Dooyeweerd introduced the term individuality structure: “The philosophy of the cosmonomic idea does not first break up a thing's unity into modal spheres of law, and then, in retrospect, look for unity in a thing. Often the law describing the structure of a specific subject (eg the copper atom) can be reduced to a few more general laws (eg the electromagnetic laws in quantum physics).
The need for a non-reductionist ontology
The continuity postulate in modern philosophy and biology
Continuity and discontinuity
From what is stated on the previous page, it is clear that in Coyne's thinking primacy is given to the irrationalist side of nominalism, because it is the continuous process of evolution that produces discrete groups: "For years after the publication of the Origin, biologists struggled and failed to explained how a continuous process of evolution produces discrete groups known as species" (Coyne.
Ambiguities caused by the continuity postulate
From what is argued on the previous page, it is clear that in the thought of Coyne, primacy is given to the irrationalist side of nominalism, because it is the continuous process of development that produces discrete groups: "For years after the publication of The Origin, biologists struggled and failed to explain how a continuous process of evolution produces the discrete groups known as species" (Coyne, 2009:185). The idea of emergent properties can therefore suggest that increasing complexity can produce, from a purely physical constellation, biotic properties or even the biotic aspect of reality This would mean that an additional subject function can "emerge", namely the biotic aspect - as Klapwijk argues in 2008.
However, in a recent message to Thinknet (an online discussion group on Reformation philosophy) he advocates the view “that the phenomena present at a higher level of being have emerged in the process of time, but not the basic laws that control such innovation; these laws are commands given by God, laws as old as creation” (Thinknet Commentary, June 8, 2015).
Problems attached to emergent-evolutionism
Yet, if this transition does not eliminate the initial (or primary) aspect, it is wrong to claim that it has changed into another aspect. However, the flow of evolutionary events is not always smooth and uniform; it also contains crises and turning points which, viewed in retrospect, may appear as breaks in continuity. Furthermore, Dobzhansky believes that "the phenomena of the inorganic, organic and human levels are subject to different laws specific to those levels" (Dobzhansky, 1967:43).
An important difference, however, is that Dobzhansky thinks it unnecessary to assume any internal reduction of these laws, despite the fact that he adds that it is "useless to describe the phenomena of a dominant level in terms of those in foundation" (Dobzhansky, 1967:43). In particular he asserts that "universal constants, such as mass, and respectively energy, charge, rotation as well as local and temporal properties, are not reducible to something else" (Rensch.
Alternative biological trends of thought in 20 th century biology
Indeed, the concept of organization as something independent of internal and external environments implies that form must be the basic characteristic of all living things” (Sinnott, 1972:51). Haas emphasizes the obedience of every living being in working out the course of his life to an inherent law or program, which he prefers to refer to as his plan of life: “The plan of life contains as its constituent parts the plans of each of its expressions; the genetic plan for their succession; a functional plan for the implementation of its activity; a behavioral plan for all his 'actions'.” (Haas, 1974:336). Heitler uses this term in the context of the following hypothesis that he would like to defend (against consistent physicalism): "The organism has its own laws, which partially supersede the laws of physics and chemistry with something more general" (Heitler, 1976). :3).
By integration we can obtain statements about the overall relationship (eg, the shape of the planetary orbits), but these must follow from the differential elements” (Heitler, 1976:5). The gestalt of the cell (or cat's paw) exceeds all descriptive possibilities of c.g.s.
The continuity postulate relativizes distinct levels
According to him, world events are governed by several basic laws: “Despite all evidence in favor of the monistic principle, the primary basis of world events is pluralistic” (Rensch, 1971:33). Rensch refers in particular to “the causal law, universal constants, the law of conservation, the principles of symmetry and the laws of logic” (Rensch see also Rensch, 1991:236ff). If there are no discontinuities in the evolutionary lineage, then lower animals, plants and even the inorganic sphere should exhibit certain corresponding “psychic” components – a conclusion drawn by Rensch: “According to our previous findings and discussions, we are justified in to take .
It would not be impossible to attribute 'psychic' components also to the realm of inorganic systems, ie. As a substitute for the assumption that psychic phenomena appeared suddenly after an astronomical and geological prehistory of thousands of years, Rensch believes that it is much more conceivable and acceptable to connect the evolution of the psychic to the evolution of the material (anzufügen), i.e.
The underlying dialectic of nature and freedom
Intelligent design (ID)
A common modern view advocates the idea that natural "interactions between simple material entities governed by natural laws eventually produce chemical elements from elementary particles, then complex molecules from simple chemical elements, then simple life from complex molecules, then more complex life from simpler life, and finally conscious living beings like ourselves". However, in the Prologue to the second book, Darwin's Doubt (2013), Stephen Meyer notes: “The kind of information that is present in living cells—i.e. No undirected physical or chemical process has demonstrated the ability to produce definite information starting "from purely physical or chemical."
