The Potential Role of Social Media in Peacebuilding in Zimbabwe
Enock Ndawana
University of Johannesburg, South Africa
Abstract
This article uses securitisation theory to examine the Zimbabwean government’s handling of protests and protesters’ use of social media. It is based on the case study of Harare and data gathered from both primary and secondary sources. The article argues that securitisation of the right to protest in Zimbabwe forecloses opportunities for engagement, which negatively affects peace and develop- ment. It asserts that social media platforms’ capacity to mobilise discontented citizens for protests can be used by Zimbabwean policy makers to engage the citizens and enhance the formulation and development of pro-peace and development policy initiatives. The article concludes that embracing relevant digital technologies, particularly social media platforms, can offer broader policy engagement opportunities and thereby minimise protests by disgruntled citizens.
Keywords
Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF, peacebuilding, securitisation, digital technology, social media, protests
Introduction
In Zimbabwe, the right to protest has been increasingly endangered by the state. The government shuts down the internet, either totally or partially, in the face of threatening protests in urban areas (Madenga, 2021, pp. 400–401). This is primarily occasioned by the national security concerns arising from the perceived capacity of social media to mobilise and coordinate users and protesters (Matingwina, 2018). The two main occasions that put Zimbabwe under the spotlight for interfering with the citizens’ access to the internet during protests were in 2016 and 2019. In July 2016, access to WhatsApp was partially closed for more than 4 h whereas in January 2019 the government imposed a total closure of all internet services for seven days (Mare, 2020, p. 4247). Both occasions revealed the increasing importance of social media in registering dissent against deteriorating socio-economic conditions and restricting of democratic space (Mpofu & Mare, 2020). The role of social media in protests in Zimbabwe is largely confined to urban areas. According to Datareportal (2022), out of around 15 million people in which 32.5% and 67.5% live in urban and rural areas, respectively, there were 4.65 million (30.6%) internet users and 1.55 million (10.2%) social media users in Zimbabwe in
Corresponding Author:
Enock Ndawana, Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, P. O. Box 524, Auckland Park 2006, South Africa.
Email: [email protected]; [email protected]
& Development 2023, Vol. 18(1) 53–67
© The Author(s) 2023
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sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI: 10.1177/15423166231154408 journals.sagepub.com/home/jpd
January 2022. Zimbabwe’s rural areas face huge challenges such as poor or lack of network coverage and shortage of electricity (Chiweshe, 2017, p. 171). The high cost of data and smartphones also con- tinue to prevent many poor people in both rural and urban areas to access the internet (Matsilele, 2022, p. 93).
There is a contradiction between the Zimbabwean government and non-state actors’and citizens’view of protests. On the one hand, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government solely views protests as predisposed to cause anarchy and as part of a foreign-backed effort targeting illegal regime change. Thus, it uses coercive state apparatus and concomitant measures in quelling the violence.
On the other hand, civil society, opposition political parties and citizens consider their protest activities as peaceful and meant to register their displeasure against the worsening social, economic and political con- ditions in the country. They strongly believe that unending corruption and mismanagement of the economy by the government brought about the unbearable situation in the country. They consider the use of coercive force by partisan institutions as solely meant to stop them from exercising their constitutional right (Feltoe et al., 2016). The shutting down of the internet and banning of protests signify extraordinary mea- sures in which citizens are denied their fundamental civic and political rights such as the freedom of asso- ciation and assembly and the right to demonstrate and petition under the pretext that they pose existential threats to Zimbabwe (Ndawana, 2021, pp. 138–147). For instance, in both 2016 and 2019, the government not only temporarily suspended citizens’access to WhatsApp and the internet respectively citing abuse of the social media platforms, but also briefly banned protests altogether (Hove et al., 2020, p. 80; Ndawana, 2020, p. 205). The net effect has been primarily political insecurity, which is used here to denote the antithesis of political security. The latter entails a situation where people are able to live in a social order that respects their basic human rights, observes the rule of law and guarantees political freedom (Hassan, 2015, p. 86).
Extant studies on the use of social media in protest movements have shown how they have enabled activists to circumvent censorship, organise and direct protests and spread rumour effortlessly in cases where governments have a predilection to suppress dissent and control public discourse (e.g.
