This thesis provides an explanation of contemporary bilateral relations between India and Pakistan in relation to the Kashmir conflict. Looking at the historical background of the conflict, it explains how the Kashmir conflict has become a thorn in the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Indeed, the study provides an insight into the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan in the context of the Kashmir conflict. To illustrate this point I identify the dimension of identity politics, which is also at the heart of the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan.
CHAPTER THREE
SELF-HELP MEASURES
There is also the possibility of a nuclear confrontation over the Kashmir crisis and this is one of the overall implications for the security of South Asia. The 1998 nuclear tests carried out individually by India and Pakistan in connection with inconsistent interpretations of the Cold War undoubtedly led to the debate on the possibility of a nuclear war between the two South Asian giants (Ganguly and Wagner, 2010:479). This section does not focus overtly on the techniques of nuclear deterrence doctrine (Holloway, 1979; Freedman, 2004) as such.
While it remains the case that there is no solution to the Kashmir issue and relations between India and Pakistan remain tense, this interdependence means that there are greater chances of finding a solution, either by the rest of the world, either bilaterally. Consequently, most of the arguments presented here show that the current nature of India-Pakistan relations, the Kashmir issue, and the possibilities of inadvertent escalation of nuclear war pose greater challenges to the security of the South Asian region. The 1998 nuclear tests, combined with inconsistent interpretations of the Cold War, appear to have exaggerated the possibility of nuclear war in South Asia (Ganguly and Wagner, 2010: 479).
On the one hand, this big game hinders the international community's efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.
CHAPTER FOUR
AN AUDIT OF THE INDIA-PAKISTAN PEACE PROCESS
Despite India's non-cooperative stance on the plebiscite issue, the Security Council did not give up on the issue. At the invitation of the Soviet Union, Shastri and Ayub Khan met in the city of Tashkent, Republic of Uzbekistan. After the end of the Cold War, US interests changed in the region.
Moreover, India has linked the resumption of Composite Dialogue with Pakistan to the prosecution of all those involved in the attacks. However, US involvement may not bring the desired results on this issue. 75 that there has not been any meaningful or substantial involvement of the international community in the Kashmir issue.
In this chapter I have provided a historical analysis of the various phases of attempts to settle the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and their outcomes.
CHAPTER FIVE
INDIA-PAKISTAN BILATERAL RELATIONS
78 in the 1990s under the auspices of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), their economic ties still remained extremely weak. The nature of the regimes in both countries greatly affects the process of conflict resolution and their bilateral relations. More importantly, in the wake of the Mumbai attack, India is actively pursuing an entrenchment strategy, a combination of cooperation and containment, vis-à-vis Pakistan.
On the contrary, Pakistan has not yet granted MFN status to India as it has linked the issue to the resolution of the Kashmir conflict (Jillani 2011). As a result, bilateral trade and economic cooperation has been hampered, without having any positive impact on the resolution of the Kashmir conflict. Multiple power centers in Pakistan have tied the hands of civilian leaders in making politically sensitive decisions on the Kashmir conflict.
This proves the extent of the existing interplay between both ethnic and religious factors and the impact they have on the inability to resolve the Kashmir issue.
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION
Nevertheless, Pakistan's adoption of asymmetric strategies and tactics, large balance of power between both countries, Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons, distribution of power at the local level and the nature of the Kashmir theater mitigated India's superiority. As a result, bilateral trade and economic cooperation remain relatively low and have not made any positive impact on the resolution of the Kashmir conflict. After succumbing to pressure from the international community, both countries expressed their desire to resume dialogue in February 2011.
Due to the growing human, political and economic costs of the conflict, both countries have a trust deficit and lack the political will to resume the peace process that was interrupted after the Mumbai attack. As a result, ongoing conflicts and simmering tensions have changed the nature of the conversation on the Kashmir dispute over the years. From this discussion, I have shown that the Kashmir issue poses a major challenge to the security of South Asia, making the region one of the most dangerous places in the world.
Such a guarantee is unlikely judging by the previous precedent in the relationship between the two states' (Vaish, 2011:72).
APPENDICES
ACCESSION DOCUMENT
Achieving these goals is believed to be essential to the well-being of India and Pakistan's 600 million people. They felt that the continuation of tension between the two countries does not serve the interests of peace in their region and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and indeed the interests of the people of India and Pakistan. Kashmir was discussed and each side presented their point of view. ii) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries will be. 123 by February 25, 1966 at the latest, to withdraw to the positions they held before August 5, 1965, and both sides will observe the terms of the cease-fire on the cease-fire line. iii) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agreed that relations between India and Pakistan would be based on the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs. iv) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the other country and will encourage propaganda that promotes the development of friendly relations between the two countries. v) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agreed that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High Commissioner of Pakistan to India would return to their posts and that normal functioning of the diplomatic missions of the two countries would be restored.
Both Governments will comply with the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. vi) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed to consider measures for the restoration of economic and trade relations, communications and cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan and to take measures to implement the existing Agreement between India and Pakistan feed . The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue discussions on issues related to the problems of refugees and the deportation of illegal migrants. They further agree to discuss the return of the properties and assets taken by both parties in connection with the conflict. ix) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue their meetings at the highest and other levels on matters of direct concern to both countries.
They invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to attend this declaration.
Peace Agreements Digital Collection
The following is the text of the joint statement issued at the end of the Prime Minister, Mr. In response to an invitation from the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Pakistan from 20 to 21 February 1999 during the inauguration of the Delhi-Lahore bus link. A banquet in honor of the Indian Prime Minister and his delegation was hosted by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at Lahore Fort the same evening.
On February 21, a civic reception was held in the Governor's House in honor of the visiting Prime Minister. The following is the text of the memorandum of understanding signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Reaffirming their governments' continued commitment to the principles and purposes of the UN.
The two sides will undertake a review of existing communication links (eg between the respective Directors General, Military Operations) with a view to improving and enhancing these links and ensuring safe and secure communications.
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