For this reason, chemical evolutionary theories have failed to solve the mystery of the origin of first life – a claim that few mainstream evolutionary theorists now dispute” (Meyer, 2013:vi). This book explores the mystery of the Cambrian explosion which was initially dated between 20 and 40 million years ago, now reduced to 5 or 6 million years (Meyer, 2013:72).
Increasing complexity exceeding traditional genetics
In some organisms, as much as half of the entire genome consists of ORFan genes” (Meyer. In the absence of homologs, ORFans cannot be linked to a common ancestral gene, a “fact tacitly recognized by the increasing number of evolutionary biologists who attempt to 'explain' the origin of such genes through de novo ('out of nowhere') origins” (Meyer, 2013:216).Erwin and Davidson argue that no current evolutionary theory explains the origin of the de novo body plans. found in the Cambrian explosion (see Meyer, 2013:356).
The result is clear: "the cause responsible for the generation of the new animal forms, whatever it was, must have been different from any observed biological process operating today in actual living populations" (Meyer, 2013:356). This turmoil includes the evidence of the Cambrian explosion which, according to Erwin and Davidson (2002), is not accounted for by any known (micro or macro) theory of evolution.
The idea of a Bauplan is shared by different orientations
The challenge and mystery of the Cambrian explosion
At each level of the biological hierarchy, organisms require specific and highly unlikely (information-rich) arrangements of lower-level constituents to maintain their form and function. Genes require specified arrangements of nucleotide bases; proteins require specified arrangements of amino acids; cell structures and cell types require specified arrangements of proteins or systems of proteins; tissues and organs require specific arrangements of specific cell types; and body plans require specialized arrangements of tissues and organs. What Meyer and other ID theorists want to take into account is the fact that “the animal forms that emerged in the Cambrian not only did so without any clear material antecedent; they arrived on the scene complete with digital code, dynamically expressed integrated circuits, and multi-layered, hierarchically organized information storage and processing systems” (Meyer, 2013:381).
He argues that “evoking the activity of a mind provides a causally adequate explanation for the pattern of abrupt appearance in the Cambrian fossil record” (Meyer, while also explaining the “observed stasis in the fossil record” (Meyer, 2013: 375) stasis concerns “animal body plans that define the higher taxa, including classes and phyla” that “remain exceptionally stable in their basic architectural designs, and show 'no change in direction' with respect to geological history after their first appearance in the Cambrian.
The “designing” capacities of an “intelligent mind”
Furthermore, the design of an "intelligent mind" is as irrelevant as the "laws of nature" that apply to physical entities. The materialist claim that "everything is material" is self-contradictory, as we have already mentioned, since the conditions (laws) of our being material are not material in themselves, any more than the conditions of our being green are green. . Type laws are created that apply to different types (types) of entities and exhibit typically defined universal properties that allow us to imagine them (concepts consist of universal properties).
The ID argument attempts to account for the intelligibility of these features by postulating an intelligent agent, without critically reflecting on this leap from intelligibility to an intelligent agent or an intelligent design. Artifacts are the result of formative human actions that presuppose the type laws that apply to different kinds of cultural objects.
The idea of type laws as an alternative to physicalism and ID
The difference between the atomistic Einzelkausalität and the holistic "Ganzheitskausalität" is also framed in terms of the opposition Ganzheit and Zufall (totality and chance). He declares that the question of freedom is to be regarded as a metaphysical question of faith that cannot be answered by the science of philosophy (cf. Driesch. In his theory of the freedom of the will, Arnold Gehlen continues Driesch's negative description of the "entelechy".
At the same time he realizes that Driesch actually brought biotic phenomena under the rule of the classical deterministic ideal of science. It will suffice to mention that Dawkins and Gould respectively represent the nature pole and the freedom pole of the basic humanist motif of nature and freedom.
Concluding remark
The mystery of the supposed origin of the first living entity and the mystery of the unbroken paleontological record as well as the currently living natural system should lead us to accept what we don't really know, rather than jumping to speculative paths. of explanation, such as like the unsubstantiated postulate of continuity or the idea of an Intelligent Designer. After confronting the order of creation, which includes modal laws and typical laws, we are also facing the limits of our scientific conceptual understanding, because a transcendental-empirical investigation of modal laws and typical laws on the basis of the regularity of reality does not tell us how God created the universe. Earlier we mentioned that Meyer is fully justified in writing that "chemical evolutionary theories have failed to solve the mystery of the origin of the first life".
Critical Thoughts on the General Part of Descartes' Principles, in: Philosophical Works, pp. 383-412. The nature of chemical bonding and the structure of molecules and crystals: an introduction to modern structural chemistry.