Garrett, 2006; Mugari, 2020). The London riots of 2011 showed social media’s, especially Facebook and Twitter, potential to facilitate riotous protests (Yang, 2013). In Africa, social media was central in mobilising and coordinating protests against authoritarian regimes in North Africa during the Arab Spring, which started in 2010 (Barrons, 2012). In Zimbabwe, social media has been effectively used to express political dissent and mobilising political protest and other forms of injustice (Gukurume, 2017; Hove & Chenzi, 2020; Matsilele, 2022; Matsilele & Ruhanya, 2021). As an excep- tion, Chiweshe (2017) found that urban youths in Harare mainly used social media to discuss anything but serious political engagement thus promoting political apathy. Still, the successful use of social media in registering dissent in Zimbabwe has culminated in the government implementing state- directed internet shutdowns (Madenga, 2021; Mare, 2020) and extensive digital surveillance (Munoriyarwa, 2022). Elsewhere, governments such as those in China, Russia, Egypt, and Ethiopia have also resorted to various forms of internet censorship apart from a total or partial internet shutdown in the face of protests mobilised and coordinated through social media (Ayalew, 2019; Gerbaudo, 2013;
Wu, 2018). This has been justified on the basis that social media platforms are also used to spread fake news designed to generate fear and panic among the citizenry (Walsh, 2020b).
A growing body of literature acknowledges the role of information and communication technologies (ICT) in promoting peacebuilding work (e.g. Baytiyeh, 2019; Grunewald & Hedges, 2021; Kahl &
Puig Larrauri, 2013; LeFebvre, 2016; Onditi, 2021; Spillane, 2015; Tellidis & Kappler, 2016;
Wahlisch, 2020). For Kahl and Puig Larrauri (2013), digital technology has not only offered There is a contradiction between the
Zimbabwean government and non-state actors’and citizens’view of protests.
peacebuilding processes new avenues of engagement, participation and accountability. It has also brought with it the empowerment of people to participate in conflict management efforts in their com- munities through promoting collaboration, change of attitudes, and offering a robust voice to commu- nities. Digital technology also has the potential to narrow the time lag between warning about and response to a conflict situation by both local and national authorities (Spillane, 2015). It has also been argued that peacebuilding processes are likely to benefit from‘the strengths of social media to reach more people, hear more voices, and build lasting peace through meaningful dialog’ (LeFebvre, 2016, p. 231). Yet, other scholars (e.g. Wahlisch, 2020, p. 123) observed that the challenges that can stand in the way of new technology to work for peace include restricted internet access and related limitations in conflict zones. This undermines the government’s efforts to exploit the internet to get an appreciation of people’s opinions. Again, though new technologies can help in conflict pre- vention and diplomatic initiatives, they cannot provide political nuances from personal experiences and intuition, which still require face-to-face engagements.
A major benefit of digital technology in the context of peace and security is its potential to provide gov- ernments and people with the ability to, among other issues, gather citizens’needs and grievances, analyse the data and use it to improve the citizens’ lives (Mugari & Chisuvi, 2021; Senekal &
Kotzé, 2019). For example, social media platforms such as Twitter have been effectively used by the police in a number of countries to inform the public about real-time crime-related events and risks (Walsh, 2020a). Social media platforms have also been used to build trust and support as a result of the posting of messages relating to successful crime prevention, updates about ongoing law enforcement work and correction of misinformation on various media platforms (Schneider, 2016).
Senekal and Kotzé’s (2019) study on South Africa found that the extensive use of the WhatsApp plat- form has the potential to turn the messages exchanged there into a valuable avenue for obtaining Open Source Intelligence. This provides almost real-time data on the potential occurrence of mass violence, which enables timely interventions. Mugari and Chisuvi’s (2021, p. 97) study on social media and national security in Zimbabwe also noted that‘as a news platform, social media enables the dissemin- ation of critical information on socio-economic issues to citizens and the more the citizens get informed on issues that affect their livelihoods, the less their agitation and predisposition to violent dissent’. This article brings together the hitherto divergent scholarly works on the use of social media in protest movements and ICT for peace focusing on the ways in which social media platforms could be used beneficially for peace in Zimbabwe. It diverges from previous works that mainly focused on the role of social media in protests and violent government responses (e.g. Gukurume, 2017; Hove &
Chenzi, 2020; Madenga, 2021; Mare, 2020; Matsilele, 2022; Matsilele & Ruhanya, 2021;
Munoriyarwa, 2022). This article demonstrates that securitisation of the right to protest in Zimbabwe forecloses opportunities for engagement, which negatively affects peace and development.
