In this article we consider social cohesion primarily in terms of its absence – “the nature and extent of social and economic divisions within society” (Easterly et al.). Social cohesion is also often defined in negative terms – by its absence – as “the nature and extent of social and economic divisions within society” (Easterly et al.). This would give us insight into relevant factors that have implications for the prospect of social cohesion.
An overview of the range of definitions of social cohesion found in the literature provides an important insight into social cohesion as a concept: that there is "no single accepted definition of the term internationally" (OECD, 2012:53). Social cohesion can therefore also be defined in negative terms, by its absence, "as the nature and extent of social and economic divisions in society" (Easterly et al. That economic inequality is identified as the primary source of social division by the majority of respondents in the SARB -the study, is closely connected with a critique of social cohesion discourses in official.
The explanations found in the literature delineate two major mechanisms by which inequality causes social division and undermines social cohesion. There remains a lack of clarity about the nature of the causal relationship, or sequencing, between inequality and social cohesion.
Relative standing and inequality as the primary source of social division
It is impossible to know what the net effect of prosocial behavior and depressive symptoms would be on inequality in total, but it is certainly plausible that it may be associated with lower levels of social cohesion. If relative status is a major determinant of subjective well-being at the individual level, it seems likely that it may also have an impact on the level of cohesion of a society. Empirically, the expectation that relative status (and thus inequality) is a key determinant of social cohesion finds basis in the global study of Cederman et al. (2011).
The authors note that economic and political inequalities between ethnic groups increase the risk of conflict between them. More importantly for purposes here, they also find that groups below and above the national average in the estimated actual distribution of wealth are more likely to be involved in conflict than groups whose wealth is closer to the national average. Posel and Casale (2010) found significant differences between objective and subjective measures of relative ranking of individuals in the national income distribution in the context of South Africa, with perceived relative position having a.
Using data from the 2008 wave of the National Income Dynamics Survey (NIDS), Posel and Casale (2010) found that perceived economic rank is a much better predictor of subjective well-being than actual rank as measured by income data. Cruces et al (2013) observed similar discrepancies between objective measures and subjective ratings of relative standing in a study in Argentina. Regarding respondents' assessments of their own relative position, Cruces et al (2013) find that where respondents thought they fit in the national distribution was strongly related to their place in the local income distribution or some other reference group.
These findings have two important implications for the study of relative status as it relates to social attitudes: (i) that subjective understanding of where one fits in the economic distribution may be a better indicator of social attitudes than more objective measures; and (ii) that the extent to which people identify with a reference group matters for the extent to which feelings of relative deprivation influence social attitudes. Further work by Posel and Rogan (2016) examines the finding that there is significant overlap between monetary and subjective measures of poverty in South Africa. Of interest to this article, subjective assessments of poverty are related to factors beyond the household's current economic resources, including the household's ability to generate resources in the past and in the future, the household's access to basic facilities and average health status. status of household members.
Using a subjective measure of relative perceived financial situation might be more indicative of how the household views its continued prosperity than an objective measure of current income or expenditure.
Data: South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB)
Therefore, both groups think they are closer to the median than they really are. With the help of data from the Survey of Living Conditions (2008/9), they find that three fifths of all households that are defined as poor in terms of household expenditure per capita also self-assess as poor. A number of characteristics appear to be important for the divergence between monetary metric and subjective poverty.
The 2015 SARB survey was conducted in August and September 2015 by international market research agency TNS. The study used a multi-stage cluster design, where enumerator areas (EAs) were randomly selected and households within each of these areas were randomly selected for visits. The final sample of 2,219 respondents was then weighted to adequately represent the adult population of South Africa.
Data from the 2015 SARB round is used to examine whether there is a relationship between relative economic well-being among South Africans and the belief that inequality is the greatest source of division in the South African context. In addition, the characteristics that make individuals more likely to identify economic inequality as the greatest source of social division are considered, and in doing so shed light on the conditions in which economic inequality is perceived to cause division - and thus social undermine cohesion.
Descriptive Statistics
Considering perceptions of one's economic situation by ethnicity in Figure 2, it is interesting to note that people of color are most likely to consider themselves worse off than other South Africans, and that this exceeds the likelihood that black South Africans consider themselves even for the worst off, which is demonstrated. to be objectively disadvantaged elsewhere. One might have expected that a larger proportion of white South Africans would consider themselves better off than other South Africans, especially since a larger proportion consider themselves relatively worse off than their Indian counterparts. A small majority of respondents report that the gap between rich and poor is the primary social divide.
People of color are more likely to consider inequality the main social divide (58%) and this is consistent with objective intra-racial inequality which is consistently high. White individuals are the least likely of the population groups to have reported the gap between rich and poor as a major social divide, although 47% of white individuals consider it so. Indian/Asian individuals are slightly more likely than black individuals to consider the gap between rich and poor the main social divide, although a small majority (or slightly more than a majority) of both groups certainly perceive it in this way.
The Model
This model examines a variety of factors, some subjective in relation to the individual's perception of the greatest division in South Africa. If the individual concerned in any of these cases has registered the gap between rich and poor which forms the biggest divide in South Africa, the outcome variable for the logistic model presented is 1. Relative to those who rate their relative financial status as poorer reported, those who see themselves as equally or better off are significantly less likely to view inequality as the primary social divide in South Africa.
In terms of racial groups, white respondents are slightly less likely to think that the gap between rich and poor is the biggest divide in South Africa compared to black respondents. Interestingly, black and Indian/Asian minorities are more likely to consider income inequality to be the biggest divide in South Africa. Women are slightly more likely than men to consider the gap between rich and poor to be the biggest divide in South Africa.
This may be due to the fact that women in South Africa earn lower wages across the board (Finn, 2015:10). Female-headed households are also common in South Africa, and these costs and relatively lower wages can contribute to women feeling the gap between rich and poor more acutely. In terms of education, compared to those with incomplete education, all those with higher education believe that the gap between rich and poor is significantly less likely to be the largest gap in South Africa.
People living in formal housing are less likely than those in informal or traditional housing to view inequality as the biggest divide in South Africa. Older individuals are slightly less likely to see the gap between the rich and the poor as the biggest divide in South Africa, but the size of this effect is small. Our findings have shown that one's perceived economic situation matters for the recognition of inequality as the most critical social division in South Africa.
Worryingly, school leavers are significantly less likely to identify inequality as the primary social divide in South Africa.
Conclusion
Feelings of marginalization and relevant social divisions are likely to be complex compared to those who have no direct interest in the labor market. Perceptions of inequality as social divisions are linked to historical racial and gender disadvantage and continued exclusion.
Contemporary theoretical perspectives on the study of social cohesion and social capital Brussels: Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten. Measured as poor versus feeling poor: Comparing monetary and subjective levels of poverty in South Africa. Relative Attitude and Subjective Well-Being in South Africa: The Role of Perceptions, Expectations and Income Mobility.
National Reconciliation, Social Mobility in an Unequal Society: Exploring Access and Advantage in South Africa. A comparative study of income inequality, corruption and how inequality and corruption reinforce each other and erode social trust.
