BASUTOLAND IN TRANSITION
PATRICK DUNCAN
A former Judicial Commissioner in Basutoland.
Now Editor ofliContact," a South African liberal periodical.
ON Thursday, 18 December, 19£8, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Lord Home, made a state- ment in the House of Lords announcing that "agreement has been reached on all the essential features of a new Constitution with the object of placing more power and greater responsibility in the hands of the Basuto nation/5 This agreement was
"largely based5' on a Report, 4<a historic document in the rela- tions between55 the British Government and the Basuto nation.
The Report was a product of the Basuto people themselves, worked out by their own National Council, in consultation with a South African jurist, Professor Denis V. Cowen, of Cape Town University.
The Secretary of State said that " i n accordance with the proposals in the Report, 1 intend to recommend to Her Majesty, the Queen that, subject to certain legislative and reserve powers remaining with the High Commissioner, the Constitution should establish a Legislative Council for Basutoland. . . . This Council would be given power to legislate for all persons in Basutoland and would have the right in addition to discuss those matters which remain in the High Commissioner's legislative sphere.
Its financial powers would include the right to vote the estimates on Council matters and to discuss those relating to the High Commissioner's matters. . . .
"There would be an Executive Council, established broadlv along the lines of the Report, comprising four unofficial members and four official members, of whom one would be the Resident Commissioner who would preside.
"Both delegations are satisfied that the best solution is to establish a single roll for Basuto and non-Basuto British sub-
o
jects. . . .
The astonishing thing about this Report is that it is an African document. It is true that in the drafting of it the Basuto had the very great assistance of a most gifted South African, Professor Cowen. But the initiative for the writing of it was purely Basuto, emanating from a resolution of the National Council.
The choice of Professor Cowen was a choice of the Basuto;
u
A F R I C A S O tl T Hall expenses involved w e r e found by t h e Basuto from their National Treasury, A n d C o m m i t t e e s of t h e Basuto National Council w e r e responsible for every stage in t h e progress of the R e p o r t ,
T h e local British Administration had little t o do with the drafting of t h e d o c u m e n t . O n each C o m m i t t e e t h e r e sat one representative of t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Each representative was probably t h e m o s t sympathetic and tactful m a n available. Each was an e x p e r i e n c e d a d m i n i s t r a t o r . N e i t h e r quality helped with t h e initiating of ideas, b u t b o t h did t h e essential j o b of keeping t h e C o m m i t t e e s ' v i e w and that of t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n close t o g e t h e r . Clearly, t h e Administration has changed its policy radically during t h e past t w o years, and t h e people have suc- ceeded, at last, in getting w h a t they have b e e n busy demanding for some eighty years.
C h a p t e r 2 of t h e R e p o r t is entitled " H i s t o r i c a l I n t r o d u c t i o n / ' and is an admirable s h o r t conspectus of events from 1868, 90 years ago, w h e n Basutoland first b e c a m e British territory.
T h e R e p o r t divides these years into t h r e e p e r i o d s : (1) 1 8 6 8 - 1 9 1 0 , o r t h e formative p e r i o d ;
(2) 1 9 1 0 - 1 9 3 8 , o r p e r i o d of e c o n o m i c and social changes;
(3) 1938-19SS> o r period in w h i c h successive attempts at administrative reform t o o k place.
Shortly after annexing Basutoland in 1 8 6 8 , t h e British Govern- m e n t handed i t over t o t h e Parliament of t h e Cape Colony.
And, in accordance w i t h its general policy, t h e Cape attempted progressively t o substitute " t h e jurisdiction of Magistrates for t h a t of t h e C h i e f s / ' as Lord Hailey has phrased it.
This policy was n o t acceptable t o t h e Basuto, and t h e regula- tions passed t o i m p l e m e n t it p r o v e d to be u n w o r k a b l e . Its failure was m a d e plain in t h e G u n W a r of 1 8 8 1 , and t h e Cape asked Britain In 1883 t o take t h e t e r r i t o r y back and administer It itself. This was d o n e , and t h e foundation was laid for the p r e s e n t division b e t w e e n t h e U n i o n and t h e High Commission T e r r i t o r i e s .
Britain reversed t h e Cape policy of d i r e c t magisterial govern- m e n t , and laid d o w n a n e w policy. Lagden r e c o r d s that the instructions t o Colonel (Sir) Marshall Clarke, t h e first Resident C o m m i s s i o n e r , w e r e brief:
" H e r Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t w e r e of o p i n i o n t h a t nothing m o r e c o u l d b e a t t e m p t e d at first than t h e p r o t e c t i o n of life and p r o p e r t y and t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of o r d e r o n t h e b o r d e r ;
B A S LI T O L A N D I N T R A N S I T I O N 5?
but the Basuto w e r e to be encouraged to establish internal self-government sufficient to repress c r i m e and settle any tribal d i s p u t e s /1 1
These instructions w e r e faithfully carried o u t in t h e beginning, and easy-going relations existed b e t w e e n t h e British and t h e Basuto. T h e first Resident Commissioners h o n o u r e d Moshoeshoe's r e q u e s t ,
" t h a t the Q u e e n should send a man to live w i t h m e w h o will be her ear and eye and also h e r hand t o w o r k with m e in political m a t t e r s . . . . T h e Q u e e n rules my p e o p l e only through m e . T h e man w h o m I ask from t h e Q u e e n to live with me will guide and direct m e . . . . W h e n t h e agent and I agree as to what is right I shall carry it o u t /5
But for many reasons t h e s e t t l e m e n t , though admirably wise at the t i m e , did n o t have sufficient flexibility. It e n t r e n c h e d the chiefs, who b e c a m e secure in t h e i r rights and tended to neglect t h e welfare of t h e p e o p l e . It offered t h e progressive Basuto little possibility of influencing t h e i r o w n c o u n t r y . Accordingly, after a b o u t 1920, the signs began to multiply that the system had outlived its m a x i m u m usefulness. A " B a s u t o - land Progressive A s s o c i a t i o n " sprang u p , to r e p r e s e n t t h e up- and-coming m i d d l e classes. T h e " L e k h o t l a la Bafo" (League of Commoners) arose u n d e r t h e able leadership of t h e p r o p h e t - like Josiel Lefela, which sought to end British influence in Basutoland, and to r e u n i t e chiefs and p e o p l e , w h o , they said, had been p a r t e d by t h e British.