It also shows how social media platforms’capacity to mobilise discontented citizens for protests can be used by policy makers to engage the citizens and turn around state-society relations.
This article’s analysis is the outcome of data collected through a review of literature and interviews conducted in Harare with 15 purposively selected officials in both the public and private spheres between July and October 2019. These included both serving and retired senior personnel from the security sector, policy-makers, civil society and opposition political parties. Only eight interviews are cited in this article. The interviews were conducted during the author’sfieldwork for his doctoral research, which received ethical clearance from the University of Johannesburg. The doctoral study focused on how militarisation shaped human and state security in Zimbabwe. Given the sensitive nature of this study, all informants are anonymised. The research guide questions included: What role did social media play in the July 2016 and January 2019 protests? Why did the government respond with forceful measures to handle protests and protesters’use of social media in July 2016
and January 2019? How can the government promote the use of social media for peace and dialogue?
As Zimbabwe’s capital city, Harare possesses the potential to unravel interesting viewpoints about the topic under discussion. It is where key state security and political stakeholders are found, and its control is often a space of contestation among different political groups. The documentary analysis included peer-reviewed works and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) reports. Newspaper articles from both public and private newspapers covering the July 2016 and January 2019 protests in English were also consulted in order to overcome the challenge of media polarisation in the country. A key advantage of the documentary sources used is that they provided access to information on securitised state responses to protests in Harare and other urban areas in the country.
The article proceeds in four parts. It provides the theoretical framework illuminating the study’s ana- lysis before turning to discuss the securitisation of protests and protesters’use of social media, which occurred during the July 2016 and January 2019 protests. Lastly, the article explains how the Zimbabwean security sector and public institutions can adapt technology to remain viable and able to efficiently fulfil their constitutional mandates thereby promoting genuine peace and security before ending with a conclusion.
Securitisation Theory
Originally developed by the Copenhagen School of critical security studies,1 securitisation theory submits that threats are not existent ‘out there’ as an objective occurrence discernible by reference to set conditions. Instead, threats arise out of a process where an issue is portrayed discursively as an existential threat and is acknowledged as such by a related audience (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 31).
The key components of a successful securitisation, according to the Copenhagen School, entails the securitising actor; invocation of existential threat; exceptional measures for dealing with the threat and an accepting audience (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 32–33). An effective securitisation includes that the actor has the position of power and authority to generate the securitising claim, that the assumed threats enable securitisation and that the securitising speech act invokes security discourses.
Consequently, security is‘intersubjective’in that it is decided among key actors. Critics have ques- tioned the importance of a sanctioning audience in securitisation, especially outside western societies.
For example, Floyd (2016) argues that successful securitisation is realised when a threat that validates a response (securitising move) has been identified. It is followed by a transformation of behaviour (action) by a pertinent agent (securitising actor), and the action taken is justified by the securitising actor making reference to the identified threat and stated in the securitising move. This shows that the production of security is interwoven with political expectations about what needs to be secure and from what. Thus, no objective and set conditions determine the existence of security threats but subjective ones as judged by the state elite.
Although securitisation theory is restricted by its state-centric emphasis and overstating the sovereignty of state actions (Waever, 2011, p. 469), it offers a useful window through which one can assess the Zimbabwean state responses to protests and protesters’use of social media. It reveals a greater depart- ure from understanding protest as a democratic right to recognising protest as a threat to order in the state or to national security. The moment the threat has been recognised, the actor that has generated the assertion is in a position to validate any exceptional actions by connecting to the defence of the object of security, culminating in a great politicisation of events bounded within the domain of emer- gency politics (Newman, 2010, p. 85). Social problems have long ceased to be dealt with via a consen- sual process. There is also a departure from democratically established policies and procedures which take place separate from regulated political activity, thus rejecting protest and use of social media during protests as legitimate practices of public participation within the political space (Taureck,
2006). Cognisant of the fact that securitisation often results in the militarisation of the responses to security issues, key proponents of securitisation theory suggest desecuritising issues, that is, removing them from the security agenda and emergency politics (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 4). Desecuritisation calls for the consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of handling particular challenges within security or non-security milieus. In certain contexts such as epidemic diseases, securitisation is desir- able because it assists people to manage major problems by concentrating and rallying focus and resources (Waever, 2011, p. 469).
