IB LIO G R A PH Y
Daichcs, D. 1956. Critical Approaches to Literature. London, Longman.
Eagleton, T. 1976. Marxism and Literary Criticism. London, Methuen.
Eliot, T.S. 1962. Religion and Literature. (In Scott, W.S., ed. Five Approaches of Literary Criticism. New York and London, Collier Macmillan Publishers, pp. 43-56).
Eliot, T.S. 1975. The Function of Criticism. (In Kermode, F., ed. Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, London, Faber and Faber, pp. 68-76).
Etchells, R. 1969. Unafraid to be: A Christian study of contemporary English writing.
London, Inter-Varsity Press.
Mukarovsky, J. 1970. Standard Language and Poetic Language. (In Freeman, D.C., ed.
Linguistics and Literary Style. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, pp. 40-56).
Olson, E. 1976. On Value Judgments in the Arts. Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press.
Opperman, D.J. 1974. Naaldekoker. Cape Town and Johannesburg, Tafelberg
Rookmaker, H.R. 1970. Modern Art and the Death of a Culture. London, Inter-Varsity Press.
Roper, D.L. 1979. Our Christian Task in the Arts: Some Preliminary Considerations.
Potchefstroom, Instituut vir die Bevordering van Calvinisme.
Seerveld, C. 1968. A Christian Critique of Art and Literature. Toronto. The Association for Reformed Scientific Studies.
Watson, G. 1978. The Discipline of English, London and Basingstoke, Macmillan.
Wellek, R. and Warren, A. 1942. Theory of Literature. Penguin.
Wellek, R. 1970. Discriminations: Further Concepts of Criticism. New Haven and London, Yale University Press.