The British noticed these signs, and occasionally t r i e d to patch the system. In t h e ' t w e n t i e s they t r i e d to r e f o r m t h e courts system. T h e chiefs of those days financed themselves largely from c o u r t fines, and they opposed any idea of r e f o r m , and so this a t t e m p t failed. In 1938 t h e Colonial E m p i r e was sold on the idea of " i n d i r e c t r u l e " , i . e . , t h a t g o v e r n m e n t could continue for a long p e r i o d t h r o u g h t h e chiefs—-and in 1938 the British Administration i n t r o d u c e d reforms to t h e Basuto court system and t r i e d (most unsuccessfully) t o tabulate and regulate t h e chieftainship. Still, little had b e e n d o n e to make, a place for t h e rising m i d d l e classes, and in 1946 a further attempt was made t o settle dissatisfaction. A " N a t i o n a l Treasury" was set up t o finance t h e chieftainship and t h e c o u r t system. But t h e r o o t of t h e m a t t e r had n o t b e e n t o u c h e d ,
1 "The Basutos" page 560.
2 uThe Basutos" page 3 1 ^ .
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A F R I C A S O U T tWhat was necessary was for the rising middle-classes and literate people to be brought into the machinery of government; foi the people's voice to be heard there; and for the way to be opened for the Basuto to enter the modern world as equals, The earlier reforms had not really touched these essentials, and dissatisfaction persisted.
Then, in January, 19^3, occurred an important event. Under the Presidency of Mr. Ntsu C. Mokhehle, the Basutoland African Congress was set up. It collected the sort of people who had been left out by the earlier settlements. Under its wing a small group began to produce a monthly journal called 'Mohlabani*
(the warrior). Its editor, Mr. B. M. Khaketla, was and is a close friend of Mr. Mokhehle, and it had instantaneous and devastating effects. It slated government officials for their sins of omission and commission. I can testify to the shocked trauma suffered by the small white community of Maseru when it appeared. Accustomed to learning from their Basuto inter- preters that they were angels of light rescuing the Basuto from indigenous darkness, they discovered from l Mohlaham that they were regarded as obstacles to the Basuto in the struggle for freedom and equality. They also read of the unmentionable—
how Mr. A. of the Agricultural Department had sworn at a teacher; how Mr. B. had used government transport to attend a polo match; how Bishop C. had written to his flock; and how Trader D. had done down his customers. Basutoland has never been the same since.
The Administration was shocked, but did not react with prison camps, and set up only a small Special Branch. Its composition is reported in the latest (19^7) Annual Report as follows: "This Branch is commanded by an Assistant Superin- tendent of Police, and the establishment consists of one Staff Sergeant, two Corporals, ten Troopers and one Lady Clerk."
What they did do was to invite an ex-Governor-General of Ceylon, Sir Henry Moore, to head a committee to make recom- mendations for a new establishment that would satisfy more of the Basuto.
Although at this time I wras no longer in the service, the think- ing of the Administration was clear for me, or for anyone else, to see. Britain believed that if it gave the Basuto real local government but kept the central government under its own close control, enough Basuto would either be satisfied or em- ployed for the tide of criticism to ebb. This thinking was
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clearly reflected in the Moore Report, which was indeed written in close collaboration with the Administration.
But the Basuto are canny, and the report unleashed a tre- mendous volume of criticism. For months the debate raged.
The Administration was assured by its interpreters that the criticism was the work of "just a few agitators"; the people, so they assured their employers, would vote for the Moore Report.
This did not happen, and the Report was rejected almost unanimously by the National Council in i9££.
A year later, the Administration surrendered and agreed to set up the Committees responsible for the latest Report and Constitutional proposals.
The balance of power is now with the Basuto. Although in the Constitution there is a division between ''Council matters" and "High Commissioner's matters", this division is more apparent than real, for the High Commissioner will be obliged to consult the Council on all matters, including those reserved for his own decision. Now, with the powers of the Council increased to the extent that they have been, this con- sultation will, in practice, give the Council a practical veto over the "High Commissioner's matters." This has been shown by the manner in which the British have never inter- fered in Southern Rhodesia, although they were specifically given the right to do so in the 'twenties. It has also been shown by the manner in which even in the past the Basuto land Council, although in name merely advisory, has been able to prevent the passing of legislation of which it did not approve.
This is a fact of immense importance to the Basuto, who will now have the responsibility of making the new Constitution work. It will call for the highest degree of enthusiasm, efficiency and responsibility. My view is that the necessary men and qualities will be forthcoming, even if some of the able Basuto now in the Union have to return home to help. But if they are to succeed, they will have to maintain unity and build strength.
It is also a fact of importance to the Union and other Southern African States. For many are the "Native Reserves" south of the Zambesi. In each there will be responsible men watching the Basuto experiment. The Swazis and Bechuana can be expected to follow suit in the near future.
For how long can the structure of white supremacy continue intact under pressures like these?