In relating this outline to the Zimbabwean context, the criminalisation of protests, and protesters’use of social media qualifies them as threats to order, and the stability of society. This results in the government’s decision to take exceptional measures including shutting down the internet, which violates the protesters’ standing and rights as citizens. Protests and efforts to hold the government answerable, with or without the use of social media often become associated with the opposition. Being delineated as a threat signifies that those engaging in protests are deprived of their political agency to justifiably play a part within the state.
Working under this facade of national security, the state legitimises and imposes a securitised reaction.
The security forces are bestowed with a great deal of power to deal with law-breaking and uncertainty in a securitised state (Maroleng, 2005). Those who have the most power in government are reinforced via the securitisation of the state (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 29). The emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 as a vibrant oppos- ition party resulted in the political competition being tough for ZANU-PF than before.2 While the Zimbabwe Republic Police has increasingly banned or interfered with protests by the opposition and civic society, it rarely does the same for ZANU-PF activists, which it actually provides police escorts (Zimbabwe Peace Project [ZPP], 2016, pp. 6–7). Securitisation measures against protests are considered necessary for the maintenance of order and stability but they fail to rectify the citizens’grievances.
Costs of the Securitisation of Protests and Social Media in Harare in 2016 and 2019
Social media, in particular WhatsApp, played an immense role in mobilising and coordinating the pro- tests that occurred on 6 July 2016. This was partly due to its relative cheapness compared to other internet-dependent platforms such as Facebook and Twitter (Young, 2016). These protests were code- named #ShutdownZim and were largely in the form of a stay away. They were mainly mobilised and directed by the #ThisFlag movement led by Pastor Evan Mawarire (Gukurume, 2022, p. 287). Many citizens in the major cities and towns in the country such as Harare and Bulawayo heeded the call for a stay away (ZPP, 2016). The protests were prompted by the government’s introduction of Statutory Instrument 64 of 2016. It banned citizens without import licences from continuing to buy in bulk a range of goods, including basic commodities, outside the country in the midst of a deterior- ating socio-economic and political environment (Musarurwa, 2016, p. 52). In 2016, social media was also used by many youth-led protest movements such as the Occupy Africa Unity Square and the Tajamuka/Sesjikile (We have rebelled) Campaign to protest against a deteriorating economic crisis and poor human rights record (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2016, p. 3). The major problems facing the country at the time ranged from delayed payment of civil servants’ salaries, unreformed electoral laws and rampant corruption to a liquidity crisis and the forced introduction of the surrogate currency, the bond note (Musarurwa, 2016, pp. 52–54). Displaying the empowering role of social media platforms, especially WhatsApp, Zimbabweans increasingly showed a growing decline in Securitisation measures against protests
are considered necessary for the maintenance of order and stability but they fail to rectify the citizens’grievances.
restraint and risk-averse attitudes as they used the platform and others like Facebook and Twitter to criticise the Robert Mugabe administration (Wigmore-Shepherd, 2016). The 6 July 2016 protests dis- played that deteriorating socio-economic and political conditions inform cyber-activism, which can morph into physical activism with far-reaching consequences for peace and security.
Consistent with securitisation theory, the Mugabe administration considered the citizens’protests and use of social media to raise their grievances as an existential threat to the Zimbabwean state. The perceived threat to the government not only resulted in it partially shutting down the internet, in particular citizens’ access to WhatsApp, but also briefly suspending the carrying out of protests in Harare (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2016, pp. 14–16). The state’s responses were justified by the claim that the protests were violent, evident in the barricading of roads in high-density areas such as Budiriro in Harare, and people were abusing social media through sharing subversive content (ZPP, 2016, pp. 16–17). The gov- ernment, through the Postal and Telecommunications Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ), strongly warned citizens against the generation and sharing of subversive and abusive material on social media.
It also reminded citizens of its capacity to carry out surveillance on the population through the database it generated when it made the registration of sim cards mandatory since 2013 (Chigogo, 2016). The partial internet shutdown was essentially designed
‘to cut off social media services used by protestors to mobilize’(Mare, 2020, p. 4256) and the publi- cising of human rights violations committed by the police (ZPP, 2016, p. 17). The government also responded with violence that resulted in the arrest of over 600 people, including political and social activists, journalists and human rights defenders (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2016, p. 3). The state’s actions were anti-peace and anti-development because they closed opportunities for engagement with citizens through social media. They also displayed increased authoritarian- ism, which worsened instead of addressing the urban populations’grievances. The government’s harsh responses further weakened state-society relations by violating the citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms. These included but were not limited to the freedom to demonstrate and peti- tion and the freedoms of expression, association and assembly.
In the post-Mugabe era, social media again played a significant role in mobilising and coordinating the protests that started on 14 January 2019. Various civil society organisations such as the #ThisFlag of Pastor Mawarire and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions were at the centre of the protests (Mutlokwa, 2020). The protests were triggered by a 150% increase in the price of fuel in the middle of a quickly deteriorating economic environment. The protests turned violent, which clearly dis- turbed other people’s rights. The protesters blockaded roads, established road blocks, and extracted money from motorists by claiming ‘passage fees’. They also vandalised property, pillaged shops and intimidated people in the high-density areas of Harare and Bulawayo, among other major cities and towns. This was done supposedly to reinforce the strike (Amnesty International, 2019; Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission 2019). Businesses losses reached about $300 million (Share, 2019). This turmoil resulted in the government imposing an internet shutdown during the period of the protests apart from a violent military crackdown that left a trail of over 1,803 human rights violations (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2019, p. 3).
The order to shut down the internet was issued by the then Minister of State Security, Owen Ncube, through the Central Intelligence Organisation Director General, Isaac Moyo, using the Interception of Communications Act of 2007 (Veritas, 2019). Some provisions of this Act permit- ted the government to legitimately intercept or monitor data and voice traffic tofight crime and safeguard national security (Mare, 2020, p. 4247). Internet access was restored on 21 January 2019 after the high court ruled that the blackout was unlawful (Kuwaza, 2019).
The government’s harsh responses further weakened state-society relations by violating the citizens’fundamental rights and freedoms.
Social media was used to not only mobilise protests, but also record human rights violations. Thus, the internet shutdown was designed to not only undermine the efforts of labour unions and civil society leaders and other organisers to direct protests. It was also meant to close the spreading of images of state violence against demonstrators to the external world (Amnesty International, 2019, p. 19).
Accordingly, the internet closure of 2019 and related government responses, similar to those of July 2016, violated a number of human rights, especially those related to the internet to access information, share ideas and express oneself. They were counterproductive to peacebuilding and development because they not only closed opportunities for the state to engage with citizens through social media platforms. They also worsened instead of addressing urban populations’grievances further posing a high risk for sustainable peace and development.
Disregarding what motivated the above protests can tempt one to say that the Zimbabwean govern- ment’s use of hard-line military action to bring back law and order was necessary to avoid further loss of life and destruction of property beyond what was experienced. An informant indicated that without such government reaction, the ‘situation could have degenerated into total chaos and anarchy’(Interview C, 2 August 2019). Another informant lamented the violence of the protesters, saying‘when people are exercising their civil and political rights, they should not impinge on the rights of others because this trashes the rule of law’ (Interview H, 4 September 2019). Late in 2019, purporting to prevent a recurrence of the violent protest actions, the police and the courts stopped the MDC Alliance’s planned succession of demonstrations in the main cities and towns countrywide, beginning with a ban on the protest slated for 16 August 2019 in Harare (Ndebele, 2019). Sharing similar sentiments, the Minister of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services, Monica Mutsvangwa, noted that the government shuts down the internet during distur- bances to stop social media platforms from being used ‘to spread propaganda and fake news, which may result in more bloodshed, loss of life, and even genocide’(Herald Reporter, 2022). In fact, in the post-2000 era,
Every effort to demonstrate against or petition the government regarding the deteriorating political and eco- nomic conditions in the country has been framed and interpreted as solely meant to overthrow the govern- ment. As a result, a government heavy hand through the deployment of the security forces awaits all kinds of demonstrations (Interview NB, 14 August 2019).
As indicated by a different informant, under ordinary situations‘the state should take appropriate measures to strike a balance between meeting the demands of protesters’rights to exercise their civil and political liberties and other citizens without interest in the protests’(Interview E, 27 August 2019). As an alterna- tive, the Zimbabwean government gives importance to the need to protect those citizens not partaking in protests and to manage acts of chaos, instead of redressing the condition that incited the protests and uphold the right to demonstrate. The government faces a dilemma in trying to balance the population’s access to the internet at all times and its rights to safety and peace. For Minister Mutsvangwa, if the government fails to shut down the internet in the face of social unrest, it amounts to‘a total act of irre- sponsibility on the part of the State’(Herald Reporter, 2022). Civil society acknowledged that the protests were solely designed to register disgruntlement with the declining economic circumstances where, among other worries, citizens were not able to meet the expense of buying bread, sugar and bus fare to and from work while the government appeared uninterested to address the challenges (Interview G, 29 August 2019). The government’s proclivity to use dictatorial methods exacerbates citizens’objections, with extensive implications for peace and development.
The government’s proclivity to use dictatorial methods exacerbates citizens’ objections, with extensive implications for peace and development.
Many people interviewed noted that the shutting down of the internet and related infringement of civil and political rights citing national security reasons during protests is unjustifiable. For instance, one informant noted that:
The closure of the space for people to exercise their civil and political rights had nothing to do with national security per se but was designed for ulterior motives. It was meant to protect the ruling party. State security in Zimbabwe is intertwined with the continued rule of those in power. ZANU-PF’s insatiable desire to remain in power culminates in the government viewing almost all democratic political activities by other parties as synonymous with them undermining state security. It is difficult for anyone to embark on demo- cratic activities and remain immune to the dictates of state security as defined by ZANU-PF (Interview A, 17 July 2019).
The above quotation clearly exhibits that securitisation processes in Zimbabwe are anchored in safeguarding the status quo. The protesters’incessant demand for the then president Mugabe and now Emmerson Mnangagwa to resign because of their failure to resolve a myriad of the country’s problems was judged by the authorities to represent a key threat (Interview F, 28 August 2019). As one author has observed with reference to the January 2019 protests:‘the[in- ternet] shutdown was an obvious method of political survivalism, where the narrow interests of the ruling elite were placed above those of the general population, whose ability to engage in commercial and economic activity and earn a livelihood was significantly affected’ (Gopaldas, 2019, p. 13).
The Mnangagwa administration, akin to the Mugabe regime before, continues to equate any oppos- ition with foreign-sponsored meddling resulting in it seeking to effectively outlaw dissent to
‘pre-empt regime change’ (Interview DMat, 20 August 2019). Displaying a decolonial posture, Minister Mutsvangwa noted that countries from the Global South need to emulate countries such as China, India and Iran by being ‘standard makers’ rather than just ‘standard takers’ as they catch up with digital technology (Herald Reporter, 2022). The fact that these countries are notorious for implementing various forms of internet shutdowns when they face protests suggests that Zimbabwe follows their modus operandi presumably to avoid digital colonialism. In this context, digital colonialism refers to the use of digital technology by powerful countries such as the United States of America for imperial control of the socio-economic and political life of devel- oping countries (Kwet, 2019).
To prevent both digital colonialism and the use of social media in mobilising and directing protests as in July 2016 and January 2019, the government enacted the Data Protection Act in 2021. The Act began as the Cyber Crime, Cyber Security and Data Protection Bill and was passed by the cabinet in 2019 designed to, among other things, strengthen the government’s hand in snooping on any private communication (Karombo, 2019). This Act, which changed some sections of the Interception of Communications Act, the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act and the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform Act), deals with data protection issues. However, it is more concerned with the political ramifications of social media in which it mainly focuses on cybercrime in relation to national security (MISA Zimbabwe, 2021). Consequently, the govern- ment’s inclination to close the internet results in pro-peace and development opportunities such as meaningful dialogue, reaching many people and hearing more voices offered by social media being missed. Securitisation of the right to protest negates peace and development because chances for constructive engagement are lost.
Embracing Technology as a Vehicle for Peacebuilding in Zimbabwe The securitisation of protests and protesters’use of social media in Zimbabwe adversely affects peace and development. This section explains how best the Harare administration can stop blaming digital technology, especially social media platforms, for anti-government protests. It suggests two key ways in which the government should use digital technology to turn around state-society relations as it offers broader policy engagement opportunities thus minimising protests by disgruntled citizens.
First, the Zimbabwean government can mobilise resources for the establishment of an early warning system that will, among other sources, rely mainly on social media platforms to gather citizens’ needs and grievances, analyse the data and use it to support decisions inclined to result in the allocation of adequate resources to address the citizens’problems before they culminate in protests. In sync with the literature on ICT for peace (e.g. Kahl & Puig Larrauri, 2013; LeFebvre, 2016; Spillane, 2015), the potential of a similar early warning system has been proffered by Senekal and Kotzé (2019) using the case of South Africa. The responsible use of the data gathered from the WhatsApp platform has the cap- acity to help improve service delivery. It forestalls mass violence when the government fulfils citizens’ demands before the outbreak of protests. Improved social service delivery reduces chances of conflict through promoting ‘social cohesion, inclusive development and peaceful communities’(McCandless
& Rogan, 2013, p. 1). The goal is to end the anti-peace and anti-development consequences such as unnecessary human rights violations and economic losses that always accompany protests in Zimbabwe.
The Zimbabwean government is not really divorced from the digital world though its interaction with citizens on social media platforms has not resulted in the improvement of service delivery. The govern- ment has made an effort to move towards e-government. Government departments and ministries, espe- cially the Ministry of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services, mainly use social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp to communicate and clarify some government policy positions and actions (Mugari & Chisuvi, 2021, p. 93). More so, ZANU-PF-affiliated groups of social media trolls and supporters such asVarakashi(destroyers) are also present online (Tshuma et al., 2022). Thus, Zimbabwe already has the capacity to carry out surveillance on its citizens as evi- denced by the quick response in arresting critical voices (Mutlokwa, 2020). The government has seldom used information gathered online for the improvement of people’s lives. Among the reasons why the government fails to address the issues raised by the citizens include a combination of corruption, inept leadership, lack of funding and authoritarianism driven by the militarisation of politics (Ndawana, 2020). Both government and party officials, as well as groups, are preoccupied with using online spaces to defend the ruling party’s programmes and interests at any cost (Tshuma et al., 2022). The government needs to put to good use its access to new technologies sourced from Chinese companies such as CloudWalk Technology to enable and strengthen its surveillance of citizens (Feldstein, 2019, pp. 40– 41). The government must stop using its access to new technology to suppress the citizens (see Munoriyarwa, 2022). The ZANU-PF government also fails to address citizens’concerns because it con- siders critical viewpoints raised by citizens, civil society organisations and opposition political parties via social media platforms as primarily designed to serve neo-colonial interests and overthrowing it.
Putting an end to the reasons behind the government’s lack of response to the problems facing the citi- zens and opening their access to social media platforms to promote constructive engagement for improved policymaking can go a long way in promoting peace and development in Zimbabwe. It is true that this may not necessarily be in the ZANU-PF government’s interest. There is a need for a radical transformation of the Zimbabwean state from securisation politics to desecuritisation.
Desecuritisation politics is likely to result in the data harvested from social media before or during protests in Zimbabwe being responsibly used by various government departments. This is because it allows normal and democratic ways of handling protests and related developments. Thus, the
Zimbabwean government should prioritise having the ability to mine social media activities to get insights for a better quality of services across all policy areas.
Lastly, embracing digital technology can broaden policy engagement platforms resulting in improved policy formulation, development and direction critical for the implementation of peace and development initiatives. Through engaging social media, the government is in a position to reach more urban-based people and hear more voices to gather their aspirations and communicate the practical steps it will take to redress the situation before or during the outbreak of protests. The government needs to build citizens’ trust through what it communicates via the media. As in Australia, Canada and the United States of America (Schneider, 2016), the government agencies such as the police can successfully use social media platforms to counter anti-government protest messages. To overcome some of the challenges that can stand in the way of new technologies to work for peace in Zimbabwe where 10.2% (1.55 million) Zimbabweans use social media compared to 13.64 million (89.7%) with mobile phones (Datareportal, 2022), the government should also target using the most available platforms to the broader citizenry. Apart from social media plat- forms, the government can also use the short message service (SMS) to spread peace messages coupled with a clear plan of action outlining what the government can be intending to do regarding the citizens’ grievances and concerns. Sustainable peace and development can only be achieved when the government avoids simply spreading propa- ganda, but genuinely engages the citizens to improve their situation. The enforcement of laws such as the Data Protection Act to deal with disinformation and the posting of polarising content would appear legitimate to the citizens when it solely targets those who really abuse social media and related rights.
As Mugari and Chisuvi (2021, p. 96) have observed, when government agencies and officials often engage with citizens via social media and providing citizens with vital and accurate information, a pen- chant to violent action is reduced. It will also expedite the calming of the nerves of the citizens in the event that violent protests occur. The use of different media platforms accessible to the citizenry will ensure that the government’s messages about the need for peace and programme of action to deal with the citizens’grievances reach as many people as possible and overwhelm those mobilising for anti-government protests. Shutting down the internet during major anti-government protests as in 2016 and 2019 is counter- productive to peacebuilding and development initiatives that can be propagated through social media.
Shutting down the internet not only worsened the country’s poor record of tolerance of citizens’civic and political rights. It also prevented security agencies from easily accessing open-source intelligence whose significance for both peace and development work in the digital era cannot be overemphasised.
Conclusion
This article augments previous works that mainly focused on the role of social media in protests and violent government responses without focusing on how social media can be beneficial for peace in Zimbabwe.
Informed by securitisation theory, the article reveals that healthier state-society relations can be built only if both the government and citizens use social media for constructive engagement. State-centred con- ceptions of security that privilege maintaining the status quo and elite interests undermine citizens’peace- building and development work through social media platforms. Securitisation of the right to protest in Harare was counterproductive to peace and development because it negatively affected the political and socio-economic rights of Zimbabweans by closing opportunities for engagement. Governments that Sustainable peace and development can
only be achieved when the government avoids simply spreading propaganda, but genuinely engages the citizens to improve their situation.
leverage on the opportunities presented by digital technology, especially social media platforms, such as reaching more people with critical information and hearing many voices on social, economic and political development issues are likely to have meaningful dialogue with their citizens. This allows them to prioritise the interests and aspirations of the citizens with positive implications on peacebuilding and development.
Still, responsible use of social media platforms by citizens, opposition political parties and civil society orga- nisations is also required. When social media is used to encourage protests, which ultimately turn violent, it is obvious that a semi-authoritarian state, as in Zimbabwe, promptly resorts to its coercive state apparatus with far-reaching negative consequences for peace and development.
Governments, including in Zimbabwe, need to realise that it is foolhardy, anti-peace and anti- development for them to continue solely blaming digital technology for anti-government protests when they are not addressing citizens’grievances. Protests have become almost a perennial challenge in Zimbabwe due to the citizens’need to have different services that are in short supply. Social media platforms are simply mobilising tools and should not be blamed for protests whose primary causes rest in deteriorating socio-economic and political conditions. The government should use social media to gather citizens’ grievances and address them in a timely manner before the outbreak of protests.
Social service delivery should be a priority of every government to reduce chances of conflict and promote all-round development, social cohesion and ultimately harmonious societies. In the event that protests have occurred, the government should notfind it convenient to shut down the inter- net. It must sincerely communicate the short and long term measures it will be putting in place to address the citizens’ concerns. This is likely to enable the government to build trust with the citi- zens when they accept what the government com- municates through the media. The Zimbabwean state needs a radical transformation from its current authoritarian disposition and related use of propa- ganda, and at times, misinformation to adopt an attitude of engagement with its citizens. Overall, the militarisation of protests is hostile to peacebuilding and development.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received nofinancial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Notes
1. The Copenhagen School of critical security studies was developed through the work of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever together with their colleagues at or with a connection to the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute.
2. The MDC split several times (2005, 2014 and 2018) since its formation but in this paper the term MDC is used for consistency’s sake to refer to the main faction that remained vibrant with the founding leader, Morgan Tsvangirai until his death in mid-February 2018. He was succeeded by Nelson Chamisa who contested the 2018 elections under the MDC Alliance banner. Chamisa formed the Citizens Coalition for Change in January 2022 following the usurpation of both the MDC names by a faction led by Douglas Mwonzora. As a result, where the various factions are mentioned an effort is made to distinguish them.
Social media platforms are simply
mobilising tools and should not be blamed for protests whose primary causes rest in deteriorating socio-economic and political conditions.
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Author Biography
Enock Ndawanais a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Johannesburg’s Faculty of Humanities.
His research focuses on African security, human security, gender and conflict, conflict resolution and transformation.
